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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
After the 1997 financial crisis electricity supply industry (ESI) restructuring and 
privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in this industry were included in the 
Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform.  
Considering the extent of debate over privatisation, restructuring and regulation of 
the ESI in Thailand in recent years there was a surprising lack of rigorous economic 
analyses and studies. This thesis aims to fill that gap. 
Part I of this thesis highlights the economic and political background material on: the 
SOE sector; reform and privatisation of SOEs; SOEs, restructuring and regulation in 
the ESI in Thailand.  
Then, in Part II, the theoretical and empirical literature on privatisation, natural 
monopoly and economic regulation along with regulation in practice, is drawn upon 
to create framework for analyses in Part III. In addition, characteristics of developing 
countries are discussed to explore an appropriate choice of regulatory regimes in 
Thailand. 
In Part III analyses of regulation and privatisation in ESI in Thailand are presented. 
Regulatory, efficiency and fiscal issues are examined.  
The major finding from the regulatory analysis is that, due to poor regulatory 
capacity, a specialised, separated and centralised form of regulatory body for ESI is 
recommended for Thailand. A high powered incentive regulatory regime, in the form 
of a revenue cap, is recommended for electricity transmission and distribution.  
In addition, this analysis demonstrates that the adoption of regulatory finance from 
developed countries with well developed capital and equity markets needs some 
modifications to fit with Thailand, which is characterised by poor accounting and 
auditing systems and weakly functioning capital and equity markets. The problem of 
lack of data and asymmetric information faced by the regulator in Thailand is more 
severe than in developed countries. 
Then this thesis examines the empirical analyses for the two widely claimed 
justifications for privatisation: efficiency improvement and fiscal benefit. 
In the efficiency analysis, measures of the technical efficiency of the electricity 
generation sector in Thailand are estimated by employing a comparative application 
of Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis approaches. Results 
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show that the state owned, electricity generating company in Thailand is on the 
efficiency frontier, meaning that the expected efficiency improvement after it 
privatisation is unlikely to happen. 
Then a fiscal analysis is undertaken to evaluate fiscal net benefits of full privatisation 
in form of asset sales of all SOEs in ESI. This analysis employed a bottom-up 
valuation approach, taking issues in the public sector into account, to assess fiscal 
costs (retention of SOEs) and benefits (sale of SOEs) of privatisation.  
Full privatisation of Thai state owned, electricity generation company results in fiscal 
net benefits only when ESI restructuring and deregulation of wholesale electricity 
market are well established. Under revenue cap regulation, full privatisation of the 
regulated distribution monopolies is fiscally feasible only when they are privatised at 
very high sale price or privatised firms achieve very high annual costs reductions and 
operate much more efficiently than under public ownership. 
In summary, ESI restructuring and adoption of a regulatory regime, form and finance 
from developed countries has to be undertaken with care and modified in light of 
Thai characteristics and economy. ESI reform requires proper sequencing.  Building 
up regulatory capacity and designing effective and practical regulatory regimes are 
required to achieve effective regulation in Thailand. ESI has to be restructured to 
introduce competition, and regulation has to be in place to ensure fair competition 
and to regulate natural monopoly activities before privatisation should be considered. 
In view of the limited benefits of privatisation, alternative policies that can achieve 
the objectives of privatisation without transfer of ownership should be considered. 
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 Part I 
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Synopsis I 
 
The main objective of Part I is to present economic and political background material 
on: the state owned enterprise (SOE) sector; reform and privatisation of state 
enterprises; and restructuring and regulation in the electricity supply industry (ESI) 
in Thailand. This background material contributes to an understanding of the 
characteristics and performance of SOEs and government policies on state enterprise 
reform. Such an understanding will be helpful in interpreting the empirical results 
presented in Part III. 
State enterprise reform in Thailand has been undertaken since the 1960s. This thesis 
focuses on developments after the 1997 financial crisis, following which the Master 
Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform (Master Plan) was approved.  
According to the Master Plan, state enterprise reform and privatisation will be 
implemented cohesively with regulatory reform and industry restructuring. The 
Master Plan covers four main utilities: energy, telecommunication, transportation and 
water, among which electricity supply industry restructuring is at the centre of debate 
and public concern. Economic and political issues related to public sector reform in 
Thailand subsequent to the approval of the Master Plan are discussed. 
SOEs operate in a number of industries with different characteristics. As the focus of 
this thesis is on SOEs in the ESI, an understanding of the characteristics and 
performance of these enterprises, their structure and restructuring, and their 
regulation is needed.  
In Chapter 2, background information on SOEs and the history and progress of 
privatisation in Thailand, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis, is presented. 
Economic and political effects on progress in privatisation are also discussed.  
Chapter 3 presents more detailed information on SOEs in the ESI together with 
industry structure and regulation.  
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Due to the natural monopoly nature of this industry, industry restructuring with 
regulatory reform is required before reform of state enterprises. To reflect this, ESI 
restructuring plans will be presented chronologically together with SOE reform and 
the regulatory plan. 
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 Chapter 1 
  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the thesis 
State owned enterprise (SOE) reform, particularly in the form of privatisation has 
been on the economic policy and political agenda, in Thailand since the 1960s. 
However, until the late 1990s, the pace of reform was slow because of both 
economic and political reasons. Due to high economic growth in the 1980s the 
government was not under much pressure to improve its performance. In addition, 
any attempts at privatisation were strongly opposed by bureaucrats, the labour unions 
of SOEs, and the public. Privatisation policy is politically unpopular. 
After the 1997 financial crisis, SOE reform in Thailand recommenced, and the 
Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform was drawn up and approved. The 
Master Plan covers main utilities industries: energy, telecommunication, 
transportation and water. Among these utilities, electricity supply industry (ESI) 
restructuring is at the centre of debate and public concern.  
Electricity is essential to the consumption and production of goods and services, and 
thus vital to the public interest in a modern economy. Reliable electricity systems are 
needed. A sufficient supply of reliable and competitively priced electricity is 
essential for modernisation, domestic growth, and international competitiveness.  
Moreover views on the optimal ownership and regulation on ESI have changed over 
the past decade, hence ESI restructuring toward a more competitive and transparent 
model has been introduced worldwide. 
The ESI has special characteristics. It consists of two kinds of activities: natural 
monopoly (transmission and distribution) and competitive activities (generation). 
These activities can be operated in either vertically integrated or disintegrated 
enterprises under either public or private ownership and subject to regulation. 
In Thailand the ESI is a vertically integrated monopoly under public ownership. 
Three state owned enterprises: the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT), the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) and the Provincial Electricity 
Authority (PEA) are responsible for these activities.  
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EGAT is the dominant generator and sole transmission operator, while MEA and 
PEA are monopoly distributors and retailers in their jurisdiction areas. With these 
characteristics, it is necessary to consider restructuring and reform as a package 
which may involve both restructuring of the industry and changes from public to 
private ownership 
1.2 Scope and objectives of the thesis 
Evaluation of ESI restructuring and SOEs reform in ESI is a complicated issue.  
To complete such an evaluation it is necessary to examine issues including the 
optimal regulation of monopoly infrastructure, the potential for improvements in 
technical and allocative efficiency and the costs and benefits of privatisation. A 
comprehensive and integrated assessment of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
study. Instead a number of specific issues will be isolated and analysed. 
With or without ESI restructuring and under either public or private ownership 
regulation is needed for the natural monopoly activities of transmission and 
distribution.  
Regulation is required particularly after ESI restructuring and privatisation of SOEs. 
The question is related to which regulatory regime and form that has been pioneered 
and employed by regulators in developed countries, should Thailand adopt, and what 
will be the problems in the implementation of the regulation that need to be 
addressed. 
State enterprise reform in the form of privatisation is implemented for various 
objectives.  
Two of the objectives, which are widely argued in favour of privatisation, are 
efficiency improvement and fiscal benefit. Analysis of these justifications in the 
context of SOEs in the ESI in Thailand will be addressed separately. Although there 
are political factors that push privatisation forward, this thesis does not cover a 
political analysis of privatisation.  
1.2.1 Objectives of the thesis 
The main objective of this thesis is to economically analyse regulation and 
privatisation in the ESI in Thailand.  
This thesis has specific objectives as follows: 
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1. To explore the appropriate design of a regulatory institution and regulatory regime 
and form for electricity activities characterised by natural monopoly: transmission 
and distribution; 
2. To examine issues of regulatory finance in electricity distribution in light of 
specific characteristics of Thailand as a developing economy; 
3. To evaluate operating efficiency of an electricity generating enterprise in order to 
test the hypothesis that under public ownership the enterprise is inefficient and 
privatisation is justified; and  
4. To assess fiscal effects of full privatisation of all SOEs in the ESI.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
There are three parts in the thesis as shown in Figure 1.1.  
The thesis starts with Part I highlighting the economic and political background of 
SOEs in general and in ESI in Thailand in particular.  
To analyse regulation and privatisation in ESI in Thailand, various theoretical 
frameworks are required and then are assembled in Part II. The author places Part I 
on the economic and political background of Thailand, ahead of Part II, on 
theoretical framework, in order to explain issues in Thailand and explore later which 
theoretical framework is needed to analyse these issues. The final part of thesis is 
Part III, which aims to employs the theoretical frameworks drawn in Part II for 
analysis of regulation and privatisation in Thailand that was the focus of Part I. 
This thesis is presented in 10 chapters. The first and last chapters are the introduction 
and conclusion of the thesis. 
Description of each part and constituent chapters are presented as following. 
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Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis 
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1.3.1 Part I: Economic and political background 
The main objective of Part I is to present economic and political background material 
on: the SOE sector in Thailand; reform and privatisation of state enterprises; and 
restructuring and regulation in the ESI in Thailand. This is designed to create 
understanding of the characteristics and performance of SOEs and government 
policies on state enterprise reform, which will form the basis for analyses in Part III.  
Chapter 2 describes the SOE sector in Thailand and the history and progress of 
privatisation in Thailand, particularly after the financial crisis in 1997. Financial and 
operating performance of SOEs is provided, along with state enterprise reform 
together with the economic and political factors leading to privatisation. With similar 
characteristics of SOEs, though with different characteristics of industry, this chapter 
provides an insight into the rationale for and performance of enterprises under public 
ownership. 
Chapter 3 covers specific characteristics of the ESI in Thailand including regulation 
and restructuring; the privatisation plan; and progress since the announcement of the 
plan. It provides a background to the current structure, regulatory body and 
regulation, tariff structure and ESI restructuring and privatisation plan and progress. 
This provides the foundation for the economic analyses of regulation and 
privatisation in Part III. 
1.3.2 Part II: Surveys of literature 
Part II is a review of the literature on privatisation and regulation which provides a 
theoretical framework for the empirical analyses in Part III. Part II consists of 
Chapter 4 to 6. 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on privatisation in both developed and developing 
countries. Definitions of privatisation are discussed and transactional methods of 
privatisation in both developed and developing countries are briefly explained. 
Theories of privatisation are briefly explored, along with the objectives of 
privatisation. Then costs and benefits of privatisation to different economic agents 
along with empirical studies to investigate the costs and benefits of privatisation on 
various economic variables are reviewed. 
Chapter 5 explores the concept of natural monopoly; why regulation is needed for 
natural monopoly; how regulation should be designed to maximise social welfare 
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with and without the problem of asymmetric information between regulator and 
regulated firms; and how interest groups affect choice of regulation.  
In Chapter 6, rate-of-return (ROR) and incentive regulatory regimes, and their 
variations adopted by developed countries, will be discussed together with criticisms 
and limitations. There has been significant convergence in practice between ROR 
and incentive regulation, specifically in term of required financial data. 
Then Chapter 6 aims to determine the regulatory, financial elements of both ROR 
and incentive regulation in electricity transmission and distribution. As revenue 
requirement is a common and important variable in both types of regulation, this 
chapter will discuss the financial issues used to determine revenue requirement, 
based on practice in developed countries with well developed and functioning capital 
market. 
The main question is whether regulations that were pioneered, developed and 
adopted by developed countries can function efficiently and effectively in developing 
countries or not. Chapter 6 also explores the specific characteristics of developing 
countries, which affects the choice of regulatory regimes, and explores appropriate 
choice in economic regulation of natural monopolies for developing countries in the 
light of these characteristics. 
1.3.3 Part III: Economic analyses of regulation and privatisation 
Part III consists of economic analyses of regulation and privatisation in ESI in 
Thailand. 
In Part III the theoretical framework drawn in Part II will be employed to analyse 
regulation and privatisation in Thailand as presented in Part I. The relationship 
between empirical analysis, theoretical frameworks and policy application is 
presented in more detail in Figure 1.1. 
The regulatory analysis in Chapter 7 explores the regulatory institutions and regimes 
(discussed in Chapter 6) for electricity activities characterised by natural monopoly: 
electricity transmission and distribution (discussed in Chapter 5). The chapter also 
examines issues of regulatory finance in light of specific characteristics of 
developing countries (discussed in Chapter 6). The main focus is on the building 
block approach, where allowable prices are determined by an examination of the 
capital base, rate of return, depreciation, noncapital cost and price index-X 
adjustment mechanism for revenue requirement estimation. 
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One of the major objectives of reform and restructuring in electricity supply industry 
is the achievement of improvements in operating efficiency (discussed in Chapter 3). 
Given that it is difficult to derive internationally comparable measures of operating 
efficiency for distribution and transmission enterprises, attention is focused on the 
generation enterprise, EGAT. 
The efficiency analysis in Chapter 8 aims to evaluate the efficiency of EGAT under 
public ownership, through testing the hypothesis of whether under public ownership 
enterprise is relatively inefficient as claimed by proponents of privatisation 
(discussed in Chapter 4). The technical efficiency of EGAT in Thailand is measured 
by employing both a comparative application of the Data Envelopment Analysis and 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis and employing power plant and electricity supplier data 
sets during the 1990s. 
Another justification for state enterprise reform is the fiscal benefits (discussed in 
Chapter 4). In Chapter 9, a fiscal analysis is undertaken to evaluate the fiscal effects 
of full privatisation on SOEs in the Thai electricity supply industry: EGAT, MEA 
and PEA.  
The central technique, as discussed in Chapter 4, is to assess the value of the 
enterprises in continued public ownership. This analysis yields a ‘break-even’ sale 
price, demonstrating that privatisation will improve the government’s fiscal position 
if the sale price exceeds the break-even price, holding other variables, such as 
regulated prices and revenues, constant. 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis makes several original contributions to the existing literature on 
regulation and privatisation. 
The regulatory analysis in Chapter 7 is the first to discuss regulatory finance in the 
light of characteristics of the Thai electricity distribution sector. The contribution is 
in two parts.  
First, the optimal form of regulation is considered, taking into account the problems 
of data inadequacy and imperfection as well as weakly functioning capital and equity 
market in Thailand.  
Second, estimates of weighted average cost of capital and revenue cap for regulatory 
purposes are made for the first time. 
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Privatisation of SOEs has been the subject of extensive debate in Thailand since the 
1997 financial crisis, but there has been little formal economic analysis. Many 
assumptions in the debate have not been subject to rigorous analysis. 
In particular, while the efficiency argument for privatisation in SOEs in Thailand has 
been widely accepted, there has been no empirical analysis conducted to support the 
argument. The efficiency analysis in Chapter 8 is the first attempt to estimate the 
technical efficiency of EGAT and EGAT’s power plants employing the standard 
techniques of Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. 
Finally, although fiscal benefits are often mentioned as a benefit from privatisation, 
there is no study with an emphasis on a fiscal assessment of SOEs in Thailand. The 
fiscal analyses of SOEs in the ESI in Thailand in Chapter 9 are the first work to 
address this issue. 
1.5 Paper arising from the thesis 
Sirasoontorn, P., 2004. Measurement and comparison of technical efficiency: 
evidence of Thai and international electricity generation, Paper presented at 
the International Conference Electric Supply Industry in Transition: Issues 
and Prospects for Asia, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, 14-16 
January. 
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 Chapter 2 
  
 STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES AND  
 PRIVATISATION IN THAILAND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Thailand state owned enterprises (SOEs) in various sectors have been established 
since the 1960s to achieve multiple economic and political goals. Meanwhile private 
sector production and participation in sectors dominated by SOEs has been 
promoted, one method being privatisation. Since then privatisation has been a feature 
of economic policy and the political agenda. Economic and political justifications for 
privatisation in Thailand are various, for example, to promote competition, to 
increase efficiency and to reduce public debt. They also change from time to time, 
being affected by both internal and external economic and political forces.  
After the financial crisis in 1997 privatisation plans were reawakened and the Master 
Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform (Master Plan) was set up, however 
privatisation plans since then have not been achieved successfully owing to political 
factors. 
This chapter aims to set up the background of SOEs and the history and progress of 
privatisation in Thailand, particularly after the financial crisis in 1997. These 
backgrounds are useful to provide a broad picture of SOEs and privatisation in 
Thailand, which will be narrowed down into SOEs in the electricity supply industry 
in the next chapter. With the similar characteristics of SOEs, though different 
characteristics of industry, this chapter provides an insight into the rationale for and 
performance of enterprises under public ownership. 
In Section 2.2 a definition and evaluation of the financial performance of SOEs will 
be presented. In Section 2.3 a brief history of privatisation in Thailand since the 
1960s, followed by factors leading to privatisation, particularly the role of 
international organisations during the financial crisis in Section 2.4 will be explored. 
In Section 2.5 details of the Master plan initiated in 1998 as the central plan of 
privatisation will be discussed. In Section 2.6 two periods of progress in privatisation 
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in Thailand divided by government administration: the Chuan and Thaksin 
government, together with political factors affecting progress in each period will be 
discussed. In Section 2.7 a summary of the chapter is provided. 
2.2 State owned enterprises in Thailand  
Before the 1960s Thai economy was mainly agricultural with a relatively small 
industrial sector.  
With a limited private sector, the government had a major role in the country’s 
economy. SOEs were set up and used as one of the instruments by government to 
achieve multiple socio-economic and political goals. These were to represent 
government in business, to provide basic infrastructure, to set good examples for 
businesses in the private sector, to provide national security, to promote culture and 
to provide social benefits.  
In 1958 when Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat engineered a coup to become the next 
Prime Minister, there were more than 100 SOEs. One of the major changes in the 
economy and politics was the creation of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) to prepare five-year development plans known as 
NESDB plans for the economy. These plans have led to the transformation from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy, increasing concentration on developing the 
private sector and reducing the role of government.1  
According to the Budgetary Procedure Act BE 2502 (1959), a SOE is defined as; 
A) governmental or business organisation that is owned by the government; or 
B) company or partnership in which government agencies hold in aggregate more 
than 50 per cent of shares; or 
C) company or partnership in which government agencies and/or SOEs in A) and/or 
B) hold in aggregate more than 50 per cent of shares; or 
D) company or partnership in which government agencies and/or SOEs in D) and/or 
A) and/or B) and/or C) hold in aggregate more than 50 per cent of shares; or 
E) company or partnership in which government agencies and/or SOEs in A) and/or 
B) hold in aggregate more than 50 per cent of shares. 
                                                 
1 The detail of transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy is not discussed here 
because it is out of the scope of this study. Krongkaew (1995) and Warr (1993) provide a good 
discussion on this issue. 
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From the First plan (1961–66) to the Ninth plan (2002–06), there have been attempts 
to promote the role of private sector and reduce the role of SOEs, however SOEs still 
play an important role in the Thai economy. By the end of 2001 their total assets 
amounted to 5,663.80 billion baht, which was equal to 184.29 per cent of GDP. Their 
total assets have increased by 6.66 per cent from 1997 to 2001.  In the same period 
their total liabilities have also grown with higher rate (10.74 per cent) than growth 
rate of total assets. By 2001, total liabilities were 5,118.78 billion baht. Therefore the 
debt-net worth ratio2 since 2000 is around 9, as shown in Table 2.1.  
This illustrates the reliance on debt of SOEs in Thai economy as the higher the ratio, 
the higher reliance on debt and the less the protection for lenders to rely on equity as 
a funding source in the event of financial difficulties. SOEs in Thailand receive 
subsidies from the government in form of capital contribution, which is recorded as 
one of the components of the net worth of each SOEs. Therefore, the net worth of 
SOEs is higher than it would have been if they were operating as private firms. 
Net incomes or losses show combination of profit and loss making SOEs 
performance in Thai economy. Net losses were greatly affected by increasing 
expenditure due to foreign exchange devaluation after the financial crisis in 1997. 
Since 2001 the Thai economy has recovered gradually, and net incomes of SOEs 
have increased to 145.70 billion baht. 
Following government policy to increase labour productivity in SOEs, the number of 
employees has declined for several reasons, for example, implementing the early 
retirement program. In the four years from 1997 the number of employees 
diminished by 8 per cent.  
In aggregate SOEs in Thailand were profitable. Remittances to the Ministry of 
Finance in each year were considerable and exceeded subsidies to loss-making 
SOEs. This does not reflect the full picture however, as indirect government support 
such as soft loans and loan guarantees is not included. 
This is consistent with the fact that SOEs in Thailand relied on debt financing, as 
shown by high debt-net worth ratio. As shown in Table 2.2, nonfinancial state 
enterprise3 debt in 2003 was 851 billion baht and accounted for 29 per cent of total 
                                                 
2 Debt-net worth ratio, sometimes called debt-equity ratio, is calculated by dividing all financial debt 
by equity. 
3 According to reporting framework from Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 by the 
International Monetary Fund, the public sector in Thailand includes the general government sector 
(central government and local government subsectors) and the nonfinancial public sector. 
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public debt4.5 It comprised of government guaranteed (81.6 per cent) and 
nonguaranteed (18.4 per cent) debt from both domestic and foreign sources. The 
public debt data6, including debt incurred by nonfinancial public enterprises, can 
overstate the fiscal burden because nonfinancial public enterprise debt will be part of 
the fiscal burden if, and only if, SOEs default (Rattakul 2003:235).   
 
Table 2.1 Financial indicators of state owned enterprises in Thailand (billion 
baht) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total asset 5,309.94 5,054.15 5,460.98 5,685 5,663.8 
Debt 4,622.52 4,294.85 4,890.51 5,159.52 5,118.78 
Net Worth 687.41 759.3 570.47 525.48 545.02 
Debt-net worth ratio (time) 6.72 5.66 8.57 9.82 9.39 
Revenue 1,122.71 1,182.45 1,077.76 1,383.04 1,386.73 
Expenditure 1,142.24 1,178.03 1,239.77 1,306.16 1,241.03 
Net Income (Loss) -19.53 4.42 -162.01 76.89 145.7 
Subsidy 26.54 30.12 21.06 24.33 32.35 
Remittance to Ministry of Finance 67.57 49.41 56.03 44.19 59.01 
Number of employees (person) 309,956 305,125 299,686 286,681 285,063 
Number of State owned enterprises 68 68 66 64 64 
GDP at constant 1988 price 3,072.6 2,749.7 2,872 3,008.7 3,072.9 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
                                                                                                                                          
Nonfinancial public corporations are all resident legal entities created for the purpose of producing 
goods and nonfinancial services for the market and that are controlled by general government units. 
They do not include financial public corporations such as Government Saving Bank and monetary 
public corporations such as Bank of Thailand. As a result, in Thailand there are 46 nonfinancial public 
enterprises: five in the power sector, 16 in telecommunication and transport sectors, 11 in industrial 
sector, five in agricultural sector and nine in other sector. This explains the discrepancy in results 
between Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.  
4 The public sector debt in Thailand consists of government debt, nonfinancial state enterprise debt 
and FIDF debt. Debt issued by the government amounted to 56 per cent of total public debt, including 
domestic and external borrowings to finance government expenditure and some of financial 
restructuring costs to bail out financial institutions after the financial crisis in 1997 (Tier 1 and Tier 2 
bonds and FIDF I and III bonds). FIDF debt consists of FIDF II bonds and nongovernment-guaranteed 
liabilities. 
5 The proportion of nonfinancial state enterprise debt to total public debt reduced from 71 per cent in 
1996 to 29 per cent in 2003 because the government has to carry the large debt from bankrupt 
financial institutions after the financial crisis. However in terms of value, nonfinancial state enterprise 
debt has increased from 432 billion baht in 1996 to 851 billion baht in 2003. 
6 The aggregate debt measures fail to take account of the assets of SOEs. Net worth is a more relevant 
measure. 
 14
Table 2.2 Structure of public debt in Thailand (billion baht) 
 2001 2002 2003 Per cent of total debt in 2003 
Government debt 1,263.71 1,670.55 1,651.63 56.37 
   External debt 449.62 409.57 344.27 11.75 
   Domestic debt 814.09 1,260.98 1,307.36 44.62 
Nonfinancial state enterprise debt 970.55 907.11 851.05 29.05 
   Guaranteed debt 796.43 771.96 694.59 23.71 
      External debt 384.8 351.37 305.12 10.41 
      Domestic debt 411.63 420.59 389.47 13.29 
   Nonguaranteed debt 174.12 135.15 156.46 5.34 
      External debt 74.89 63.22 61.14 2.09 
      Domestic debt 99.23 71.93 95.32 3.25 
FIDFa debt 697.45 476.18 427.36 14.59 
   Government Guaranteed 112 112 62 2.12 
   Nonguaranteed 585.45 245.28 365.36 12.47 
Total public debt 2,931.72 3,053.84 2,930.04 100 
GDPb 5,091.4 5,399.6 5,904.4  
Public debt as per cent of GDP 57.58 56.56 49.62  
a FIDF = Financial Institutions Development Fund 
b Office of National Economic and Social Development Board 
Source: Public Debt Management Office, Ministry of Finance 
 
 
Table 2.3 Performance of state owned enterprisesa in Thailand 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Profit (Loss) (billion baht) 56.31 27.64 -141.5 40.71 69.74 
Return on asset (per cent) 1.75 0.72 -3.61 0.98 1.64 
Return on equity (per cent) 7.73 3.27 -17.37 4.87 7.63 
Debt equity ratio (time) 3.43 3.52 3.81 3.96 3.66 
a There are 59 SOEs which do not include SOE subsidiaries, enterprises in liquidation 
process, or financial institution temporarily under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand. 
Performances of each SOEs are shown in Appendix 1. 
Source: Comptroller-General’s Department, Ministry of Finance 
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As shown in Table 2.37 the return on total assets8 of SOEs is low, 2 per cent in 2001. 
This mainly results from the low profit and low utilisation of assets, a common 
feature of the SOEs charging the lower tariffs than profit-maximising levels and 
facing with over-manning and over-sizing of organisation. 
Whereas the return on total assets is low, the return on equity9 was 8 per cent in 
2001. This suggests the rate of return to the investor is comparable to that of private 
sector utilities in developed countries. It is evident that although the public sector is 
quite large in term of assets, SOEs’ contributions to the government are considerable. 
In 2001, following the financial crisis and the implementation of the Master Plan 
discussed below, there were 59 SOEs altogether. These SOEs are grouped by 
objectives, roles and economic functions: energy, transportation, telecommunication, 
water, financial, industrial, agricultural, commerce and services, as well as social and 
technology sectors, as shown in Appendix 1. SOEs in energy, transportation, 
telecommunication and water sectors provide basic infrastructure to Thai economy. 
In the financial sector, SOEs were set up to promote saving: Government Saving 
Bank and to develop certain specific economic sectors: Government Housing Bank 
and Export-Import Bank of Thailand. SOEs were established to promote 
development in specific sectors such as wood, dairy farming, agricultural products, 
industrial estates and tourism.  Some of SOEs in industrial, agricultural and 
commercial and services sector were established for military support such as the 
production of textiles, leather products, glass containers, preserved and canned food 
and batteries. SOEs in these groups also operate to extract monopoly rents from 
socially stigmatised businesses such as tobacco, playing card production and lottery. 
Some of SOEs provide social welfare improvement services, particularly SOEs in the 
social and technology sector. These SOEs provide public good services such as 
                                                 
7 In Thailand, financial data of SOEs reported by different agencies for different purposes varies by 
the number of reported SOEs in aggregate. The number of SOEs in Table 2.3 is 59 SOEs, which are 
planned to be corporatised and privatized under the Master Plan, throughout the period of study 
whereas in Table 2.1 the number of SOEs changed through time and is greater than that in Table 2.3. 
The reason is that in Table 2.3, the list of SOEs includes only the main SOEs and does not include 
SOE subsidiaries, enterprises in liquidation process, or financial institution temporarily under the 
supervision of the Bank of Thailand. 
8 Return on total assets is measured by dividing net income after interest and taxes by total assets. The 
data in Table 2.3 were calculated and reported by Ministry of Finance. 
9 Return on equity, or the rate of return on shareholders’ investment, is calculated by dividing net 
income after interest and taxes by equity. The data in Table 2.3 was calculated and reported by 
Ministry of Finance. 
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sports, zoos and botanical gardens. Some provide services in housing, pawn shops 
and pharmaceutical products to the poor. 
The net profit of 59 SOEs in 2001 was 69.74 billion baht, which mostly came from 
the public utility sectors. Fifty, 19.7 and 11.5 per cent of net profit is contributed by 
the energy, telecommunication and transportation sector, respectively, as shown in 
Appendix 1.  
Table 2.4 shows the ranking of the profit-and-loss-making SOEs according to profit 
and loss in 2001.  
The Petroleum Authority of Thailand in the energy sector gained the highest profit, 
which accounted for 22.45 per cent of total net profit. The second highest was the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand in the same sector, which received 
16.62 per cent of total net profit. These were followed by the Government Saving 
Bank and Thai Airways International Public Company Ltd. 
The SOEs with the highest losses were the Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd, the 
State Railway of Thailand and the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority. Their losses 
were 5.68, 5.33 and 3.16 billion baht respectively in 2001. Critical to SOEs in 
transport sector: the State Railway of Thailand and the Bangkok Mass Transit 
Authority, losses were their fares being very low compared to the true cost, as a 
result of their obligations to provide cheap community services to the poor. For 
political and distribution reasons, they cannot raise fares to match real costs. It 
should be noted that after privatisation the firms are likely to be regulated to suppress 
prices due to community service obligations.  
2.3 Thailand’s privatisation history 
With the predominance of Keynesian economics, the First NESDB plan (1961–66) 
was based on the idea that the government would provide necessary infrastructure for 
the economy and reorganise government agencies to facilitate economic 
transformation and expansion. It would also encourage the private sector to become 
involved in productive investment and transactions and ensured that the state would 
not create industries to compete with private enterprises.  
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Table 2.4 Most and least profitable state owned enterprises ranked by profit 
(loss) in 2001 (billion baht) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Per cent of 
total profit 
in 2001 
Ten most profitable state owned enterprises in 2001    
1 Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand 
2.21 11.74 -6.38 12.70 15.66 22.45 
2 Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand 
12.83 18.49 -25.06 20.18 11.59 16.62 
3 Government Savings Bank 6.24 4.41 4 8.17 8.52 12.22 
4 Thai Airways International 
Public Company Ltd. 
-25.2 3.93 5.86 4.82 8.36 11.98 
5 The Communications 
Authority of Thailand 
9.24 7.37 3.71 5.69 7.18 10.29 
6 Airports Authority of 
Thailand 
4.32 5.09 5.27 6.87 7.01 10.06 
7 Telephone Organization of 
Thailand 
23.78 13.63 1.94 4 5.98 8.57 
8 Thailand Tobacco Monopoly 5.53 5.16 5.52 5.34 5.65 8.11 
9 Metropolitan Electricity 
Authority 
4.14 2.73 -0.94 2.16 5.19 7.44 
10 Provincial Electricity 
Authority 
9.07 11.52 -7.38 6.70 4.24 6.07 
Ten least profitable state owned enterprises in 2001    
1 Krung Thai Bank Public Co. 
Ltd 
0.21 -61.58 -91.94 -28.94 -5.68 -8.15 
2 State Railway of Thailand -2.41 -3.06 -7.19 -5.08 -5.33 -7.64 
3 Bangkok Mass Transit 
Authority 
-2.47 -2.73 -2.44 -2.89 -3.16 -4.53 
4 Bangchak Petroleum Plc -3.78 0.03 -1.78 -1.56 -1.56 -2.24 
5 National Housing Authority 0.15 0.04 -0.12 -0.64 -0.87 -1.24 
6 Provincial Waterworks 
Authority 
0.08 -0.29 -0.68 -0.49 -0.42 -0.6 
7 Expressway and Rapid 
Transit Authority of 
Thailand 
0.44 -0.07 -4.16 -0.65 -0.21 -0.3 
8 Thai Plywood Company Ltd. -0.13 -0.1 0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.2 
9 Metropolitan Rapid Transit 
Authority 
0.08 0.07 -5.91 -1.88 -0.13 -0.19 
10 New Bangkok International 
Airport Co. Ltd. 
-0.01 0.23 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 
Source: Comptroller-General's Department, Ministry of Finance 
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As a result, privatisation efforts began in Thailand during the First plan in which nine 
SOEs created to promote Thai employment, including a shoe polish formula factory 
and a pin and clip factory, were dissolved. A push for increased privatisation, 
particularly of SOEs in the commercial sectors, has been part of every subsequent 
plan. Over this period however the Thai government also promoted SOEs in 
infrastructure projects, large capital intensive projects or projects with national 
security implications. 
By the mid–1970s, the NESDB had assessed that most of the existing SOEs were 
inefficient. They were slow to grow, unprofitable and required subsidies from the 
government rather than generating revenues. Most had high average costs of 
production and low rates of return. Most of the profit-making SOEs were protected 
monopolies. The lack of competition in many sectors hindered the introduction of 
new products and services and the expansion of service coverage (Rondinelli and 
Priebjrivat 1999:99). 
One of the factors that contributed to inefficiency was the lack of operating 
flexibility and slow decisions on investment resulting from too much supervision by 
too many government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance, the Budget 
Bureau and the NESDB. In addition, the executives and managers of most of SOEs 
were political appointees or government bureaucrats with little experience in 
business. Political intervention also led to over-manning and high costs (Rondinelli 
and Priebjrivat 1999:99–100). 
During the Fifth plan (1982–86), there was an abrupt increase in world oil prices and 
the serious problem of fiscal deficit.  
Most Thai economists agreed that the SOEs should be privatised to lessen the 
government’s economic difficulties and improve efficiency. During this time, there 
were some attempts to promote privatisation. For example, several Cabinet 
resolutions set out privatisation policy more clearly. A June 1985 resolution allowed 
each SOE to propose its own privatisation policy to be screened by a State Enterprise 
Policy Committee before being considered by Cabinet. In response, most SOE 
executives argued that they were not experiencing financial difficulties so there was 
no compelling reason for privatisation. Labour unions and bureaucrats also opposed 
privatisation, and the widespread resistance resulted in a few of privatisation 
proposals being implemented.  
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The privatisation plans were reawakened in the 1990s due to some of the SOEs 
suffering from growing losses and escalating complaints of poor service. For 
instance, Bangkok Mass Transit Authority accumulated losses to such an extent that 
at the end of 1989 its net worth was a negative 9 billion baht. The poor services 
included the area of quality, coverage and reliability, including the frequent power 
failure in provincial areas and the inability to meet demand on crowded bus routes. 
Privatisation was proposed as a way to improve efficiency. Several new government 
projects were handed over to private concessions, including the installation and 
operation of 4.1-milllion new telephone lines and the second-stage expressway.  
During the Seventh plan (1992–96) there were some new laws passed to increase 
flexibility, transparency and private participation in SOEs activities, such as the Joint 
Venture Act BE 2535 (1992).  
The Eighth plan (1997–2001) also emphasised a way for increasing the role of the 
private sector. For example, the government established permanent organisations to 
manage increases in private sector participation including industry specific regulators 
and supporting the transformation of SOEs into public companies traded in the Stock 
Exchange Market. However, repeated changes of government led to delays in and 
amendments to the privatisation plan. 
The Ninth plan (2002–06) sees the government again champion privatisation as one 
of the key ways to improve efficiency and quality in the transportation, 
communications and energy sectors. It is also envisaged that a more efficient use of 
utilities infrastructure will facilitate and enhance production and service sectors 
capability. Ultimately this is anticipated to develop capability and competitiveness at 
national, enterprise, and basic production unit levels, as described below. 
 
Conduct privatization step-by-step with a focus on preparation for 
privatization, both in terms of organizational restructuring and personnel 
development, toward a goal of achieving good corporate governance must 
be conducted. Private investment will be encouraged to ease the public 
investment burden and provide people with alternatives to obtain better 
quality services. Meanwhile, regulatory agencies for each infrastructure 
sector will be established to ensure standards, both related to quality and 
service rates, are established and maintained in order to be fair to service 
providers and consumers, and benefit the society at large (National 
Economic and Social Development Board 2002:86–7). 
 
In summary privatisation and promotion of private sector participation has been 
implemented since the 1960s with alternating objectives including improving the 
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efficiency and quality of service and reducing the government’s fiscal and financial 
burden. In Section 2.4, the factors leading to privatisation will be discussed. 
2.4 Factors leading to privatisation 
After the Second World War the Keynesian macroeconomic policy, which believes 
that fiscal policy and government intervention are needed to promote economic 
growth and development and to reduce unemployment, was adopted in both 
developed and developing countries. The Keynesian school was very influential in 
the world economy until the severe stagflation in 1967 and the First Oil Crisis in 
1973 in which the Keynesian fiscal policy could not lead the economy out of the 
simultaneous problems of unemployment and inflation.  
Meanwhile the influence of Neo-Liberalism, which the United States (US) and 
United Kingdom (UK) followed under the Reagan and Thatcher administration 
respectively, was growing internationally. The idea of reducing the role and 
intervention of government and relying on the market mechanism has subsequently 
been widely adopted. International trade, investment, financial liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation were promoted with the belief that the market 
mechanism and private sector function well with minimal government interference.  
The economic policies influenced by Neo-Liberalism were also adopted by the major 
international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) as well as being the principle behind agreements such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These policies have been imposed on the 
developing countries, particularly those in crises, via international politics and 
conditionality of loans. Williamson (1990) details the policies for structural 
adjustment or economic reform that were imposed in Latin America when there was 
a debt crisis. The policies are fiscal discipline, redistribution of public expenditure to 
health, education and infrastructure, tax reform, financial liberalisation, exchange 
rate management, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct 
investment, privatisation, deregulation, and secure property rights. These policies 
were generally applicable and universally agreed upon in Washington DC, including 
by implication senior members of the US administration and Congress, the Federal 
Reserve, the World Bank, the IMF, and policy think-tanks, collectively known as the 
Washington Consensus.  
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Economic development policies in Thailand adjusted to some of the policies 
supported by the Washington Consensus in the late 1970s.  
Thailand clearly followed them in the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly those 
relating to trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment and financial liberalisation. 
Privatisation was the most controversial of these and was not promoted successfully 
due to internal political influences, even though there has been continual criticism of 
SOEs performance since the 1970s.  
By the late 1990s, circumstances had changed and privatisation came to the forefront 
of the Thai political agenda.  Two key factors drove this change.  
The first was the Government of Thailand’s commitment to liberalise various 
sectors, such as energy and transportation, under the Uruguay Round of the GATT.  
A second factor was the economic shock experienced in 1997. The floatation of the 
Thai Baht in July 1997 and the subsequent domestic economic and financial crises 
forced Thailand to seek the assistance of the IMF in the form of a US$17.3 billion 
standby loan.  
On 14 August 1997, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of 
Thailand co-signed the first Letter of Intent (LOI) committing Thailand to the 
economic adjustment package outlined by the IMF.  
According to the first LOI, the government agreed to accelerate privatisation in key 
commercial and infrastructure sectors to achieve the objectives of increasing the role 
of private participation; freeing up public resources; reducing the public debt; 
promoting competition; increasing efficiency and productivity; and ensuring better 
labour welfare. The government also agreed to review and improve the legal 
framework for private sector participation.  
In the subsequent LOIs the government repeated its commitment to reform the state 
enterprise sector as shown in Table 2.5.10 In the eighth LOI the privatisation process 
is ongoing. 
Corporatisation and privatisation of SOEs in ESI appeared in the first LOI and 
repeatedly appeared in subsequent LOIs. However progress has been slow by 
opposition from labour union, academics and politicians.    
There has been widespread criticism led by Stiglitz (2000b) of the IMF’s country 
assistance strategy, which comprises of four steps: privatisation, capital market 
                                                 
10 Siriprachai (2000) analysed the details of eight Letters of Intent and found that the ingredients of the 
Washington Consensus policies were extensively imposed as the conditionality of loans.  
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liberalisation, market based pricing and free trade respectively. Stiglitz argues that 
the IMF uses the same set of rescue packages for every country in crisis without deep 
understanding and study of the specific economic and social conditions in each 
country. In the belief that privatisation would improve economic efficiency in the 
public sector, the IMF usually lists privatisation as the first step in the rescue strategy 
and pushes the country in crisis to implement this step as quickly as possible. 
Stiglitz also criticised the Washington Consensus policies as being the cause of 
financial crises in Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998. Although the East Asian 
countries had opened up their financial markets and adopted financial liberalisation 
policies, the fast track of liberalisation without prudential supervision and strong 
institutions caused the financial crisis.11
The situation in Russia in 1995, where the IMF advocated rapid and mass 
privatisation through vouchers, loans-for share, auctions and management buy-outs is 
a good example. 
Privatisation at the rapid pace can lead to private sector monopolies and allow 
powerful minority group to take control, an example being the Russian sell-off 
allowing a small group of oligarchs to gain control of state assets.12
The critiques of the Washington Consensus expounded by Stiglitz have discredited 
the IMF and reduced its political capacity to insist on the implementation of these 
policies. Stiglitz also had a great impact on shaping perceptions among professional 
economists around the world, including Thailand.   
                                                 
11 Siriprachai (2000) and Phongpaichit and Baker (2000) discussed the causes of Thai economic crisis 
in 1997 elaborately and found that the liberalisation policies promoted by the IMF are the major 
causes of this crisis. 
12 Florio (2002) analysed the whole impact of Washington Consensus policies on pre and post Russian 
crisis in 1998. 
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Table 2.5 Letter of intents and privatisation plans and implementation 
 PLetter of intent rivatisation plans and implementations 
tter of Intent 1  
4 August 1997) 
edium-term programs including of  
• Increased private sector participation in an number of transportation and 
power projects under build-operate-transfer arrangements 
Corporatisation and privatisation program in the energy, tra
utility, and communications sectors 
Headway in privatising the national a
private sector in the electricity, telecommunication and gas sectors 
• Changes in the regulatory framework including a corporatisation law 
Pursuing the alternative methods of privatisation and divestiture: dir
sales to the public and joint-venture arrangement 
• Completing the preliminary plan to increase the role of the private sector
in energy, public utilities, communications and transport sectors 
Majority-owned state enterprises, already corporat
privatise. Government will reduce the government’s stake in the 
national airline (93 per cent owned by state in 1997) and Bangcha
petroleum company (80 per cent owned by state in 1997) to well below 
50 per cent by mid–1998. 
Planning to submit to Parliament the necessary legislation to facilita
the privatisation of the state enterprises, which are not currently 
corporatised, by June 1998 
Establishing a privatisation
including Corporatisation Law and develop a regulatory framework, 
with the assistance of the World Bank, by 30 June 1998 
t-term programs including  
• Transportation Sector: Government will substantially privatise Thai 
Airways International in 1998, initially through a strategic partnership
with a foreign investor and with remaining shares being offered to the 
domestic market and employees 
Energy Sector: EGAT will init
Generating Company and Power Gen 2 during 1998. Over the long 
term, EGAT will be split into separate generation and transmission 
companies, which themselves will eventually be privatised. 
Oil Sector: Government will relinquish its stake in Bangchak petroleum
company which will begin in Jun
Exploration and Production and privatise PTT itself by the end of 
Telecommunication Sector: Government will amend the Establishing
Acts of the Telephone Organization of Thailand and the Communica
Authority of Thailand during 1998 in order to prepare for their 
corporatisation and privatisation by the end of 1999. 
Me ium-term program including  
Privatisation of the railways and the port 
Drawing up a defined agenda to implement the restructuring and 
privatisation program that was presented in the Third Letter of Intent 
Le
(1
M
• nsportation, 
• irline and expanding the role of the 
• ect 
Letter of Intent 2  
(25 November 1997) 
 
• ised, being the first to 
k 
• te 
Letter of Intent 3 
(24 February 1998) 
•  secretariat, propose legislative reform 
Shor
 
• iate sale of its stakes in Electricity 
•  
e 1998 and will sell part of PTT 
1999 
•  
tion 
d
• 
Letter of Intent 4 
(26 May 1998) 
• 
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  Letter of intent Privatisation plans and implementations 
Letter of Intent 5 
(25 August 1998) 
• Cabinet approval of the establishment of Office of State Enterprises and 
Government Portfolio in Ministry of Finance to support and coordinate 
privatisation, to develop private participation in infrastructure, and to 
monitor state enterprises. 
• Cabinet approval of use of Master Plan for State Enterprise Reform, 
establishing overall strategy, principles for regulatory bodies, and 
sequencing of divestiture on 1 September 1998. 
• Cabinet approval of use of privatisation proceeds: (i) for Ministry-of-
Finance-owned enterprises, 50 per cent of receipts will be used for 
social projects, and the remainder deposited with Financial Institutions 
Development Fund (FIDF) to reduce its debt; (ii) for subsidiary 
enterprises, a proportion is first allocated to state enterprise investment 
and to labour welfare funds, and the remainder split equally between 
social projects and deposits with FIDF. 
• Cabinet approval of Corporatisation Law aimed at facilitating the 
incorporation of state enterprises. 
• Cabinet approval of amendments to the 1954 Aviation Act to permit 
Thai Airways to sell a significant stake to domestic and foreign 
investors. 
• Preparing the comprehensive sectoral plans, setting out timetables for 
establishing regulatory frameworks for private sector operators, for 
corporatisation and privatisation of selected state enterprises, and 
proposed privatisation strategies for each of selected state enterprises. 
Privatisation of selected enterprises 
• Sale of EGAT’s stake in Electricity Generating Company 
• Sale by PTT of a significant stake in PTT Exploration and Production 
• Issuing bidding documentation for the sale of government share in 
ESSO Thailand 
Letter of Intent 6 
(1 December 1998) 
• Further progress made in the government’s privatisation plan, the major 
aspects of which were set out in the Master Plan for State Enterprise 
Reform. 
• Work on defining a regulatory framework to increase competition in 
key sectors such as telecommunications and energy well advanced. The 
Cabinet approval expected by the first quarter of 1999. 
• Draft Corporatisation Law cleared by the Cabinet to be enacted by 
Parliament. 
Letter of Intent 7 
(23 March 1999) 
• Parliament approval of the Corporatisation Law 
• Approval of the privatisation plan in the energy sector to allow private 
sector participation in the Ratchaburi power plant by end of 1999, 
beginning  the divestiture of government equity in Bangchak Petroleum 
in mid–1999 and to restructure the natural gas supply industry. 
• In the transport sector, a bidding prospectus for the privatisation of Thai 
Airways in mid–1999 prepared and financial advisors selected to help 
with the corporatisation and eventual privatisation of the Airport 
Authority. 
• Government study of the water sector regarding the need for a 
regulatory framework and tariff structures. 
Letter of Intent 8 
(21 September 1999) 
• Privatisation of intervened and state owned banks: Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce 
• Preparation for privatisation of intervened and state owned banks 
including Bangkok Metropolitan, Siam City Banks, Laem Thong Bank 
and Nakornthon Bank 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1999a and 1999b) 
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It is worth mentioning that even the World Bank, which has been a proponent of 
priv y for developing privatisation 
do lead  
po The uti  
as a water concession sc ate power plant projects in Peru and 
electricity projects A ls 
concede that it does no r public or private 
ownership (Nellis 1999).
Despite the various argum  
the Government of Thai  
expedite the privatisati as established the State 
Enterprise Policy Co ared 
the Master Plan. 
2.5 Master plan for st prise sector reform  
The Master Plan was p s 
designed to provide the r 
reforms as privatisatio and institutional changes were 
prepared, approved a  i
The Master Plan o , 
transportation and water. Es 
in  lis f
Im SOE ve 
manner. Therefore, n m 
Committee (SERC), com
SEPC. The SERC il tor 
participation and regulato es before forwarding them to the Cabinet 
fo eov , oversee transparent 
and tim
To overcome legal cons
Plan proposes two parts 
Laws BE 2532 (1989),  
2535 (1992), Securities Laws and Corporatisation Law should be reviewed. In 
atisation polic countries since 1980, admits that 
es not always  to favourable outcomes, particularly in public utilities such as 
lities program in Latin American and African countries such
heme in Bolivia, priv
wer and water. 
in rmenia resulted in higher prices. World Bank officia
t matter whether infrastructure is unde
  
ents for and against privatisation, the Letters of Intent bind
land to pursue the privatisation programs. To facilitate and
on process, the government h
mmission (SEPC), appointed privatisation advisors and prep
ate enter
 a proved by the Thai Cabinet on 1 September 1998. It wa
basic guidelines, principles, practices and time frames fo
n plans and legal, regulatory 
nd mplemented. 
c vers four main sectors: energy, telecommunications
 It also includes a framework for the privatisation of SO
 other sectors. A t o  SOEs being privatised is shown in Appendix 1. 
reform and privatisation had to be carried out in a cohesiplementation of 
a ew committee is proposed, the State Enterprise Refor
bining the future corporatisation committee with the current 
w l review and approve all privatisation, private sec
ry reform initiativ
r approval. Mor er the SERC will have the responsibility to 
ely privatisation. 
traints and facilitate the privatisation process, the Master 
for legal reform. Firstly, existing laws such as Competition 
Alien Business Law, Private Sector Participation Act BE
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addition to existing legis ise Sector Reform Law 
is  pri r   
e Ma  than 
owning and operating e  
ensure that public goods and services are properly delivered and to protect 
 in specific 
enterprises whose operations are strategic, socially obligatory or noncommercial in 
nature, yet are considered necessary for the quality of life of Thai citizens. The 
Master Plan advocates clear separation of three roles as policy maker, regulator and 
operator of the state. 
The Master Plan also proposes a program of regulatory reform, which includes the 
specification of individual regulatory bodies in each of the infrastructure sectors of 
telecommunication, water, transport and energy, and the definition of roles and 
responsibilities of these authorities.  
According to the Master Plan, enterprises and the state use a wide variety of methods 
of privatisation defined as follows: 
 
Privatisation is here defined as all measures, which increase private sector 
participation in sectors where government enterprises presently operate. It 
includes divestiture of state owned enterprises or assets (ownership 
transfer), concession arrangements, joint ventures, management contracts, 
leasing, outsourcing, contracting of services, deregulation which increases 
competition, creation of needed regulatory bodies, and introduction of new 
competitors (Office of State Enterprise and Government Securities 2000:6). 
 
The specific objectives of the privatisation program are as follows: 
 structural objectives 
• stimulate and provide a basis for renewed economic growth of the country by 
attracting needed investment and know-how (foreign and domestic); 
• improve the economic efficiencies of underlying sectors of the economy; 
• improve the quality and availability of services for Thai people at reasonable 
prices; 
 financial objectives 
• reduce the financial burden on government resources (such as subsidies, loan 
guarantees); 
• provide capital necessary for needed infrastructure investments; 
lation, a new omnibus State Enterpr
 proposed as the ma y legislation for creation of independent regulatory bodies.
According to th ster Plan, in the future the state will reduce its role. Rather
nterprises, the state acts as policy maker and regulator to
consumers. However, the state will still maintain an operating role
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• stimulate, broaden and deepen Thai capital markets; 
 social objectives 
• facilitate the creation of new and improved job opportunities for the Thai 
people; 
• provide resources for needed social services, retraining, and education; 
• ensure expanded provision of quality services at reasonable prices to the public 
(Office of State Enterprise and Government Securities 2000:7). 
According to the plan, 50 per cent of privatisation proceeds will be used to fund vital 
social projects and deposits with FIDF. It should be noted that 
n the fiscal budget. Because 
of accounting conventions, privatisation appears to generate large surpluses. But 
ndustries which can be separated into both 
petitive, 
d before privatisation begins. In the 
                                                
social services such as education, public health, labour welfare and agriculture.  
The other 50 per cent will be allocated to the Financial Institutions Development 
Fund (FIDF) to reduce its debt. In the case of subsidiaries of SOEs, a proportion is 
first allocated to SOE investment and to labour welfare funds and the remainder split 
equally between 
privatisation may bring only the illusory improvements i
these privatisation may reduce public sector net worth, hence the effect maybe to 
exacerbate public saving.13
Privatisation alone cannot achieve all of these objectives. Master Plan also focuses 
on the restructuring of infrastructural i
natural monopoly and competitive activities. For example, the electricity supply 
industry can be functionally separated into generation, transmission, distribution and 
retailing activities. Only generation and retailing activities can be com
whereas transmission and distribution are natural monopolies, which require strict 
regulation after privatisation. The horizontal and vertical disaggregation of SOEs is 
required before corporatisation and privatisation.  
A proper study on industry restructuring and regulatory reform also has to be 
conducted on the process of corporatisation and privatisation of existing SOEs.  
The electricity supply industry is one sector in which an industry restructuring plan, a 
new regulatory body and regulation were studie
natural gas sector, separation between transmission pipelines, distribution pipelines 
and gas trading is planned. Third party access rules on the transmission services with 
 
13 In Section 4.5, fiscal effect of privatisation will be discussed in detail. 
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regulation to ensure fair pricing and nondiscriminatory treatment in pipeline services 
will also be applied.  
The principle of separation of regulator and operator is to be employed in the 
telecommunication, transport and water sector. In telecommunication sector, two 
SOEs, the Telephone Organisation of Thailand and the Communications Authority of 
Thailand will be corporatised and privatised. Complete liberalisation in 
telecommunication market is expected in 2006, following Thailand’s agreement with 
the World Trade Organisation.  
In the water sector, the Metropolitan Water Authority is planned to be either 
horizontally separated into two companies with concessions then granted to private 
concession arrangements for different regions 
OEs in three modes of transport: land, water and 
air. A restructuring plan is drawn, with a proposal to establish transport authorities 
whose ro
Since th
privatisa
2.6 Pr
ases. 
Plan to 2001 
Sin
privatisa
Firs  and 
enc
Land Code and Condominium Act and the lease provisions of the Civil and 
Sec
facilitating the incorporation of SOEs.  
operators or to be corporatised and then get strategic partners to operate and manage 
through management contracts. The Provincial Water Authority is also planned to be 
horizontally unbundled. Following this the Provincial Water Authority will perform 
as a contract manager overseeing 
nationwide. 
The transport sector consists of 14 S
le is to manage concessions granted to private operators. 
e Master Plan was approved in 1998, there has been slow progress in 
tion in Thailand which will be discussed in Section 2.6. 
ogress of privatisation in Thailand 
The progress of privatisation in Thailand can be divided into two ph
2.6.1 Phase 1: Master 
ce the Master Plan has been approved, there has been some progress in the 
tion process.  
tly, the government has amended some laws to facilitate privatisation
ourage foreign direct investment. These include the Alien Business Law, the 
Commercial Code.  
ondly, in 1999 the Parliament approved the Corporatisation Law aimed at 
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In was partially privatised in 
 total share offering was 920 million shares. The Petroleum 
Au
of US illion. However, Petroleum Authority of Thailand remains largely a 
SO  shares. 
The
2000 to R idiary of 
tion, 
ed in 2000 to establish the National Telecommunication 
eventually helps just the rich owners of banks and big businesses at the expense of 
the taxpayers. Moreover the experience in foreign countries such as during the 
sis in 2001 demonstrates 
the energy sector, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand 
November 2001. The
thority of Thailand set the initial price offering at 35 baht per share, raising a total 
$631 m
E with the Ministry of Finance holding slightly less than 75 per cent of its
 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand sold Ratchaburi power plant in 
atchaburi Electricity Generating Co. Ltd, which is a subs
Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Public Company Limited.  
In the transport sector, SEPC approved a restructuring framework including avia
maritime, rail, long distance bus, highways, expressways, motorways and public 
transit including urban bus on 9 October 2000. The corporatisation of the State 
Railway of Thailand was approved, along with the privatisation of Thai Airways and 
Airport Authority of Thailand. 
In the telecommunication sector, the restructuring plans of the Telephone 
Organisation of Thailand, the Communication Authority of Thailand and the Thai 
Post Corporatisation were approved on 26 July 2000. The Frequency Allocation 
Commission Act was enact
Commission, a regulator of the telecommunication sector to release the broadcasting 
of television and radio from government influence. Another task of the commission 
is to allocate television, radio and telecom frequencies. 
During this phase, the Master Plan has been criticised by various groups including of 
SOE employees, academicians, businessmen, politicians and activists in Thailand. 
Koomsup (2002) summarised the arguments against the Master Plan as follows.  
Firstly privatisation can lead to massive unemployment, particularly for low skilled 
employees.  
Secondly there is belief that SOEs in utility sector should remain state owned and 
efficiency can be improved within and under state management.  
Finally there is fear of corruption among politicians and officials involved in 
privatisation process.  
Because 50 per cent of proceeds from privatisation are allocated to FIDF to reduce 
debt burden incurred during the financial crisis, it is argued that privatisation 
California energy crisis in 2000 and Argentina’s financial cri
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that services provided by private sector can be more expensive unreliable and 
inefficient. This shows the failure of privatisation and market liberalisation. It also 
r to achieve fast economic recovery. The concept is 
rket. With all these privatisation plans, the government still maintains its 
short run. Partial 
ch will create a debt 
burden in the future. The government’s major shareholding in SOEs also raises 
 compete in SOE’ businesses. This 
ts.  
In response to criticism that privatisation will lead to selling off national assets 
nt decided to sell SOEs’ shares mainly to 
and management experiences from foreign strategic partners.  
 before the industry restructuring and regulatory reform plans 
 shares below their true value. Furthermore 
leads to more questions about the true benefits of privatisation.  
2.6.2 Phase 2: 2001 onwards 
In February 2001, the government changed from the Chaun government to the 
Thaksin government. The new economic team has set privatisation of SOEs as one of 
the economic stimulants in orde
that the share issued privatisation of SOEs in the stock market will increase the 
market capitalisation and eventually encourage more investment, consumption, 
economic growth and recovery. SOEs in petroleum, electricity, telecommunication, 
airport, ports, banks, tobacco and water were identified as candidates for fast track 
corporatisation and listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand by 2003. Further share 
selling to private investors was also planned for SOEs which were already listed in 
the stock ma
majority ownership in most SOEs. Thus privatisation is only partial.   
Koomsup (2002) observed that fast sale of SOEs’ shares in stock market will bring 
revenues to the government and reduce the fiscal burden in 
privatisation allows government to be a major shareholder but in the long run the 
investment burden in these SOEs still belongs to government whi
questions of fairness to private investors to
practice will discourage future competition and deter new entry into marke
cheaply to foreigners, the governme
individual Thai investors. This restriction excludes the opportunity to benefit from 
technology, marketing 
Moreover the policy shift toward fast-track corporatisation and partial privatisation 
has diverted attention and efforts away from restructuring and regulatory reforms. It 
is likely that the Thaksin government will push fast-track corporatisation and partial 
privatisation through
are clearly drawn and implemented. This can cause uncertainties among private 
sectors and could push prices of floated
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without proper design of industry, market, and regulatory body and instruments, 
privatisation can lead to unfair competition and worsen economic efficiency. 
The privatisation programmes under Thaksin government are strongly opposed by 
labour unions, particularly the partial privatisation plans of SOEs in utilities such as 
electricity and water.  
In beginning of 2004, the plans was put on hold and postponed indefinitely. The 
Ministry of Finance and the utilities-related ministries were assigned the task of 
improving the Master Plan in order to ensure the plan suited to the current economic 
 services to serve different objectives and are subject 
f poor performance by SOEs, 
ing 
inly as a result of protests from various agents such as academics and 
ard and at the same 
reasons and demands from interest groups. An attempt to 
conditions.  
2.7 Summary 
SOEs operate in different industries and a different degree of competitive 
environment, provide goods and
to different laws and regulation. Few common characteristics are the large size of 
enterprises, reliance on debt financing guaranteed by government and reliance on 
subsidy from government for loss-making SOEs. Some of the profit-making SOEs 
can remit a profit back to the Ministry of Finance. 
With the dominance of SOEs in the Thai economy since the 1960s, privatisation was 
also introduced to promote private sector involvement and was pushed forward with 
various motives, including claims by Thai proponents o
the fiscal burden and increases in competition. Externally the World Bank and the 
IMF also pushed privatisation particularly after the 1997 financial crisis. 
Amid the support for privatisation, progress is slow compared to other develop
and transition economies such as the Latin American and post Soviet Union 
countries, ma
labour unions.  
The Thai government lacks the courage to push privatisation forw
time is reluctant to hold it back. On-and-off implementation of the privatisation plan 
is based on political 
rigorously evaluate the privatisation program from an economic and academic 
perspective before implementing it to ensure that the maximum social net benefit is 
achieved has not been successfully fulfilled. Being politically sensitive, full 
privatisation in Thailand is a long journey. 
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 Chapter 3 
  
 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN THAILAND 
 
3.1 Introduction 
According to the Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform (Master Plan) 
privatisation programs in Thailand cover four main utility sectors: energy, 
telecommunication, transportation and water with the energy sector the largest. 
Appendix 1 shows that state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy sector generated 
the highest profit among all the SOEs in the privatisation program in 2001.  
In the energy sector there are five SOEs operating in three industries: the electricity 
supply industry (ESI), the natural gas industry and the oil industry. Even if these 
industries are grouped as one sector, they have distinct characteristics and operating 
environments.  
The ESI will be the focus of this study due to its unique value to the Thai economy. 
The distinct structure of the ESI, in which there are both competitive and natural 
monopoly activities, complicates privatisation and regulation issues and has to be 
studied before decision on privatisation is made.  
Although Chapter 2 provides a general background on SOEs and privatisation in 
Thailand, it does not cover specific characteristics of the industry, regulation, 
restructuring and privatisation plans and progress of the ESI. These need to be 
addressed for a deeper analysis of ESI. 
This chapter aims to achieve this task. It will provide a background to the current 
structure, regulatory body and regulation, tariff structure and ESI restructuring and 
privatisation plan and progress of ESI in Thailand in order for economic analyses of 
regulation and privatisation in Part III. 
In Section 3.2 the structure of the ESI, in which three SOEs: the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
(MEA) and the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) are key players together with 
private sector participant will be explored. In Section 3.3 current regulatory body and 
regulation will be discussed. In Section 3.4 the criteria and methods of designing 
tariffs for both bulk and retail supply in the context regulation will be addressed.  
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In Section 3.5 plan and progress of ESI restructuring and privatisation in Thailand is 
examined before a summary is made in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Structure of electricity supply industry in Thailand 
The ESI can be functionally divided into generation, transmission, distribution and 
retailing activities. In Thailand most of the generation and all transmission activities 
are operated by the EGAT. The distribution and retailing activities are the 
responsibility of the MEA and PEA. The EGAT generates and supplies electricity to 
the MEA and PEA for further distribution to consumers. From this structure, it can 
be seen that almost all ESI activities are handled by three main SOEs, namely 
EGAT, MEA and PEA.  
To promote competition in this industry, the government has also promoted private 
sector participation in the generation business in the form of Small Power Producers 
(SPPs) and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) since 1992. Under the power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) both SPPs and IPPs sell electricity to EGAT. Moreover, 
the government also approved the establishment of the Electricity Generating 
Company (EGCO) in 1992 and of the Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding 
Public Company Limited (RATCH) in 2000 to compete in the generation business. 
Under the current structure, EGAT, as the sole owner of the transmission system, is 
acting as monopsonist with respect to the generation businesses and a natural 
monopolist in the electricity transmission business. 
With the current structure, the majority of consumers nationwide have to depend on 
the services of the MEA and PEA, as there is no competition in the distribution and 
retailing activities. Therefore it can be broadly summarized that the current ESI is 
operating in a monopolistic manner. The structure of ESI is shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Current electricity supply industry structure in Thailand 
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3.2.1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
EGAT was established in 1968 under the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand Act BE 2511 (1968) and is supervised by the Ministry of Energy. EGAT is 
responsible for electricity generation and transmission. 
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Table 3.1 Financial indicators of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (billion baht) 
At September 30:              1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Assets  148.18             175.31 193.06 220.73 245.1 269.3 295.98 316.06 358.45 396.36 434.11 409.33 382.09
Liabilities 93.57             
             
             
               
              
              
               
              
              
              
109.82 119.97 141.48 160.31 167.43 172.35 206.64 230.63 278.7 311.79 275.23 236
Equity  54.61 65.59 73.09 79.24 84.79 101.88 123.63 109.42 127.81 117.66 122.32 134.1 146.08
Operating revenuea 49.3 56.18 61.86 67.8 76.19 95.25 108.83 125.38 146.57 134.34 160.99 185.07 207.1
Operating expensesb 32.01 39.63 43.67 48.91 55.89 67.46 82.79 100.58 115.01 108.62 131.91 168.38 178.9
Operating income 17.28 16.55 18.19 18.88 20.3 27.78 26.05 24.79 31.56 25.72 29.08 16.69 28.2
Net income 12.39 11.7 12.34 11.34 12.03 18.96 27.09 12.83 20.31 -24.26 20.18 14.27 27.35
Financial ratiosc
    Return on assets (per cent) 8.36 6.68 6.39 5.14 4.91 7.04 9.15 4.06 5.67 -6.12 4.65 3.49 7.16
    Return on equity (per cent) 22.68 17.85 16.88 14.31 14.19 18.61 21.91 11.72 15.89 -20.62 16.49 10.64 18.72
    Debt equity ratio (time) 1.71 1.67 1.64 1.79 1.89 1.64 1.39 1.89 1.8 2.37 2.55 2.05 1.62
aElectricity sales or operating revenue after deducting the promotion of exports, industrial estate discount, natural disaster discount and social 
contributions 
bExcludes losses/(gains) from foreign exchange  
cAuthor’s calculation 
Note: Data is taken from the annual reports of EGAT whereas data in Chapter 2 and Appendix 1 are taken from the Ministry of Finance. 
Source: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand annual reports 
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As shown in Table 3.1, EGAT has earned positive operating income from 1990 to 
2002. After the financial crisis in 1997, EGAT has received a loss (24.26 billion 
baht) only in 1999 due to losses from the foreign exchange rate and the introduction 
of the managed float exchange rate system. To investigate the performance of EGAT 
operations, comparison between the operating revenues and operating expenses gives 
the real picture. The data reveals that even after the financial crisis, EGAT has still 
maintained positive operating income for the 1990s.  
Besides this, the other financial ratios should be considered. Since 1990, the return 
on assets of EGAT has varied between 3 and 9 per cent because the net income 
affected by financial crisis has fluctuated whereas the value of total assets has been 
steadily increasing, which is the common characteristic of SOEs in Thailand.  The 
return on equity has been consistently double digit since 1990. The high rates of 
return or the high net incomes that EGAT is able to earn as a per cent of investment 
indicate that EGAT has good financial performance. Nevertheless, EGAT’s 
profitability could result from monopoly power in the electricity market, not from 
operating efficiency. The average of debt equity ratio was around 1.7 before the 
financial crisis and after that it has increased to 2.1 in 2001. These numbers are quite 
low. They indicate that EGAT has lower financial dependence on debt financing than 
equity, which includes a subsidy from government and retained earning.  
From these indicators, generally it can be concluded that EGAT is a profitable 
enterprise. As a result, in 1994 EGAT gained Class A ranking for SOEs from the 
government, which rewarded EGAT to be subject to less ministerial control and its 
own salary scales which are no longer linked to civil service schemes. Moreover, 
EGAT is allowed to make contracts directly with other agents for selling and 
purchasing electricity and fuel.  
3.2.2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority and Provincial Electricity Authority  
MEA and PEA are state enterprises under the Ministry of Interior and will be 
transferred to the Ministry of Energy in 2004. They are in charge of electricity 
distribution for the whole country. MEA was established on 1 August 1958 under the 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority Act 1958. MEA is in charge of the distribution of 
electrical power in Bangkok, Nonthaburi and Samut Prakan Provinces, covering an 
area of 3,192 square kilometres.  
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PEA was established by a Royal Decree executed on 20 September 1960. It 
distributes electricity to customers outside of the MEA’s jurisdiction. The service 
area of the PEA is approximately 510,000 square kilometres, accounting for 99 per 
cent of the total area of the country. 
The differences in the operations of MEA and PEA are shown in Table 3.2. It is 
obvious that PEA is a bigger organisation and serves a much wider area and larger 
number of customers than MEA. PEA serves 160 times as big area as MEA. 
Maximum power demand in MEA area is just half of that in the PEA area. Demand 
per square kilometre in MEA area is very high compared to PEA because service 
areas of MEA: Bangkok, Nonthaburi and Samut Prakan Provinces are the heart of 
Thailand containing residential, government, business and industrial sectors. The 
largest portion of energy sales and number of customers of both MEA and PEA 
comes from nonresidential demand including small, medium and large business and 
the government sector.  
 
Table 3.2 Operating statistics of electricity distribution companies in 2003 
At September 30: Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
Provincial Electricity 
Authority 
Distribution area (square kilometre) 3,192 510,000 
Maximum power demand (MW) 6,825.04 12,878 
Demand per square kilometre (MW) 2.14 0.03 
Energy purchase (million kWh) 38,587.01 70,186 
Energy sales (million kWh) 36,930.53 65,497 
      Residential 7,935.11 15,099.4 
      Nonresidential 28,995.42 50,397.6 
Number of customers (customer) 2,362,502 12,377,483 
      Residential 1,900,906 11,469,178 
      Nonresidential 461,596 908,305 
Number of employees (person) 9,913 27,823 
Source: Metropolitan Electricity Authority and Provincial Electricity Authority annual 
reports in 2003 
 
Both MEA and PEA are the sole electricity distributors in their areas. As shown in 
Table 3.3 and 3.4, both SOEs have generated positive net income since 1990, except 
in 1999 where the net income was affected by the economic crisis and exchange rate 
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devaluation. Like EGAT, they achieved a fluctuating return on assets since 1990, 
because of changes in net income, although the net assets have been rising 
throughout the decade.  
In 2001, the returns on assets of MEA and PEA are 5.1 and 3.4 per cent respectively. 
Also, the returns on equity of MEA and PEA have been double digit since 1990 and 
declined to 16.16 and 10 per cent in 2001 respectively however the numbers are still 
high. 
These financial ratios indicate that MEA and PEA have been operating very well. 
For MEA and PEA, the averages of debt equity ratio before the economic crisis was 
around 2.25 and 1.85 respectively and after the crisis they have decreased to 2.24 and 
1.82 respectively. These numbers are considered low. They show that MEA and PEA 
have relied on equity financing rather than debt. MEA and PEA’ equity financing 
mainly comes from government subsidy and retained earnings. MEA and PEA 
received government subsidy reported as capital contribution from government in 
their annual report for 0.36 and 4.8 billion baht respectively each year since 1995. 
However the largest portion of equity financing comes from retained earnings. In 
2003 the retained earning of MEA and PEA was 37 and 59 billion baht respectively.  
However it should be noted that even if EGAT, MEA and PEA are profitable, they 
may not be technically efficient enterprises. Holding a monopoly in their market, 
they are able to reap a profit regardless of their efficiency levels. 
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Table 3.3 Financial indicators of the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (billion baht) 
At September 30:             1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Assets 25.45            31.56 35.87 39.79 46.63 53.76 59.21 68.02 77.02 81.82 87.99 93.64
Liabilities 18.57            
             
              
             
             
             
             
            
           
22.28 24.84 26.97 31.53 35.52 37.28 46.04 53.30 55.6 61.07 64.09
Equity 6.88 9.28 11.03 12.82 15.1 18.24 21.93 21.98 23.72 25.09 26.45 29.55
Electric energy sales 31.59 35.65 38.29 42.18 46.52 54.81 60.59 66.06 71.02 66.3 74.6 87.78
Operating revenues 31.8 35.9 38.62 42.99 47.38 55.79 61.64 67.16 72.09 67.4 75.74 88.97
Operating expenses 30.31 33.88 36.76 40.55 44.33 51.65 57.78 63.26 63.75 63.89 72.16 82.66
Operating income 1.49 2.02 1.86 2.45 3.06 4.13 3.86 3.9 3.34 3.51 3.58 6.31
Net income 1.64 2.54 2.29 2.73 3.29 4.52 4.82 4.14 2.73 -0.94 2.16 4.77
Financial ratiosa
    Return on assets (per cent) 6.46 8.03 6.39 6.87 7.05 8.4 8.13 6.09 3.54 -1.14 2.45 5.1 
    Return on equity (per cent) 23.9 27.32 20.79 21.32 21.77 24.77 21.96 18.85 11.5 -3.73 8.17 16.16 
    Debt equity ratio (time) 2.7 2.4 2.25 2.1 2.09 1.95 1.7 2.09 2.25 2.22 2.31 2.17
aAuthor’s calculation 
Note: Data is taken from annual reports whereas data in Chapter 2 and Appendix 1 are taken from the Ministry of Finance. 
Source: Metropolitan Electricity Authority annual reports 
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Table 3.4 Financial indicators of the Provincial Electricity Authority (billion baht) 
At September 30:             1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Assets             51.21 58.4 69.9 76.26 87.22 100.82 117.81 138.32 147.32 151.54 157.31 167.96
Liabilities             
             
             
             
             
             
             
            
           
38.97 40.58 44.86 48.38 51.55 56.77 64.59 82.27 88.51 99.09 103.81 110.76
Equity 12.25 17.82 25.04 27.88 35.67 44.04 53.21 56.05 58.81 52.45 53.5 57.21
Electric energy sales 29.03 34.22 39.03 46.71 51.72 64.73 75.4 88.01 100.22 98.63 112.77 134.64
Operating revenues 29.87 35.3 40.81 48.58 53.98 67.24 77.92 90.95 103.14 101.72 115.83 137.77
Operating expenses 26.69 30.76 33.86 39.69 43.55 57.05 68.23 78.82 92.57 93.59 108.41 132.6
Operating income 3.17 4.55 6.94 8.89 10.43 10.18 9.69 12.13 10.56 8.13 7.42 5.17
Net income 3.85 5.81 7.66 9.84 11.37 11.95 12.03 9.07 10.49 -7.5 6.70 5.72
Financial ratiosa
    Return on assets (per cent) 7.52 9.94 10.96 12.9 13.03 11.85 10.21 6.55 7.12 -4.95 4.26 3.4 
    Return on equity (per cent) 31.43 32.59 30.6 35.28 31.87 27.13 22.60 16.18 17.83 -14.3 12.52 9.99 
    Debt equity ratio (time) 3.18 2.28 1.79 1.74 1.45 1.29 1.21 1.47 1.51 1.89 1.94 1.94
aAuthor’s calculation 
Note: Data is taken from annual reports whereas data in Chapter 2 and Appendix 1 are taken from the Ministry of Finance. 
Source: Provincial Electricity Authority annual reports 
 41 
3.2.3 Private sector participation in the electricity supply industry 
In the past, the ESI model of Thailand was based on absolute monopoly power 
supply and public ownership.  
Since 1992 the government has been promoting greater role for the private sector in 
electricity generation business. Instead of attracting private capital by raising funds 
from the domestic market through the sale of government securities and bonds, the 
government prefers to invite the private sector to invest directly in the generation 
business. In 1992 the EGAT Act was amended to end EGAT’s monopoly status in 
generation and permit the private production and sale of electricity. 
As a result of this policy, the role of the private sector has been increasing. Table 3.5 
shows that the proportion of electricity generated by EGAT has decreased from 
86.66 per cent of the gross energy generated and purchased in Thailand in 1996 to 
59.86 per cent in 2001. In the same period, the proportion of electricity generated by 
private sector has increased from 13.34 per cent in 1996 to 40.14 per cent in 2001. 
Important measures have been implemented to promote a greater role of the private 
sector, particularly in the generation business.  
The first measure is the establishment of EGAT’s subsidiary companies, which 
would eventually be privatised and listed on the stock market. Through this measure, 
the full privatisation of EGAT can be avoided, with the main advantage for EGAT 
being to continue its normal operation without interruption. 
Secondly, the ESI has been deregulated to allow private sector investment in power 
generation projects, in the form of both the SPP program and the IPP program. The 
electricity sales are made to EGAT under PPAs. 
Finally, to reduce the investment burden EGAT also purchases electricity from the 
neighbouring countries: Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Malaysia. 
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Table 3.5 Gross energy generation and purchase in Thailand (million kilowatt-hour) 
Source      1996 Per cent of total in 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Per cent of total 
in 2001 
EGAT generation         
Natural gas         
         
         
         
      
     
         
        
         
         
       
         
24,145 28.1 27,865.31 31,832.96 32,749.17 35,804.64 34,871.18 33.8
Fuel oil 22,660 26.37 19,093.53 18,285.97 15,945.38 11,453.75 3,110.61 3.02
Lignite 16,770 19.52 18,808.54 16,817.17 15,587.78 15,450.51 17,306.58 16.78
Hydro 7,234 8.42 7,055.47 5,881.87 3,433.46 5,296.03 6,310.55 6.12
Diesel oil 3,650 4.25 3,472.3 1,104.73 726.66 155.69 155.23 0.15
Renewable Energy 1.3 -a 1.53 1.38 1.74 1.82 1.74 -a
Total EGAT generation 74,460.3 86.66 76,296.68 73,924.08 68,444.19 68,162.44 61,755.89 59.86
Purchase from 
EGAT's subsidiaries
    EGCO         
          REGCO .. n.a. .. 8,535.15 8,299.27 8,245.57 6,352.25 6.16 
          KEGCO .. n.a. .. 5,432.31 5,649.05 5,749.71 5,831.74 5.65 
    RGCO - n.a. - - - - 6,915.38 6.7 
IPPs
    Independent Power  
    (Thailand) Co. Ltd - n.a. - - - 772.49 3,723.62 3.61
    Tri Energy Co. Ltd  - n.a. - - - 1,424.29 4,273.03 4.14 
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      Source 1996 Per cent of total in 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Per cent of total 
in 2001 
SPPs       - n.a. - 2,825.89 6,085.07 9,408.82 11,389.29 11.04
Department of Energy 
Development and Promotion  -        
         
     
         
n.a. - 16.05 32.56 26.80 30.1 0.03
Foreign countries
    Laos .. n.a. .. 1,385.24 1,894.9 2,973.48 2,885.24 2.8 
    Malaysia .. n.a. .. 15.72 8.95 17.12 8.66 0.01 
Total purchase 11,464 13.34 16,427.98 18,210.36 21,969.8 28,618.28 41,409.31 40.14
Grand total 85,924.3 100 92,724.66 92,134.44 90,413.99 96,780.72 103,165.2 100
a 0.002 per cent 
n.a. not applicable 
.. not available 
- zero 
Note: EGCO is Electricity Generating Public Company Limited. REGCO is Rayong Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. KEGCO is Khanom Electricity Generating Co. 
Ltd. RGCO is Ratchaburi Generating Co. Ltd. SPPs is Small power producers 
Source: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand annual reports 
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3.2.3.1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand’s subsidiary companies 
In 2002, there were two subsidiary companies, the EGCO and RATCH.  
The EGCO, the first IPP in Thailand, was established on 12 May 1992 in accordance 
with the Cabinet resolution for partial privatisation of EGAT in order to acquire 
some of EGAT’s assets and operation. It had established Rayong Electricity 
Generating Co. Ltd. to purchase Rayong power station in Rayong province with the 
installed capacity of 1,232 MW from EGAT on 7 December 1994 for 17 billion baht. 
On 20 February 1995, EGCO established Khanom Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. in 
order to acquire Khanom power station with total capacity of 824 MW in Nakorn Sri 
Thammarat province from EGAT on 19 June 1996.  
The second subsidiary is the RATCH, which was established in March 2000 with a 
registered capital of 300 million baht and 100 per cent ownership by EGAT. RATCH 
formed a wholly owned subsidiary, Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. in 
March 2000 to purchase Ratchaburi power plant complex, which has a production 
capacity of 3,645 MW and is expandable to 5,200 MW, from EGAT for 60 billion 
baht. 
Both EGCO and RATCH were initially 100 per cent owned by EGAT. After public 
offering to both international and domestic investors, EGAT’s holding in EGCO and 
RATCH was reduced to 25.48 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively.1 Both 
companies now operate power plants and sell electricity to EGAT under long-term 
PPAs.2 From Table 3.5, in 2001 the electricity supplied by both subsidiaries to 
EGAT accounted for 18.51 per cent of the gross energy generated and purchased in 
Thailand. Both subsidiaries are considered to be the largest electricity private 
generators. Even though setting up EGAT’s own subsidiaries has increased the 
number of players in the generation industry, it has been criticized for giving an 
                                                 
1 As of 31 March 2001, the shareholding structure of the EGCO comprises 25.48 per cent from 
EGAT, 20.78 per cent from CLP Power Projects (Thailand) Limited and 53.74 per cent from the 
general public. For the RATCH, the shareholding structure is roughly the following: 45 per cent of 
shares retained by EGAT, 40 per cent distributed to the general public and 15 per cent by EGAT 
employees and EGAT provident fund.  
2 All electricity produced by Rayong Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. is sold to EGAT, under a 20-year 
PPA whereas output from Khanom Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. is sold directly to EGAT under two 
PPAs, which are one 20-year PPA for the combined-cycle unit and the first thermal plant and one 15-
year PPA for the second thermal plant. Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. sells electricity to 
EGAT by a 25-year PPA. 
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illusory appearance of competition because other companies will not gain advantages 
in the same way as the incumbent firm or the insiders do (Ryder 1997). 
3.2.3.2 Small power producer and independent power producers  
The SPP program commenced in 1992. SPPs are small power projects that are either 
cogenerators or facilities using renewable energy, such as waste/residues from 
agricultural activities or garbage, as fuel, which will contribute to more efficient use 
of domestic energy resources. They sell no more than 90 MW of power to EGAT for 
each project under both firm and nonfirm contracts3. Since each SPP can sell power 
directly to consumers located in its vicinity, its generating capacity is therefore very 
often as large as 120–150 MW.  
As of January 2004, EGAT had eventually signed contracts to purchase power from 
73 SPP projects, with a total generating capacity of 4,258.71 MW and a total sale of 
2,276.2 MW to EGAT, as shown in Table 3.6. Power supplied to the grid comes 
from 61 SPP projects with a total generating capacity of 3,814.01 MW and total sale 
to EGAT of 2,134.6 MW. 
An IPP is a power producer in the private sector with a large generating capacity, 
using commercial energy such as natural gas, indigenous and imported coal and 
emulsion. The IPP program comprises of the larger scale power generation projects 
where investors can sell electricity to EGAT under long-term contracts through a 
competitive bidding process.  
As shown in Table 3.7, PPAs have been signed with seven IPPs giving a total 
capacity of 5,909.50 MW. The generating capacity of each of these IPPs ranges from 
350 MW to 1,400 MW.  
Since then, four IPP projects have supplied electricity into the system on a 
commercial basis: the Independent Power (Thailand) Co. Ltd.; Eastern Power & 
Electric Co. Ltd.; Tri Energy Co. Ltd.; and Bowin Power Co. Ltd. The other three 
IPPs are in the process of obtaining financing.  
The progress of the IPP program is considered slow. The main reason is that there 
were protests from academics, environmentalists and local leaders. There has also 
been debate over the projects of Bo Nok power plant by Gulf Power Generation Co. 
                                                 
3 Firm contract is a contract, which is made in period of at least five years and under which the 
capacity is specified and the capacity and energy payments are made. Non-firm contract is a contract, 
which is made in period of less than five years and under which only the energy payment is made. 
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Ltd. and Hin Krut power plant by Union Power Development Co. Ltd. in Prachuap 
Khiri Khan.  
Opposition claims that the coal fired Bo Nok and Hin Krut power plants would 
damage the environment and would threaten the livelihood of nearby fishing 
industries. Opposition further claims that Bo nok and Hin Krut power plants are 
unnecessary since the country has already secured a steady energy supply.  
On the other hand, National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) claims that without two 
power plants, Thailand may face devastating power shortages (The Nation 2002).  
In May 2002, the government decided to postpone these two projects and leave the 
plan to EGAT to reconsider (Kositchotethana 2002).  
In 2003, EGAT decided that the Hin Krut project is to be relocated to a new site, the 
location of which has not yet been determined, and must switch its fuels from coal to 
natural gas. The Bo Nok project has been cleared to proceed as planned, constructing 
the plant at the original site and using coal as long as the Gulf Power Generation Co. 
Ltd. can convince opponents to accept the project (The Nation 2003). 
The economic crisis in 1997 has also greatly affected the Thai shareholders in SPP 
and IPP projects and forced them to seek new and foreign partners. A number of 
international companies have decided to participate in SPP and IPP projects, 
including Tractebel (Belgium); Imatran Voima Oy (Finland); Energie Baden-
Wuerttemberg (Germany); Sumikin Bussan Corporation (Japan); Fortum Power 
Holding B.V. (Finland); CMS Corporation (the US); China Development Bank 
(China); and Tomen Power Singapore (Singapore). However, in almost all SPP and 
IPP projects there are Thai shareholders in the form of small or big corporations such 
as BANPU; EGCO; Hemaraj Land & Development PLC; Thai Oil Company 
Limited; and Alphatech Group.  
Relying on foreign investment in SPP and IPP projects are common characteristics of 
Asian power markets (International Energy Agency 1997:55). This mainly results 
from the inability of local investors to finance power generation projects, particularly 
in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis. A consequence of the increased level of 
foreign investment is enhanced access to the latest electricity generation technology 
and innovation. 
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Table 3.6 Power purchase from small power producers in Thailand 
As of January 2004 Firm contract Nonfirm contract Total 
Proposals submitted    
    Number of projects 79 50 129 
    Generating capacity (MW) 7,845.11 893.71 8,738.82 
    Sale to EGAT (MW) 4,624.8 292.28 4,917.08 
Received notification of acceptancea    
    Number of projects 42 43 85 
    Generating capacity (MW) 3,655.21 820.7 4,475.91 
    Sale to EGAT (MW) 2,123.3 281.1 2,404.4 
    Type of fuels    
        Natural gas 20 - 20 
        Hydro power - 1 1 
        Coal 5 2 7 
        Oil 1 - 1 
        Bagasse 2 30 32 
        Paddy husk, wood chips 2 1 3 
        Municipal waste - 1 1 
        Bagasse, wood bark, paddy husk 1 - 2 
        Rubber wood chips, palm residue 1 - 1 
        Paddy husk, bagasse, eucalyptus - 1 3 
        Black liquor 1 - 1 
        Waste gas from production process - 2 2 
        Wood bark, wood chips, black liquor 1 - 1 
Contract signed    
    Number of projects 31 38 73 
    Generating capacity (MW) 3,492.51 766.2 4,258.71 
    Sale to EGAT (MW) 2,019.6 256.6 2,276.2 
Supplying power to the grid    
    Number of projects 31 30 61 
    Generating capacity (MW) 3,126.51 687.5 3,814.01 
    Sale to EGAT (MW) 1,912.2 222.4 2,134.6 
- zero 
a Excluding small power producers not presenting the proposal security and withdrawing. 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office  
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Table 3.7 Thailand's independent power producer awards 
Company Capacity (MW) Fuel 
Schedule 
commercial 
operation date 
Commercial 
operation date 
Term 
contract 
(year) 
Phase I (1996–2000)           
Eastern Region           
Independent Power 
(Thailand) Co., Ltd. 
Ao Phai, Chonburi 
700 Gas 21 September 1999 15 August 2000 25 
Eastern Power & 
Electric Co., Ltd. 
Bangbo, 
Samutprakarn 
350 Gas 31 July 2002 25 March 2003 20 
Western Region      
Tri Energy Co., Ltd. 
Ratchaburi 700 Gas 1 July 2000 1 July 2000 20 
Phase II (2001–2003)      
Union Power 
Development Co., 
Ltd. Hin Krut, Bang 
Sa Phan, Prachup 
Kirikhan 
1,400 
(2x700) Coal
a
Unit Ia 
1 March 2008 
Unit IIa 
1 March 2009 
.. 25 
Bowin Power Co., 
Ltd. 
Bowin, Chonburi 
713 
(2x365.5) Gas 1 September 2002 31 January 2003 25 
BLCP Power Limited 
Rayong 
1,346.50 
(2x673.25) Coal 
Unit 1 
1 October 2006 
Unit 2 
1 February 2007 
.. 25 
Gulf Power 
Generation Co., Ltd. 
Bo Nok, Prachup 
Kirikhan 
700 Coala Unit I
a 
1 March 2008 .. 25 
Total 5,909.5     
.. not available 
aUnder negotiation due to project delay and changes in location and fuel. 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office 
 
  
To attract foreign investors, as do other Asian countries, the Board of Investment of 
Thailand provides a number of tax and nontax incentives for investing in the 
electricity generating business. This includes permission for foreign investors to own 
50 per cent or more in an IPP project. However, there is an argument opposing 
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foreign involvement that foreign investors have no interest in the long-term 
economic or social well being of the host countries. It is risky to put the 
infrastructure sector into their hands.  
The introduction of SPP and IPP programs were designed to decentralise electricity 
investment decision making from central utility planners to private power producers 
as well as from central government to provincial, district and local levels of 
government. This allows local residents to participate in decisions on who generates 
electricity and where.  
Most of the new private power producers use relatively clean fuels such as natural 
gas particularly SPPs as shown in Table 3.6, using state-of-the-art generating 
technologies which help reduce environmentally harmful emissions and fuel 
consumption (Ryder 1997). 
Even though the initial objective of the SPP and IPP program is to attract private 
investment in the generation business, EGAT has put restrictions on the amount of 
electricity it will buy. These restrictions have been criticized as unfair treatment of 
new firms in order to protect EGAT’s monopoly status.  
For the IPP program, it can be seen that EGAT prefers the large-scale power plants 
with a capacity of more than 600 MW. As shown in Table 3.7, six of seven IPPs 
have a capacity greater than 600 MW. Two of them have supply greater than 1,000 
MW, however due to technological advances the smaller power plants potentially 
have a cost advantage.  
Through applying this selection criterion, EGAT was perceived to discriminate 
against smaller-scale power producers, reduce the number of bidders and limit the 
competition. As a result, the market may end up with the few large dominant 
producers with little incentive to cut cost and improve efficiency (Ryder 1997; 1999). 
Even though the selection process of IPP has a competitive nature, the benefits of the 
whole process do not directly pass to the consumers. Only competition among the 
IPPs to acquire a licence to generate electricity and supply it to EGAT with the fixed 
and long-term PPA between IPP and EGAT occurs.  
There is no competition to supply electricity at the cheapest possible price to the final 
consumers. Usually the PPAs are signed before the IPP projects start and the 
projected costs of big, expensive and capital-intensive IPP projects are overestimated 
to cover the risk. The conditions in long term PPAs guarantee that the investors are 
protected from market risk.  
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This is common practice among the IPPs, which informally form a cartel to push up 
the contract price between themselves and EGAT, finally passing down to the 
consumers (Lorchirachoolkul 2001:4). Finally, even if the selected IPPs can achieve 
greater technical efficiency while running their operation, the benefits from reducing 
costs will stay with them and not be passed on to the consumers because long term 
contracts which are already signed are seldom changed.  
In summary, the benefits claimed by many to flow from promoting competition in 
this industry by increasing private sector participation are dubious. 
3.2.3.3 Purchase from foreign countries 
Besides the SPP and IPP programs, another program that can reduce the investment 
burden of EGAT is the purchase of electricity from neighbouring countries. 
Currently Thailand trades electricity with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Malaysia.  
As shown in Table 3.8, Thailand has been net importer of electricity since 1998.  
The major import source is the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The share of 
electricity purchased from Lao People’s Democratic Republic accounted for 2.8 per 
cent of gross energy generated and purchased in 2001, as shown in Table 3.5.  Two 
projects, in which PPAs have been signed with Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and been in operation since 1998 and 1999, are Theun-Hinboun project with a 
capacity of 187 MW and Houay Ho project with a capacity of 126 MW respectively.  
Recently the Government of Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the Union of Myanmar and the People’s Republic of China to purchase electricity 
from 2010 and 2017 respectively, along with an Agreement on the Power Sector 
Cooperation Program with Cambodia.  
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Table 3.8 Thailand’s foreign trade of electricity (million kWh) 
Lao  Malaysia 
Year 
Export Import Net export  Export Import Net export 
1996 83 - 83  1 - 1 
1997 92.95 - 92.95  - - - 
1998 127.75 1,385.24 -1,257.49  - 15.72 -15.72 
1999 168.9 1,894.9 -1,726  0.94 8.95 -8.01 
2000 145.96 2,973.48 -2,827.52  0.72 17.12 -16.4 
2001 165.66 2,885.24 -2,719.58  5.36 8.66 -3.3 
- zero 
Source: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand annual reports 
 
3.3 Regulatory body and regulation of electricity supply industry in Thailand 
There is no formal and independent regulatory body for ESI in Thailand. National 
energy policy, management and development and key regulatory functions such as 
price regulation, are conducted by the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC), 
established under the National Energy Policy Council Act, B.E. 2535 (1992). The 
Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) acts as the Secretariat, which in turn acts 
as the arm of the cabinet responsible for the energy sector. NEPC employs a cost of 
service form of control to regulate retail electricity tariff together with regulation 
with CPI-X on base electricity tariff, where CPI is Consumer Price Index and X is 
efficiency improvement factor.4  
The Ministry of Energy5 (MOE) was set up in 2002 to unify more than 20 
government agencies in nine ministries and SOEs directly related to the energy 
planning policy, regulation and implementation. The MOE, established under the 
Parliament Act for reorganising Ministries, Division 28, 2002, has the authority 
cover the procurement, development and management of energy in Thailand. 
As shown in Figure 3.2 the MOE organisation comprises of the Office of the 
Minister;  Office of the Permanent Secretary; Department of Mineral Fuels (formerly 
Natural Fuel Division under the Department of Mineral Resources, Ministry of 
                                                 
4 Tariff structure and determination will be discussed in the Section 3.4. 
5 On 3 October 2002 the Thaksin government decided to restructure the Cabinet and established the 
new ministries, one of which is the Ministry of Energy. 
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Industry); Department of Energy Business (formerly the Fuel Storage Safety Control 
Division under the Department of Public Works, Ministry of Interior and Bureau of 
Fuel Oil under the Department of Business Registration, Ministry of Commerce); 
Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency (formerly the 
Department of Energy Development and Promotion under the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Environment); and EPPO (formerly the National Energy Policy 
Office (NEPO) under the Office of the Prime Minister). 
 
Figure 3.2 Authorities in energy sector in Thailand 
 
Cabinet 
National Energy Policy Council 
Ministry of Energy 
Office of the 
Minister 
Office of the 
Permanent Secretary
Energy Policy 
and Planning 
Office 
Department 
of Mineral 
Fuel 
Department 
of Energy 
Business 
Alternative and 
Conservative 
Energy 
Department 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office  
 
Note also the energy-related SOEs: EGAT (formerly under the Office of the Prime 
Minister); the PTT Public Company Limited (formerly under the Ministry of 
Industry) and Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited (formerly under the 
Ministry of Finance) were transferred to the MOE. The MEA and PEA, which are 
currently under the Ministry of Interior, will be transferred to the MOE in 2004. 
The Department of Mineral Funds is assigned to explore, develop and manage 
petroleum and coal resources. In contrast the Department of Energy Business is 
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responsible for the regulation of safety and quality in oil and gas businesses, along 
with consumer protection. The main task of the Department of Alternative Energy 
Development and Efficiency is research and development of renewable energy and 
energy conservation.  
EPPO is responsible for strategic energy planning to achieve the objectives of 
sufficient energy at fair prices to enhance competitiveness in the real sector. 
3.4 Electricity tariff structure in Thailand 
Due to the 1997 economic crisis, decreasing power demands and changing load 
patterns, the electricity tariff restructuring was studied by a consultant team of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Merz & McLellan, engaged by NEPO. The objectives 
of the study were to study the cost structures of all activities of ESI, namely 
generation, transmission and distribution, and to propose a new tariff structure for 
both bulk supply and retail supply. The new tariff structure was approved by the 
Cabinet on 3 October 2000 and became effective as from October 2000. 
Retail electricity tariff comprises of base tariff and additional costs from automatic 
adjustment mechanism (Ft). The details of the electricity tariff structure are provided 
as follows.6
3.4.1 Criteria for electricity base tariff determination 
The main criteria in determining the base tariff structure are the load pattern, the 
marginal costs, the revenue requirement of three SOEs, financial criteria, and social 
criteria. The base tariff is calculated based on present values of variables from these 
criteria by using financial model. 
3.4.1.1 Load pattern 
Power consumption in Thailand varies over a day, which is described as the peak 
period and off-peak period as follows: 
During the peak period, EGAT has to operate its generating capacity to the point of 
the minimum reserve margin, whereas PEA and MEA have to use full dispatch 
capacity.  
 
 
                                                 
6 This section is summarised from National Energy Policy Office (2001).  
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Table 3.9 Load pattern 
Period Time Day 
Peak 09.00–22.00 Monday-Saturday 
Off-Peak 22.00–09.00 0.00–24.00 
Monday-Saturday 
Sunday 
Source: National Energy Policy Office 
 
Therefore if demand increases in the peak period, the power sector would have been 
required to increase investment in power generation and distribution. These costs 
will only increase in the long run.  
The consumers, who consume electricity during the peak period, should pay 
electricity at a higher rate than the consumers in the off-peak period. Therefore, to 
create efficient electricity consumption the time-of-day rate, which is charged 
different rates at the different periods of day, was introduced in 1991.  
In early 1997, due to the changing load pattern the time-of-use rate was introduced as 
an alternative for the time-of-day customers and as a compulsory rate for new power 
consumers. Under the time-of-use rate, the tariff would be expensive during the peak 
period and would be cheaper during the off-peak period. 
However due to the problem of the meter installation expense, a tariff structure that 
reflects the marginal costs such as time-of-day and time-of-use rates could not be 
applied to all consumers. Therefore, the consumers with similar load pattern would 
be placed into the same categories. There are seven categories: residential, small 
general services, medium general services, large general services, specific business, 
government institutions and nonprofit organization, as well as agricultural pumping. 
3.4.1.2 Marginal costs 
To determine the tariff structure, the marginal costs of four levels: generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing have to be included. The marginal costs of 
generation and distribution will differ in each period and even each hour, and vary 
due to geographical locations.  
However determination of the tariffs from the hourly changing marginal cost requires 
a considerable expenditure on meter installation. Therefore the two-part tariff was 
designed to capture both demand charge and energy charge in order to best reflect 
 55
marginal costs. The energy charge is calculated from the generation costs plus loss in 
the system whereas the demand charge is calculated from the costs of transmission 
and distribution systems.  
The marginal cost based tariff structure, excluding the financial criteria for three 
SOEs in ESI, includes of the marginal cost based bulk supply tariff of 1.70 
baht/kWh. The marginal cost based retail tariff classified by consumer categories and 
displayed in Table 3.10. 
 
Table 3.10 Marginal cost based retail tariff on average 
Consumer category 
Marginal cost based retail 
tariff on average 
(baht/kWh) 
Residential 2.31 
Small general services 2.47 
Medium general services 1.94 
Large general services 1.9 
Specific business 1.78 
Government institutions and nonprofit organisation 2.31 
Agricultural pumping 2.37 
Street lighting 1.83 
Total 2.08 
Source: National Energy Policy Office 
 
3.4.1.3 Revenue requirement 
Aside from the marginal costs that must be taken into account, the revenue 
requirement of the three SOEs must be included in determining tariff structure as 
well as ensuring financial stability. Each year the three SOEs will develop financial 
projections based on assumptions concerning fuel prices, inflation rates, load 
forecasts, and the investment plans of each SOE. 
To encourage the three SOEs to improve their efficiency on their operation, the three 
SOEs are regulated by CPI-X. Total operating cost is separated into three portions: 
20, 40 and 40 per cent of fixed costs, uncontrollable costs and controllable variable 
costs respectively. Only controllable variable costs are regulated by CPI-X. 
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Controllable variable costs are estimated to increase by (1+CPI-X) each year. X 
factor was taken from London Economics (1997) which are 5.8, 2.6 and 5.1 per cent 
for generation, transmission, and distribution and supply, respectively. These revenue 
requirement and efficiency levels has not been reviewed and revised since then.  
It should be noted that when regulation by CPI-X was imposed, ESI restructuring in 
Thailand has not been fully undertaken. The government decided to impose this 
regulation on the three SOEs by classified X factor according to different 
characteristic of activities: natural monopoly (transmission and distribution) and 
competitive activities (generation). 
Then an appropriate level of revenue requirement is also determined by including 
financial criteria.  
3.4.1.4 Financial criteria 
For the financial criteria, the emphasis is placed on ‘cash-based’ requirements in 
order to generate sufficient revenue to enable the three SOEs to make investments 
and to pay back loans, including interest.  
These financial criteria are in line with the conditions for a loan guarantee from the 
World Bank. The criteria are as follows: 
• minimum self-financing ratio: the ratio of funds generated from internal sources 
over the average three-year capital expenditure; 
• minimum debt-service coverage ratio: the ratio of net cash income before interest 
over debt service requirement for the year; and 
• maximum debt/equity ratio: the ratio of long-term debt over total equity. 
These criteria aim for financial viability for the three SOEs. The idea, which is the 
same as the concept of rate of return regulation, is to ensure that SOEs have a 
considerable rate of return to cover the cost of operations and investment, but it does 
not provide SOEs with incentives to improve efficiency and to reduce costs in the 
way that incentive regulation does. 
The current financial criteria are as follows: 
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Table 3.11 Financial criteria of revenue requirement 
 EGAT MEA PEA 
Self-financing ratio (per cent) >25 >25 >25 
Debt service coverage ratio  (time) >1.3 >1.5 >1.5 
Debt equity ratio (time) <1.5 <1.5 <1.5 
Source: National Energy Policy Office 
 
In order that the financial criteria would reflect as closely as possible the actual 
financial status of the utilities, the definitions of the financial performance criteria 
has been amended.  
Firstly, the requirement to meet the financial criteria during the initial period of the 
introduction of this tariff structure should be relaxed by considering the average 
outcome instead of isolated annual figures. Therefore, the three SOEs should 
maintain the debt-service coverage ratio to be no less than 1.1 in each year.  
Secondly, the definitions of self-financing ratio and debt-service coverage ratio have 
been amended to integrate the revenue obtained from the privatisation or sale of 
assets. 
3.4.1.5 Social and political criteria 
The key social and political criteria for the electricity tariff determination are as 
follows: 
• uniform tariffs should be applied nationwide; 
• subsidization for residential customers should remain, particularly for small 
residential consumers whose consumption is low; and 
• the structure of electricity tariffs for other consumer categories should be 
designed to best reflect the marginal costs. 
Note that among these criteria there is potential conflict between the first two equity 
criteria and the last efficiency criterion. 
3.4.2 Bulk supply tariff and retail tariff structure 
The marginal cost based bulk supply tariff and retail tariff structure was revised by 
taking into account the financial criteria of the three power SOEs and social and 
political criteria. 
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3.4.2.1 Bulk supply tariff 
The bulk supply tariff that EGAT charge to the MEA and PEA comprises of the 
generation and transmission costs. The tariffs will vary according to the voltage 
levels and periods of time of consumption as follows. 
 
Table 3.12 Bulk supply tariff structure (excluding value added tax and 
automatic adjustment clause (Ft)) (baht/kWh) 
Generation cost  Transmission cost  Total 
Voltage level 
Peak Off-peak  Peak Off-peak  Peak Off-peak 
230 kW 1.88 1.15  0.28 -  2.16 1.15 
Exit of a 230: 115/69 
kW substation 1.88 1.15 
 
0.5 - 
 
2.38 1.15 
End of 115–69 kW line 1.94 1.18 
 
0.87 - 
 
2.81 1.18 
11–33 kW line 1.95 1.18  1.04 -  2.99 1.18 
- zero 
Note: Peak stands for peak period including 09.00–22.00 hours Monday to Saturday. 
Off-Peak stands for off-peak period including 22.00–09.00 hours Monday to Saturday and        
0.00–24.00 hours Sunday. 
Source: National Energy Policy Office 
 
In the past, EGAT sold electricity to the PEA at a lower wholesale rate than to the 
MEA. This was due to uniform retail tariff being applied nationwide. With the 
distribution costs for consumers in the PEA areas being higher than in the MEA 
areas, a cross-subsidy from MEA to PEA was required via a bulk supply tariff. A 
more explicit approach regarding subsidization for the PEA was later established, in 
the form of a surcharge on the tariff that EGAT imposed on the MEA and a 
deduction from the tariff that EGAT imposed on the PEA.  
Under the new bulk supply tariff structure, the tariff charged by EGAT to MEA and 
PEA is the same without any surcharge or deduction, with the subsidization between 
MEA and PEA being in the form of a lump sum financial transfer. The amount of 
financial transfer will vary according to the remittance rates of annual net profits of 
the three SOEs to the government. The financial transfers from MEA to the PEA 
during 2001–03 are shown in Table 3.13. 
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Table 3.13 Financial transfers from Metropolitan Electricity Authority to 
Provincial Electricity Authority (million baht) 
 2001 2002 2003 
30 per cent remittance to the government 7,979 8,650 9,152 
40 per cent remittance to the government 
during 2000–2001 and 35 per cent during 
2002–2003 
8,153 8,589 9,041 
Source: National Energy Policy Office 
 
Adjustment of the financial transfers will be made annually based on the allowed 
revenue of MEA and PEA. 
3.4.2.2 Retail tariff structure 
Retail tariff includes base tariff calculated from revenue requirement and marginal 
cost of each SOE and taken into account the other factors as explained above; and 
additional tariff from automatic adjustment mechanism (Ft). 
The electricity tariff structures as base tariff are different between consumer 
categories.  
To capture the fluctuation of the SOEs’s uncontrollable costs which cannot be 
predicted in revenue requirement, Ft has been introduced since 1992. Estimation 
methods of Ft have changed from time to time. Only the estimation method approved 
in 2000 will be explained here.  
Ft is separated by individual businesses: generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail. The key elements for the determination of Ft are the change in fuel prices, the 
change in power purchase prices from the non-EGAT generators, the change in 
actual and projection of base tariff calculation of the three SOEs, the inflation rate, 
change in electricity demand and the change of foreign exchange rates. The Ft will be 
adjusted on a four-month basis.  
In sum the monthly tariff collected from consumers will comprise two parts which 
are the base tariff and tariff derived from the Ft formula. 
MEA and PEA have a schedule of retail tariffs to charge customers. With the current 
customer category, the current tariffs and the previous tariffs by including the Ft of 
0.65 baht/kWh are as follows: 
 60
Table 3.14 Comparison of the previous and current retail tariff (Including 
Ft=0.65 bath/kWh) (bath/kWh) 
Customer category Previous retail tariff  (1) 
Current retail 
tariff (2) 
Difference of (1) and (2) 
(per cent) 
Residential 2.29 2.28 -0.46 
    <150 kWh/month 1.88 1.88 - 
    >150 kWh/month 2.54 2.52 -0.84 
Small general service 2.86 2.77 -2.93 
Medium general service 2.31 2.31 -0.16 
    Low voltage 2.37 2.37 - 
    Medium and high voltage 2.3 2.29 -0.19 
    <250,000 kWh/month 
     (Two-Part Tariff) 2.34 2.34 - 
    <250,000 kWh/month (TOU) 2.35 2.16 -7.84 
     >250,000 kWh/month 2.09 2.07 -1.11 
Large general service 2.07 2 -3.53 
     Low voltage 2.35 2.3 -1.96 
     Medium voltage 2.16 2.08 -3.79 
        TOD to TOU 2.19 2.12 -3.36 
        TOU 1.94 1.79 -7.37 
     High voltage 1.95 1.85 -5.25 
        TOD to TOU 2.01 1.9 -5.2 
        TOU 1.87 1.83 -2.15 
Specific business 2.16 2 -7.46 
     Low voltage 2.19 2.08 -5.23 
     Medium voltage 2.12 1.96 -7.54 
     High voltage 2.98 2.72 -8.64 
Government institutions 2.32 2.27 -2.41 
     Low voltage 2.45 2.46 0.26 
     Medium voltage 2.43 2.15 -11.24 
     High voltage 2.19 1.98 -9.6 
Agricultural pumping 1.8 1.8 - 
     Low voltage 1.8 1.8 - 
     Medium voltage 1.8 1.8 - 
Average 2.26 2.21 -2.11 
- zero 
Source: National Energy Policy Office 
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As shown in Table 3.14, the current tariffs have been generally decreased. Even 
though the need for marginal cost based pricing is recognised, in practice it has not 
been able to be fully implemented because of the need to subsidise provincial and 
small energy consumers. The present tariff structure effectively supports two levels 
of cross subsidies: metropolitan consumers providing a subsidy to provincial 
consumers and large users subsidising the smaller consumers. 
3.5 Electricity supply industry restructuring and privatisation in Thailand 
Following the 1997 financial crisis, the policy to promote the private sector role in 
ESI has been proceeded under the Master Plan.  
According to the Master Plan, the main objectives in promoting greater private sector 
participation in ESI are to increase competition, to improve efficiency, to reduce the 
investment burden on the government as well as nonfinancial state enterprise debt, to 
promote the more efficient use of energy such as that demonstrated by SPP projects 
using the cogeneration system, and to ensure power users are given the best possible 
services, price levels and safety standards. 
However since the ESI is subject to natural monopolies, the increase in the role of 
the private sector and privatisation must be implemented in parallel with the ESI 
restructuring and deregulation programs in order to promote competition and avoid 
the transfer of public monopolies to private sector monopolies. This section aims to 
discuss the reasons why ESI restructuring was needed by policy makers and the 
progress of ESI restructuring in Thailand. 
3.5.1 Why electricity supply industry restructuring and privatisation? 
ESI policy makers claimed that the ESI restructuring plan is needed because the 
existing ESI structure and policy affects consumers in numerous ways, which can be 
summarised as follows together with a discussion on reasons why the government 
has a policy to restructure the ESI in Thailand. 
3.5.1.1 Electricity tariffs 
The current electricity tariff is based on the financial requirements, which are, firstly, 
the self-financing ratio of at least 25 per cent in order to assist EGAT, MEA and PEA 
to invest more in the future, and, secondly, the debt service coverage ratio of at least 
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1.3 per cent for EGAT and 1.5 per cent for the MEA and PEA in order to pay back 
capital loans and interest. Under the current tariff determination, these three SOEs 
are financially safeguarded throughout the lifetime of the power plants and the power 
system even if they perform inefficiently or the demand decreases. The current tariff 
structure does not reflect the performance of the firms and does not give incentive for 
them to operate efficiently. 
3.5.1.2 Supply and service quality 
The current ESI structure contributes to enhancing cooperation among the 
generation, transmission and distribution activities in order that minimal 
interruptions occur in its power system or that if an interruption does occurs, it will 
last for the shortest time possible, guaranteeing supply and service quality. This is 
proven by the fact that a nationwide blackout for several hours has never occurred in 
Thailand.  
Under the new ESI structure with the expected competitive model, the generating 
utilities will have a greater incentive to maintain the supply and service quality. The 
service standard will be developed together with the evaluation system. 
Imposing incentives on the firms in ESI to operate efficiently, which ultimately leads 
to an improvement in supply and service quality and on efficiently determined tariff 
structure, is a major rationale for ESI restructuring. It should be emphasised, 
however, that privatisation of SOEs in ESI may not be the only way to achieve those 
goals. These objectives could be achieved under public ownership provided that 
competition in the ESI has been promoted and new entry has been allowed.  
3.5.1.3 Poor performance in state owned enterprises 
Even though the three SOEs in ESI in Thailand are profitable, it is unnecessary that 
they operate technically efficiently. The lack of efficiency in the organizational and 
human resource management of these SOEs is also a major problem affecting the 
operation and management of the enterprises, and is a result of the large 
organizational size and the centralized management and the politicised management 
policy. Operations in a large organisation with a lot of staff must follow various 
bureaucratic process and procedures. This issue will be intensively discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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3.5.1.4 Increasing liabilities of state owned enterprises 
Since their establishment, EGAT, MEA and PEA have performed adequately their 
duties in supplying electricity to meet domestic demand. Over the last two decades 
(1980–90s) the economy of Thailand has boomed and the demand for electricity has 
increased tremendously.  
To match the growing demand, EGAT has increased its investments in new power 
plants, however this leads to a substantial investment burden and subsequently 
requires large funding in term of debt financing. In 2003, the debt of SOEs in ESI 
was 242.87 billion baht, accounting for 28.54 per cent of nonfinancial state enterprise 
debt.  Debt incurred by EGAT (150.84 billion baht) in 2003 is the largest amount 
among the SOEs in the ESI as well as nonfinancial state enterprises. 
For these SOEs, the sources of funding mainly come from self-financing revenue, 
foreign loans, international monetary institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, financial institutions or governments of countries who are 
willing to offer loans. Being owned by the state, these SOEs’ loan commitments are 
guaranteed by the government.  
As shown in Table 3.15, 82.3 per cent of the total debt incurred by the three SOEs is 
guaranteed by government. 64.56 per cent of guaranteed debt incurred by these SOEs 
is from external sources. This implies that the general public as taxpayers have to 
share the liability burden when these SOEs default. To reduce the burden of public 
borrowing and to allow for the rapid expansion of power supply to meet demand, the 
deregulation of the ESI and promotion of private participation were recommended.  
This debt issue relates to EGAT investment decisions. EGAT investment is based on 
the long-term demand forecasts with the assumption that electricity demand would 
rise steadily along with projections of economic growth.  
The question arises whether this assumption is valid. There is criticism that the 
demand forecasts were wrong and the risk of overestimation is quite high, which can 
lead to over-investment in this sector. The available capacity of EGAT and its 
subsidiaries and the overwhelming response to the IPP and SPP programs are 
sufficient to meet demand, therefore state investment in power plants may not be 
necessary. 
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Table 3.15 Total debt outstanding of nonfinancial state enterprises and state 
owned enterprises in the electricity supply industry in 2003 (billion 
baht) 
At September 30: Guaranteed Nonguaranteed Total As per cent of NFSE debt
Nonfinancial State  
Enterprise (NFSE) 694.59 156.46 851.05 100 
     External 305.12 61.14 n.a. n.a. 
     Domestic 389.47 95.32 n.a. n.a. 
Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand 136.54 14.3 150.84 17.72 
     External 79.39 - n.a. n.a. 
     Domestic 57.15 14.3 n.a. n.a. 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority 15.58 12.12 27.7 3.26 
     External 8.88 - n.a. n.a. 
     Domestic 6.7 12.12 n.a. n.a. 
Provincial Electricity Authority 47.76 16.57 64.32 7.56 
      External 40.78 - n.a. n.a. 
      Domestic 6.98 16.57 n.a. n.a. 
Total debt of SOEs in ESI 199.88 42.99 242.87 28.54 
As per cent of SOEs in ESI debt 82.3 17.7 n.a. n.a. 
As per cent of NFSE debt 28.78 27.48 n.a. n.a. 
n.a. not applicable 
- zero 
Note: NFSE is nonfinancial state enterprise, SOE is state owned enterprise and ESI is 
electricity supply industry. 
Source: Public Debt Management Office,   Ministry of Finance 
 
3.5.2 Electricity supply industry models 
Before discussing progress on ESI restructuring in Thailand, ESI models adopted in 
the world will be discussed. ESI reform in many countries since the early 1990s has 
followed a broadly similar pattern. 
In many developing countries, reform of the power sector starts from a market 
structure characterised by public ownership, legal monopoly and a vertically 
integrated supply chain linking power generation, transmission, distribution and 
customer services. The process of full reform toward competition in the power sector 
consists of four main stages.  
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The first is the formation and approval of ESI policy by government with 
commitment to sustain the reform process. The second is development of an 
independent regulatory body and transparent regulatory framework for the ESI.  The 
third is vertical and horizontal disintegration of generation from transmission and 
distribution in current SOEs and the establishment of electricity market. There is also 
the issue of open access of transmission and distribution companies to all network 
users on nondiscriminatory terms. The last is divestiture of the public ownership at 
least in generation and distribution activities. Note that the detailed design of reform 
program varies, leading to a variety of market structures, degrees of private 
participation and sequencing of reform processes. 
According to Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), the variety of market structures can be 
broadly categorized by the degree of competition as follows.  
Firstly a monopoly model is characterised by no competition at any level of activity 
and only a single monopolist producing and delivering electricity to the users. This is 
the basic model adopted by most developing countries before reforms.  
The second is a purchasing agency or single buyer model, which allows a single 
buyer or purchasing agency to purchase electricity from generators and sell 
electricity to distribution companies and large or industrial users. The generation is 
separated from transmission and distribution activities.  This model will encourage 
the competition in generating sector and allow entry of IPPs. Usually this single 
buyer or purchasing agency is state owned to facilitate regulation.  
The third is the wholesale competition model, which allows distribution companies 
to purchase electricity directly from any generator, transmit electricity under open 
access arrangements over the transmission system to their service area and deliver it 
over their local grids to their customers. This model creates competition in the 
wholesale market but the local distribution companies still retain their monopoly 
over supply to their local customers.  
The final model is the retail competition model, which allows all customers to 
choose their electricity supplier either through choice of retail supplier or by direct 
access to the wholesale market. 
To achieve effective competition, particularly in the wholesale and retail competition 
model, nondiscriminatory access to the transmission grid needs to be secured. 
According to International Energy Agency (1999), there are two basic models 
developed so far.  
 66
The first is a grid access model. Under this model, the incumbent owner of the grid 
must allow competitors or newcomers to use it without discriminatory action. Under 
this model vertical disintegration is not required. This model was chosen for the 
liberalisation of the power market across the European Union and Order 888 of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  
The second is the competitive pool model. This model is a combination of grid 
access rules and a competitive spot market for wholesale electricity. It requires 
vertical disintegration of generation and transmission and of generation and supply.  
The retail competition model can be achieved through a combination of the 
competitive pool and grid access models such as the case in Victoria, Australia 
(International Energy Agency 1999).  
The experience in England and Wales in the UK, who have employed the 
competitive power pool since 1990, is good example of this model in practice. 
Tipmabutr and Limpasuwan (2004) provide evidence that during 1990s operation of 
power pool in the UK resulting in decrease in electricity prices in the wholesale 
market.  
However there were some problems in power pool operations. The pricing 
mechanism was too complicated. The capacity payment did not reach its target and 
did not provide adequate incentive for long-term investment. Electricity prices did 
not reflect the true production costs. Gaming was possible in the power pool. And 
consumers realistically had few choices.  
Therefore another form of competition in the wholesale market, called New 
Electricity Trading Agreements, was introduced in 2001 to replace power pool 
(Tipmabutr and Limpasuwan 2004).  
New Electricity Trading Agreements provide freedom to generators and consumers 
to directly negotiate and make contracts for selling and purchasing electricity with 
each other In power pool, generators and consumers had to trade electricity in the 
pool only.  
New Electricity Trading Agreements allow electricity to be traded many years ahead 
by bilateral contracts and over-the-counter trading in future markets. It also allows 
short term trading for 24 hours ahead before gate closure in the form of power 
exchange. After gate closure, the imbalances will be managed by the National Grid 
Company employing a balancing mechanism according to the Balancing and 
Settlement Code.  
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To incorporate Scotland into the same electricity system and to improve operations 
under New Electricity Trading Agreements, the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Agreement will be introduced in October 2004 (Tipmabutr and 
Limpasuwan 2004). 
In practice, there are some variations from the grid access and competitive pool 
models. Among these variations, a single buyer model, where a vertically integrated 
state-owned utility coexists with a competitive section based on the grid access 
model, has been adopted by Japan, France, Portugal and Spain.  
As in other developing countries, Thailand has focused on moving from a monopoly 
model to a wholesale competition model. Thailand has adopted the purchasing 
agency model as a transition path to wholesale competition since 1992 in order to 
allow time for the generation and distribution sectors to develop a competitive 
wholesale electricity market. Under the purchasing agency model, EGAT is a single 
buyer from private investors: IPPs and EGAT’s subsidiaries, EGCO and RATCH, 
and a single seller to the distribution companies: MEA and PEA and large and 
industrial users. The simple design for trading electricity between EGAT and private 
sectors is a series of bilateral contracts or long-term PPAs.  
The advantage of this model is that the private sector can participate in the 
generation business and can reduce the investment burden of government. Through 
this model, Thailand has opened up the electricity market to new entrants in 
generation activity. This single buyer model is popular among developing countries 
because it assists to maintain a unified wholesale electricity price, simplifying price 
regulation and preserving an important role for the authorities to make decisions on 
investments in generation capacity.  
On a cautionary note Lovei (2000) argues that in countries with a weak or corrupt 
government and low payment discipline, this model has major defects. There would 
be an upward bias in the generation capacity since the decisions about generation 
capacity are made by an authority who does not have to bear the financial burden 
from their decisions and who cannot resist the powerful interest groups. Note also 
that under PPAs with government assurance there is a poor adjustment of electricity 
price, particularly when demand is shrinking, which eventually leads to an increased 
imposition on the taxpayers.  
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3.5.3 Progress in electricity supply industry restructuring and privatisation in 
Thailand 
Since the Master Plan was approved in 1998, there have been several policies and 
plans relating to ESI restructuring. These policies and plans were altered 
intermittantly owing to changes in governments and protests from labour union and 
academicians. In this section, ESI models and restructuring plans proposed and 
rejected since the approval of the Master Plan will be discussed chronologically. It is 
obvious that studies on ESI models and restructuring undertaken by consulting firms 
hired by policy makers and players in industry, particularly EGAT, are not entirely 
supportive of the public benefit aspects. These studies clearly reach conclusions 
predetermined by those commissioning the research. 
3.5.3.1 Power pool and electricity supply industry reform in Thailand 
According to the Master Plan, the future structure of the ESI is planned to follow the 
competitive model, however the guidelines provided in the Master Plan are only a 
general framework to determine the scope and direction of the implementation.  
NEPO was assigned to undertake a detailed study and determine a suitable 
implementation plan. NEPO commissioned a consultant consortium comprising of 
National Economic Research Associates, Barker Dunn & Rossi, Cameron McKenna 
and Presko Shanwick, led by Arthur Andersen Co. Ltd., to undertake a study on 
“Thailand Power Pool and Electricity Supply Industry Reform – Phase 1” (Arthur 
Andersen et al. 2000).  
The reform plan was revised and presented to the Cabinet for consideration, and it 
was finally approved on 25 July 2000 by the Chuan government (National Energy 
Policy Office 2000).  
According to this proposed plan, in the final stage there will be both wholesale and 
retail level competition. The generation companies will offer competitive bids to sell 
power via the Power Pool, while the newly established independent system operator 
will be responsible for merit order dispatch and the regulated electricity delivery 
companies will be responsible for power distribution within their areas.  
The independent regulator will regulate the natural monopoly activities: transmission 
and distribution and also promote real competition in competitive activities, while 
the retail companies will offer retailing services to the consumers.  
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By that time EGAT will be split into generation companies, which will be privatised 
and competing in the power pool before finally owning and be responsible solely for 
transmission activity. MEA and PEA will be split into the regulated electricity 
delivery companies and the retailing companies competing in the retailing market. 
The details of the proposed plan are shown in Appendix 2.  
This ESI reform was planned to start in 2000 and the final stage will start from the 
year 2003, however the plan was delayed and dropped altogether due to the 
following reasons.  
Firstly, EGAT employees are strongly opposed to the plan to separate EGAT’s 
generation facilities from its transmission and hydro electric business. In particular 
they do not want to lose job security and fringe benefits such as free electricity. 
Strong employee opposition forced the government to delay any separation and 
privatisation and allowed time to study on EGAT’s organisational, financial and 
legal structure to better prepare for privatisation and respond to increase competition. 
Secondly, the California power crisis and the implementation of the New Electricity 
Trading Arrangement to replace the power pool in the UK in 2001 fuelled scepticism 
about the merits of introducing a power pool in Thailand. The power pool in 
Thailand was heavily influenced by the debate and criticism. Senior EGAT officials 
said that the power pool mechanism is too risky and too expensive for Thailand. It 
was claimed that the number of power producers competing for sales in the proposed 
pool would be too small to ensure healthy competition but would lead to collusive 
behaviour in fixing prices, which inevitably would be too high (Kositchotethana 
2001).  
Some proponents, however, mentioned that the comparison between California and 
Thailand is invalid. Unlike California, Thailand faces a massive overcapacity of 
electricity generation facilities which will reduce the threat of a repeat of California’s 
blackouts (Crispin 2001).  
Crispin (2001) noted the economist’s opinion that ‘…“What is behind all the rhetoric 
is EGAT’s desire to maintain monopoly control” says Praipol of Thammasat 
University. “California is EGAT’s way of trying to wriggle out of their earlier 
commitments.”…’. 
EGAT officials are also concerned that after implementing the power pool prices 
may increase or fluctuate widely, and there may be insecurity in electricity system 
and a lack of energy. 
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Another point is that since the domestic generation companies are small and do not 
have a strong financial position compared with foreign firms, fear of being taken 
over by foreign companies and the creation of private monopolies after opening up 
the electricity wholesale market has created sentiment against privatisation of SOEs 
in ESI and ESI reform. 
In addition, the change of government in 2001 has delayed the implementation of the 
ESI reform plan. Even if the Thaksin government has set privatisation as an urgent 
policy priority7 and planned to list EGAT in the stock market in the third quarter of 
2003, the reform has slowed down because the government pays much concern to 
vested interests. There was also no consensus among NEPO, SOEs: EGAT, MEA 
and PEA, the private sector and academics who are involved in the issue of ESI 
reform.  
Most of the disagreement however comes from NEPO and EGAT. The idea behind 
the difference between NEPO and EGAT is that EGAT wants to remain a single 
entity and not be broken up before privatisation, whereas NEPO wants the energy 
supply and production units to be separated before they are listed in the Stock 
Exchange Market of Thailand.  
EGAT was also strongly opposed to the power pool concept, and together they have 
drafted a new model, following the Grid Access or Third Party Access Model, which 
they claim is less risky (Kositchotethana 2001). This model would basically allow 
power users to purchase electricity directly from producers and/or their marketing 
arms, at agreed prices plus wheeling8 charges. It will give large industrial consumers 
freedom of electricity choice but leave small consumers and entrepreneurs beholden 
to EGAT’s pricing discretion. The EGAT-backed approach would be partly similar 
to the current situation in Thailand, with the big difference being that consumers 
would not be limited to dealing with the two state distribution monopolies, the MEA 
and PEA. With this model EGAT can maintain its monopoly hold on transmission. 
                                                 
7 On 26 February 2001, the Thaksin government set urgent new policies, one of which is  
 
to utilise state enterprise as key vehicle to mobilise domestic resources from Thai investors 
to promote revitalisation and development of the Thai economy through selling shares of 
incorporating a holding company incorporated by grouping a number of state enterprises 
with strong income potentials employing professional management and free from political 
interference as one alternative and listing of individual state enterprise directly in the Stock 
Exchange Market of Thailand the appropriate time as another alternative (Office of Prime 
Minister 2001:1). 
 
8 Wheeling is a industry jargon for moving power across a transmission or distribution system. 
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Amid all the arguments over the ESI model, the government has postponed approval 
of the Energy Law and called for further study on the ESI model of Thailand. 
Regardless of this, plans for preparing EGAT, MEA and PEA to be corporatised and 
listed in the Stock Exchange Market of Thailand were approved by SEPC on 20 
August 2002. The public share offering of EGAT, MEA and PEA was set to 
commence in the first, second and fourth quarter in 2004, respectively. 
3.5.3.2 New electricity supply arrangement vs Multiple buyers/Multiple sellers-
Partial liberalisation model  
After the MOE was established, EPPO (formerly NEPO), EGAT, MEA and PEA 
finally agreed to drop the power pool model. Taking all of the above concerns, EPPO 
proposed a new model, called the New Electricity Supply Arrangement (NESA). 
EGAT proposed the Multiple Buyers/Multiple Sellers-Partial Liberalisation model 
(PL).  
The detail of the NESA and the PL are shown in Appendix 3 and 4, respectively. 
The NESA is based on the New Electricity Trading Arrangement of the UK while 
the PL is based on the grid access model. Under NESA, the electricity market will be 
fully liberalised in both the generating and retailing segments but in PL only the 
market for the large industrial users, accounting for 30 per cent of the whole market, 
will be liberalised. Bilateral contracts will be employed by both NESA and PL for 
electricity trading in the liberalised market. 
Under PL, the grid system and function of system operator will not be separated from 
EGAT whereas under NESA, EGAT will be disintegrated both vertically and 
horizontally into several generation businesses, grid system and system operator.  
With PL, the distribution companies MEA and PEA will stay intact. The parties who 
use the grid and distribution system will pay the wheeling charge to EGAT, MEA 
and PEA. Seventy per cent of the market, including residential, business and small 
industrial consumers, will purchase electricity from MEA and PEA in the same way 
as the current ESI structure operates and be charged under the same tariff structure.  
EPPO proposed that under NESA the independent regulator should be established 
while EGAT considered that the regulator should be under the control of a state 
agency that MOE can choose.  
On 23 December 2002, the MOE through the EPPO organised a seminar on ESI 
reform to brainstorm and discuss about the optimal ESI model by comparing the 
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current structure with NESA, PL and power pool, particularly in relation to 
electricity system security, competition, tariff, quality of service, regulation and 
public share offering (Energy Policy and Planning Office 2002). Regarding the issue 
of security in electricity system generation and transmission, it is still inconclusive 
whether the NESA or PL model is the best but it was that the PL model in which 
EGAT is clearly responsible for the security system, is more secure. For the 
distribution system, it makes no difference which model is adopted. 
As for competition and tariffs, the participants were concerned that under NESA 
there is no exact price as in the power pool system. But the EPPO argued that the 
purchasers can buy electricity from the producers by the bilateral contracts in which 
price will reflect the real marginal costs. Another concern was that the small 
electricity consumers will not have the bargaining power to negotiate with power 
producers, however the EPPO argued that NESA will allow the users to purchase 
electricity via bilateral contracts. Alternatively they can purchase electricity from 
MEA and PEA.  
Regarding the issue of regulation, they concluded that there are three approaches to 
regulation: regulating by MOE, an independent regulator operating under 
government policies, and an absolutely independent regulator, with EPPO studying 
which approach suits Thailand best.  
As for the public share offering, they agreed that in the short term after 
corporatisation the government should be the major shareholder and even in the 
medium term the government should hold at least 70 per cent of shares. They insisted 
that the share cross holding of firms both in horizontal and vertical structure is not to 
be permitted, except by the government in order to eliminate private monopoly in the 
market.  
To avoid being dominated by the foreign firms, foreigners’ share holdings must be 
specified in the regulation of firms or be regulated by energy law or decree.  
The hydro power plants should not be privatised either and should be also under the 
government regulation it was maintained. The conclusion from this seminar will be 
considered and incorporated into the future plan. 
On 9 September 2003, the Cabinet approved the cancellation of the Cabinet 
resolution on 25 July 2000 on the ESI reform and the establishment of power pool 
and assigned the MOE to conduct further study on the ESI restructuring model. 
Again the ESI model proposed by both EPPO and EGAT to be implemented in the 
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future is not finalised, however the Cabinet approved to corporatise the whole EGAT 
as a public company under Corporatisation Law.  
The proceeds from selling SOEs will not be spent paying debt to IMF and reducing 
FIDF debt since these debts was repaid at the end of July 2003 and the motive of 
privatisation to pay debt is no longer valid. The main motive behind privatisation has 
shifted to delivering an increase in efficiency. 
3.5.3.3 Enhanced single buyer model 
After being tasked by the Cabinet on 9 September 2003, MOE hired Boston 
Consulting Group to conduct a study on strategies for the development of Thailand’s 
energy sector and the power sector efficiency improvement program. This study 
includes of studies on ESI models, the regulatory framework and the tariff 
mechanism for Thailand (Boston Consulting Group 2003).  
The ESI models developed by Boston Consulting Group for Thailand were based on 
the key objectives of security of supply in terms of high grid reliability and adequate 
generation; customer satisfaction in term of high efficiency and service levels, stable 
power prices and competitive tariffs; social and environmental obligations in form of 
adequate rural electrification and environmental conservation; creation of national 
champion9; and low risk and cost of transition from the current ESI structure to the 
new one.  
After assessing the current situation and constraints in Thailand together with 
stakeholder interviews and studying previous reports, Boston Consulting Group 
proposed five alternative ESI structures: full competition (FC) model, competitive 
bilateral contract (CBC) model, partial competition (PC) model, enhanced single 
buyer (ESB) model and super national champion (SNC) model. The key 
characteristics of each model are shown in Appendix 5. 
The FC model was previously studied and proposed by NEPO as the power pool 
model. As explained above, this model was ruled out of consideration. It is 
associated with the risks of no central planning system to ensure adequate capacity, 
gaming by participants leading to higher wholesale prices, high transition costs and 
breaking up and loss of scale, all of which reduce an incumbent’s ability to be a 
                                                 
9 A national champion is a single large company, seen as being better able to compete internationally 
by virtue of economies of scale and the benefits of a large home market. 
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national champion. This model has been replaced by the NESA proposed by EPPO, 
which follows closely New Electricity Trading Arrangement in the UK.  
The CBC model also follows the New Electricity Trading Arrangement concept. 
There are, however, some distinct and different characteristics of the CBC model 
compared to the NESA.  
In the CBC model, EGAT’s generation and transmission is not ownership unbundled. 
Along with this, system operator is not independent and is ring fenced within EGAT, 
and there is no explicit bilateral contract market. The power contracts will be 
negotiated with retailers or large end users.  
A benefit that the CBC model gains over the FC model is that the use of power 
purchase contracts can potentially reduce fluctuations in wholesale prices. In the 
retail market, both the FC and CBC model allow the end users to freely choose the 
suppliers. 
The PC model was previously studied by EGAT as alternative to EPPO’s NESA 
model, which was called the PL model. The main characteristic of the PC model is 
that EGAT, MEA and PEA are not ownership and legal unbundled. EGAT is 
anticipated to be account unbundled as it moves into the generation and transmission 
business. There is no competition in the retail market, and only the large users, which 
account for 30 per cent of demand, are allowed to purchase electricity directly from 
the suppliers.  
The ESB model is similar to the current ESI model. While the PC model allows the 
choice of suppliers and restricted access to grid and distribution network for the large 
users, the ESB model does not allow this at all. In the ESB model, all wholesale 
energy is purchased by the single buyer, EGAT.  
The key benefit of this model is that it requires minimal structural changes from the 
current ESI model and allows the preservation of financial strength and scale of 
incumbency to be competitive in the region. It also eliminates the risk of function 
segregation and allows coordinated centralised planning system, which in turn 
ensures adequate investment and system reliability. However this model provides 
less incentive to increase service levels, particularly at retail level, and to increase 
efficiency due to the absence of competition. 
In the SNC model, EGAT, MEA and PEA are integrated into a holding company. 
The rationale of this model is to create a single national champion and to ensure that 
all three companies participate in a single initial public offering. However this model 
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may be perceived as a step back in term of deregulations for Thailand and the 
evolution of more competitive models as it limits competition in both generation and 
retailing activities. 
Steering committee to develop strategies for the development of Thailand’s energy 
sector and power sector efficiency improvement program has been formed. The 
participants have discussed the reform model proposed by the Boston Consulting 
Group and agreed that the FC, CBC and PC models are unsuitable at present, when 
taking security of supply and customer satisfaction as priority objectives, due to the 
high risk in transition from the current model (Boston Consulting Group 2003). 
These models may be maintained as future options. As explained above the SNC 
model is considered as a step backward for ESI restructuring, the participants 
agreeing that the ESB model is the most likely alternative to be adopted not just for 
ESI restructuring in the foreseeable future but also to facilitate the process of 
corporatisation and privatisation which is scheduled to be completed in the first 
quarter of 2004. 
The key characteristics of the current model and the ESB model are shown in Table 
3.16. 
The report by the Boston Consulting Group was criticised by Pechman and Bidwell 
(2003) relating to a number of issues.  
Firstly, the report by Boston Consulting Group exhibited a slant against a more 
competitive structure and toward the EGAT based ESB structure.  
Secondly, the Boston Consulting Group claims a set of desirable outcomes that will 
result from the ESB model such as a level playing field, transparency and economies 
of scale. Yet Boston Consulting Group does not define clearly what the outcomes 
really mean or explain how the recommended model leads to these outcomes. For 
example, the concept of a level playing field is not defined in the report. The report 
explains that the ESB model has beneficial transparency features. Transparency of 
price can be achieved by a power pool or independent system operator operating in a 
competitive market.  
The Boston Consulting Group also claims that the ESB model will lead to the desired 
alternative of economies of scale, however it has been proven that the significant 
economies of scale disappeared from electricity generation (Christensen and Greene 
1976). 
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Table 3.16 Characteristics of the current electricity supply industry model in 
Thailand and the enhanced single buyer model 
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d the new electricity firm structure with the 
in which 
 
It
integrate customers, particularly the industrial and large customers, into a strategy for 
power sector development in Thailand. There has been a technological revolution in 
distributed generation and cogeneration, which allows the smaller generation sizes to 
be the highly efficient units, and industrial customers can gain advantage from that. 
In the ESB model, the industrial sector is not viewed as a partner in developing the 
electricity sector but is treated as single buyer in a paternalistic manner to determine 
what the industrial sector can provide.  
In December 2003 the Cabinet approve
aim of enhancing efficiency proposed by the MOE. NEPC was given the authority to 
oversee the SOE in the ESI during the transition period to be corporatised.  
The new electricity firm structure will be in the form of the ESB model, 
EGAT will be the electricity generator and the controller of the transmission system. 
The financial account of both businesses will be clearly unbundled. Meanwhile, 
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MEA and PEA remain to acquire and sell electricity within their respective area. 
Their electricity purchasing and selling accounts will be separated as well. 
The Cabinet also approved the establishment of a regulatory body to oversee the 
te policies into implementation 
gh license fees. The Board of 
orporatised to change the legal entity from SOEs 
otests by the labour union affiliated with EGAT since 
                                                
power industry, named the Energy Commission of Thailand. The new regulatory 
body will be established and governed as an autonomous agency under Ministry of 
Energy, and is mandated with economic regulation.  
The core responsibilities of regulator are to transla
plans, procedures, technical codes and legislation as required; to undertake core 
regulatory operations such as licensing, tariffs, approval of load forecasting and 
infrastructure development plans; to manage new plant-up bids10; to monitor market 
players’ compliance of rules and regulations; to facilitate dispute resolution between 
market players and conduct public hearings; to collate, administer and make 
available industry information; and to provide input for policy development 
regarding future ESI market structure for Thailand. 
The regulator’s operating budget is funded throu
commission comprises of seven members: one member as nonexecutive chairman, 
five members are nonexecutive board members and one member as chief executive 
officer. Only the chief executive officer is a full-time employee. The Chief executive 
officer has the final decision making authority on operational issues whereas board 
of commission decides strategic issues. The Minister and the Cabinet have final 
decision authority on policy issues.  
The EGAT, MEA and PEA will be c
to corporations and to facilitate the privatisation process that follows. The initial 
public offering of EGAT, MEA and PEA were scheduled in the first, third and fourth 
quarter of 2004, respectively.  
Once again due to the strong pr
23 February 2004, the Thaksin government decided to put the privatisation of EGAT 
on hold indefinitely. The EGAT labour union, being supported by the labour union of 
other SOEs, including of MEA and PEA, the State Enterprises Labour Relations 
Confederation and the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and 
General Workers’ Unions, claimed that privatisation of EGAT will lead to an 
 
10 New plant-up bids are bids for new power plants by IPPs. 
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increase in electricity bills and were worried that shares in EGAT will fall into the 
hands of powerful politicians or businessmen after being listed in the stock market. 
The EGAT labour union always plays a major role in protesting against privatisation. 
EGAT employees perceive that privatisation will lead to a reduction in the workforce 
and possible reductions in lucrative benefits. The size of the labour union, EGAT 
employee dispersion throughout Thailand and the positional power held within the 
organisation give EGAT staff an advantage in dealing with political agendas which 
other SOEs in Thailand do not possess. Employees of EGAT are very well organised 
and regularly protest government decisions and the relevant Ministry. Thai 
government regularly compromise with the EGAT labour union given EGAT 
employees ability to cut off the electricity supply.  
Academics also disagree with ESB model as it is identical to the current model. 
Privatisation without the ESI restructuring in promotion of wholesale market 
competition will not bring economic benefits in the form of efficiency 
improvements, cost and tariff reductions (Manager 2004). It simply leads to groups 
with a vested interest gaining ownership in the market. 
3.6 Summary 
The structure of the ESI in Thailand consists of four main activities: generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing. Electricity generation and retailing activities 
can operate in a competitive environment whereas transmission and distribution 
activities are characterised by a natural monopoly which needs regulation regardless 
of the ownership the enterprises operate under. 
Currently these activities are largely operated by just three SOEs, namely EGAT, 
MEA and PEA. EGAT is the largest electricity generating firm and the sole 
transmission operator and electricity purchaser from private power producers, which 
are IPPs and SPPs. In contrast the MEA and PEA are the only firms in their own 
areas to operate electricity distribution and retailing businesses.  
All three SOEs in the ESI are profit-making enterprises. This can be explained by the 
dominance of EGAT in electricity generation and that they are natural monopolists in 
their electricity transmission and distribution businesses. The current cost of service 
form of regulatory control together with a revenue cap on base electricity tariffs 
guarantees that they will be compensated for any cost incurred. 
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The main objectives of ESI restructuring are to improve efficiency of firms, to 
increase competition, to reduce investment and fiscal burden of government, to 
promote efficient use of energy and to provide the best possible services to 
consumers.  
After the 1997 financial crisis there have been a couple of ESI model restructuring 
and privatisation plans drawn and dropped, including power pool, NESA versus PL 
and the ESB model. Results from each report are different to satisfy hirers’ demand, 
and there has even been an attempt from players and authorities in the ESI to distort 
results in their favour. Their interference is in the every step of decision making on 
ESI restructuring and privatisation and they do not act in the best interest of 
consumers. 
In addition, after each plan is approved protests from labour unions and concern from 
academics always created an unfavourable political environment to pursue plan. The 
important disagreements among the authorities, three SOEs, labour unions and 
academics are on the ESI model and privatisation, resulting mainly from the different 
incentives of each agent. For example, EGAT, MEA and PEA prefer to stay whole 
and support ESI models that do not allow them to separate. The government, 
particularly the Thaksin government would like to privatise SOEs as fast as possible 
to promote capital market development without the appropriate ESI model. Labour 
union concerns centre on their benefits and welfare after privatisation. Although their 
concerns should be taken seriously, their disagreements disrupt the ESI restructuring 
process in Thailand. 
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 Part II 
 SURVEYS OF LITERATURE 
 
Synopsis II 
 
Analyses of privatisation and regulation in the electricity supply industry (ESI) 
require various theoretical frameworks. This is the focus of Part II.  
Literature on privatisation, at both a theoretical and empirical level, is presented in 
Chapter 4. Definitions and methods of privatisation are included. Although the 
various objectives of privatisation are noted, together with empirical studies to 
investigate the validity of arguments for privatisation, the focus is more on 
arguments of efficiency improvement and fiscal benefit. This will be the framework 
for both an efficiency and a fiscal analysis of privatisation of state owned enterprises 
in the ESI in Thailand that will be elaborated upon in Part III. 
In Chapter 5 the theories relating to natural monopoly and regulation are drawn upon 
to explore why economic regulation is needed for natural monopoly activities: 
electricity transmission and distribution. This discussion is inclusive of how, in 
theory, regulation is designed to maximise social welfare, while taking into account 
of asymmetric information between regulator and regulated firms. 
Regulation in practice, including regulatory regimes and finance, is the core theme in 
Chapter 6. Regulatory regimes, rate-of-return and incentive regulation and their 
variations, which have been pioneered, developed and adopted in developed 
countries, are presented together with comment on their criticisms and limitations. 
Chapter 6 will then discuss issues on regulatory finance to determine the revenue 
requirement based on financial practices in developed countries endowed with 
mature and well functioning capital market. Standard financial issues will be drawn 
upon as a framework for regulatory analysis in electricity distribution in Thailand, 
which is the focus of Part III.  
Finally, Chapter 6 will review specific characteristics of developing countries and 
explore choice of regulatory regimes in developing countries. 
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These regulatory regimes and finance will again contribute to Part III, which will 
include a regulatory analysis evaluated in the light of specific characteristics of 
developing countries.  
Finally, although literature on privatisation and regulation are generally reviewed 
separately, the concepts of privatisation and regulation are interrelated. To achieve an 
optimal outcome from restructuring of ESI, privatisation without regulation and vice 
versa can be harmful. 
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 Chapter 4 
  
 PRIVATISATION: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
According to the Master Plan (Royal Thai Government 1998), privatisation, together 
with legal, regulatory and institutional reform, is one of the main policies to reform 
the state enterprise sector in Thailand. A review of the literature on privatisation is 
needed to provide both a theoretical framework and an empirical background for 
analysis of privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the electricity supply 
industry (ESI) in Thailand in Part III. 
There is a large body of literature regarding privatisation in various issues in both 
developed and developing countries. This chapter attempts to summarise the relevant 
issues, however in each section more specific and rigorous works are noted for 
further references. The discussion in this chapter will provide framework for 
efficiency and fiscal analyses in ESI in Thailand. 
In Section 4.2, definitions of privatisation are discussed. Transactional and non-
transactional methods of privatisation in both developed and developing countries 
are described. Mass privatisation, public share offering, direct sales and mixed sales 
are briefly explained.  
In Section 4.3 theories of privatisation, based on idea of government failure, 
including property rights theory, principal-agent theories, public choice theory and 
organisation theory are then briefly explored why transfer of ownership to private 
sector is justified.  
In Section 4.4 the objectives of privatisation, including efficiency, competition, 
government intervention and fiscal benefit are then explored. Then costs and benefits 
of privatisation to different economic agents are discussed in Section 4.5. Empirical 
studies are reviewed in Section 4.6 to investigate the costs and benefits of 
privatisation on various economic variables. In Section 4.7, a summary of the chapter 
is provided. 
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4.2 Definition and methods 
There is a large body of literature relating to privatisation that incorporates both a 
broad and narrow definition of the term. A few examples follow.  
Kikeri et al. (1994) narrowly define privatisation as follows ‘privatisation is defined 
here as the transfer of majority ownership of SOEs to the private sector by the sale of 
ongoing concerns or of assets following liquidation.’  
On the other extreme, Kay and Thompson (1986) and Domberger and Piggott (1986) 
define privatisation very broadly. Kay and Thompson (1986) mentioned 
‘privatisation is a term which is used to cover several distinct, …, means of changing 
the relationships between the government and the private sector.’ In this broader 
view, privatisation methods includes denationalisation or sale of public owned assets; 
deregulation or liberalisation; and contracting out or franchising of the production of 
state financed goods and services to the private firms. 
King (1992) argued that neither deregulation nor liberalisation is an act of 
privatisation. Deregulation or liberalisation, the means by which a market is opened 
up to private competition, affects the industry as a whole, not each organisation 
internally.  
Abelson (1987) pointed out that privatisation may be affected indirectly by 
deregulation by the removal of entry restrictions into the market. Although 
deregulation or liberalisation increases the role of the private sector, deregulation and 
privatisation are distinct concepts and having one without another is possible.  
King (1992)’s view on privatisation is that ‘it involves a change in the way an 
organisation is governed and controlled towards what is considered as typifying the 
private sector.’ He pointed out that ‘privatisation involves two features: 
(a) government-instigated, direct change in the mode of internal control and 
organisation of an economic unit; 
(b) an aim that such a change will improve the (cost) efficiency of production and 
distribution.’ 
King’s broad definition means that privatisation involves enterprise based changes in 
the governance and organisation of an enterprise and that these changes are aimed at 
improving the cost efficiency of organisation. It rules out any industry-wide changes 
such as: deregulation or liberalisation, but includes a movement toward private 
production, such as contracting out or the diminution of government ownership and 
control of an enterprise. 
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Abelson (1987) provided an alternative definition of privatisation in stating that 
‘privatisation usually means the transfer of activities and assets from the public to the 
private sector.’  
In yet another definition, López-Calva (1998) broadly classified privatisation 
methods as transactional or non-transactional.  
Transactional methods consist of mass privatisation, direct sales or trade sales, public 
share offerings in the stock market, mixed sales, franchising or contracting out and 
management and employee buy-outs.  
Non-transactional methods include of management contract, give-away, liquidation 
and de-monopolisation.  
The types to be used depends crucially on the objectives of privatisation, the 
financial and operating performance of the state owned enterprises (SOEs), the 
structure of the industry in which SOEs operate and economic and political factors of 
each country.1
In the section following, some widely employed transactional methods of 
privatisation are discussed briefly using the work of López-Calva (1998) and the 
OECD (2003).2
4.2.1 Mass privatisation 
Mass privatisation involves the transfer of company shares to a large group of private 
buyers through the distribution of shares to eligible citizens either for free or for a 
minimum charge through vouchers (OECD 2003:86; Megginson and Netter 
2001:339). This method was employed widely in the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. It allows the privatisation of a large number of enterprises 
within a short period of time, and is politically acceptable, particularly when shares 
are distributed to both employees and the public. It has the added advantage of 
helping to develop the capital markets. 
However, mass privatisation yields small or no sales proceeds to government. It may 
undermine corporate governance, since control usually remains with insiders, and 
                                                 
1 Factors that influence the privatisation method are explained in detail by Megginson and Netter 
(2001).  
2 In Thailand the definition of privatisation by Office of State Enterprise and Government Securities, 
Ministry of Finance follows the broadest definition of privatisation including of asset sales, 
contracting out, deregulation and establishment of a regulatory body. This definition is too broad and 
confusing, as it includes an act on industry and institutions which is out of the scope of privatisation.  
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does not attract foreign investment with the potential transfer of financial technical 
and managerial expertise (López-Calva 1998:12–3). 
4.2.2 Public share offering 
Public share offering is the sale of a company through a public offering in which 
shares of the company are floated on the stock exchange market (López-Calva 
1998:16; OECD 2003:86). While this method of privatisation can create a broad 
ownership base and is the most transparent approach, it is also the most expensive 
approach because it requires a lot of preparation and planning and involves the 
restructuring of the company. Hence it is thus suitable only for large companies with 
the potential for good performance. Privatisation by public share offering also 
requires the existence of well developed financial and legal infrastructure including a 
well functioning stock market and sophisticated laws.  
At the same time, it enhances the development of the equity markets and the 
promotion of a culture of equity ownership.  
The main problem is how to determine the share price. There is the risk of setting the 
share price too high resulting in a large number of unsold shares, along with the risk 
of setting the price too low so that shares are underpriced in the initial public offering 
(Domberger and Piggott 1986:155).   
Share-issued privatisation has to be handled with care. When it is done badly, 
privatisation can go wrong. For example, in Russia and other economies in transition, 
hundreds of firms were more or less given away to a small group of well-connected 
insiders. Many of the assets were sold at unreasonably low prices.  
Another issue is whether to privatise the company in a single offering or sell shares 
in a series of tranches. The second approach has been more popular. However, this 
approach may result in a lengthy period in which the enterprise is partially privatised. 
This often creates governance problems. 
4.2.3 Direct sales or trade sales 
Direct sales or trade sales to strategic investors is a transfer of ownership and control 
to private investors through either competitive bidding or a privately negotiated deal 
(López-Calva 1998:13). This method of privatisation is employed for the sale of 
enterprises in need of strong management and an infusion of technology. The 
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investors have to demonstrate their expertise to guarantee the successful performance 
of the firm after privatisation.  
The advantage of this method of privatisation is that it can be undertaken in the 
absence of a well functioning equity market and it generates better sale proceeds. 
Comparing this with the broad ownership method of public share offering, direct 
sales or trade sales are more conducive to the development of a strong governance 
structure through a greater concentration of shareholders (OECD 2003:92). The 
disadvantage is that it does not promote capital market development, as it is not 
transparent as a public share offering and is prone to corruption in the process of 
selecting strategic investors.   
4.2.4 Mixed sales 
Mixed sale essentially involves a direct sale accompanied by a public share offering 
as a second stage. It starts with the transfer of some portion of shares to a strategic 
investor  so that the strategic investor can provide management expertise and 
technology infusion to the company, followed by the public offering of the remaining 
of shares on the stock market (OECD 2003:99).  
This method of privatisation promotes domestic capital market and ensures that the 
company benefits from technology transfer and stronger governance by strategic 
investors (López-Calva 1998:21). 
The disadvantage of this method is the cost incurred in both stages of privatisation, 
which is greater than adopting the separate method. A well functioning capital 
market is also required to maximise the benefits of sale and to diffuse ownership 
concentration.   
4.2.5 Concession, franchising or contracting out 
Another type of privatisation is concession, franchising or contracting out to private 
firms the production of state-financed goods and services. Concession or franchising 
involves giving rights in supply or distribution of goods or services to a single 
producer or operator for a certain period. It was conceived as a mechanism for 
introducing competition to the market where competition within the market is not 
feasible or desirable (Domberger and Piggott 1986:157). 
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Through this type of privatisation competition takes place through bidding for the 
concession or franchise contract. The winner is the competitor who bids the 
minimum supply price.  
An alternative mechanism is to grant the contract to the producer bidding the highest 
capital sum for the concession. The value of bids under this mechanism will reflect 
competitors’ expectations of the discounted flow of monopoly rents over the life of 
the contract. 
Concession or franchising is suitable when the market is inherently monopolistic, 
when the government wishes to exert control over output and price, and where the 
provision of goods and services is to be financed through explicit government 
subsidies. In particular it is a good option for large, sunk investments with significant 
uncertainty in demand forecasts and where it is difficult for the government to switch 
quickly to a new provider after the contract is awarded (López-Calva 1998:24). 
Concession or contracting out is a popular method to increase private sector 
participation in various public activities. Infrastructure is the most common sector in 
which concessions have been widely implemented, including toll-roads, railroads, 
airports and electricity generating in the form of IPPs (López-Calva 1998:24). The 
forms of private sector participation in infrastructure projects include the following; 
• build-operate-transfer scheme- a company builds an infrastructure project, 
operates it for a while and transfers it to public sector; 
• build-own-operate scheme- a company builds an infrastructure project, owns it 
and operates it with some degree of involvement from government; and  
• build-own-operate-transfer scheme- a company builds an infrastructure project, 
owns it, operates it for some period of time and finally transfers it to government. 
There are some difficulties involving concessions that should be considered.  
The first is that bidding must be competitive otherwise collusive bidding will impose 
more costs.  
The second difficulty is contract specification. Concession is a good method when 
the contracts have been specified clearly and unambiguously, but this is not always 
possible. A concern for investors is a regulatory risk. Concession contracts can be 
designed to give government the opportunity to expropriate the project or profits and 
to renationalise the project, whereas public concern is the renegotiation of contracts 
and the exploitation of a monopoly position by private investors (López-Calva 
1998:24–5).  
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The third problem is identification of the duration of the contract. Long-term 
contracts such as 25-year power purchase agreements granted to independent power 
producers can lead to hold up problem by which private producers have less 
incentive to improve efficiency in operations.  
Finally, concession requires some regulation to enforce and monitor the contract. 
Quiggin (1996b; 2002) pointed out that the allocation and management of risk is an 
important issue within contracting in infrastructure projects. Risk occurs in every 
stage of the project: build, own and operate.  
Risk associated with the building stage includes delays due to strikes, financial 
difficulty and equipment breakdown (Quiggin 1996b:56). This risk can be mitigated 
by a well written contract to monitor the firm’s performance and financial status 
during the construction phase.  
The activities of a project can be divided into core and peripheral operations. 
Quiggin (1996b) suggested that private sector operation of core activities is 
appropriate only in cases where project is privately owned whereas the operation of 
peripheral activities can be undertaken without the operator’s ownership. In both 
cases operational risks such as the risk associated with the cost of repairs and 
maintenance can be borne. This risk must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
The contract for both construction and maintenance should be well written and 
require the constructor to guarantee that work meets set standards and will provide 
separate repair and maintenance services post construction.  
It should be noted that ownership risk is the pure risk premium associated with risky 
capital investment (Quiggin 2002), including systematic and regulatory risk. Under 
public ownership, regulatory risk is internalised so government is the better agent to 
bear the risk.  
Finally, Quiggin (1996b) pointed out that the build-own-operate-transfer scheme is 
not socially optimal because if private sector ownership and operation of an 
infrastructure project is socially optimal, there is no reason for eventual transfer to 
public ownership and is better off leaving the project with the private firm. 
4.3 Theoretical approaches 
This section starts with concept of market failure which justified government 
intervention. Then reasons why government intervention fails to achieve economic 
goals are explained by concept of government failure. The government failure calls 
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for policies to increase in private sector involvement and to reduce in government’s 
role in provision goods and services. Privatisation is one of these policies.  
Then theoretical works explaining different performance between firms under public 
and private ownership will be presented. These theories can be disaggregated into 
four main groups: property rights theory, principal-agent theory, public choice theory 
and organisational theory.3 Essentially these theories explain how private ownership 
is superior to public ownership, and that economic efficiency gains are likely to 
emerge from the transfer of ownership and control of assets from public to private 
firms.  
4.3.1 Market failure or government failure 
Two fundamental theorems of welfare economics describe the relationship between 
competitive markets and efficiency. The first theorem states that every competitive 
economy is Pareto efficient. The second theorem describes further that with the 
appropriate initial redistributions every Pareto efficient resource allocation can be 
attained through a competitive market mechanism. 
However there are some circumstances in which a competitive system is not able to 
work efficiently, which are together explained by market failure theories. The causes 
of market failure are essentially grouped into four categories; which are imperfect 
competition, public goods, externalities and information asymmetries.4  
In market failure, the preferred response to market failure is government 
intervention, which can be divided into two types: government ownership and 
operation, particularly in cases of public goods and natural monopoly businesses; and 
government regulation in cases of externality and information asymmetries (Prager 
1992:303). Market failure theories claim that, with government intervention, the 
market can function more efficiently. Apart from enhancing economic efficiency, 
government intervention is justified on the basis of economic sovereignty, continued 
provision of income to government, increasing employment and high-capital-cost 
investment in infrastructure. 
Market failures dominated economic policies until the 1980s when the shortcomings 
of many led economists to investigate government failure. Bhalla (2001) reviewed a 
number of theories of government failure. A central idea of these theories is that 
                                                 
3 Villalonga (2000) lists chronologically the specific theoretical studies within each group. 
4 Stiglitz (2000a) provides detail of each concept, hence they are not repeated here. 
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government fails a test of efficiency due to constraints such as low contestability, 
limited competition and technology gaps (Bhalla 2001:43).   
Stiglitz (2000a) summarised four major reasons for government failures. Firstly, 
government has limited information to foresee the consequences of policy actions. 
Secondly, government has limited control over the private market response to its 
actions. Thirdly, government has limited control over the bureaucracy, hence 
occasionally there is more than one government agency tediously working to 
implement a policy. Finally, there are limitations imposed by political processes. 
Even if governments were well informed, the political process would add some 
difficulties. For example, politicians have incentives to act to benefit of special 
interest groups.  
In government failure models, problems caused by government intervention are 
commonly more serious than the market imperfections the government tries to fix. 
Government failure theories played a dominant role in 1980s and 1990s. They led to 
the policies designed to increase private sector involvement and reduce the 
government’s role in the provision goods and services to the public implemented 
around the world. Privatisation is one of these policies. It is often justified by the 
claim that SOEs, as the whole, are not very profitable and efficient 
4.3.2 Property rights theory 
Property rights theory explains the differences in the performance of SOEs and 
private firms on the basis of differences in property rights.  
Private property rights allow an individual to use scarce economic resources 
exclusively and to transfer them at any time and at whim. Public ownership is 
different from private ownership because ownership of SOEs is not normally and 
easily transferable. There are no daily sales of shares, no tender offers and take-over 
attempts. Ownership of SOEs remains ultimately diffuse. 
Due to the nature of nontransferability of the property rights of SOEs, government 
owners or taxpayers are prohibited from contributing their expertise to enterprises in 
which they would have comparative advantage in operating (Davies and Brucato 
1987:12). Moreover, nontransferability of ownership also attenuates the property 
rights of taxpayers and makes these right weaker than those of owners of private 
firms.  
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Taxpayers cannot sell or transfer their ownership rights to another party. If they do 
not agree with the way SOEs are operated, there is no effective way to transfer 
ownership or to change the management of SOEs.   
The connection between the average public owner or taxpayer and the manager of 
SOEs is too long and weak to monitor the managers in SOEs, and the transaction 
costs of monitoring are very high. Also, the cost and rewards of economic activities 
do not accrue directly to individuals responsible for the property rights.  
In addition, the problem of nontransferability of ownership leads to a lack of 
incentives for private markets to monitor and put pressure on SOE management to 
perform more efficiently and weakens the rewards-punishment systems which are 
necessary for cost-minimising behaviour.  
De Alessi (1980) employed the property rights approach and investigated the 
performance of many industries. He provided evidence that property rights do matter 
in explaining that private firms with property rights perform better than SOEs. 
However, as noted below, subsequent empirical research has produced mixed results. 
4.3.3 Principal-agent theory 
Principal-agent theory focuses on monitoring systems and incentives arising under 
both public and private ownership. Public and private managers, as agents of 
shareholders or public owners who have objectives of profit maximisation or social 
welfare maximisation, do not share the objectives of the principal and are more 
informed than the principal. They have their own objectives of private welfare 
maximisation.  
Estrin and Pérotin (1991) argued that with public ownership the owner-manager 
relationship is more complicated because the chains of principals and agents is 
expanded; the objectives of enterprises are politically determined and these are 
driven by a policy-making administrative structure in management.  
Changing ownership from the public to the private sector creates a new principal-
agent relationship. Under private ownership, managers are given more incentives and 
rewarded on the basis of improved performance to shift the objective closer to the 
profit maximisation goal, even in an environment of incomplete information and 
incomplete contracts (Schmidt 1996b:17–9; Bös and Peters 1991:48). This 
movement encourages improvement in technical efficiency but can lead to a higher 
price and thus lost allocative efficiency (Schmidt 1996a:578). In addition, if the 
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enterprise is required to pursue social objectives other than profit maximisation, 
regulatory risk is likely to arise under privatisation. 
4.3.4 Public choice theory 
Public choice theory’s central idea is that politicians, who control SOEs managers, 
want to maximise their own utility functions and pursue political objectives such as 
the maximisation of votes, investment, employment and their budget rather than 
public interest (Boycko et al. 1996). Therefore they prefer to set goals for SOEs 
which may conflict with the objective of efficiency maximisation. It is costly to 
monitor the behaviour of SOEs either through information gathering or lobbying for 
general public, hence transferring ownership to the private sector can avoid this rent 
seeking behaviour by driving a wedge between politicians and managers, 
depoliticising firms and leading to firm restructuring. 
Although public choice theory has been used mostly by advocates of privatisation, 
the process of privatisation is itself subject to the analysis of public choice theory. 
Politicians may use the privatisation process to allocate rents to favoured groups (or, 
in some cases, to themselves) thereby reducing social welfare. 
4.3.5 Organisational theory 
According to organisational theories, the role of organisational characteristics and the 
internal environment of an organisation is crucial to determining the performance of 
firms (Parker 1995; Perry and Rainey 1988). These characteristics, including 
incentives and the control mechanism, culture, objective, organisation structure, 
communication and reporting systems, labour and the nature and location of the 
business differ between public and private firms (Parker 1995).  
Performance improvement is induced by privatisation only when there are significant 
changes in the internal environment through transferring the enterprise from public 
ownership to private ownership. For example, management in the enterprise has to 
be improved. The objectives of enterprises after privatisation have to become more 
tangible and more market drive, focusing more on profit maximisation and/or cost 
minimisation. The nature of SOEs is politically determined, as for most of SOEs 
legislation defines the areas of activity in which they are permitted to operate. The 
location of SOEs is also politically constrained with private firms more flexible in 
developing new business and investing in new locations, driven by market forces. 
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4.4 Motives and objectives 
Apart from improvement in efficiency explained by theories in Section 4.3, 
Domberger and Piggott (1986), Kay and Thompson (1986), Vickers and Yarrow 
(1991), King and Pitchford (1998), Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999), Sheshinski 
and López-Calva (1999), Megginson and Netter (2001) and OECD (2003) have 
reviewed the motives for and objectives of privatisation. The reasons and objectives 
of privatisation together with the arguments for and against privatisation will be 
explained briefly as follows. 
4.4.1 Efficiency 
As explained in Section 4.3, one of the most important objectives in privatising SOEs 
is to increase efficiency.  
There are two types of efficiency.  
The first is technical or productive efficiency, which require firstly the minimum 
quantity of any input be used to produce a given quantity of output, holding all other 
input levels fixed, and secondly that those inputs are used in a cost-minimising 
combination (Domberger and Piggott 1986:148).5  
The second is allocative efficiency. An allocation is said to be efficient if the product 
meets consumer needs at prices which reflect the marginal costs of provision.6
In the presence of competitive markets, the private sector is more allocatively 
efficient than the public sector because there are incentives to achieve efficiency, 
which come from the product market and the capital market (Vickers and Yarrow 
1991:115). The incentives are different because managers of SOEs pursue objectives 
that differ from those of firms in the private sector and face less monitoring 
(Sheshinski and López-Calva 1999:7). In the competitive product market, the firm 
competes with a lot of competitors in order to survive it has to produce what 
consumers want and sell to them at a competitive price. Therefore, the firm in a 
                                                 
5 The literature on efficiency measurement and literature on regulation tend to use inconsistent 
terminology. In the regulation literature the terms “technical efficiency” and “productive efficiency” 
equate to the term “cost efficiency” in the efficiency literature. The technical or productive efficiency 
here is defined by following the literature on regulation. Later on in Chapter 8 in which the efficiency 
measurement is discussed. The technical efficiency is defined by following the literature on efficiency 
measurement. 
6 In the regulation literature the term “allocative efficiency” relates to equating marginal cost and price 
while in the efficiency literature it generally relates to using inputs in optimal proportions given their 
respective prices, which is a component of cost efficiency (the other component being technical 
efficiency). Hence allocative efficiency defined here is not consistent with that used in the allocative 
efficiency measurement discussed in Chapter 8. 
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competitive market has an incentive to achieve allocative efficiency (Kay and 
Thompson 1986:20). 
However there are some cases where the competitive market may fail in its allocative 
role.  
Firstly when increasing return to scale exists in the production of some commodities 
such as electricity, the cost of investment is so high that they bear a loss if they 
produce where price is equal marginal cost. This is a so called natural monopoly.  
Secondly, a competitive market outcome will not take account of the positive 
(negative) externality of some commodities such as transport so the private sector 
will supply less (more) than the socially optimum equilibrium. Therefore, the 
allocation is not efficient.  
The capital market can also impose the threat of bankruptcy or of takeover. The 
private firm has to adopt the objectives of cost minimization and profit 
maximization, which leads to productive efficiency, to avoid the risk of bankruptcy 
or takeover. In contrast the threat of bankruptcy is not credible to managers in public 
firms which face the soft budget constraint (Sheshinski and López-Calva 1999:8).  
Moreover, private firms are continually monitored by capital markets. If capital 
markets are efficient, share prices will be a good basis to make a contract between 
shareholders and managers and to monitor the performance of managers (Vickers 
and Yarrow 1991:115). However, it should be noted that the problem of free riders 
for shareholder monitoring may arise since privatisation aimed at widening share 
ownership will have disperse shareholders in the new firms. This will reduce the 
effectiveness of monitoring. 
Usually SOEs have a number of objectives and cost minimization has low priority 
where there is no clear-cut profit maximization objective. Most governments direct 
SOEs to pursue non-commercial objectives for political reasons. For example, the 
objective of decreasing unemployment leads to over-manning in SOEs. Therefore a 
comparison of performance between SOEs and private firms without considering 
their objectives is not favourable (King and Pitchford 1999:39). 
In addition, SOE management incentives are not compatible with the objective of 
profit maximization since their earning is not related to performance measured by 
profit and they are immune from takeover. Incentives to monitor managerial 
behaviour are poor, so managers will pursue their personal objectives. However, 
managers work under political decision-makers (politicians) that impose their 
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personal objectives as well, so we have a limitation in using political institutions as 
monitoring systems. Moreover, they have no ultimate punishment on poor 
performance since the loss of SOEs will be subsidized by the government.  
There is no need for them to have productive efficiency to survive.  
4.4.2 Competition  
To improve efficiency, privatisation by the transfer of public to private ownership is 
not always the answer. Low efficiency may be the result of the environment within 
which the firm operates rather than the structure of ownership. There are both 
efficient and inefficient SOEs and private firms, but if product markets are 
competitive, lower efficiency is penalized by falling market share and lower profits. 
If capital markets are effective, this leads to bankruptcy or the takeover of 
unsuccessful private firms. Thus market disciplines do more to improve the 
performance of the private sector than of the public, however this is not due to the 
transfer of ownership  alone but the interaction of ownership and competition that 
promotes efficiency (Kay and Thompson 1986:24; Bishop and Thompson 
1992:1189; King 1994:14).  
The experience of China demonstrates that enterprise restructuring, concentrating on 
improving the allocation of property rights and incentives via competition, can yield 
large benefits even without privatisation (Megginson and Netter 2001:338). In 
contrast, massive privatisation in Russia without promoting competition and the 
building up of regulatory frameworks and institutions has led to economic collapse.  
Therefore, deregulation or liberalization plays an important role to remove the entry 
restrictions into the market in order to create competition prior to privatisation so that 
the private monopolies will be avoided after privatisation (Domberger and Piggott 
1986:156). 
It is commonly argued that the presence or absence of competition is an important 
determinant of a firm’s economic efficiency.7 Opening up a market to competition is 
important to improve economic efficiency for both private firms and SOEs 
(Domberger and Piggott 1986:150).  
                                                 
7 It is not clear, however, whether the higher efficiency observed in firms subject to competition 
represent a genuine welfare gain or reflects an increase in work intensity. Leibenstein (1966) has put 
forward the notion of X-efficiency to describe increases in efficiency to increases in motivational 
efficiency workers are stimulated by incentive pay or management by competition. Stigler (1976) has 
criticized this concept and argued that the apparent efficiency gains reflect on the job leisure. 
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There is little evidence to show that SOEs which work under competitive 
environment are less efficient than their privately owned competitors (King and 
Pitchford 1998:315). 
Therefore, the next objective of privatisation is to promote competition in public 
industries. The objective is not perfect competition but to increase rivalry and 
competition. There are, however, some obstacles to promoting competition, which 
are market failure, natural monopoly, statutory monopoly and non-commercial 
objectives.  Privatisation of some of types of business will lead to a private 
monopoly.  
Private firms that do not face competitive product markets, do not always have 
greater incentives to productive efficiency than SOEs do. Only competitive, private 
firms have sufficient incentives to achieve both productive and allocative efficiency 
(Kay and Thompson 1986:22).   
If it is not possible to have competition in the product market, one way to solve this 
problem is to use franchising. For a statutory monopoly, to promote competition the 
government has to repeal the restrictive statutes.  
Yet deregulation is not enough to promote competition, because an incumbent firm 
has technical, financial and political advantage, resulting from a long period of 
statutory protection. As the dominant incumbent, it will reduce the threat of 
competitive market entry, and even if the market is liberalized, may remain 
dominated by a single operator, which is even more harmful to the economy. As a 
privatised firm, the government does not have any direct control and is advised to use 
regulation to influence the firm’s conduct.  
The objective of regulation is to protect consumers until competition arrives. It 
should be only a temporary method of control otherwise it will destroy the incentive 
to work (Beesley and Littlechild 1983:6–7). However, the Beesley-Littlechild view 
has proved over-optimistic as privatised monopolies such as British Telecom have 
retained their dominant position for many years, requiring continued regulation. 
Failure to develop a viable regulatory regime for private ownership makes public 
ownership ultimately irresistible (Newbery 1997:363; King 2002:19).  
4.4.3 Government intervention 
Privatisation may improve performance by limiting government intervention in 
company operations, as the operations of the firm may run more smoothly without 
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bureaucratic obstacles, however the privatisation of natural monopolies needs 
regulation for welfare reasons. Therefore, government intervention is not limited to 
the public sector, with governments controlling privatised firms via the regulatory 
bodies.  
The evidence is still inconclusive as to whether a public firm, which is subject to 
public sector style government intervention, is preferred to a private firm with private 
sector style regulatory interference (King and Pitchford 1998:315). 
4.4.4 Fiscal benefit 
One of the objectives of privatisation is to raise government revenue as privatisation 
gives government the opportunity to capitalize profit streams and raise immediate 
revenue (Vickers and Yarrow 1991:118). This objective can be in conflict with the 
objective of efficiency improvements, since the asset value of SOEs to be sold is 
highest if the privatised firm still has its monopolistic privileges through a statutory 
barrier to entry. This comes at a cost to allocative efficiency. 
A real fiscal benefit to government will arise only if assets are sold for more than 
their value in continued public ownership. This issue is addressed in more detail in 
Section 4.5. 
4.4.5 Priorities and sequencing of privatisation 
If the government has to privatise SOEs, it is impossible to privatise all of them at 
once.  
The problem of determining which enterprises should be privatised first, and which 
later, is commonly referred to as that of ‘sequencing’.  
The ideal is to privatise those industries where the benefits to the agents are greatest 
first.  
To do so the government should consider some criterion to indicate the priorities in 
privatisation. For example, the industries where competition rather than monopoly 
are likely to predominate, such as manufacturing industries, should be privatised 
first. There is some domestic and international competition so the privatised firms 
cannot exploit monopoly power. For the industries that retain monopoly power, such 
as public utilities, it would be more fruitful to encourage competition by removing 
restrictions on entry and restructuring the industries. Before privatisation, however 
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there should be regulatory bodies and regimes for industries characterised by a 
natural monopoly set up to control the privatised firms. 
4.5 Costs and benefits of privatisation 
Privatisation can bring benefits and costs to different economic agents: consumers, 
workers, government and asset buyers, in various ways. 
4.5.1 Consumers 
If privatisation together with competition can achieve objectives of efficiency and 
cost reduction, producers can improve performance and efficiency in operation and 
provided this gain is passed to consumers, consumers will benefit from decrease in 
price and improvement in quality of services. Privatisation has sometimes been 
associated with the removal of various cross-subsidies. This will benefit some 
consumers and harm others, if the new prices are closer to those that would prevail in 
a competitive market there is a general presumption of a net increase in consumer 
welfare. 
In industries with a substantial component of natural monopoly, such as the ESI, the 
effect of privatisation on consumer welfare will depend on the regulatory changes 
that accompany privatisation. If firms are privatised with their monopoly position 
intact, consumers are likely to be made worse off. 
For analytical purposes, it is often convenient to separate the effects of changes in 
regulation from those in changes of ownership. This permits an analysis of the 
effects of privatisation in which output prices, and therefore consumer welfare, are 
held constant. 
4.5.2 Workers 
Privatisation has both benefits and costs to workers. It can significantly reduce 
employment through labour shedding after industry restructuring and privatisation 
because the new owners are not willing to maintain overmanning and labour surplus 
associated with the public ownership. On benefit side while privatisation leads to 
employment reduction, productivity gains from employment cuts results in wage 
improvements for employees who remained with privatised firms. Privatisation can 
creates new jobs at the enterprise level and at sectorial level when privatised firms 
use assets more productively and invest in news projects and when competition in 
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industry is promoted after privatisation (Kikeri 1998:389). In addition, privatisation 
has generally been associated with significantly higher pay for senior managers 
However, it is not clear that changes in ownership are essential here. In cases where 
public monopolies have been corporatised and subjected to competitive restructuring, 
without a change of ownership, substantial reductions in employment and increases 
in labour productivity have been observed (Quiggin 1996a:153). 
4.5.3 Asset buyers 
Privatisation will not bring any net benefits to asset buyers if the asset is sold in an 
efficient and competitive capital market and if there is no buyer with specific cost 
advantages gaining an above-normal rate of profit from ownership of the enterprise.   
However, these conditions have not always been satisfied. In many cases, 
privatisation has produced a large-scale transfer of wealth to asset buyers. One set of 
examples arises from policies of privatisation by public float in developed countries. 
For example, Mayer and Meadowcroft (1986) found that in the first-stage 
privatisation of British Telecom, shares rose by nearly 100 per cent on the first day 
of trading. This was a large benefit to asset buyers, around 11 per cent of whom were 
foreigners.  
Another instance of large transfers has arisen in transition economies such as the 
Soviet Union, where well-placed insiders secured control of publicly owned assets at 
very low prices. This experience led Nellis (1999) to advocate a rethinking of 
privatisation. 
4.5.4 Fiscal position of government  
If assets are sold in competitive markets, prices are set independently of ownership, 
and labour markets are perfectly competitive, the social gains and losses from 
privatisation will be fully reflected in changes the fiscal position of government, 
determined by the difference between the sale price of publicly-owned assets and the 
present value of earnings under continued public ownership,  
Real economic gains arise only if there are improvements in productive and 
allocative efficiency. If there are improvements in productive efficiency resulting 
from the privatisation process, the present value of the expected profit stream after 
privatisation will be larger than the present value of the profit stream under continued 
public ownership.  The firm’s sale price will reflect this expectation, and will be 
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greater than the present value of the anticipated public ownership profit stream. An 
increase in the net worth of the public sector will result. 
Quggin (2003) explained that ‘changes in public sector net worth arising from 
privatisation can arise only if the price for which the asset is sold differs from its 
market value, or if the value of the asset in public ownership is different from its 
value in private ownership.’ Quiggin (2003) refers to this explanation as ‘the 
equivalence proposition’.  
This treatment leads us to consider possible violation of the equivalence proposition, 
that is, conditions under which privatisation is not fiscally neutral.  
One possible source of violations of the equivalence proposition arises if there are 
differences in technical efficiency between public and private firms. The hope of 
realising efficiency gains is one of the main motives for privatisation. This issue is 
addressed in Chapter 8. 
4.5.5 The cost of capital 
The equivalence proposition may also be violated if the public sector rate of discount 
is lower than the cost of private equity capital. There is considerable debate over the 
discount rate that should be employed for the valuation of assets.  
Some economists argue that the appropriate discount for public investment projects 
should be the real bond rate, while others argue that cost of capital to government be 
calculated by adding an appropriate social risk premium, normally a less than one 
percentage point difference to the real bond rate.  
Another group again argues that the government should base all analysis on the 
private sector discount rate. Employing the private sector discount rate on public 
investment is not appropriate because private sector financing of infrastructure 
project is more costly than public financing using funds borrowed at the government 
bond rate.  
Mansoor (1988) observed that if governments face a lower cost of capital than the 
private sector, privatisation may reduce welfare. This argument was developed 
further by Walker (1994), Quiggin (1995; 1998b) and Grant and Quiggin (2003), and 
is also discussed briefly by Pinheiro and Schneider (1995). Similar arguments are 
presented by Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Walker and Walker (2000). 
Quiggin (2003) distinguishes two components of margin between the private costs of 
capital and the risk less bond rate.  
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The first component is the allowance needed to compensate for the risk of default on 
private borrowings so as to yield an average return equal to the riskless bond rate. 
The second component is the allowance for pure risk. In the capital asset pricing 
model, this allowance is the equity premium reflecting the difference in returns 
between the market portfolio and riskless bond rate.  
Quiggin (2003) showed that if the capital asset pricing model is to be given 
economic content, it must be placed in the context of a life-cycle optimisation model, 
yielding a consumption based capital asset pricing model.  
Theoretically the equity premium estimated from a consumption based capital asset 
pricing model should be less than one percentage point, however the observed value 
of the equity premium in long data series has been around 6 percentage points. The 
result is that the discount rate applicable to public enterprises is smaller than the rate 
for a comparable private project.  
This evidence is called the equity premium puzzle, first observed by Mehra and 
Prescott (1985).  
Quiggin (1995) argues that if the rate of return accorded to private equity is higher 
than the government’s cost of fund, then moving from debt to equity financing with 
privatisation will leave government worse off. 
To assess the fiscal benefits of privatisation Quiggin (2004) explains that this market 
risk premium is not relevant because it reflects the weakness in spreading risk by 
private firms rather than the social cost of risk.  
Proponents of the private sector discount rate argue that this is appropriate for the 
valuation of assets because it incorporates the return as compensation for risk. 
Quiggin (1998a; 1998b) summarised three types of risk that public enterprises and 
private firms should be concerned about and argued that to evaluate privatisation 
these risks should not be taken into account.  
The first of these is regulatory risk, which arises from changes in government policy. 
It is critical for firms in regulated, natural monopoly industries. Regulatory risk can 
be disregarded in the valuation of publicly owned enterprises because it is fully 
internalised.  
The second is enterprise-specific risk, which is driven by factors unique to a given 
enterprise at a given point in time. These include the effects of managerial skills or 
demand fluctuations in markets. Enterprise-specific risk is uncorrelated with the risks 
facing firms in general or with fluctuations in the economy as a whole, therefore the 
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aggregate of enterprise-specific risks is minimal. Privately owned enterprises also 
bear less enterprise-specific risk than publicly owned companies.  
Finally, systematic risk is the risk associated with aggregate output fluctuations. It is 
not diversifiable by market mechanisms such as portfolio diversification that are 
suitable for private firms. Governments have a superior capacity to spread risk 
through the tax system, which provides a degree of insurance against systematic risk. 
4.6 Empirical studies 
Whether the government should privatise SOEs or not is the main question, which is 
still left unanswered.  
To answer this question assessment of benefits and costs of privatisation of 
privatisation for all agents in the economy should be evaluated.  
Benefits of privatisation may include improvements in technical and allocative 
efficiency whereas costs of privatisation may be in form of unemployment and 
possible exploitation of private monopoly. Benefits and costs of privatisation deal 
with different issues and require different assessment methods. Most empirical works 
focus on individual aspect for assessment to evaluate the validity of privatisation. 
Few of them evaluate the net benefit of privatisation.  
The number of empirical studies relating to privatisation has been growing rapidly. 
Domberger and Piggott (1986), Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999), Villalonga 
(2000), Kikeri and Nellis (2001; 2004), Zinnes et al. (2001), Megginson and Netter 
(2001) and OECD (2003) have extensively reviewed these empirical literature in 
various aspects as follows. 
4.6.1 Performance and efficiency 
Studies of benefits of privatisation to economy in forms of improvement of 
performance and efficiency of the firms are discussed as follow. 
Domberger and Piggott (1986) surveys the literature on empirical studies which 
evaluate and compare the performance of public and private enterprises in a 
particular industry in order to prove the hypothesis that privately-owned firms 
perform better than publicly-owned firms, which is the major rationale for 
privatisation. They surveyed the literature, mostly written during 1970s, working on 
the specific industries such as electric utilities, railroads and refuse collection in 
developed countries such as the US, Canada and West Germany. In doing so they 
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found that most of studies failed to find superior private enterprise performance. In 
particular, the presence of competition is an important determinant of a firm’s 
economic performance.  
It is very important to measure efficiency relative to the objectives that the firm is 
trying to achieve, because the objectives of public and private firms are usually 
different. SOEs will perform less efficiently than private firms because there is no 
clear-cut profit objective and among their objectives cost minimisation and profit 
maximisation have a low priority (Domberger and Piggott 1986:148). In fact where 
both private and public sector managers have similar incentives and objectives, 
performance difference are less obvious (King and Pitchford 1998:315). 
Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999) reviewed the literature where the objective was 
to compare the pre and post-privatisation performance of SOEs. This literature is 
classified into three groups based on the evaluative methodology and data coverage.  
The first group is the case study dealing with specific firms. The case study uses the 
counterfactual analysis to compare the performance of firms under a privatised 
scenario and a hypothetical public ownership scenario. They found that after 
privatisation, the net welfare increased.  
The second group of literature deals with the cross-industry evidence in a specific 
country. All of the literature in this group studied the case of developing countries 
such as Mexico, Slovenia, Russia and Central European countries. Again, they found 
that performance in terms of profitability has improved after privatisation.  
The last group concerns the cross-country evidence. This literature compares pre and 
post-privatisation performance of firms from both developed and developing 
countries. The performance indicators are mean and median levels of profitability, 
sales, operating efficiency, leverage, capital expenditure and employment. The 
evidences of better performance of the firms after privatisation are robust with 
profitability higher.  
However, an improvement in operating efficiency is not obvious in many cases. It is 
not true that higher profitability implies higher efficiency, as the link between them 
relies on market structure.  
It is impossible to compare the results from these two studies since they are based on 
the different comparisons, groups of literature and sample countries.  
Domberger and Piggott (1986) reviewed the literature regarding developed countries 
with superior product and capital markets. With well-functioning and competitive 
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product and capital markets, the public firms can operate as efficiently as or even 
more efficiently than private firms.  
Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999) focus on the literature relating to developing 
countries by comparing pre and post-privatisation performance of the firms. Most of 
the SOEs in developing countries before privatisation usually suffered from low 
profitability and overmanning. It is quite biased to use the performance indicators 
mentioned above.  
Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999) also review empirical studies on privatisation in 
transition economies. Their conclusion is similar to Sheshinski and López-Calva 
(1999) where privatised enterprises outperform state enterprises.  
In particular they found that the outsider-dominated firms perform better than the 
insider-dominated firms. Therefore, the methods of privatisation and ownership 
control after privatisation are a major factor affecting the performance of the 
privatised firms (Frydman et al. 1999:1186–7).  
Megginson and Netter (2001) reviewed literature during the 1990s and beyond 2000s  
comparison of the publicly-owned and the privately-owned firms in developed 
countries and the comparison of pre and post privatisation performance in both non-
transition and transition economies.  
For the first set of literature comparing public and private firms, they reach the 
different conclusion from Domberger and Piggott (1986). Most of the literature 
agrees that private firms are more profitable and productive than SOEs and mixed 
enterprises.  
For the second set of literature on comparison of pre and post-privatisation 
performance, the finding that firms can perform better after privatisation is similar to 
that Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999) found. 
The recent study on changes in the performance of privatised enterprises in Eastern 
European countries by Claessens and Djankov (2002) finds that privatisation is 
associated with an improvement in enterprise performance. One econometric study 
by Gupta (2002) on the partial privatisation of firms in India concludes that partial 
privatisation in the form of a diffuse minority sale of shares has a positive impact on 
firm profitability and efficiency without a decline in employment. 
Studies on evaluating of the effects of privatisation on performance on privatised 
firms often ignore the explanatory model of the change in performance.  
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Villalonga (2000) explained that two important factors leading to the diversity of 
results are the market structure of each of the industries and countries and the way 
their efficiency is measured. Villalonga pointed out that most of studies compare 
public and private enterprise performance using a static question comparing both 
types of firms in a given period of time.  
However privatisation is by definition a change and needs to be addressed 
dynamically. The evolution and transition between public and private ownership 
within a given firm has to be taken into account.  
Also, political and organizational factors during the transition period can affect 
firm’s efficiency, either positively or negatively.  
Alexandre and Charreaux (2004) studied the efficiency of French privatisations and 
found the same results in that contextual, organizational, governance and strategic 
variables affect the privatisation process and the efficiency of privatised firms. 
4.6.2 Capital market development 
Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999) mention that privatisation improves the 
development of the financial sector through an increase in the level of stock market 
capitalisation.  
The impact of privatisation through share offerings on the growth of the world stock 
market are an increase in stock market capitalisation, improved stock market 
liquidity and an increase in number of share holders (Boutchkova and Megginson 
2000:69–71).  
For the local equity market, Perotti and Oijen (2001) studied whether privatisation in 
22 emerging economies during 1988–95, including that of Thailand, has a significant 
effect on local equity market development.  
As one type of privatisation method, privatisation sales through public offering in the 
local stock exchange market directly increases market capitalisation. However the 
evidence showed that this direct effect of privatisation does not account for much of 
the growth in local stock markets.  
The indirect effect of privatisation on local stock market development occurs mainly 
through the resolution of political risk. The process of privatisation, when 
implemented rigorously and consistently, leads to a progressive resolution of 
regulatory and legal uncertainty and thus to a confidence in future policies. This 
eventually broadens the appeal and confidence in equity investment. Privatisation 
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that is successfully implemented can reduce the perceived political risks of 
developing countries and strengthen investor confidence, which affect the 
attractiveness of equity investments and lead to stock market development. 
4.6.3 Macroeconomic variables 
The literature on the macroeconomics of privatisation is quite limited. The most 
important reason is that it is difficult to isolate the effect of privatisation from other 
policies, such as fiscal and public sector restructuring and trade liberalisation, which 
are often adopted at the same time (Sheshinski and López-Calva 1999:18). 
Zinnes et al. (2001) put emphasis on the complementarity of privatisation and other 
policies. For example, privatisation without the liberalisation of current and capital 
accounts hinders the newly privatised domestic firm ability to gain access to foreign 
skills, markets and financing. They all, however, agree that privatisation can have an 
adverse effect on a macroeconomic level as well, particularly in increasing the 
unemployment level, when privatisation leads to employment shedding.  
Privatisation also has negative effects on wealth (asset and income) distribution, by 
which upper-income groups gain more equity shares than lower-income groups at 
least in the short run (Kikeri and Nellis 2004:102). 
Barnett’s (2000) study on 18 developing countries found that privatisation proceeds 
transferred to the budget are saved and then privatisation process is strongly 
correlated with an improvement in macroeconomic variables: higher real GDP 
growth and lower unemployment rates.  
Cook and Uchida (2003) re-examined the relation between privatisation and 
economic growth, using data for 63 developing countries over the period of 1988–97. 
Contrary to the results obtained by Barnett (2000), their results suggest that 
privatisation has contributed negatively to economic growth.  
The main reason is that competition policy and regulatory regimes in developing 
countries have not been developed and implemented effectively. Weak regulation 
and the high proceeds from privatisation, if accompanied by low gains in economic 
efficiency, can provide an explanation for the negative relationship between 
privatisation and economic growth. 
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4.6.4 Cost and benefit analysis 
Apart from the partial analyses focus on individual aspect of cost and benefit of 
privatisation as presented above, the cost and benefit analysis of privatisation 
covering broader impacts of privatisation will be discussed. Note that although these 
studies attempt to capture impacts on various economic variables, none of them can 
capture all. 
Chong and López De Silanes (2003) evaluated literature relating to the privatisation 
experience in Latin America8. Their empirical evidence shows that privatisation 
leads to higher profitability, greater output and productivity growth, improves fiscal 
benefits and service quality and provides better access to services for the poor.  
The gain after privatisation relies on the manner in which privatisation is carried out. 
Transparency and homogeneity in procedures, speed and industry restructuring 
before privatisation lead to better outcomes and less opportunities for corruption.  
In addition the main factors of success in privatisation are complementarity of two 
policies: re-regulation or deregulation of industries previously protected from 
competition and effective corporate governance institutions. 
A study of privatisation in Asia by Boubakri et al. (2004) investigated 50 firms from 
10 countries, including of Thailand, privatised over the period of 1980–97 and found 
that privatisation improved profitability, efficiency and output but not employment.  
However these improvements are insignificant compared with the newly privatised 
firms from other developing countries. They found that corporate governance and the 
economic environment have a significant effect on the extent of performance 
improvements. These include a lower level of political risk, a friendly institutional 
environment, developed capital markets and higher foreign ownership.  
Galal et al. (1994) studied the welfare effects of privatisation in developed and 
developing countries, particularly effects on firm efficiency, investment and 
consumer welfare, employing cost and benefit analysis. They found that privatisation 
through divestiture improve economic welfare due to a dramatic increase in 
investment, improved productivity, more rational pricing policies, increased 
competition and effective regulation. 
                                                 
8 Recent studies on benefits and costs of privatisation in each Latin American countries are Porta and 
López-De-Silanes (1999) for Mexico, Torero (2003) for Peru, Garrón B. et al. (2003) for Bolivia, 
Pombo and Ramírez (2003) for Colombia, Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003) for Brazil, Fischer et al. (2003) 
for Chile, and Galiani et al. (2003) for Argentina. 
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Newbery and Pollitt (1997) employed social cost and benefit analysis to evaluate 
privatisation of electricity sector in the UK. They found that efficiency improved 
significantly in the first years following the privatisation, however from 
counterfactual analysis results show that the new private shareholders received big 
financial gains at the expense of government and taxpayers. Consumers and/or 
taxpayers received some benefits, but distribution of benefits is not equal. 
Considering the fiscal benefits from privatisation, Barnett (2000) reports that the 
fiscal situation tends to improve over time, particularly when receipts of privatisation 
are saved rather than spent, as privatisation reduces the net transfer and subsidies to 
SOEs and assists government to collect taxes from privatised firms. Empirical 
studies on the equivalence proposition by Quiggin (1995; 1998a; 1998b), however, 
obtained the opposite conclusion that fiscal benefit is not justified. The results show 
that forgone earning under public ownership exceeded interest saving from using 
either using proceeds of privatisation to repay debt or that being generated under 
privatisation. Hence fiscal benefit is unjustified as a motive for privatisation. 
Furthermore, privatisation creates fiscal illusion since the reductions in the budget 
deficit resulting from the proceeds of privatisation can lead to a lower level of public 
saving in economy. 
4.7 Summary 
Privatisation is justified by theories of government failure. The choice of 
privatisation method from both transactional and non-transactional types should be 
made based on the objectives of privatisation. 
There are some arguments for and against these objectives that government should 
consider before making any decision on privatisation. If the government has to 
privatise SOEs, it should give priority to the industries that will most benefit to the 
consumers in the economy after privatisation. Costs and benefits of privatisation 
should be evaluated. 
Sequencing of privatisation in the form of ownership transfer is an important issue. 
To gain benefits from privatisation, sequencing of privatisation is needed. 
Sequencing must start with restructuring industries to create a competitive 
environment, the establishment of a regulatory body and regimes to regulate the 
natural monopoly and then ownership transfer can be undertaken. 
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From various aspects on empirical studies of benefits of privatisation, it is still 
inconclusive whether privatisation is justified. The performance and efficiency 
studies show that superiority of performance of private firms over SOEs is 
inconclusive. The performance of firms does not rely solely on the ownership 
structure of firms as market structure plays more important role in enhancing the 
performance of firms. There is no obvious evidence that privatisation can bring fiscal 
benefits. Privatisation is beneficial to fiscal and macroeconomic variables such as 
growth, unemployment and stock market capitalisation only when privatisation is 
implemented in tandem with other policies such as competition policy, regulatory 
policy and local stock market development. 
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 Chapter 5 
  
 NATURAL MONOPOLY AND  
 ECONOMIC REGULATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Apart from the privatisation plan, as discussed in Part I, the establishment of 
regulatory regimes is needed for state enterprise reform, particularly for industries 
characterised by natural monopoly in Thailand. In addition, privatisation of a natural 
monopoly without clear regulatory regimes to impose on the structure and conduct of 
privatised firms leads to a private monopoly which is harmful to economy.  
Before regulatory regimes in practice are explored in next chapter, it is necessary to 
understand the definition of natural monopoly and the theories of regulation.  
This chapter aims to explore what a natural monopoly is; why regulation is needed 
for a natural monopoly; how regulation should be designed to maximise social 
welfare with or without the problem of asymmetric information between regulator 
and regulated firms; and how interest groups affect the choice of regulation model. 
In Section 5.2, natural monopoly is defined by both the traditional view and concept 
of subadditivity of costs, and then the natural monopoly characteristics of electricity 
transmission and distribution are investigated. The normative theories of economic 
regulation explaining how regulation is designed with and without asymmetric 
information, namely adverse selection and moral hazard, are then explored in Section 
5.3 to 5.5. The role of interest groups in positive economic theories of regulation is 
discussed in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 summarises the chapter.  
5.2 Natural monopoly 
The main argument for regulation of electricity transmission and distribution is that 
the industry is characterised by natural monopoly which occurs when competition in 
the market is not desirable. 
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5.2.1 The traditional view of natural monopoly 
Natural monopoly1 was traditionally defined as a single-product firm where the 
technology of production is characterised by economies of scale or increasing return 
to scale throughout the range of production.  
Economies of scale exist when average costs decrease as level of outputs increase as 
shown in Figure 5.1.  
In Figure 5.1 the market is served by a single firm producing a single and 
nonstorable output, whose level is denoted by y. The demand curve is shown as 
D=p(y), where p is a price of output. Firm produces any give y at the minimum 
possible total cost, C(y). The average cost of production is AC(y)=C(y)/y.  
To break even, the firm has to earn total revenues that are at least as large as total 
costs. Therefore, the price charged will be at least equal to the average cost of 
production for that firm. If the firm sets the price at minimum average cost, pB, and 
produces output at yB, there is no other firm that can enter and produce y>yB because 
the output cannot be stored and profits would be negative for such level of 
production.  
On the other hand, if any firm enters the market and produces yA<yB, another firm 
would enter and produce yC, where A Cy y yB< ≤ .  
This second firm would charge a price p in the range ( ) ( )C AAC y p AC y≤ < , driving 
the first firm out of the market while the second firm remains economically viable.  
The only production level that precludes entry is y=yB with p=pB. 
To sum up, the traditional view states that a natural monopoly is based on the 
existence of economies of scale throughout the relevant range of production on the 
market. Competition within the market will lead to inefficient and fluctuating 
unstable price.  
 
                                                 
1 The concept and definition of natural monopoly is provided in detail in Braeutigam (1989), 
Waterson (1988) and Church and Ware (2000). King and Maddock (1996) provided less formal 
presentation of definition of natural monopoly. 
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Figure 5.1 Economies of scale 
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5.2.2 Natural monopoly and subadditivity 
A change in the traditional view of a natural monopoly occurred when Baumol et al. 
(1982) proposed the concept of subadditivity of costs.  
5.2.2.1 Subadditivity and single-product firms 
Natural monopoly exits if, over the range of output, the cost function is subadditive. 
The cost function is subadditive at output level y if 
1
( ) ( )
N
i
i
C y C y
=
< ∑ ,        (5.1) 
where and . 
1
N
i
i
y
=
=∑ y 2N ≥
The cost function is subadditive if any division of production of output level y among 
N firms results in greater industry costs than if y is produced by a single firm. 
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Figure 5.2 Subadditivity without economies of scale  
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The subadditivity provides a better explanation than economies of scale for 
determining when the natural monopoly exits.  
Consider the case when firms have identical cost structures as shown in Figure 5.2. 
Each firm’s average cost declines up to output level yMIN, and then increases 
thereafter. The market demand curve intersects the average cost curve at the 
production level yB>yMIN. Given the shapes of the curves, the cost function is 
potentially subadditive even though economies of scale do not exist for all levels of 
output up to yB. A single firm would thus serve the entire market at a lower average 
cost than any industry with more than one firm. 
To illustrate natural duopoly using Figure 5.3 the industry average costs, when there 
is a single firm in the industry and when output is optimally split between two firms, 
are represented by AC1(y) and AC2(y) respectively. The minimum industry average 
costs for a single firm are equal to that for two firms. For levels of output up to yNM, a 
natural monopoly exists in the industry, even though for levels of output between 
yMIN and yNM the technology is characterized by diseconomies of scale. For levels of 
output greater than yNM, the industry is a natural duopoly. 
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Figure 5.3 Natural duopoly 
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It is clear that concepts of economies of scale and subadditivity are related but not 
identical.  
For the single product firms, the existence of economies of scale is not necessary for 
subadditivity. Economies of scale are sufficient for a natural monopoly but not 
necessary whereas subadditivity is a necessary and sufficient condition for a natural 
monopoly.  
The level of production depends on market demand. At price p*, if demand is either 
D1 or D2, the market is a natural monopoly, but if market demand grows to D3 at the 
same price, the industry is a natural duopoly. 
However it will not always be the case that a natural monopoly can sustain itself 
against new entrants even if the incumbent firm produces efficiently and earns only a 
normal return on investment.  
Using Figure 5.3, suppose that to serve the whole market D2, the incumbent charges 
p*. It is possible that a new entrant will charge a lower price which say, p1, providing 
yMIN to the market. This is a case when the market is unstable and in which the 
natural monopoly is unsustainable. To satisfy demand two or more firms are 
required, which is socially inefficient. In this situation, government controls would 
be needed to place restraints on entry and manage prices. 
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5.2.2.2 Subadditivity and multiple product firms 
In many markets, firms produce multiple products. In this section, the definition of 
subadditivity for a multiproduct firm is provided. Assume that a firm produces M 
different products. If 
1 2 1 2
1
( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., )
N
M
i i i
i
C y y y C y y y
=
< ∑ M
≥
,     (5.2) 
where , 
1
; 1, 2,..., ; 2
N
j j
i
i
y y j M N
=
= =∑
then the cost function for the list of outputs , where 1 2( , ,..., )MY y y y= jiy is the 
output of product j by firm i, is subadditive. Y is the output vector. The subaddivity 
condition requires that it be less costly to produce all products together than any 
division of the same products in the same amounts across any number of firms. The 
subadditivity of multiproduct firms depends on the economics of joint production. 
There are few more sufficient conditions for subadditivity in the multiproduct case. 
To simplify, the case of the two-product firm is considered. 
• Cost complementarity: Cost complementarity exists if the marginal cost of every 
product is nonincreasing in the output of all products. Cost complementarity is 
formally defined as 
2
0
k l
C
q q
∂ ≤∂ ∂ . As the output of product k increases, the 
marginal cost of k does not increase and neither does the marginal cost of 
producing any other product.  
• Product-specific scale economies and economies of scope: To explain product-
specific scale economies, the concept of average incremental costs is needed. 
Average incremental costs for product 1 are defined 
as:
1 2 2
1
1
( , ) (0, )( ) C y y C yAIC Y
y
−= . The average incremental cost for good 1 is 
the change in total costs from producing y1 units, holding production of good 2 
constant. Product-specific scale economies exist for product j if average 
incremental costs reduces as output of product j increases. A firm that produces 
two products, both of which are characterized by product-specific scale 
economies, may not be a natural monopolist if there are sufficient diseconomies 
of joint production. 
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To measure the economies of joint production, the concept of economies of scope 
is needed. A production process is characterised by economies of scope if joint 
production is less costly than producing the product individually. In the simple 
two-product case, economies of scope exist at the output level Y=(y1,y2) if 
 is satisfied. If the cost function is characterised by 
decreasing average incremental costs for all products and economies of scope, 
the cost function will be subadditive. Declining average incremental costs imply 
that a single firm is subadditive in each product whereas economies of scope 
imply that it is cost-efficient to produce the entire set of products. 
1 2 1 2( , ) ( ,0) (0, )C y y C y C y< +
• Multipleproduct economies of scale and transray convexity: A measure of scale 
economies at the level of the firm is 
1
( )
M
i i
i
C YS
q MC
=
=
∑
, where MCi is the marginal 
cost of product i. If S>1 there are multipleproduct scale economies. Ray average 
cost is defined as the average cost of producing the fixed bundle for a given scale 
of production. If the scale of production is t, then ray average cost is 
( )( ) C tYRAC t
t
= , where Y is the unit bundle. If S>1, then ray average cost is 
declining. Multiproduct economies of scale are equivalent to decreasing ray 
average cost.  
• An industry will be a natural monopoly and the cost function will be subadditive 
if for all relevant output vectors, the cost function is characterised by 
multiproduct economies of scale and transray convexity.  
To understand transray convexity, consider an output vector . The 
cost function is transray convex at Y if there exists positive numbers w
1 2( , )Y y y=  
 1, w2 and w 
that define a line such that for any two output vectors Y1 1 2 2w y w y w+ =  a and Yb 
that lie on the same line the following is true: 
, for all 0(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )a b aC Y Y C Y C Yλ λ λ λ⎡ ⎤+ − ≤ + −⎣ ⎦ b 1λ< < . Transray 
convexity holds if the cost of producing a weighted average of any two output 
vectors (Ya and Yb) on the same line as Y is less than a weighted average of the 
costs of producing the two output vectors independently. 
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5.2.3 Natural monopoly and electricity transmission and distribution 
Gans and King (2000) demonstrated that electricity transmission embodies a natural 
monopoly technology. Competition cannot be introduced into electricity 
transmission. An integrated transmission system is the most efficient design to 
maintain and improve the security of supply. 
The electricity distribution network is also natural monopoly because building a 
duplicate distribution network to serve the same local market is not cost efficient. 
Salvanes and Tjøtta (1998) empirically studied whether electricity distribution in 
Norway is natural monopoly by testing whether its cost function is subadditive.  
To test for subadditivity, they employed the consistency region or the domain of the 
estimated translog cost function as a test region. In this region, the estimated cost 
function is nonnegative, has nonnegative marginal costs and is homogeneous, 
monotonic and concave in input prices. If the consistency region is not empty, a cost 
function is subadditive. 
Sample of 91 distribution companies in 1988 was employed. The outputs of these 
companies were reduced to number of access contracts and an aggregate measure of 
energy output whereas the inputs are capital, labour and purchased electricity. The 
results strongly indicate that the estimated cost function for local electricity 
distribution companies is subadditive. Natural monopoly could not be rejected for 
local distribution of electricity to end users.  
5.2.4 Natural monopoly and competition for market 
It is characteristic of a natural monopoly that first best pricing at marginal cost by a 
natural monopolist is unprofitable. As discussed in Section 5.3, a regulated natural 
monopolist charges the second best average cost price to ensure it breaks even but at 
this price the deadweight loss incurs and government regulation is required to 
achieve the first best outcome. If deadweight loss at the second best is tolerable, 
however, then the regulation is not required.  
Other forms of competition for market such as auctioning of a monopoly franchise, 
contestable market and intermodal competition can lead to the second best outcome.2  
It should be noted that an electricity transmission and distribution network which is 
characterised by huge sunk costs of exit and limited substitute energy do not allow 
                                                 
2 Braeutigam (1989) reviewed the literature on forms of competition for market to achieve second best 
outcome. 
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other forms of competition to work effectively, therefore regulation of electricity 
transmission and distribution is widely employed to minimise the welfare loss. 
5.3 Normative theories of economic regulation 
As discussed in Section 5.2 that electricity transmission and distribution activities are 
characterised by natural monopoly, regulation of these activities is needed to 
maximise social welfare.  
Regulation is the use of government power for the purpose of restricting the 
decisions of economic agents. There are many types of regulation, which are often 
classified into social and economic regulation (Viscusi et al. 2000; Ogus 2002).  
Social regulation covers the area of environmental and consumer protection and 
labour conditions in terms of occupational health and safety and equality whereas 
economic regulation is mainly exercised in relation to activities that lack 
competition, particularly with a natural monopoly.  
Section 5.3 to 5.5 focuses on economic regulation. Normative theories of economic 
regulation and positive economic theories of regulation will be discussed. 
Normative theories of economic regulation explain how regulation should be 
designed to maximise social welfare. Following the main idea of public interest 
theory due to market failures, the government intervention in the form of providing 
of goods and services and regulation is rationalised.   
The early literature mostly studied how to define and regulate price and its structure 
that the monopolist should charge. Weyman-Jones (1994), Armstrong et al. (1994), 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), Train (1991), Waterson (1988) and Braeutigam (1989) 
reviewed the literature on this issue extensively. 
Regulation is undertaken to minimise the deadweight loss and maximise the 
distributive and economic efficiencies. Most of early regulatory tools concentrated 
on how to control prices and various theories of pricing for natural monopoly such as 
marginal pricing, price discrimination, peak load pricing, the two-part tariff, the 
nonlinear tariff and Ramsey pricing were developed.  
Yet these models do not take the problem of asymmetric information into account. 
They assume that firms and regulator are equally well informed, particularly the 
costs of firms and market demand. Weyman-Jones (1994) and Baron (1989) provide 
a good summary of the literature on regulatory mechanisms in which the regulator 
has incomplete information and a limited ability to observe the actions of the firms.  
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Rate of return regulation in the famous Averch and Johnson (1962) model is 
exogenously specified and based on the assumption that regulator and firm have 
symmetric information about demand and cost, and the regulator acts naively in 
regulating profit by controlling the rate of return. This model was extended to 
incorporate the problem of asymmetric information: hidden information (adverse 
selection) and hidden action (moral hazard). The central idea of various models 
under the problem of asymmetric information is to develop and design regulatory 
mechanism that the regulator can use to induce the firm to operate in such a way that 
the regulator’s objective, that of social welfare maximisation, is achieved. 
In an endogenous regulatory mechanism, the firm has more information than the 
regulator. The regulator is assumed to have the authority to control certain aspect of 
firm’s operations, particularly price.  
The regulatory game can be viewed in terms of either of delegation or of revelation.  
In the delegation formulation, the regulator delegates pricing decisions to the firm 
but regulator specifies a mechanism to determine price.  
In the revelation approach, the firm reveals the costs or variables needed and the 
regulator uses this data to set the price. Through the revelation approach, a firm will 
overstate its cost. The regulator has to find the optimal mechanism for a firm to 
reveal the truth and has to be concerned about unobservable actions.  
In the model of regulation under the adverse selection problem in which the firms are 
better informed, regulators will choose the regulatory tools to maximise the expected 
value of social welfare subject to the constraints of inducing participation in the 
business and ensuring truth-telling.  
This is the Bayesian approach to regulatory mechanism design under which the 
regulator’s prior beliefs about the probability distribution of random variables are 
incorporated.  
With moral hazard problems, in which the firm knows how much unobservable effort 
it puts to reduce cost, the principal-agent model is employed to design the regulatory 
mechanism. Again this is a Bayesian approach, and the Bayesian mechanisms 
depend on each particular regulator and the state of their information.  
In practice however, the regulator does not have all the information which is 
necessary and sufficient to design the regulatory tools, the regulator has only the 
observable and verifiable published historical accounting data as available 
information. 
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As this data cannot be foreseen, these mechanisms are not optimal but converge to 
the optimum over time. This is called non-Bayesian mechanism.  
The combination of Bayesian and non-Bayesian mechanisms is the theoretical 
foundation of incentive regulation, which will be discussed later on. 
5.4 Objectives of economic regulation on natural monopoly 
Economic regulation typically refers to government-imposed restrictions on firm 
decisions over price, quantity, and entry and exit (Viscusi et.al. 2000:308).  
The main (explicit or implicit) objectives in economic regulation of natural 
monopolies are as follows: 
• Rent extraction goal: To charge consumers reasonable prices for services 
provided by the regulated monopoly;  
• Capital attraction goal: To reduce the participation constraint by providing 
adequate incentives to attract additional capital to the regulated monopoly and to 
invest in maintaining the existing capital stock in order to balance supply and 
demand over time and to ensure the continuity of services3;  
• Supply-side efficiency goal: To induce the monopoly to perform its services 
efficiently in terms of cost and production technology; and 
• Demand-side efficiency goal: To provide consumers with the incentives to utilize 
services efficiently through the level and structure of prices (Joskow 1998:36). 
Although the objectives of regulation target both the demand and supply side, in 
practice the regulatory mechanisms are commonly imposed on the supply side or 
regulated firms. The demand-side objectives will be achieved indirectly via the 
supply-side regulations.  
Essentially the regulator’s job is to maximize incentives for firms to operate 
efficiently while concerned with the participation constraint to secure continued 
service and to balance supply and demand over time. 
5.5 Regulation with the problem of asymmetric information 
The problem of information in theories of economic regulation relies on the 
asymmetry of information between regulator and firm. Basically the firm is better 
informed than the regulator about cost and demand in the industry and the firm’s 
                                                 
3 The capital attraction goal inherently conflicts with the rent extraction goal since higher prices attract 
capital but yield more rent to regulated firms. 
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action. By using the principal-agent analysis, under which the regulator is the 
principal and the firm is the agent, the former problem is called adverse selection and 
the latter problem is called moral hazard. Armstrong et al. (1994), Weyman-Jones 
(1994), Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Armstrong and Sappington (forthcoming) 
provided a good review on regulatory models related to two problems. There are 
many models developed in recent decades to explain regulation with asymmetric 
information. Armstrong and Sappington (forthcoming) also reviewed recent 
theoretical contributions to the practical regulation policies, optimal regulation with 
multiple firms and access pricing.  
This section does not attempt to review them all but aims to review the simple 
models to demonstrate the problems. 
Loeb and Magat (1979) introduced the basic regulatory model which led to 
development in regulatory theories. In the Loeb and Magat model, there are two 
players: the regulator as principal and the firm as agent.  
The regulator knows the firm’s demand curve and how to calculate marginal cost 
given the unknown parameter γ (MC = MC(γ)).  
The firm knows the value of parameter γ, which represents the firm’s efficiency or 
productivity or other exogenous factors affecting costs. In the basic model, the firm 
is able to observe γ, as a random variable, realisation and select the action on quantity 
of output at the regulated price, whereas the regulator does not know about γ. 
 
Figure 5.4 Loeb-Magat mechanism 
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Source: Weyman-Jones (1994) 
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In Figure 5.4, it is assumed that the firm realises the random variable γ2. The 
regulator asks the firm to report γ and then sets price so that p = MC(γ) and asks firm 
to report γ. To obtain a high price, the firm will report γ1 rather than tell the true γ. 
The regulator needs a truth-telling mechanism to obtain the γ that the firm truly 
realises.  
In the Loeb and Magat contract, the regulator agrees to pays the utility all the 
consumer surplus up to the observed price and quantity. If a firm reports γ1, it sells q1 
at p1 and receives the transfer of consumer surplus of A. If a firm announces γ2, it 
would receive a transfer of A+B+C which is preferred. Firms will not announce γ 
lower than γ2, such as γ3 because whereas previously it would receive A+B+C+D+E, 
it would then incur costs of D+E+H over and above its actual revenues. As a result, 
the net transfer is A+B+C-H which is smaller than A+B+C. Therefore, firm will tell 
the truth with the price set at marginal cost and the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus maximised.  
This approach is characteristic of as a revelation approach, however it should be 
noted that this model focuses on the allocatively efficient outcome not on the 
distribution of surplus.  
Therefore the main drawback of this model is that the regulator transfers consumer 
surplus to the producer. One method to compensate for the transferred surplus is to 
auction the right to be a monopolist. 
5.5.1 Regulation with adverse selection 
The simplest adverse selection problem in designing the optimal regulatory scheme 
was analysed by Besanko and Sappington (1987). Just as with the Loeb and Magat 
model, demand conditions are accurately known by both the regulator and the firm. 
The regulator knows how to calculate marginal cost given a parameter, ci, where i=H 
or L for high and low costs. The regulator does not know the realisation of the binary 
random variable ci: фH and фL. The regulator wishes to maximise a weighted social-
welfare function in which the relative weights on consumer and producer surplus are 
β and (1- β), respectively. The regulator’s objective is shown as following 
( ) ( )[ ]1W S p Tβ β π= + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ,      (5.3) 
where S is consumer surplus, π is firm’s profit and T is a negative lump-sum transfer 
from the consumers to the firm. The firm’s breakeven level to participate in the 
business is π*.  
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The regulator’s tool is a combination of a price cap and a transfer payment for each 
possible cost announcement by the firm: [pi, Ti]. The choices of both variables 
depend on the possible realisation of cost parameter, high or low. If the regulator has 
perfect information on the marginal cost, the first best solution: π = π*, pi=MC(ci), 
qi=D(p), will be implemented. However the regulator does not have perfect 
information and can only design a contract to encourage a firm to tell the truth based 
on the belief. 
The regulator aims to maximise the expected value of social welfare subject to the 
constraints of inducing participation and ensuring truth-telling. 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }Max 1i i i
i
EW S p c T c cφ β β π⎡ ⎤= + + − i⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∑ ; where i=H or L (5.4) 
subject to:  
( ) *icπ π≥  and  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , ; ,  or i i i j j ip c T c c p c T c c i j H Lπ π≥ = .   (5.5) 
The first constraint is the individual rationality constraint whereas the second is a set 
of incentive compatibility constraints. These constraints ensure that when the firm 
has a cost parameter, ci, it cannot do better than self select the contract offered for 
announcing that value.  
If the firm realises a high cost, it will truthfully announce this by selecting a contract 
with a high price and a low transfer payment, producing a low output below the first 
best level and just breaking even.  
The firm will not select the low price contract because the combination of price and 
transfer payment will lead to a loss. If the firm realises a low cost, it will truthfully 
announces this by selecting a contract with a low price equal to the marginal cost and 
a high transfer payment, producing the first best output level and making abnormal 
profits. The firm will not choose a high price contract because it leads to too low an 
output to make abnormal profits. The optimal regulatory mechanism trades market 
power against informational monopoly by offering a menu of contracts that lead to a 
low output with breakeven performance and a high output with abnormal profits.  
5.5.2 Regulation with moral hazard 
The regulation with moral hazard problem can be described by the principal-agent 
model developed by Sappington (1991). 
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According to Sappington’s model, there are two players: regulator as principal (P) 
and firm as agent (A). Both P and A are assumed to be risk-neutral and share the 
same prior beliefs about a random productivity variable, r. High realisation of r raises 
output, Z. A’s expected output performance also depends on A’s effort, e, which is 
unknown to P as following: 
( ) ( ), ; 0; 0f fE Z f r e
r e
∂ ∂= >∂ ∂ >
0
      (5.6) 
while P’s valuation of output is: 
( ); 0;V V Z V V′ ′′= > ≤ .       (5.7) 
The game between P and A starts with P designing a contract to pay A for 
performance: p = p(Z) and offering this contract to A. A can accept or reject. If A 
rejects, the game finishes. A will accept if the expected utility of contract is at least as 
large as A’s reservation utility (U*): ( )( )( ) *E U p Z U≥ . If A accepts, A works and 
observes the realisation of r. Then A decides on the level of e. The realisation of Z is 
observed and payment is made, according to p = p(Z).  
The first best, full information equilibrium for P is where A chooses the value of e 
which, given the value of r, maximises P’s expected surplus: E(V(Z)) – cost of effort 
including U*. This e is e*(r) and where P collects all the surplus leaving A with U*. 
In Figure 5.5, A’s utility function, U(e,p), is represented by indifference curves 
between effort (bad) and payment (good). Let U’ > U*. P’s valuation of output 
increase as output increases which in turn rises as effort rises, for a given value of r. 
It is represented by V(Z(e)) line. If P has full information and can directly observe 
A’s effort, effort level is e* at which P’s surplus (V(z)-U*) is maximised, and A 
achieves utility level, U*. This equilibrium is located where the slope line tangent to 
U* is equal to slope of V, which maximises the vertical distance between V and U*.  
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Figure 5.5 Incentives and principal-agent contracts 
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If P cannot directly observe A’s effort, A will have an incentive to be productively 
inefficient. The question how P induces an effort level of e* arises. P can pay A a 
fixed sum, C, to produce output. A seeks to reach his highest indifference curve, U’, 
at a corner solution with zero effort. Instead of a flat fee, A is made to be the 
franchisee to the output production and is given the residual claim to the surplus 
above a fixed franchise fee, k, payable to the principal. Therefore A becomes the 
residual claimant to V-U*-k. The vertical distance between V-k and U* is maximised, 
if A chooses effort level, e*. P can choose any k which leaves A as residual claimant 
to U* or more. Therefore P is able to claim all surplus and leave A to deliver e* in 
order to reach U*. In this model, P does not need any incentive to put resources to 
gather information. 
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5.6 Positive economic theories of regulation 
The aim of the positive economic theory of regulation is to explain why and how 
industries are regulated based on the interests and objectives of the firms and 
regulator. 
For the government’s role as regulator, along with the public choice theory, capture 
theory was developed.4 This theory assumes that regulatory capture, which is defined 
as regulation that is captured by the interests of the regulated and then stops to work 
in favour of the public interest, is another argument suggesting that the benefits of 
regulation are not passed on to the public. 
The more general theory of economic regulation was introduced by Stigler (1971) 
and extended by Posner (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983).5 The main 
proposition of Stigler (1971) is that regulation is not designed to correct market 
failures as given the the potential benefits are acquired by the industry or interest 
groups. It is designed and operated primarily for industry’s benefit. This proposition 
is in favour of capture theory.  
This proposition was criticised by Posner (1971) who stated that in many cases 
regulation strongly benefited specific consumer groups in form of internal or cross-
subsidisation.  
Peltzman (1976) extended this idea. He proposed that politicians will select a policy 
of regulation ensuring that political support is maximised.  
It is not always true that regulation will benefit only industry, particularly in cases 
where consumers can organise themselves effectively. This extended theory can 
predict the form of the benefit transfer. Transfers can be in the direct form of 
subsidies or indirect forms such as price or quantity regulation or restriction to 
market entry. The form of the transfers depends on the elasticity of supply. 
Preference is given to subsidies when the supply is inelastic, such as in health care 
and domestic housing.  
Becker (1983) had the similar setup as Peltzman in stating  that interest groups, 
which Becker called pressure groups, organise to put pressure on the political process 
to grant them benefits or exempt them from paying for others’ benefits. Some groups 
                                                 
4 In relevant literature, capture theory is sometimes called private interest theory. 
5 This theory is called the economic theory of regulation by Posner (1974), Chicago theory of 
government by Noll (1989) or interest group theory of regulation by Newbery (1999). These work 
provide a good discussion on this theory. 
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are more efficient in exerting political pressure than others, therefore wealth is 
transferred to these groups. This transfer provokes deadweight losses. Becker’s 
central argument is that a limit exists for these transfers because of deadweight 
losses. The loss to the less efficient pressure group is larger than the gain of the more 
efficient pressure group, therefore the less efficient group has more pressure to push 
regulatory policy in their favour.  
In summary the Chicago theory of regulation predicts that regulation will be imposed 
in favour of interest groups which might be against the public interest, therefore 
regulation is not always desirable.  
There were attempts to test interest group theories of regulation.  
In the early studies, regulation is found to be inefficient and to protect the regulated 
firms which supported the interest group theories, however these studies could not 
explain why government would decide to deliver benefits to regulated firms. One 
explanation is that the interest group may have influenced votes on regulatory 
legislation.  
In the Virginia school of public choice, rent seeking is a central idea. Rent seeking is 
the behaviour of economic agents to devote scarce resources in return for monopoly 
rights granted by governments. The monopolist is willing to devote resources to 
protect his monopoly rights against possible threats from potential competitors, 
therefore the incentives to regulate remain intact. 
However the positive theories of regulation do not suggest the method or tool of 
regulation. 
The positive theories suggest that deregulation would enhance efficiency because 
regulation curtails competition and inefficient operations develop. Additionally, rents 
accrued to interest groups benefiting from regulation can be dissipated by 
unregulated competition (Peltzman 1989), however predictability of positive theories 
that movement toward deregulation and privatisation is weak (Quiggin 1987; Levine 
and Forrence 1990).  
5.7 Summary 
Being explained by both the traditional view of natural monopoly and the concept of 
subadditivity of cost, evidence shows that electricity transmission and distribution is 
characterised by a natural monopoly. Hence, to maximise social welfare under either 
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public or private ownership, electricity transmission and distribution must operate 
subject to economic regulation. 
Design of regulation is explained by normative theories of economic regulation in 
which natural monopoly is regulated by defining and regulating price and price 
structure to maximise social welfare. Theories have been developed from 
assumptions based on perfect information to regulation with the problem of 
asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Another school of theories relating to regulation are positive economic theories of 
regulation. These theories do not explain the method or tool of regulation but explain 
how regulation is in favour of interest or pressure groups, and that the rent seeking 
behaviour of interest groups can be harmful to the public interest. 
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 Chapter 6 
  
 ECONOMIC REGULATION OF  
 NATURAL MONOPOLY IN PRACTICE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are various objectives to economic regulation of a 
natural monopoly. Apart from taking the problem of asymmetric information and the 
influence of interest groups into account, regulation of the electricity transmission 
and distribution sector in practice has to be designed to achieve various objectives.  
On the one extreme, if the regulator has only a capital attraction objective to secure 
the continuity of services and to balance supply and demand over time, which are 
very important to services like electricity, it has to give incentives or full insurance to 
the regulated firms against the possibility of making a loss so that the firms will not 
go bankrupt and the return to investors is guaranteed.  
With full insurance, the regulated firm is not permitted to earn more than its costs 
and prices are allowed to rise to maintain earnings during periods of low demand. 
The firm would receive compensation for its actual costs by an exact amount.  
This is a ‘rate-of-return’ (ROR) regulation, sometimes called ‘cost-plus’ or ‘cost-of-
service’ regulation. Under this type of regulation, the rate of return is regulated to 
ensure that it exactly matches the cost of capital in each period. In this regulatory 
regime there is no incentive for the regulated firms to pursue supply-side efficiency 
at all. 
At the other extreme, the regulator defines a set of minimum service standards 
including the prices that the regulated firm can charge. There is absolutely no 
constraint on the earnings of the firm. If the firm is able to reduce costs while 
complying with the regulated standards, it can retain the resulting profit. If demand is 
low, the firm will suffer loss. There is no earning guarantee in this regulatory regime, 
but it offers the strongest possible supply-side efficiency incentives to the regulated 
firm to minimize costs. This is called ‘incentive regulation’.  
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In the real world, both pure regulation regimes are not feasible. All known regimes 
lie somewhere between the two extremes. In addition, that there has been a 
significant convergence in practice between ROR and incentive regulation, 
specifically in terms of information required for regulatory variables. For example, 
setting up and revising caps requires the same type of financial and technical skills as 
the ROR system (Kessides 2004:122). 
To regulate electricity transmission and distribution in both ROR and incentive 
regulation, the revenue requirement is needed and has to be determined in a way that 
ensures the regulated firms earn a fair return, operate efficiently and cannot exercise 
the monopoly power.  
Because revenue requirement is a common and important variable in both types of 
regulation, this chapter will discuss financial issues that determine the revenue 
requirement. It should be noted that financial issues discussed are based on practices 
in developed countries1 with a well developed and functioning capital market. 
For developing countries with specific characteristics, there are some variations in 
regulatory finance and practices.  
This chapter aims to explore regulatory regimes adopted in developed countries and 
to discuss regulatory finance needed for the determination of revenue requirement. 
Then specific characteristics of the developing countries which affect the choice of 
regulatory regimes will be discussed and the appropriate choice of economic 
regulation of a natural monopoly based on these characteristics will be explored.  
Material in this chapter will be a background for analysis of regulation in the ESI in 
Thailand later in Part III. 
Section 6.2 will discuss ROR regulation and its criticisms. Incentive regulation and 
its variation, together with practical problem, will then be explored in Section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 provides definitions and estimation methods of financial variables needed 
for regulatory finance. Other issues in regulation will be presented in Section 6.5.   
In Section 6.6 characteristics of developing countries will be addressed. In Section 
6.7 the choice of regulatory regimes will be evaluated based on characteristics of 
developing countries. The choice of regulatory regime is recommended according to 
                                                 
1 This chapter summarises the issues in regulatory finance from the practice by the regulators in 
developed countries such as:  The Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA), 
Office of the Tasmania Energy Regulator (OTTER), Qeensland Competition Authority (QCA), 
Essential Services Commission (ESC) (before 2002 called Office of the Regulator-General (ORG)) 
and Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) in the UK. 
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the level of development of a particular developing country. In Section 6.8 
experiences of regulation of electricity distribution in developing countries, 
particularly Latin American countries are discussed.  
Section 6.9 summarises the chapter. 
6.2 Rate-of-return regulation 
ROR or cost-of-service regulation refers to any arrangement that restricts the 
earnings of a firm to be no greater than the cost of providing the regulated service. 
The conventional criterion is that a firm cannot earn more than a fair and reasonable 
rate of return on capital to ensure that prices reflect the cost of service.  
Rate of return regulation has been used for more than a century. It was motivated in 
the US by concern about companies in the railroad market. These firms were first 
directly regulated in the 1880’s, and since then the United States has had the most 
experience with a rate of return regulation, which has been applied to monopolies in 
the electricity, telephone, natural gas pipeline and water distribution sectors (Joskow 
1998:51). 
There is considerable diversity in the practice and decisions of individual regulators 
using ROR regulation.  
The rate case inherent to ROR regulation involves two steps.  
Firstly, the rate level determination is concerned with identifying allowed operating 
costs and investment or capital costs and setting an allowed rate of return and 
depreciation. This is so the firm will have the appropriate level of earnings on its 
investment. During the rate case, tariffs are set based on the previous accounting 
period and remain in effect until the next rate case.  
Secondly, the rate structure2 dealing with tariffs for different customer classes and 
products is determined. From that point, only the regulation of rate levels is 
discussed.  
                                                 
2 Ideally, tariffs should be determined separately for each customer category at the marginal cost of 
providing electricity. However different tariffs for different customers based on price discrimination, 
though economically efficient, can be viewed as inequitable. As a result, it involves cross-
subsidisation. The other types of tariff structures are recommended.  
The first is the Ramsey pricing rule under which customer categories are charged different tariffs 
based on their elasticity of demand. Customer with low elasticity of demand such as residential and 
commercial categories would be charged a higher tariff than those with high elasticity of demand such 
as industrial customers.  
Second is the two-part tariff to allocate fixed costs among customers such as connection costs and the 
use of marginal-cost pricing to allocate variable costs. The two-part tariff structure can be extended to 
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ROR regulation requires public rate hearings in which the regulator, firms and 
consumers have the right to request a rate case. For example, the firm argues that 
current tariffs are too low because the cost allowance or the allowed rate of return is 
too low. After the presentation of detailed accounting information, the regulator 
determines the appropriate level of expenses and sets the new allowed rate of return. 
Tariffs are then adjusted to yield this new rate of return. Prices set at the rate hearing 
remain in force until a new rate hearing. Also, the regulator and customers can 
request rate hearings if the realised rate of return is significantly above the allowed 
rate of return. 
Rate hearings are the path to determine the tariffs. The rates are set only after the 
revenue requirement of the firm has been determined. The revenue requirement (RR) 
is the total cost of service determined by the regulator and it is the amount that must 
be raised for the firm to earn its fair rate of return. The elements of the firm’s 
revenue requirement are the allowed operating (O) and capital (K) costs: RR = O+K. 
The allowed operating costs include administrative expenses, maintenance, labour 
costs, fuel, and so on. The firm’s capital costs depend on the amount of capital 
invested or investments, called the rate base (RB), the allowed rate of return (r), and 
depreciation (D): K = rRB+D. The underlying idea is that a firm’s revenues must be 
equal to its costs in order that the firm earns a normal profit. Practical estimation of 
each component of RR will be discussed in the section of regulatory finance.  
6.2.1 Appraisal of rate-of-return regulation 
The potential benefit of a credible ROR regulatory system is that it is possible to be 
very effective in attracting capital investment because firms are assured that they will 
recover their operating and investment costs or may have fair return more than their 
cost of capital. This regulatory regime shifts various firm specific and market risks 
from the firms to consumers and reduces the firm’s financial risk and cost of capital 
                                                                                                                                          
a multipart tariff in electricity pricing such as the four components of the marginal cost of electricity 
service: marginal energy and generation capacity costs, marginal costs of transmission and 
distribution facilities, marginal energy cost of transmission and distribution networks and marginal 
customer costs.  
Next is a fully distributed cost pricing model under which the regulator allocates costs to serve a 
particular customer and divides common costs among customers. The common costs include the costs 
of generation and transmission whereas the connection cost to the distribution network is assigned to 
the connected customers. 
Last is base-load and peak-load tariff structures under which a low tariff for based load electricity use 
and a high tariff for peak load use.  
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(Joskow 1998:50). Although the benefit of ROR regulation prevails, ROR regulation 
has been criticised as the following. 
6.2.2 Asymmetric information 
In the process of determining the rate level and structures, there is an asymmetric 
information problem as the regulator has imperfect information about a firm’s costs. 
The firm can misrepresent its costs unless the regulator has good operating and 
accounting procedures to measure the firm’s cost of capital accurately and to audit 
the firm’s actual costs (Joskow 1998:50).  
It is also likely that the regulator sets prices that are too high, which conflicts with 
the rent extraction objective of regulation.  
One solution is to engage the regulator in managerial decisions. For example, the 
regulator would be involved in the investment planning process and has access to 
detailed information on a firm’s cost information. This way will help to increase 
information access but the cost of regulation also rises. 
6.2.3 Incentives for efficiency 
ROR regulation provides low-powered incentives to firms to reduce costs because of 
the link between prices and costs. If the firm reduces its costs, the benefit of cost 
efficiency belongs to consumers in the form of lower prices but not to firm as profits. 
If costs increase, then price increase as well, and the firm continues to earn its 
allowed rate of return.  
ROR regulation also encourages firms to be excessively risk averse as it reduces the 
firm’s incentives to undertake efficient but risky investments to reduce costs. There 
is no mechanism for the regulator to punish a firm for not undertaking cost-saving 
investments. 
6.2.4 Averch-Johnson effect 
ROR regulation provides a profit-maximising firm with incentives to inefficiently 
expand its rate base to relax the constraint on allowed profits.  
Following the classic study by Averch and Johnson (1962), suppose that firm uses 
two inputs, capital (K) and labour (L) to produce output (Y = f(L,K)). The firm’s cost 
is C = wL+rK, where w is the price of labour and r is the cost of capital. The firm’s 
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operating profits relative to its capital base are limited to an allowed rate of return, s. 
The firm’s objective is to maximise profit, π, subject to the regulatory constraint: 
( )Max ,pf L K wL rKπ = − −       (6.1) 
subject to: 
( ),pf L K wL
s
K
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ≤ .      (6.2) 
The regulatory constraint limits operating profits to a fixed proportion, s, of the 
capital base. Because p is fixed, for simplicity let p =1. The Lagrange function is: 
[ ]L ( , ) ( , )f L K wL rK sK f L K wLλ= − − + − + .    (6.3) 
The first order conditions are: 
 [ ]L 1f w
L L
λ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= − − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ 0         (6.4) 
L 0f r s
K K K
λ λ∂ ∂ ∂= − + − =∂ ∂ ∂
f       (6.5) 
L ( , ) 0sK f L K wLλ
∂ = − + =∂ .       (6.6) 
By the envelope theorem, K
s
πλ ∂= ∂ , so that 
1 0
K s
πλ ∂= >∂  which means that 
increasing s relaxes the constraint and allows π to increase. If the assumption that 
fr s
K
∂< < ∂  is made which means that the allowed rate of return is higher than the 
actual cost of capital but lower than the profit-maximising marginal revenue product 
of capital. Then from Equation 6.5, 1f fr s
K K
λ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − <⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Therefore, 
0 1λ< < . 
From Equation 6.4 and 6.5, the results are derived as follows:  
[ ] [ ]{ }1 *r s rf f
K L w w
λ λ− −∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ =       (6.7) 
[ ]*r r− = [ ] ( )(1 ) 1r s rλ λ λ− − − −  
 = [ ]( )1 r sλ λ 0− − <        (6.8) 
and therefore *r
w w
< r . The firm faces a distorted factor price ratio that causes it to 
overinvest in the capital stock.  
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The ROR regulatory method leads to the over-capitalisation of firms. This is called 
Averch and Johnson effect. 
From Equation 6.6, applying the second-order condition, the result obtained is 
( ) 0
dK K
ds s f K
⎡ ⎤= − >⎢ − ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦⎥
.       (6.9) 
Therefore an increase in the allowed rate of return will increases profit via an 
increase in the capital base. 
If the regulated price is determined by the average cost pricing, then 
( , , ,Cp Y s
Y
= = Ψ )w r or the price is determined by the firm’s output level, allowed 
rate of return and input prices. Given the value of s, the firm can simply pass the 
costs on to the consumers. Because full cost recovery is guaranteed, there is no 
advantage from investing in more efficient and cost reducing technologies. This 
conflicts with both rent extraction and supply-side efficiency objectives. 
6.2.5 Mitigating factors 
The lack of incentive for efficiency and overcapitalisation under ROR regulation can 
be mitigated.  
Under ROR regulation, between rate cases, the allowed rate of return and revenue 
requirement are not changed. Also the price is set at the rate hearing and remains 
unchanged until the next hearing.  
During the period between two consecutive rate cases, which is called regulatory lag, 
a firm can earn higher than the allowed rate of return if actual costs incurred are 
lower than anticipated. The regulatory lag between changes in costs and in price can 
give the firm incentives for cost minimisation and efficiency. The incentives for cost 
efficiency increase as the regulatory lag increases, however the longer the lag, the 
wider the gap between price and cost and the greater the allocative inefficiency.  
Therefore the regulatory lag has to be carefully determined to balance cost efficiency 
and allocative efficiency. In addition, with the fixed date of the review, the closer the 
next review the greater the incentive for the firm to pad its costs so the regulatory 
constraint at the next rate hearing is relaxed. 
To reduce the incentive of overcapitalisation, the regulator can review either before 
or after the investment whether the capital investment is used or useful and whether 
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the investment is based on avoidable costs or not. Through the review process, the 
capital component of the rate base can be controlled. 
The major assumption in the Averch and Johnson model that capital inputs are not 
sunk is not realistic. Firms which are regulated are a natural monopoly with a large 
sunk capital investment. It is very risky for a firm if the regulator decides to change 
the regulatory contract after investment.  
ROR regulation with its legal requirement that the firm be treated fairly provides 
some guarantee against hold-up by the regulator. With a lack of regulation, a firm 
would prefer to under-invest. Gilbert and Newbery (1994) provided evidence that 
during 1970s and 1980s the electric utilities in the US underinvested in capital in 
response to less favourable regulation toward them. They proposed that the ROR 
regulation with a useful criterion for capital inclusion in the rate base is more likely 
to ensure an efficient long-run investment path than the other regulatory methods 
because it helps in reducing the risk of hold-ups to the firm. 
6.2.6 Regulatory burden 
The process of rate hearings is resource intensive to ensure that all parties have equal 
opportunities to influence the decision of regulators. Moreover, to manage a ROR 
regulatory system efficiently, a huge amount of information about cost and demand 
is required (Liston 1993:28). A good accounting and auditing system is also needed.  
6.3 Incentive regulation 
The criticisms, particularly concerning the lack of incentive for efficiency, of ROR 
regulation have resulted in the development of new forms of regulation which 
provide higher-powered incentives to regulated firms, called incentive regulation. 
Incentive regulation refers to regulatory regimes where the regulator delegates 
certain pricing decisions to the firm so that the firm is given an incentive to be more 
efficient and can reap profits earned from cost reduction (Vogelsang 2002:6). The 
main objective of incentive regulation is to overcome the problem of supply-side 
inefficiency.  
In the 1980s incentive regulation was employed extensively in the UK to accompany 
privatisation and liberalisation in the public utility industries such as electricity, 
natural gas, water and telecommunications. In the US, incentive regulation was 
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firstly introduced in the telecommunication sector to replace ROR regulation in 
1989. Since then incentive regulation has been widely adopted in other countries.  
In practice incentive regulation is a form of regulation that gives incentives to lower 
rates or lower costs or to improve non price performance by weakening the link 
between regulated prices and the firm’s costs which can be accomplished by 
increasing the regulatory lag. The design of incentive regulation commonly consists 
of the following tasks.  
Firstly, the regulator sets the initial revenues requirement during the rate case and 
then adjusts them in the subsequent years.  
Next, the adjustment factors which determine how revenues evolve until the end of 
regulatory period are set and the next review begins. These adjustment factors should 
include the variation of macroeconomic variables or demand that might affect the 
firm’s cost.  
Finally, the regulator designs control mechanisms for the firm to meet specific 
objectives such as quality of supply, security of supply, environmental issues, 
research and development programs and so on. 
Reviews of incentive regulation variables give regulators more significant discretion 
over future policies than under ROR regulation. In infrastructure sectors in which 
asset lives are longer than the regulatory period, there is concern over regulatory 
credibility and risk of future prices which can inhibit investment (Kessides 
2004:122). Under ROR regulation, the regulated firms are assured that they earn a 
fair return, therefore, ROR regulation is preferred in the event that new infrastructure 
investment is needed and in uncertain environments. 
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993), to show the link between ROR and incentive 
regulation a typical model of regulatory scheme, based on historic cost and demand 
data, is: 
TR a bC= + ,         (6.10) 
where TR is actual (ex post) total revenue received, a is fixed payment, b is the 
fraction of cost born by the firm, 0<b<1 and C is ex post cost. It shows the relation 
between revenue and costs based on parameter a and b, set ex ante. The incentive of 
a firm to minimise costs is inversely proportional to the fraction of cost, b. The two 
extreme cases of this linear regulatory scheme are  
• b=0: The fixed price regulatory contract or incentive regulation; and 
• b=1: The cost plus regulatory contract or ROR regulation with no regulatory lag. 
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When b=0, the firm’s total revenue is set to a, and the firm receives only a fixed fee. 
A firm is a residual claimant for its cost saving, and the fixed price contract is 
considered an extremely high-powered incentive scheme.  
When b=1, the firm can recover the whole cost. The cost plus regulatory contract is 
an extremely low-powered incentive scheme. The power of incentive regulation 
increases when the value of b is decreasing from 1 and approaching 0.  
To increase the incentive to reduce cost, where b approaches 0, forms of high power 
incentive regulation, such as ROR regulation with infrequent rate cases or with a 
long regulation lag and revenue cap or price cap formulas with a long regulatory lag, 
can be undertaken.  
Essentially prices under incentive regulation are less sensitive to costs than those 
under ROR regulation. Under incentive regulation, the regulator periodically updated 
and adjusted the revenue requirement, caps and adjustment factors to eliminate 
excessive returns to regulated firms. Therefore prices do not change due to changes 
in cost. Under ROR regulation a public rate hearing is required to change regulated 
variables. Because rate hearings are often initiated by regulated firms, cost-related 
variables, particularly inflation, are important determinants of the frequency of 
reviews. 
The incentive of regulation has many variations in practice. The most important 
types are as follows. 
6.3.1 Price cap regulation 
Under the fixed price regulation, the regulator defines ex ante a set of prices that the 
firm will be allowed to charge consumers for the services it provides. A price 
adjustment formula is tied to a prespecified set of economic indices and factors such 
as the inflation index and the productivity growth rate. The most common form of 
price cap is  
( )1 1t tP P i X−= + − ±⎡⎣ Z⎤⎦ ,         (6.11) 
where Pt is a maximum price that can be charged to customers in year t, i is the 
inflation index, X is the productivity index and Z is the adjustment factor for 
unforeseen events. 
This regulation is known in the UK as the RPI minus X (RPI-X) and in the US as the 
CPI minus X (CPI-X) and has been widely used in telecommunication in the US and 
in electricity distribution in the UK.  
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Under RPI-X or CPI-X, the cap on price increases by the general rate of consumer 
price inflation as measured by RPI, retail price index, or CPI, consumer price index, 
deducted by the X factor. The cap on prices must adjust to the change in costs beyond 
the control of the firm such as input prices, represented by the price index. Littlechild 
(1983) first introduced the RPI-X for regulation in the telecommunication sector. In 
Littlechild’s report, the X factor was set as an arbitrary number with no relation to 
productivity offset. The objective of this X factor is for the customers to be 
guaranteed that the prices charged would decrease by X in real terms. This form of 
price cap regulation is sometimes referred to as ‘pure’ price cap regulation (Crew and 
Kleindorfer 1996a:213). 
In the US, the X factor represents the increase in efficiency and productivity which 
leads to cost reduction in a firm. Inclusion of X into the price cap allows consumers 
to share the benefit of cost reduction from the increase in efficiency or productivity 
through the declining price. Sometimes this form of price cap regulation is called 
‘performance-based regulation’ (Crew and Kleindorfer 1996a:213). 
In the long run the price cap is reviewed and updated periodically. The new set of 
price level and adjustment factor is specified within the fixed period of time.  
Efficient incentive for price cap regulation greatly depends on the length of the 
reviewing period. The longer the period of the cap is held, the greater the incentive 
the firm has to cut costs immediately. However even if a long period is used, when 
the review date approaches the incentives change for the firm. This is because the 
firm wants to look like a high cost firm so that the regulator will reset the cap at a 
higher level. Supply-side efficiency incentives are strongest if the cap is never reset. 
But this approach may become politically impossible particularly when the firm 
earns huge profits at any stage. 
Under price cap regulation, the firm has autonomy to set the price as long as the price 
is below the price ceiling. Moreover the firm determines its investment, terms of 
service and product choice.  
The regulator will set the initial prices subject to the information available. If initial 
prices are set too high, it will conflict with the rent extraction objective but will 
attract capital investment and ensure the balance of supply and demand. If prices are 
set too low, it will not provide sufficient incentives for new investment and 
maintenance of equipment, which conflicts with the capital extraction objective.  
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The frequency of adjustment of the price cap is also an important issue. The more 
frequently price caps have been set, the closer price cap regulation is to ROR 
regulation. When reviewing the value of X, the regulators check the performance 
improvement which is influenced by how well the firm has done in the recent past, 
indicated by the firm’s rate of return. Therefore, a well-functioning price cap 
regulation requires as much knowledge about cost as does ROR regulation (Gonenc 
et al. 2000:19). 
6.3.2 Revenue cap regulation 
Under fixed or pure revenue cap regulation, the firm’s allowed revenues are set 
during a regulatory period. The amount of revenue allowed during the first year is 
adjusted in subsequent years according to a prespecified set of economic indices and 
factors. With revenue cap, the firm is allowed to maximise profit during the 
regulatory period by minimising total costs. Fixed revenue caps pass cost risk to the 
regulated firms, meaning that the firm has to absorb any increase in costs and is 
unable to pass such cost increases to customers. Under the fixed revenue caps, the 
firms can reduce the volume risk through price adjustment. The rate case then takes 
place and a new revenue cap formula is set for the new regulatory period. The 
general form of revenue cap is 
( ) ({ )}1 * * 1t tTR TR CGA Customers i X Z−= + ∆ + − ±⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ,    (6.12) 
where TRt is allowed revenues in year t, CGA is customer growth factor, ∆Customers 
is annual change in the number of customers, i is inflation index, X is productivity 
index and Z is adjustment factor for unforeseen events (Rothwell and Gomez 
2003:85–6).    
With revenue adjustments in Equation 6.12, the firm can change the costs in 
accordance with the changes in variables in the formula. The measurement of 
inflation can be CPI, RPI or other price indices such as sector-specific industrial 
price indices. The customer growth adjustment factors, CGA, can be specified for 
different classes of customers such as customers connected in medium-voltage 
networks and low-voltage networks.  
The productivity growth rate, X, ensures the customers receive a share of the 
expected enhanced productivity required of the firm. Examples of unforeseen events, 
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Z, are increased taxes, changes in environmental taxes, natural disasters and so on. Z 
must include only the costs that can be forecast with a reasonable rate of accuracy. 
There are several forms of revenue cap.  
One form of revenue cap is the revenue-per-customer (Rothwell and Gomez 
2003:86). In Equation 6.12, if CGA is equal to the average revenues per customer, 
then it is equivalent to a revenue-per-customer cap.  
Next is the average revenue cap or revenue yield approach which involves a cap on 
the average revenue per unit of output. The revenue-per-customer and revenue-per-
unit cap provides an incentive for the regulated firms to satisfy increasing demand 
because there is no limit to the total revenue that firms can generate. To reduce the 
profit and volume risk firms face, the regulated firms would have to have an 
incentive to increase volumes because the average costs reduce as the output and 
number of customers increase.  
Another is the hybrid revenue cap. Hybrid revenue cap combines a fixed revenue 
component with variable components. The fixed and variable components can 
correspond to fixed and variable cost component. The advantage of this type of 
revenue cap is that total revenue is able to track total costs more closely than under 
either a fixed revenue cap or average revenue cap. 
Under revenue cap regulation, methods of allocating costs and setting prices are 
required because the revenue cap regulation itself does not address retail price. 
Both price and revenue cap create the same incentive for supply-side efficiency in 
order to maximise profit but provide a different incentive for a firm to increase sales.  
Under price cap regulation, the firm has an incentive to maximise sales. The sales 
maximising behaviour of the firm can increase demand in the market which is 
achieved by advertising for new customers and for greater use per customer, runs 
counter to the encouragement of the demand-side efficiency goal to give incentives 
to consumers to utilise electricity efficiently. Yet under revenue cap regulation, a 
firm can choose the level of output and has an incentive to minimise sales by 
increasing prices because its revenue is capped. Revenue cap regulation goes along 
well with the energy savings and demand side management program which aims at 
reducing of electricity demand (Rothwell and Gomez 2003:87). 
The important issue with this type of regulation is what the level of revenue cap 
should be. If the revenue cap is higher than the profit-maximizing monopoly 
revenue, the firm will simply ignore it because the lower revenue maximizes profits. 
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Hence, the regulator must set revenue cap lower than the profit-maximizing revenue 
or the firm will be forced to raise or lower price in order to reduce revenue and 
satisfy the regulator’s constraint.  
With the lower price, more electricity will be sold and the cost of generation will be 
higher. This is unlikely to happen, therefore the higher price will be chosen to reduce 
sales and subsequently the firm’s revenue to revenue cap level. Crew and Kleindorfer 
(1996b) prove that when the firm can freely set the output, the firm will limit the 
output level so that the price is driven up above the monopoly price.  
However this output distortion may not be a major issue particularly when the 
revenue cap is applied to a service, such as a transmission service, where the output 
decision is beyond the control of the regulated firm, at least in the short run (Crew 
and Kleindorfer 1996a:215). 
6.3.3 Sliding scale regulation 
Under the price cap regulation, there is a gap between the cost and price which leads 
to allocative inefficiency. Consumers will not gain from cost efficiency by the firm, 
as profit from cost saving belongs to the firm.  
Sliding scale regulation, sometimes called profit sharing regulation, allows the 
consumers to participate in excess profit or profit shortfalls earned by a firm in the 
form of ex post refunds or a decrease in the price of future purchases (Vogelsang 
2002:9).  
Also, sliding scale regulation provides more incentives for reducing costs to a firm 
than ROR regulation, which transfers all of the benefits from cost reduction to 
consumers by allowing the firm to share profits obtained. Profit sharing was 
employed in the electric utilities in the US in the early of the 20th century and was 
abolished in the 1950s because the regulated firms suffered losses (Vogelsang 
2002:9).  
The other form of sliding scale regulation is a banded rate of return regulation, under 
which a sliding scale would adjust prices in the current rate case so that the allowed 
rate of return, s, at the new prices would be 
( * )ts r h r r= + − t ,          (6.13) 
where h is a constant number between 0 and 1, rt is the realised rate of return at the 
tariff set in the previous rate case in year t and r* is the target rate of return (Joskow 
and Schmalensee 1986). 
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For implementation, the target rate of return is set and prices are expected to yield 
the firm a realised rate of return equal to r*. Then the sharing constant, h, must be 
selected. If h=1, prices are always adjusted to give the firm the target rate of return 
and the firm would not have any incentive to be cost efficient because the profit 
obtained will be passed to consumers. If h=0, the regulation is fixed price and, as a 
result, all profit and gains from efficiency belong to the firm, and all unexpected cost 
increases affect the firm alone. If h=0.5, then unexpected profit and loss is shared 
between the firm and consumers. 
The banded rate of return regulation is a mechanism under which tariffs are adjusted 
to keep a utility’s rate of return within a pre-specified ROR band. If earning falls 
within the ROR band, rates are not changed and the firm can make a profit or loss 
depending on its efficiency.  
Only when the achieved rates of return are below or above the band, the rate case is 
conducted to bring firm’s profit back inside the band (Vogelsang 2002:9). For 
example, if at prevailing prices the realised rate of return falls below r*, the allowed 
rate of return is adjusted upward to increase the realised rate of return by a fraction, 
h, of the difference between the realised and target rate of return. This type of 
regulation can reduce the frequency of rate cases and increase regulatory lag. 
6.3.4 Yardstick competition 
Even though the electric utilities operate in particular geographical areas and do not 
compete directly with each other, there are a relatively large number of utilities 
around countries such as the US and internationally. If these firms operated in a 
single competitive market, the price charged by one firm will be determined by the 
costs of the competitors.  
To simulate this process by basing a firm’s prices on the cost of other comparable 
firms operating under similar conditions with the same production and demand 
functions, it would be a strong yardstick competition in which firm’s performance is 
evaluated by rivals.  
Under yardstick competition, the firm is rewarded based on its standing against how 
a set of similar firms performs (Shleifer 1985:326).  
Suppose that there are N regulated firms. Let the total cost for the jth firm be Cj and 
let ACi be the average of the Cj for all (N-1) firms in this group excluding firm i. 
Strong yardstick competition would be implemented by setting firm i’s price equal to 
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ACi. The prices for the other firms are set in exactly the same manner. They are 
facing prices not based on their own cost. To make a profit, firms will try to reduce 
their cost below the average. This approach provides all firms with strong financial 
incentives for cost efficiency.  
The problem of undertaking yardstick regulation is that regulated firms are not 
homogenous (Lyon 1994:14). It is difficult to determine which firms should be 
grouped together and the differences between the firms which affect costs such as 
geology, population density, variation in customer base, consumption patterns and so 
on, must be taken carefully. Simply comparing regulated firms’ economic variables 
without accounting for differences in the factors that affect their operation is 
misleading. 
Another means of yardstick regulation is to use benchmarking based on a 
hypothetical efficient firm, in which efficient cost is derived from the efficient long-
run costs (Vogelsang 2002:9). Benchmarking with comparable firms is also 
employed together with price and revenue cap regulation.3 Benchmarking applies to 
various regulatory variables such as capital costs and operating costs in order to 
create efficient costs as revenue requirement, efficient level of service quality, and X 
factor (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001:123). 
However while benchmarking aims at true efficiency improvement, regulatory 
gaming resulting from asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated 
firms can sometimes produce illusory or virtual efficiency improvements (Jamasb et 
al. 2003:70). 
Jamasb et al. (2003) pointed out that in regulatory gaming, firms can adopt strategic 
behaviour in two ways.  
The first is behaviour that does not have a direct effect on the firms’ operation but 
can present the firms’ performance in a more favourable light. An example is the 
shifting of firms’ costs from operating to capital costs. The undesirable outcome of 
these virtual efficiencies is that they result in a welfare transfer from customers to 
firms through lower efficiency targets than the true efficiency level.  
The second is behaviour that distorts the efficient operation and investment decisions 
of firms. An example of this is an increase the firms’ cost base or delay in efficiency 
                                                 
3 Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) provide a review of benchmarking methods adopted by regulators across 
countries and jurisdiction within one country. 
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improvements. This type of gaming leads to socially inefficient resource allocation 
and deadweight loss. 
In addition, regulated firms may influence benchmarking at the adoption stage of 
regulation. Although it is not considered as a type of regulatory gaming, firms may 
attempt to influence, for example, the choice of method, model, variables and the 
definition of variables. 
6.3.5 Hybrid mechanism 
As discussed above, there are various incentive regulatory methods, each of which 
has its own strength and weakness. In practice incentive regulation often incorporates 
different methods into a single hybrid method, for example, combinations of price 
(revenue) caps and yardstick competition, and between price caps and sliding scale 
regulation. 
6.3.6 Problems with incentive regulation 
Adopting incentive regulation can create problems.  
Firstly, incentive regulation is aimed at the cost efficiency of the firm. The quality of 
service can deteriorate due to cost cutting by the firm (Church and Ware 2000:857). 
Eventually the customers will suffer from degradation of quality of service because 
most of regulated firms are the only service providers and customers do not have an 
alternative. A practical solution is that the regulator must set standards for quality, 
monitor firm performance and penalise poor quality. 
The next point is that under price and revenue cap regulation, the adjustment of price 
and revenue cap for exogenous changes in costs, inflation and productivity change 
are unlikely to match changes in costs. It leads to the problem of an errant index and 
results in substantial windfall gains for either consumers or firms, depending on 
whether prices are less than or greater than costs. When the prices do not match 
costs, price caps will lead to allocative inefficiency. It may be argued, however, that 
given that the primary aim of regulation is to mimic competition, this kind of 
temporary miss-match is precisely what one would expect to see in a competitive 
industry characterised by long-live capital. 
Implementation of incentive regulatory regimes particularly price (revenue) cap, may 
not be easy. The practical concerns consists of how to set the initial prices (revenue), 
how to define the baskets of service, how to set and reset X, how often to update the 
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caps, how to evaluate the composition of the product baskets and what the 
appropriate price index is. 
One of the reasons that ROR regulation becomes unsatisfactory is that it is costly to 
operate and requires a lot of information as part of the rate case. In practice, 
information requirements for a well functioning incentive regulation are not so 
different from ROR regulation (Liston 1993:25). Setting the price (revenue) caps 
requires necessary information about cost, and demand as well as production. 
6.4 Financial issues in economic regulation 
To regulate electricity transmission and distribution in both ROR and incentive 
regulation, the revenue requirement is needed and has to be determined in a way that 
ensures the regulated firms earn a fair return, operate efficiently and cannot exercise 
the monopoly power.  
It is crucial to define financial variables to calculate revenue requirement carefully 
because they have an influence on the final level of revenue requirement, which 
subsequently affects allowed revenue and the allowed rate of return in both ROR and 
incentive regulation. This eventually affects the electricity tariff.  
The major components of revenue requirement are the allowed return on capital, the 
allowed return of capital and the allowed return of noncapital costs.  
The allowed return on capital is the allowed return to the regulated firms to achieve a 
fair and reasonable rate of return, whereas the allowed return of capital is associated 
with recouping the capital that the regulated firm has invested in its business assets 
over the useful lives of those assets.  
The combination of these two components is called the capital costs in the ROR 
regulation. The key elements of return on and return of capital are the regulated 
capital base, the rate of return and depreciation. The allowed return of noncapital 
costs or operating costs allows the firm to recover operating and maintenance costs 
as well as administration and general costs. 
In this section the definition and estimation methods of capital base, rate of return, 
depreciation and noncapital costs are presented and discussed.  
6.4.1 Capital base 
To estimate capital base or rate base, the regulator has to define the service to be 
regulated or prescribed. The main issue is what should be included in the capital 
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base. The regulator will define the regulated or prescribed services as all services that 
are associated with or ancillary to access to the distributor’s network for the supply 
of electricity, therefore ensuring these services are subject to economic regulation. 
To value the assets employed in producing the distributor’s prescribed services, there 
are numerous valuation methods available. These methods can be categorised as cost 
based or value based approaches.  
Under the cost based approach the value of asset is related to the cost of purchasing 
the asset or the service potential embodied in the asset, either at the original cost or 
the original cost adjusted to reflect its current cost.  
Under a value based approach, the value of an asset is determined by its cash 
generating capacity. This can be measured by the net present value of future cash 
flows or the cash generated by selling the asset.  
The hybrid approach considers both the cost and the value based approach to 
estimate the asset value. A description of each approach follows. 
Cash based approaches 
• Historical or actual cost employs the actual dollar cost of acquiring the asset, 
including the relevant financing cost during construction and installation, as the 
value of the asset. 
• Depreciated actual cost uses the original cost of acquiring the asset deducted by 
the proportion of the asset service life which has expired. 
• Reproduction cost is the cost required to reproduce the existing plant in its 
present form using the production technology and specifications of the original 
asset. This approach is appropriate where a similar asset is available and the 
existing asset still represents significantly unchanged technology. 
• Replacement cost is an estimate of the current cost of replacing the asset with an 
asset which can provide equivalent services and capacity to the asset being 
valued. 
• Depreciated replacement cost is the adjustment of replacement cost by the 
proportion of the asset’s service life which has expired. This method estimates 
the net cost of replacing the asset in its current state with an asset which has a 
similar service potential. Asset replacement costs need to be depreciated where 
the existing asset’s remaining service life is less than the life that would normally 
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be expected from a new asset. The depreciation effectively recognises the limited 
remaining life. 
• Depreciated optimised replacement cost (DORC) adjusts assets that exhibit 
excess capacity, be overengineered, be suboptimally designed or be poorly 
located. The process of optimisation is about identifying the most efficient 
facilities necessary to produce a specified level of services.  
This method removes excess capacity and redundant services from the valuation 
process and reconfigures the network to eliminate poor location decisions. Values 
are thus set based on the most efficient configuration of assets that could be used 
to deliver the service.  
Value based approaches 
• Net present value or discounted cash flow values an asset as the present value of 
the predicted cash flows generated from the use of the asset. 
• Net realisable or fair market value relates to the price at which an asset will sell in 
a competitive open market. This reflects the value of an asset in its next best 
alternative use. 
Hybrid approaches 
• Deprival value examines the loss that may be expected if the entity was deprived 
of the future economic benefits of an asset. This is calculated as the lesser of the 
replacement cost of the asset and the economic value of the asset, where the latter 
is the maximum of the asset’s net present value of financial returns to the asset or 
net realisable value. 
• Optimised deprival value is measured by the lesser of depreciated optimised 
replacement cost and the economic value of the asset.  
The recommended approach to value the transmission and distribution assets for 
regulators is the DORC. The advantages of this method are as follows. 
• The optimisation process ensures that obsolete, poorly sized or poorly located 
assets are not included in the capital base and consequently are not paid for by 
users. 
• The assets can be valued in a way that technological change is allowed. 
• The means of estimating the asset value will minimise the incentive for 
inefficient bypassing of the network. 
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However this method requires costly examination and assessment procedures and a 
subjective judgement is required in determining the optimal network configuration 
and the degree of excess capacity considered to be efficient. The asymmetry of 
information between the regulator and the network owner also aggravates the 
valuation process. 
Apart from asset values, the capital base also includes easement, working capital and 
capital expenditures. 
An easement is a right to construct, operate and maintain a power line and does not 
involve ownership of the land under the line. Easements are not likely to be replaced 
and are not consumed over time. They can also be measured by historic costs. 
Working capital is measured by the excess of current assets over current liabilities. 
Capital expenditures are forecasted to take into account of such variables as growing 
forecast demand, replacements, service quality levels, operating expenses and the 
tradeoff between operating and capital expenditure. 
6.4.2 Rate of return  
The allowed rate of return is the rate which ensures the continuing financial viability 
of the firms and encourages them to invest in new and replacement assets. It is not so 
high as to lead to monopoly rent extraction.  
In competitive capital markets, the rate of return is determined by demand and 
supply for capital. Therefore, the rate of return would provide a return to investors 
that corresponds to the returns available from other assets of similar risk.  
Due to the special nature of natural monopoly businesses owned by either 
government or private firms, it is not easy to make direct comparisons to other 
similar businesses listed on the stock market to observe what might constitute the 
reasonable rate of return.  
For a regulated firm, the rate of return is established by the regulator, and should be 
set at a level that is equal to the cost of attracting capital to fund a particular asset 
given its level of risk. If the allowed rate of return is too high, the price charged to 
end consumers will be above the level that reflects costs. If it is too low, investment 
by firms will be limited and the quality of service offered to customers may be 
reduced. 
The next question is how to determine the rate of return. As the rate of return 
provides a return that corresponds to the prevailing cost of funds available in the 
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market and to the risk involved in delivering distribution services, the rate of return 
should be set on the basis of a weighted average cost of each source of funds, namely 
equity and debt.  
The most widely used model to determine the weighted average cost is the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC). The allowed rate of return for a group of assets can 
be derived by calculating the appropriate WACC. 
The firms can use two sources of capital: equity and debt. Each source of capital 
involves different risks and costs. A firm’s WACC is calculated by the sum of the 
cost of its debt, weighted by the proportion of debt to total assets and the cost of 
equity weighted by the proportion of equity funds to total assets. The nominal 
WACC is  
( ) ( )debt equity
Debt EquityWACC R R
Debt Equity Debt Equity
⎡ ⎤ ⎡= + ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢+ + ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
,   (6.14) 
where 
Rdebt is the return on debt (the cost of debt); 
Requity is the return on equity (the cost of equity); 
Debt is the market value of debt; and 
Equity is the market value of equity. 
The major components of WACC are the cost of debt, the cost of equity and the 
appropriate capital structure. The cost of equity is the most difficult and controversial 
element in WACC. This section will briefly summarise the major issues relating to 
WACC. A detailed discussion of the cost of capital is provided by Thompson (1991) 
and Wright et al. (2003). 
6.4.3 Cost of debt 
The cost of debt is the return that debt holders demand on new borrowings. The cost 
of debt can be observed just as interest rates can be observed in financial markets. 
The cost of debt varies by the default risk of the borrower, which is affected by the 
leverage level of the company, short term volatility of cash flows and long term 
security of revenue. A higher leverage level means a high level of debt relative to 
cash flows and a higher risk of default.  
To estimate the cost of debt for regulatory purposes, it needs to reflect the current 
market rate for debt for a firm that is efficiently financed.  
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For the firms under government ownership, a higher debt rating than stand alone 
entities would be expected due to implicit government guarantee.  
Therefore the cost of debt would be higher without this implicit government 
guarantee, and it can be estimated by the margin above the risk free rate, which 
should reflect the credit rating of existing electricity distributors. 
The risk free rate represents the rate of return on an asset where the actual returns 
should always be equal to the expected return. The actual returns will be equal to the 
expected returns when there is no default risks and no reinvestment risk. The 
appropriate proxy for the risk free rate is long term government bond rate. The 
maturity of bonds and the measurement of the risk free rate are the issues that have to 
be considered when calculating the risk free rate. 
6.4.4 Cost of equity 
There are several asset pricing models to estimate the cost of equity: capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), nonlinear models, conditional models, and multifactor 
models such as Arbitrage Pricing Theory and consumption and intertemporal 
CAPMs.4  
CAPM is a linear model. In CAPM, the assets will be priced so that the expected 
return from these assets is equal to the risk free rate of return plus risk premium. The 
risk premium is equal to the risk of the asset or beta multiplied by the market risk 
premium. The market risk premium is the difference between the return on the 
market as a whole and the risk free rate.  
Therefore in CAPM, the only element of cost of equity specific to the firm is its beta, 
which captures the sensitivity of the firm’s equity to the systematic risk that is 
captured by the excess return on the market index.  
The measure of risk of the asset in CAPM is beta. The equity beta for the asset is 
incorporated in the undiversifiable risks related to that asset’s industry and 
operations, which is called asset risk. Moreover, equity beta comprises an additional 
source of risk which arises from financial leverage, referred to as financial risk.  
The portfolio frontier derivation of the CAPM lies on two types of assumptions.  
                                                 
4 Wright et al. (2003) discussed the various asset pricing models starting from CAPM and the other 
successive models aiming to overcome the shortcoming of CAPM. This section will not repeat that 
discussion. 
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Firstly, it assumes that investors are risk averse and markets for risky assets are in 
perfectly competitive equilibrium.  
The second assumption is that the distribution of asset returns belongs to the 
separating distributions class, which includes the multivariate normal distribution.  
The assumption of risk aversion is important. If it is not satisfied, the trade-off 
between risk and return expressed by the CAPM does not hold. The deviation from a 
perfectly competitive market can be tolerated. CAPM continues to hold even when 
borrowing is constrained. If the second assumption does not hold, the CAPM will be 
neither linear nor have a single factor. 
To estimate the cost of equity, CAPM requires estimates of risk free rate, the 
expected return on the market portfolio, the expected return on the asset and the beta 
measure. CAPM is expressed as 
i f i m fR R R Rβ ⎡= + −⎣ ⎤⎦ ,        (6.15) 
where 
Ri = the expected return on asset i 
Rf = the risk free rate 
Rm = the expected return on the market portfolio; and 
( )
2
,i m
i
m
COV R Rβ σ=  = risk of asset i. 
Equation 6.15 can be rewritten as a weighted average of the risk free rate with weight 
(1-βi) and the expected return on the market portfolio with weight βi  
( )1i i fR Rβ β= − + i mR  .       (6.16) 
The closer is a firm’s β to unity, the lower the weight on the risk free rate. If βi is 
equal to unity, the expected return on asset i is equal to the expected return on the 
average firm in the market. The regulated industries are unlikely to be precisely 
average with a beta of unity, however the dominant element in CAPM is still the 
expected return on the market portfolio with a distinctly smaller role for the risk free 
rate. 
Even though there is considerable evidence of empirical shortcomings in CAPM, its 
clear theoretical foundations and simplicity lead to its continuing popularity (Wright 
et al. 2003:76).  
There are several reasons why the alternative of nonlinear models cannot achieve the 
popularity of CAPM.  
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The first reason is the problem of data overfitting. This means that the nonlinear 
models fit the sample too well, meaning that both systematic and entirely random 
factors are explained by the model. Moreover, in many cases nonlinear models can 
be approximated by a linear model. The conditional CAPM, in which the parameters 
of the model vary over time, usually performs better than a nonlinear model. 
The most popular competitor to CAPM has been in the form of linear multifactor 
models. These models assume that there is more than one factor driving asset returns, 
however it is difficult to identify the factors. These models are also criticised for 
overfitting and data mining.  
The other models have their own shortcomings, meaning that in practice there is no 
good successor to CAPM for estimating the cost of equity.  
As the CAPM is still widely used by regulators, the elements in CAPM will be 
discussed below. 
6.4.5 Market risk premium, betas and capital structure 
In this section market risk premium, betas and capital structure will be discussed as 
follows. 
The market risk premium represents the rewards that investors receive from taking 
the uncertain outcomes associated with owning the equity securities rather than risk 
free assets. The more risk averse the investors, the larger premium they demand.  
The main focus is on how to estimate the market risk premium. There are several 
practical methods to estimate it, including the use of historical data, surveys, the 
supply-side approach and extrapolation from foreign markets.5
The preferred method by regulators is to calculate it from historical data, however it 
should be noted that the true measure should capture the risk premium that investors 
are expecting to receive from equities compared to risk free assets, but this is 
obviously unmeasurable. The only thing that can be measured is the returns received 
in the past. The market risk premium estimated by the historical approach can vary 
depending on the time period used (a short or long time), the choice of risk free rate 
and the arithmetic or geometric average measures. 
In CAPM, the equity beta, representing the systematic risk, is estimated by using 
historical data. It can be conducted as follows 
                                                 
5 The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (2004) discussed these 
methods and provided the example of each method. 
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( )i f i m fR R R Rβ= + −  
( )1i f i iR R Rβ β= − + m
m
 
i i iR Rα β= +  ,         (6.17) 
where 
(1i f iR )α β= − ; and  
βi is equity beta. 
Equation 6.17 is typically estimated using an ordinary least square approach to obtain 
the equity betas.  
There are several issues in estimation such as the choice of return measure, the 
choice of proxy for the market portfolio, the data sampling interval, and the length of 
the estimation period and the model applied (Wright et al. 2003). The equity betas 
obtained from regression called raw equity betas.  
Raw equity betas can be adjusted based on the assumption that beta factors change 
over time, especially in industries where there is considerable structural reform 
taking place. Over time, there is a tendency for the true beta to move toward the 
market average of one because firms that survive in the market tend to increase in 
size over time, become more diversified and have more assets to produce cash flow. 
Following the Bloomberg adjustment approach which is generally employed in 
practice, the result is  
( 33.00.67* Beta Raw  beta Adjusted )+= .     (6.18) 
It should be noted that Bloomberg approach, employing the constant weights to 
adjust betas, implies that the speed with which betas converge to one is the same 
across companies. The fact is that each firm has a different speed, depending on their 
diversification strategy. Firms that then diversify more broadly would have a faster 
speed than firms which stay in the same single business.  
For the regulatory purpose, regulators do not use the simple regression equity betas 
but prefer to de/re-lever the equity beta to reflect the firms’ current financial 
leverage, resulting in the so called levered equity beta. The firms with the higher 
level of debt in the capital structure are riskier than the firms with less leverage.  
The levered beta incorporates two risk factors that bear on systematic risk: business 
risk and financial (or capital structure) risk. 
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The methodology of de/re-levering the equity beta employed by most regulators 
starts with ungearing the adjusted equity beta to produce an asset beta which removes 
the effects of financial risk and reflects only the business risk.  Re-gearing the asset 
beta to produce an estimated levered equity beta for a given financial leverage level 
is needed to incorporate the financial risk.  
The asset beta starts from the concept that the assets of the firm are equivalent to a 
portfolio of the firm’s equity and debt with respect to weight of ( )
Equity
Debt Equity
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 
for equity and ( )
Debt
Debt Equity
⎡ ⎤⎢ +⎣ ⎦⎥
 for debt. Following the WACC relationship, the 
return on assets can be defined as 
( ) ( )asset debt equity
Debt EquityR R R
Debt Equity Debt Equity
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎥
.    (6.19) 
Substitute CAPM for each of the returns: Rasset, Requity and Rdebt into Equation 6.19 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )                                
f a m f f d m f
f e m f
DebtR R R R R R
Debt Equity
EquityR R R
Debt Equity
β β
β
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ − = + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ +⎣ ⎦
   (6.20)   
The relationship between the asset, debt and equity is 
( ) ( )a d e
Debt Equity
Debt Equity Debt Equity
β β β⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎥
,    (6.21) 
where 
Rasset is the return on asset (the cost of asset); 
Rdebt is the return on debt (the cost of debt); 
Requity is the return on equity (the cost of equity); 
Rf is the risk free rate; 
Rm is the expected return on the market portfolio; 
βa is the asset beta; 
βd is the debt beta; and 
βe is the equity beta. 
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Asset betas are not directly observable and hence must be derived from the adjusted 
equity betas and debt beta. The difference between an asset beta and an equity beta 
reflects the extent to which debt is used to finance the firm’s assets.  
Given the value of adjusted equity beta and debt beta, the asset beta can be calculated 
from Equation 6.21. The asset beta is the betas applicable to the assets of the firm. 
The debt beta, reflecting the financial risk borne from the firm’s use of debt 
financing, can be estimated from CAPM as follows 
( )d f d m fR R R Rβ= + −  
( )
( )d fd m f
R R
R R
β −= − ,          (6.22) 
where 
Rf is the risk free rate; 
Rm is the expected return on the market portfolio; 
Rd is the expected return on debt or cost of debt; 
( )
2
,d m
d
m
COV R Rβ σ=   is the debt beta; and  
m fR R−  is the market risk premium. 
The estimation of debt beta is sensitive to the size of the market risk premium. If the 
market risk premium increases, the size of the debt beta will reduce.  
The other methods to estimate debt beta are to use the debt risk premium or to 
assume that debt beta is equal to zero (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
of New South Wales 2004:239). The rationale for setting debt beta equal to zero is 
that the debt beta is only employed in a de/re-levering formula which are all based on 
the CAPM framework. In CAPM, the role of the debt beta is to show that there is a 
combination of a firm’s systematic risk of equity and systematic risk of debt. If debt 
has risk that is rewarded in the market, which is assumed away in the CAPM, then 
debt beta would not be relevant to the de/re-levering process. 
Based on the estimated asset beta and debt beta, there are alternative approaches to 
de/re-lever the equity beta such as the standard approach6, the Davis approach and 
                                                 
6 The equity beta is derived from Equation 6.21. 
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the Appleyard and Strong approach.7 So far there is no consensus on the most 
appropriate method.  
The Office of the Regulator-General8, Victoria (2000) noted that the impact on the 
estimated WACC of using different re-levering/de-levering approaches is not 
significant if the same approach is used to estimate an asset beta and to re-gear the 
asset beta back into a proxy equity beta. 
In this study the standard approach will be employed. Therefore 
( )
Equity
Debt
daae ββββ −+= .        (6.23) 
The capital structure refers to the proportion of debt to total capital, which is the sum 
of debt and equity. It is the direct input to determine WACC and to determine the 
equity beta which is an input in CAPM.  
Because the actual capital structures of the firms will change over time and will be 
different across the firms, employing these will result in different inputs to the 
WACC model for different firms. This leads to inconsistent regulation. Therefore for 
regulatory purposes the industry benchmark of capital structure is preferred. 
6.4.6 Depreciation 
To value the capital base in order to calculate the return on capital, the economic 
approach to depreciation is employed to ensure the preservation of the market value 
of the assets. To estimate the asset depreciation or the return of capital the 
depreciation method must be also chosen. 
Assets have a finite life and depreciate over time. Depreciation measures the decline 
in the service potential of an asset as a result of wear and tear, ageing or 
obsolescence. The value of assets declines as they are used to generate revenue, and 
use of an asset is therefore balanced against the revenue the asset earns as a return of 
capital in that asset. 
To estimate depreciation of assets, there are two broad periodic depreciation 
approaches: the economic depreciation approach and accounting depreciation 
approach.  
                                                 
7 The discussion about these approaches to de-lever/re-lever equity beta and formula of equity betas 
are provided in Macquarie Risk Advisory (1998). 
8 It is called Essential Services Commission (ESC) since 2002. 
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Economic depreciation reflects the periodic change in the market value of an asset, 
whereas accounting depreciation allocates the cost of a fixed asset over the period of 
that asset’s useful life.  
Although both approaches measure different things, the values derived from the two 
approaches may coincide, particularly where an asset’s market value reflects its 
remaining service potential. 
The economic depreciation approach measures depreciation as the difference in asset 
values between the beginning and the end of the regulatory period with no direct 
reference to the assets’ useful life.  
In practice, this mean of measurement causes a circularity problem because the 
market value of regulated utility assets depends on assumptions about the regulatory 
treatment of asset depreciation which is a key component of regulated cash flows. 
The accounting depreciation approach depreciates assets over the term of their useful 
life. The progressive loss of service potential provides a return of the capital 
invested. There are a number of methods of accounting depreciation, including: 
straight-line depreciation, units of production and accelerated depreciation. These are 
appropriate to different types of assets. 
The depreciation approach that the regulator should adopt has to closely reflect the 
characteristics of the underlying assets.  
Electricity transmission and distribution assets can be categorised into two broad 
groups.  
The first group is with assets that never need to be replaced, or at least have a very 
long useful life and require very low maintenance such as transmission lines.  
The second group is with assets that need a relatively constant or increasing 
maintenance schedule as the duration of the asset use increases, such as transformers 
and circuit breakers. Without the maintenance schedule the productive efficiency will 
decline over time as the assets age and approach expiry. 
In practice the accounting depreciation approach is widely employed, mainly because 
the economic depreciation approach is not suitable. The economic depreciation 
approach assumes that all assets have a constant efficiency pattern by which the 
assets maintain full productive capacity until they reach the end of their useful life 
and do not require maintenance at all.  
The transmission and distribution assets exhibit either linear consumption or 
geometric asset consumption patterns. For the linear consumption pattern, productive 
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capacity declines in a linear fashion until the asset expires. For the geometric 
consumption pattern, productive capacity declines at a constant rate, and 
maintenance of assets must grow at an increasing rate to sustain output. 
The option of depreciation methodology affects the risk level and the intertemporal 
pattern of tolls. The risk-averse investors prefer depreciation methods that lead to 
front-end loaded tolls which occur when the tolls fall over time.  
With the accounting depreciation approach, the straight-line depreciation method, by 
which the depreciation of an asset is constant per year and is calculated by dividing 
cost of asset by an estimate of its useful life, is the common depreciation method 
resulting in front-end loaded tolls. The reason for this is that in the early years the 
return on investment is large and declines over time whereas the depreciation does 
not change over time. Hence the front-end loading results in very low capital cost at 
the end of an asset’s life. Front-end loading is preferred when there is rapid 
technological change and possible competition because capital recovery in the future 
is problematic. 
6.4.7 Noncapital cost  
To estimate the revenue requirement, the return of efficient noncapital costs has to be 
determined. The noncapital cost mainly includes of operating, maintenance and 
administrative costs of business. Noncapital costs are associated with providing 
services and running the businesses.  
To determine the caps, the regulator has to use the firms’ current and forecast 
noncapital costs. The regulator has to be careful that the costs are not excessive nor 
represent inefficient operating practices arising from the natural monopoly status of 
the firms. To determine the efficient noncapital costs, the regulator has to adjust the 
costs with the inflation and efficiency factor to provide an incentive for the firms to 
improve their operating efficiencies. The regulator is also mindful that there is a 
tradeoff between operating efficiency and service quality. The efficient noncapital 
cost has to be set at a level which is not too high to operate inefficiently and not too 
low for the firms to provide adequate maintenance and service quality. The impact of 
demand growth on noncapital cost has to be taken into account as well. The price 
index-X adjustment mechanism will be discussed in Section 6.5. 
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6.5 Other issues in regulation 
Apart from financial issues, the other issues in regulation will be addressed. The 
price index-X adjustment mechanism and length of regulatory periods to provide 
incentives for efficiency improvement are explored respectively. Then concept of 
efficient cost obtained by benchmarking is discussed. 
6.5.1 Price index-X adjustment mechanism 
The key aspect of incentive regulation which differs from ROR regulation is the aim 
to provide regulated firms with an incentive to improve their performance. To 
achieve the objective of incentive regulation, the regulator has to provide an 
incentive to the firm to outperform a benchmark set by the regulator and allowing 
them to retain part or all of the benefit from doing so. The price index-X mechanism 
involves inflation adjusted price (revenue) typically being reduced by X factor, called 
the adjustment factor. To apply the price index-X adjustment mechanism to 
determine the caps, the main issues are the choice of price index and the 
measurement of X factor. 
The important issue is the selection of an appropriate price index. Ideally, the 
different components of a regulated cost base would be indexed using specific 
indices for each component, however it is unlikely to obtain those indices. In 
practice, the regulator adopts a general price index for the regulated cost because it is 
widely recognised and available.  
There are both advantages and disadvantages in using a general price index because 
it does not perfectly match with the actual costs incurred by a firm. Using the CPI 
(RPI) will cause the prices to increase over time because they are seldom negative 
numbers.  
The CPI (RPI) is based on a representative basket of products and services for 
household consumption, therefore it does not reflect the true input costs that may 
reduce during declining part of the business cycle.  
The general price index is unrelated to costs and cannot create the proper cost-price 
feedback, which leads in turn to allocative inefficiency.  
Therefore the regulator has to decide to use either a general price index, which is 
available but creates the distortions of price and cost, or to calculate the industry-
specific indices, which is both time and resource consuming. 
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Price (revenue) caps have the special feature of self-adjustment. The process for the 
setting and resetting of X factor has to be correct in order that the self adjustment 
feature achieves the most benefits. The X factor is the minimum expected reduction 
in price (revenue) allowed to be earned by the regulated firms, reflecting the 
minimum expected efficiency gains. There are some issues about X factor that should 
be addressed. 
Firstly, there are two methods often used to estimate X: indexing, mathematical 
programming and econometrics (Liston 1993:31).   
Indexing is a method of measuring productivity growth as a residual from deducting 
the aggregate growth rate of inputs from the aggregate growth rate of outputs.  
The econometric method derives the productivity growth from estimates of 
parameters of the production or cost function. The trade-off between using the X 
factor from the aggregate measure of productivity growth and the difficulty in 
defining production or cost function has to be concerned. The X from the aggregate 
measure tends to be a small number which leads to the high price (revenue) cap, 
however an estimation of production or cost function to derive the X is complicated 
and rarely do these functions represent the actual characters of the firm or industry. 
The next issue is how often the value of X should be reviewed. Short lags will create 
a similar environment leading to over-capitalisation and cost inefficiency as with 
ROR regulation. Short lags allow a transfer of greater surplus to the consumers, 
while longer lags will induce more cost efficiency to the firms but not transfer the 
benefit immediately to consumers. 
The X factor is represented by the firm’s productivity growth. One measure of a 
firm’s productivity is called total factor productivity growth. Conventional total 
factor productivity growth is calculated by deducting the growth rate of outputs by 
the growth rate of inputs. Bidwell et al. (1994) discussed the concerns on using this 
conventional total factor productivity growth as the X factor, particularly with the 
problems of calculating aggregate inputs and outputs for multiproduct firms.  
Miscalculated total factor productivity growth sends the wrong signal to the firm to 
achieve the objective of cost minimisation. If total factor productivity growth is set 
too high, firm has little chance to reach the total factor productivity target. If total 
factor productivity is set too low, a firm earns a high price at the expense of 
customers and has less incentive to be more efficient to encourage the regulator to set 
the next X lower. Therefore the efficiency is lost.  
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6.5.2 Length of regulatory period 
The efficiency gain of incentive regulation depends on the length of the regulatory 
period. The longer the length the greater the incentives for the firms to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs. 
6.5.3 Benchmarking 
As discussed above, only the noncapital cost component of revenue requirement is 
subject to incentives to improve efficiency.  
However in attempting to increase incentive efficiency and reduce the incentive to 
overinvest, various forms of benchmarking on the entire revenue requirement have 
been used by regulators. The central idea is to base the revenue requirement on some 
measure of efficient costs rather than on the regulated firms’ actual costs (Irastorza 
2003:31). The regulated firms’ efficiency level is compared using a separate 
reference level to estimate the regulated firm’s reasonable costs.  
In the UK, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets proposed the efficient level of 
operating costs for each company using benchmarking and at the same time 
benchmarked capital cost separately (Shuttleworth 1999:1). 
Shuttleworth (1999) argued that there is no guarantee that benchmarking can 
improve efficiency. The reason is that there is a potential tradeoff between operating 
and capital costs, meaning separate benchmarking makes no sense. If efficient 
operating costs and efficient capital costs come from different firms, no firm can 
reach both efficient cost levels. In particular benchmarking assumes implicitly that 
high costs are due to inefficiency, but in fact there may be a number of factors that 
cannot be captured by efficiency analysis. 
6.6 Regulation in developing countries 
The main question is whether regulations pioneered, developed and adopted by 
developed countries such as the US and the UK can function efficiently and 
effectively in developing countries. There are so many differences in their state of 
development including the performance of the infrastructure sector, market and 
enforcement mechanisms and institutions that should be taken into account in 
designing the regulatory regimes (Joskow 1998:4). 
Applying economic regulation models from the developed world to developing 
countries is a question of degree rather than of kind and detail rather than 
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fundamentals (Parker and Kirkpatrick 2002:9). The problems of information 
asymmetries and regulatory and political capture in developing countries are more 
severe than in developed countries.  
Laffont (1996), Laffont (1998), Stern (2000) and Beato and Laffont (2002) have 
studied the specificities of developing countries which must be taken into account in 
choosing regulatory regimes in developing countries. These specificities can be 
summarised as follows. 
6.6.1 High cost of public funds 
The cost of public funds in developing countries is higher than in developed 
countries. The cost of public funds refers to the marginal cost of public funds, which 
is the social cost of raising one unit of funds. Due to inefficient tax systems, this cost 
includes a deadweight loss because governments raise revenues by means of 
distortionary taxes. The common estimate of the deadweight loss is around 0.3 in 
developed countries which means that to raise one unit of account it costs the citizens 
1.3 units. According to World Bank data, the deadweight loss in developing 
countries is greater than 1, such as 1.2 in Malaysia, 2.48 in the Philippines and 
between 1.19 and 1.54 in Thailand (Laffont 1996:165).  
6.6.2 Lack of well-developed accounting and auditing systems 
The ability to audit the costs of regulated firms is an important instrument for the 
regulator in designing the regulatory variables. Developing countries lack the 
elaborate accounting and auditing systems, including proper auditing staff and 
administrations (Beaton and Laffont 2002:1). This results in costs reported by state-
owned incumbents and monopolists that are unlikely to be efficient, meaning being 
that they do not reflect the market values of inputs (Kessides 2004:124) 
6.6.3 Corruption 
The internal cost of side transfers in developing countries is lower than in developed 
countries, which occurs when two parties design side transfers to arrange a private 
deal.  
Two parties take into account the costs of being identified and the necessity of using 
indirect compensations that are less efficient than money. These costs are the internal 
cost of side transfers.  
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In developing countries, it is more difficult to identify the side transfers and the 
social norms that may value some types of side transfers.  
Moreover, the regulators and bureaucrats in developing countries receive low salaries 
(Fischer and Serra 2000:188), which can allow them to be easily captured by interest 
groups. The low internal cost of side transfers thus leads to widespread corruption in 
developing countries. 
6.6.4 Political constraint 
Developing countries do not have efficient constitutional control of the government 
and the ability to commit to and write long-term contracts. The lack of checks and 
balances provided by well-functioning democracies, court systems, government 
auditing bodies and other counter powers leads government to be more easily 
captured by interest groups and more able to favour them excessively. Lack of 
political democracy and well-functioning political institutions increases the 
uncertainty of future regulations and it is difficult for a government and regulator to 
make credible commitments to long-run policies. In addition, the regulators are often 
prone to pressures from populist politicians and industry lobbyists (Fischer and Serra 
2000:188). 
6.6.5 Technical and financial constraints 
Technical constraints include managerial deficiencies and a lack of administrative 
and regulatory capacity. The shortage of qualified regulatory staff is major obstacle 
to establishing effective regulatory institutions (Stern 2000:137). The other defining 
characteristics of developing countries are the financial constraints which result from 
the inefficient credit and capital markets and the difficulty of attracting the necessary 
foreign capital. 
6.7 Choice of regulatory regimes for developing countries 
Due to the specificities of developing countries, it is unlikely that the straightforward 
adoption of regulatory regimes employed in developed countries such as these will 
achieve the objectives of regulation effectively and successfully in developing 
countries.  
This section will discuss the choice of regulatory regimes together with specific 
characteristics of developing countries. 
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The choice of regulation between the two extreme: ROR (low-powered incentive 
regulation) and incentive regulation (high-powered incentive regulation) requires a 
balance between efficiency and information rent extraction.9  
The high-powered incentive regulation which induces cost minimising behaviour 
yields large information rents to the most efficient firms.10 At the other extreme, the 
low-powered incentive regulation which provides the full reimbursement of cost 
creates a weak cost minimising incentive but can control information rents. 
Since the cost of public funds in developing countries is high, it calls for higher 
prices for goods and services provided by the natural monopoly and for lowered-
power incentive regulation (Laffont 1996:168). Intuitively, a higher cost of public 
funds means a higher cost for giving up information rents for the firms.  
It also means higher cost of inefficiency because with high cost of public funds, 
firms have no incentive to be efficient. Relatively the cost of information rent 
increases faster than cost of inefficiency.  
With this argument, the optimal regulation should sacrifice some efficiency to reduce 
information rents. Therefore, this argument favours rate of return regulation, which 
reduces the information rent, to the incentive regulation, which reduces inefficiency.  
Due to the absence of well-functioning cost accounting and auditing systems, and the 
likely resistance of firms to detailed audits, the costs are not perfectly observable. 
The imperfect auditing of cost padding, which means the ways a firm can divert 
money and increase costs for the benefit of management and workers, calls for a shift 
toward higher powered incentive regulation. If auditing does not exist, only fixed-
price contracts will prevent unlimited cost padding.  
The lower internal cost of side transfers can facilitate collusion between the regulator 
and the regulated firms. This will lead to corruption and regulatory capture of the 
regulatory agency by the firms. Beato and Laffont (2002) show through a simple 
model that the optimal level of regulation will shift toward the lower powered 
                                                 
9 The regulated firms have private information both on technological characteristics and on effort 
variables which can decrease costs but create a nonmonetary disutility to the firm’s management. Cost 
is ex post observable by the regulator who can determine the pricing rule and cost reimbursement rule. 
When high costs are observed, the regulator cannot know whether it is because the firm is technically 
inefficient or because of low effort levels. The asymmetric information on firms’ costs implies the 
information rent yielded by the firm when it is efficient because it can imitate the inefficient firm and 
realize the same cost with a lower effort level.  
10 Gasmi et al. (1994) employed simulation techniques to analyse and compare various regulatory 
regimes ranging from high to low powered incentive regulation and found that pure price cap 
regulation, which is the high powered incentive regulation provides substantial rent to the firms when 
compared to other regimes.  
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incentive regulation or ROR regulation when there is corruption and regulatory 
capture in information reporting as follows.11
Suppose that the regulator colludes with the regulated firms and hides with 
probability ρ  the fact that the regulated firm has an efficiency parameter β  when 
this parameter can be either β  or β β>  with β β β∆ = − . 
If the government employs a higher powered incentive regulation or price cap 
regulation *p eβ= − corresponding to the cost of an inefficient firm using the cost 
decreasing efficient effort level , the rent of the *e β - firm is ( )*p eβ β− − = ∆  
with an expected social cost of ρλν β∆  if λ is the deadweight loss of social funds 
and ν  is the probability that the firm is efficient.  
If the government offers a lower powered incentive regulation or ROR, the cost is β  
for an efficient firm and β  for an inefficient firm, because effort is zero in both 
cases. The social cost of this regulation is ( )1 eλ+ *. Corruption is not a feature of 
this type of regulation. 
Adopting the lower powered incentive regulation is better than the corrupted higher 
powered incentive regulation if ( )1 *eλ ρλν β+ < ∆  or *
(1 )
e ρλν βλ
∆< + . The higher the 
level of corruption, ρ , the more likely the regulator to adopt the lower powered 
incentive regulation or ROR regulation.  
The design of regulatory institutions can be employed to cope with the problem of 
regulatory capture.12 Laffont and Martimort (1998) proposed that specialised 
agencies, i.e. the separation of government agencies to deal with different interest 
groups such as consumers and firms, is better than the centralised or single agency 
dealing with all interest groups because the specialised agencies can increase the 
transaction costs of regulatory capture by the firm. Moreover Laffont and Martimort 
(1999) showed that separation of the regulatory tasks and monitoring tasks among 
several regulators, such as an economic regulator and an environmental regulator, is 
the optimal organisational response against the threat of regulatory capture. This is 
                                                 
11 If the corruption of cost auditing is considered, the higher powered incentive regulation is more 
appropriate as discussed above. 
12 Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) stressed that the regulatory institutional design is important to the 
processes and outcomes of any regulatory regime. 
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because each of the regulators can only obtain its relevant information and cannot 
extract the information rent from the firms in form of a bribe as the one integrated 
regulator can. 
Laffont and Meleu (2001) pointed out that the value of the separation of power varies 
by the level of development. With the characteristics of developing countries: high 
costs of public funds, low transaction costs of collusion (due to poor auditing and 
monitoring) and less efficient technologies, the separation of powers to mitigate the 
problem of regulatory capture is more valuable in developing countries.  
However the implementation of the separation of powers in developing countries is 
more difficult and costly. Laffont (1999) proposed that in a situation with one 
integrated regulator, to prevent the exploitation of information rent by the regulator 
the optimal regulation should be lower powered in developing countries. With the 
separated regulators, the higher power optimal regulation is preferred. 
Aubert and Laffont (2000) studied the regulatory system and institutions of 
developed countries and employed the organisation theory together with the specific 
characteristics and experiences of developing countries to design the regulatory 
systems and institutions in developing countries.  
The first main question is whether the centralised or decentralised system is 
preferable in developing countries. They concluded that the high cost of 
communications and the imperfection of decision making militate in favour of 
decentralisation, whereas the high cost of regulators and the lack of human resources 
favour the centralised system.  
With the incomplete contractual constraint, regional authorities are better informed 
about local conditions than the central government. These authorities also leave the 
greater information rents to regulated firms. In developing countries, this incomplete 
contract is even more incomplete than in the developed countries, creating further 
advantages for decentralisation. 
The next question is whether integrated or separated regulators are preferred. With 
the agency problem, several regulators separated according to functions are 
preferred. However if the transaction cost of collusion and cost of regulators are very 
high, the integrated regulator is preferred. The enforcement of separation is another 
issue biased to the integrated regulator. 
The choice of regulatory design also depends on the level of development. The small, 
less developed countries such as Jamaica, Costa-Rica and Panama have 
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multisectoral, integrated agencies and centralised regulation. Due to a lack of 
expertise and skilled staff, the high cost of setting up a regulatory agency and the 
difficulty of avoiding collusion between separated regulators, the multisectoral 
integrated agency is a better choice. For the same reasons, as well as the high cost of 
public funds, centralisation is more efficient and less costly than decentralisation.  
When the country becomes larger in economic terms, the choice of more specialised 
agencies is made by larger developing countries such as the Latin American 
countries. Decentralisation is more feasible when the country is more developed. 
Domah et al. (2002) conducted a survey and econometric studies on regulatory 
institutions from both developed and developing countries. They found that to 
establish effective electricity regulatory agencies in developing countries, the fixed 
cost or staffing cost is substantial.  
The necessary minimum staffing cost varies between developing countries depending 
on the size of the system and the regulatory and economic environments. For 
example, the small countries need 30 regulatory staffs including 15 professional 
staffs. This is a significant fixed cost. Their empirical studies are congruent with 
Aubert and Laffont’s (2000) finding that smaller economies can benefit from 
economies of scale by establishing the multisectoral regulatory institutions because 
of the lack of expertise and corruption. They suggested that having multisectoral 
agencies are the best short-term responses.  
Stern (2000) proposed options to alleviate the problem of insufficient regulatory 
staffs by the use of the consultants, the creation of a multi-national regional 
regulatory agency or a multi-national regulatory collaboration for shared information 
and possible pooling of resources between regulators. 
Governments in developing countries have less credibility in commiting to long-run 
regulatory rules than those in developed countries. This lack of commitment puts the 
ratchet effect into motion.  
In a multiperiod relationship, highly efficient firms are reluctant to reveal private 
information early and are afraid of taking advantage of the incentives in the first 
period. This means that efficient firms are averse to earning a profit by lowering their 
costs at that time if the regulator leaves open the possibility of using the information 
to impose more demanding incentive schemes in the future (Olsen and Torsvik 
1993:137). Highly efficient firms may thus be motivated to behave as the low 
efficiency firms.  
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This behaviour is described as the ratchet effect.  
To mitigate the ratchet effect, the regulator has to commit to a future policy which 
provides weak incentives and leaves the small information rents.  
Another way to counter the ratchet effect is to maintain the regulator’s relationship 
with the firms and through creating an expectation that the rents derived from future 
efficiency improvement will not be expropriated. Since the regulator in developing 
countries lacks the ability to commit to long run regulatory rules, there are no general 
regulatory regimes appropriate to cope with this problem.13  
It is also politically more difficult to create strong incentive regulation because the 
firms want their cost payments to be guaranteed. As the constitutional powers of the 
government in developing countries have less control, those holding power can 
pursue their own objectives more easily than in developed countries. If, for example, 
the political majority is in the hands of a group of consumers who own the regulated 
private firm, the preferred means of regulation is the means to maximise information 
rents because they share the rents among themselves not the whole population. This 
group will also prefer the ROR regulation.  
If the political majority are consumers who do not own the regulated firm, they do 
not have opportunity to exploit the rent and thus favour the regulation that reduces 
information rent. It is likely to adopt the higher powered incentive regulation in this 
case. 
Enforcement of regulation is poorer in developing countries than developed countries 
because the enforcement is costly and the principal agent theory with full bargaining 
power attributed to the regulator does not fit with the characteristics of developing 
countries.  
Laffont (2003) built up a model of regulation with asymmetric information and 
imperfect enforcement which is the characteristic of developing countries.  
The model suggested that if the enforcement institutions are extremely weak, the 
self-enforcing contracts should be relied on. It is useful to build an enforcement 
institution only when the social welfare obtained from enforcing the initial contracts 
is higher than what can be obtained from renegotiation. Renegotiation and 
                                                 
13 Freixas et al. (1985) proposed that in the case of linear schemes the ratchet effect pushes toward the 
high powered incentive regulation that creates higher rents in the first period to induce the revelation 
of types of firms. Since the regulator in developing countries has less ability to commit, the less the 
regulator should try to separate different types of firms. 
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enforcement are substitutes. Laffont’s model suggested that as the level of 
development increases, the level of enforcement increases which in turn leads to rise 
in enforcement expenditures.  
In this model the level of corruption also affects enforcement expenditures in two 
ways. 
Firstly, corruption at the renegotiation stage increases the cost of renegotiation and 
leads to higher enforcement expenditures.  
Secondly, corruption of the enforcement system itself leads to less enforcement.  
It is thus difficult to establish credible enforcement institutions in developing 
countries. 
Due to inefficient and unreliable contract enforcement regimes, the players 
continually believe that the cost of renegotiation is small relative to the benefits. 
Repeated renegotiation increases the cost to new entrants and discourages new 
investment.  
Bell (2003) summarised three main reasons for firms to renegotiate.  
The first is exogenous constraint. The firm operating in a new institutional 
environment may underestimate the cost of doing business and once costs become 
apparent, the firm seeks to renegotiate its contractual obligations.  
The second is exogenous event. Exogenous events such as natural disasters and 
social unrest may encourage the firm to rely on renegotiation instead of insuring 
against them if such events adversely affect their operations.  
The final reason is endogenous manipulation. With the knowledge that contractual 
and enforcement institutions in developing countries are weak, the firms can take 
advantage of weakness to renegotiate contracts in order to extract a higher return.  
Among the three reasons, only under the first reason is the company not able to 
recover its cost and willing to consider exiting.  
If the regulator refuses to renegotiate, it has to be able to distinguish between 
exogenous constraint and endogenous manipulation.  
One potential mechanism to achieve this is the introduction of options into standard 
privatisation contracts which profitable firms are likely to take up and unprofitable 
firms are likely to reject. The option serves as a signal of the true degree of 
profitability and provides clear incentives to renegotiate only when exogenous 
constraints mean that operations are unprofitable. 
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In developing countries, the financial constraints are greater than in developed 
countries. Therefore, the information rents are higher. Both the strength of financial 
constraints and the high cost of public funds favour less powerful incentive 
regulation. 
The choice of regulatory mechanism also depends on the macroeconomic stability of 
a country. The ROR regulation works poorly in countries with rapid inflation and an 
unstable interest rate and foreign exchange rate because capital cost accounting 
systems and methods for calculating costs of capital and allowed rate of return do not 
work well in unstable macroeconomic environments. Regulatory lag can also be a 
big obstacle to attracting investment in those environments. The higher powered 
incentive regulatory regime may be more conducive to incorporating adjustment 
factors to include these variations in economic conditions.  
As discussed above, many arguments favour either low or high powered incentive 
regulation, and which regime is the best for developing countries is inconclusive.  
Laffont (1996) proposes that regulatory regimes adhere to the stages of development 
concerning regulation as follows.  
In the first stage of development, the availability of experts and auditing mechanisms 
are so poor that powerful incentive regulation should be adopted. By using this type 
of regulation, short-run efficiency can be promoted. However, this encourages some 
types of corruption in regulatory and political institutions and they are costly for the 
rest of the economy due to the money drain toward the regulated monopolies they 
create. In this stage a good auditing system and regulatory capacity should be 
developed and improved.  
Once the well-functioning auditing system is established, in the second stage 
regulation should move toward a less powerful incentive regulatory regime that 
facilitates large scale investment.  
As development continues and the infrastructure system is established, it will be 
optimal to slowly move toward more powerful incentive schemes in the third stage.  
The quality of regulation in each of these stages depends critically on the ability of 
the governments to commit with credibility to the implementation of the schemes 
(Laffont 1996:176–7). 
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6.8 Experiences of the developing countries  
The design of regulatory systems, institutions and instruments of the electricity 
supply industry vary in developing countries, largely due to the differing objectives 
of regulation, specific legal and institutional frameworks for regulation and the 
regulatory governance in each country.14  
This section narrows down the various experiences of regulation in developing 
countries to electricity distribution companies, as distinct from companies involved 
in generation and transmission activities. This section also focuses on the new 
regulatory regime that of incentive regulation, in order to investigate the 
effectiveness of this regime in developing countries and taking the specific 
characteristics of developing countries into account. This type of regulatory regime 
can be applied to firms both under state or private ownership, therefore the structure 
of ownership will not be discussed here. 
Latin American countries are the first group of developing countries which 
restructured their electricity supply industry in the early 1980s and also explicitly 
adopted incentive regulation15 in natural monopoly activity and the creation of 
agencies to enforce regulation.16
The experiences of adoption of price caps in the highly uncertain environments with 
weak regulatory capacity which characterised Latin American countries showed that 
there was a downward trend in public infrastructure investment and that the 
investment level is not adequate for a growing demand (Estache et al. 2003a:2).  
                                                 
14 Stern and Holder (1999) discussed the regulation of infrastructure industries in the developing 
countries of Asia. This study does not concentrate on the regulation of natural monopoly activities of 
utilities but focuses on the issue of regulatory governance and institutional design to regulate the 
whole industry, taking into account the problem of regulatory commitment and regulatory capture in 
developing countries. Stern and Cubbin (2003) reviewed the literature on regulatory governance 
criteria, the resources needed for effective regulatory governance and the effects of regulatory 
effectiveness on regulatory outcomes. The main summary from this review is that soundly designed 
and well-established regulatory agencies embodied with strong regulatory governance should and do 
have a beneficial effect on industry outcomes. The empirical study conducted by Cubbin and Stern 
(2004) of 28 developing countries showed that regulatory law and higher quality regulatory 
governance of the electricity industry have significantly positive effects on generation capacity levels 
and higher generation capacity utilisation rates. The structure of industry (vertical and horizontal 
integration or disintegration) and of ownership (state or private ownership) affects the choice of 
regulatory systems and methods as well. 
15 The choice of regulatory regimes in Latin American countries was influenced by the advice of 
international consultants who assisted in the reform preparation (Estache et al. 2003a:5). The most 
common suggested regime is a price cap, followed by a hybrid regime closer to the price cap 
regulation than ROR regulation. 
16 Fischer and Serra (2000) provide details of the restructuring and regulation of the electricity supply 
industry in Latin America. 
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Under incentive regulation the evidence shows that efficiency improves but the 
benefit from improvement in efficiency and cost reduction is rarely passed on to the 
consumers, and the correlation between the size of efficiency gains and tariff 
reduction is weak (Bitran and Serra 1998:946).  
Estache (2003) provided evidence that in Argentina after privatisation and under 
incentive regulation, the efficiency of natural monopoly sectors: electricity, gas and 
water distribution and telecommunications increased but so did the tariff.  
Dyck and Tella (2002) measured the efficiency of firms in the Chilean electricity 
distribution industry by the ratio of reported costs to revenues during 1988–99 and 
found that it improved over time. 
One explanation of why the efficiency gain cannot be passed to the consumers is that 
the regulator cannot deliver on its mandate and the firms appropriated the gains. 
Bitran and Serra (1998) outlined the evidence from Chile that the profit of regulated 
firms in the electricity distribution sector has risen significantly with much higher 
rates of return on equity than the unregulated segments in the same industry. With 
limited asymmetric information and regulatory capacity, the regulator has difficulties 
in gathering precise cost data from the regulated firms to ensure that the efficiency 
gain has been passed on to consumers through price reduction. In addition, the firms 
have influence in the political system which can indirectly control the regulator.17  
Another reason is that the government reaps part of the gains for fiscal purposes 
through tax increases (Estache et al. 2003a:11). In Argentina, the government 
preferred to leave large rent from efficiency gain to the firms so that the government 
can extract the rents by significant indirect income tax in the infrastructural sectors. 
Estache (2003) calculated indirect income taxes on telecom services, energy and 
water services in Argentina which account for 40–50 per cent, 30–40 per cent and 
10–20 per cent, respectively. 
Estache et al. (2003a) provided evidence that in Latin American countries the 
probability of renegotiation of concession contracts granted to the distribution 
companies under the price cap regulation is higher than under hybrid regimes which 
is still higher than under ROR regulation.  
                                                 
17 In Chile the regulatory institutions are closely linked with the political authorities. They are 
ministerial departments and less independent from the politicians because the heads of regulatory 
agencies can be removed by the President (Bitran and Serra 1998:960). This poor regulatory 
institutional design encourages rent seeking activities by the firms. 
 174
One of the reasons for renegotiation by the firms is that under the same terms of 
contract firms do not gain any profit from the improvement in efficiency. It results 
from the negative correlation of tariff and efficiency gains. The problem of 
renegotiation will affect the subsequent investment by the firms because it is too risk 
and costly to do the business under such an inconsistent environment (Bell 
2003:303). If the ROR regulation had been adopted, renegotiation would have been 
avoided. 
Bitran and Serra (1998) explained that due to the problem of lack of information in 
developing countries, the regulators employing the incentive regulation have had 
serious difficulties in gathering precise cost data from firms. Therefore it is difficult 
to set the X factor. This leads to a negotiating game between the regulator and 
regulated firms. The regulator generally with a poorly qualified and experienced staff 
does not perform well in the bargaining process and puts itself at a disadvantage in 
comparison to the firms. 
Unavailability of reliable data for the X measurement in developing countries makes 
it difficult for regulators to set regulated variables and make regulatory decisions.  
One way for regulators to ease information problems is to use international 
benchmarks, adjusted by specific country conditions (Kessides 2004:125).  
Another problem with incentive regulation in practice is that the firms can behave 
strategically and so influence the future price setting.  
In Chile, Dyck and Tella (2002) found that under price caps in the electricity 
distribution industry the incentives to reduce costs are strongest early on in the 
regulatory period and weakest as the new rate review approaches. The estimated cost 
function is U-shaped across the regulatory period. The late cost revelation and 
exaggeration in reported costs during the regulatory review shows the attempt to 
influence future price caps in the next period. Dyck and Tella studied the strategic 
behaviour of firms and found that cost padding18 does exist and the regulators may 
incorporate these exaggerated cost reports in the new regulatory prices due to 
regulatory capture. 
The experience in Latin American countries suggested that adoption of the concept 
of incentive regulation without strengthening weak characteristics of developing 
                                                 
18 Firms that have private information about their costs and can report either the true data or can shift 
cost reports from the time they actually incurred to another time at a private cost to a firm. 
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countries, particularly the weak regulatory capacity and ineffective government 
commitment cannot yield the expected benefit for the consumers. 
6.9 Summary 
To sum up, there are two broad types of economic regulation of a natural monopoly: 
ROR and incentive regulation.  
ROR regulation restricts a firms’ earning to be no greater than the cost of provision 
of services. ROR regulation is criticised for the regulator having the serious problem 
of imperfect information, particularly of firm’s costs. In addition, ROR regulation 
provides low-powered incentives to improve efficiency and high-powered incentives 
for the firm to overcapitalise.  
Incentive regulation was later developed to handle these criticisms. The idea of 
incentive regulation is to provide incentives to firms to increase efficiency and 
reduce costs. Its variations include price cap regulation, revenue cap regulation, 
sliding scale regulation, yardstick competition, benchmarking and the hybrid 
mechanism.  
Incentive regulation is not flawless. The main implementation problem with 
incentive regulation is the same as ROR regulation in that the regulator does not have 
information on the firm’s financial information. 
Hence in both ROR and incentive regulation, the problem of asymmetric information 
prevails. The implementation of both types of regulation requires information that 
the regulated firms possess on cost, input and demand. 
To regulate natural monopoly activities in the electricity sector by both ROR and 
incentive regulatory regimes, revenue requirement is one of the most important 
regulatory instrument. To determine revenue requirement, various regulatory 
variables including the capital base, rate of return, depreciation, non capital cost and 
price index-X mechanism have to be carefully specified.  
It should be noted that this chapter discusses various estimation approaches to 
estimating these variables based on practices in developed countries embodied with 
well functioning capital and financial markets. 
The capital base can be valued by cash based, valued based and hybrid approaches. 
Each method has its own merit, however for valuation of electricity transmission and 
distribution assets, to achieve the objective of efficiency improvement, the cash 
based method of depreciated optimised replacement cost is recommended.  
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Rate of return is the most controversial regulatory variable.  
WACC is recommended for regulatory purposes because it is simple and easy to 
cross check. The important elements of WACC are cost of debt, cost of equity and 
capital structure. Cost of equity is the most complicated element. While there are 
several asset pricing models to estimate the cost of equity, for simplicity the CAPM 
is recommended. 
In practice the accounting depreciation approach, particularly the straight line 
method, is widely employed. Noncapital cost is simply operating, maintenance and 
administrative costs. Price index-X mechanism is imposed on noncapital costs to 
provide regulated firms with an incentive for efficiency improvement. Publicly 
available general price index is also widely employed.  
Another controversial element is X factor. It can be index number or calculated from 
mathematical programming and econometric estimation and it is not yet conclusive 
which method is the best to calculate X factor. 
Benchmarking on capital and noncapital costs is another method to estimate the 
revenue requirement. The idea is to employ efficient costs not actual costs, as the 
revenue requirement so that firms are provided with an incentive for efficiency. It is 
still inconclusive whether benchmarking on costs can provide an incentive due to 
regulatory gaming. 
These regulatory regimes and finance are pioneered, developed and adopted by 
developed countries, therefore it is important for developing countries to consider 
their own characteristics before employing these regimes. 
Specific characteristics of developing countries can be summarised as the high cost 
of public funds, the low transaction cost of collusion, corruption and regulatory 
capture, the absence of a sound cost accounting and auditing systems, poorly 
functioning capital and financial markets and the lack of regulatory capacity 
particularly of human resources. These characteristics affect the choice of regulatory 
regimes and the design of regulatory institutions.  
Taking each characteristic of developing countries into account, the recommended 
choice of regulatory regime and regulatory institutions are shown in Table 6.1. 
It can be concluded that there is no universally ideal regulatory regime and 
regulatory institution to fit all the characteristics of developing countries. The choice 
depends on particular characteristics and the severity of the problems in each 
country.  
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It should be noted that although regulatory regimes cannot prevent all possible 
negative outcomes, the design of regulatory institutions can mitigate against many 
negative effects. For example, a lack of regulatory capacity favours high-powered 
incentive regulation. To implement high-powered incentive regulation effectively, 
however financial and technical regulatory experts are still needed. This resource 
requirement can be mitigated by setting up a specialised and centralised regulatory 
institution to ensure that the expertise needed is pooled in one place. 
 
Table 6.1 Choices of regulatory regimes and regulatory institutions 
Characteristics of developing countries Regulatory regimes Regulatory institutions 
High cost of public fund Low-powered 
incentive regulation 
Specialised and 
decentralised regulatory 
institution 
Low transaction cost of collusion, 
corruption and regulatory capture 
Low-powered 
incentive regulation 
Specialised regulatory 
institution 
Absence of well functioning cost 
accounting and auditing systems 
High-powered 
incentive regulation 
Specialised regulatory 
institution 
Poorly functioning capital and financial 
markets 
High-powered 
incentive regulation 
n.a. 
Lack of regulatory capacity High-powered 
incentive regulation 
Specialised and 
centralised regulatory 
institution 
n.a. not applicable 
 
In addition, the level of development in each country is a major determinant of 
regulatory regimes. High-powered incentive regulation should be adopted for 
countries with a low level of development. When countries develop further and 
regulatory capacity and institutions are established, less powerful incentive 
regulation can be adopted to facilitate large scale investment. More powerful 
incentive regulation can later be adopted to provide firms with an incentive for 
efficiency improvement. 
Experience from developing countries that have adopted incentive regulation shows 
that to implement incentive regulation successfully and effectively the establishment 
of regulatory institution and capacity is a necessary condition.  
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 Part III 
  
 ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF  
 REGULATION AND PRIVATISATION  
 
 
Synopsis III 
 
Part III of the thesis employs the theoretical framework developed in Part II to 
analyse regulation and privatisation in Thailand as presented in Part I. Due to the 
complexity of the issues, a graphical description of the relationship between 
empirical analysis, theoretical frameworks and policy application is presented in 
Figure III.11.  
The regulatory analysis in Chapter 7 explores regulatory institutions and regimes 
(discussed in Chapter 6) for electricity activities characterised by natural monopoly: 
electricity transmission and distribution (discussed in Chapter 5), and goes on to 
examine issues of regulatory finance in the light of specific characteristics of 
developing countries (also discussed in Chapter 6).  
Due to poor regulatory capacity, a specialised, separated and centralised form of 
regulatory body is recommended for Thailand.  
A high powered incentive regulatory regime, in the form of a revenue cap, is 
recommended for electricity transmission and distribution. The building block 
approach is used to estimate the revenue requirement which is an important 
component for tariff setting. Important elements of revenue requirement including 
capital base, rate of return, depreciation, noncapital cost and price index-X 
mechanism are discussed and suggested in light of characteristics of Thailand such as 
lack of data, poor accounting and auditing system and weakly functioning capital and 
equity market. 
One of the major objectives of reform and restructuring in the electricity supply 
industry is to achieve improvements in operating efficiency (as discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
1 Note that Figure III.1 is taken from Chapter 1 and reproduced here for convenience. 
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3). In response to the difficulty of  deriving internationally comparable measures of 
operating efficiency for distribution and transmission enterprises, attention here is 
focused on the generation enterprise, the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT). 
The analysis provided in Chapter 8 evaluates EGAT under public ownership to test 
the hypothesis that public ownership enterprise is relatively inefficient (discussed in 
Chapter 4). The technical efficiency of EGAT in Thailand is measured by employing 
a comparative application of Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis, and utilises both power plant and supplier-level data sets during the 1990s. 
Another justification put forward by those promoting state enterprise reform is fiscal 
benefits (discussed in Chapter 4). In Chapter 9, a fiscal analysis is undertaken to 
evaluate the fiscal effects of full privatisation of the state owned enterprises in the 
Thai electricity supply industry, namely the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority and the Provincial Electricity 
Authority. The central technique, as discussed in Chapter 4, is to assess the value of 
the enterprises in continued public ownership yields a ‘break-even’ sale price. 
Privatisation could thus be judged to improve the government’s fiscal position if the 
sale price exceeds the break-even price, holding other variables, such as regulated 
prices and revenues, constant. 
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 Chapter 7 
  
 ECONOMIC REGULATION IN  
 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY  
 IN THAILAND 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Part I, according to the Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector 
Reform (Master Plan) regulation is needed for state enterprise reform, particularly 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) in a natural monopoly business. In each of the 
electricity supply industry (ESI) restructuring plans, the establishment of a regulatory 
body, regimes and forms is a priority of restructuring before any transfer of 
ownership will be undertaken. 
The main objective of this chapter is to address various issues concerning regulation 
in the ESI in Thailand, employing the framework set out in Part II, as follows. 
Firstly, in Section 7.2, the design of the regulatory body based on the study by the 
Boston Consulting Group will be discussed taking into specific characteristics of 
developing countries into account. 
A discussion on activities in the electricity business that should be regulated is set 
out for further analysis of the appropriate form of regulatory regime in Thailand in 
Section 7.3. In Section 7.4 regulatory regimes and forms adopted in developed 
countries are prototypes for this analysis, with the current regulatory regime in the 
ESI in Thailand is also discussed.  
In Section 7.5, financial issues in economic regulation will be addressed. This section 
aims to present the practice of regulatory finance, employed by the regulator in 
developed countries. This is then applied to the Thai case, will focus on electricity 
distribution. Financial issues include capital base, rate of return, depreciation, 
noncapital cost and the price index-X adjustment mechanism. These regulatory 
financial variables are needed to build up revenue cap. Section 7.6 summarises the 
chapter. 
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7.2 Regulatory body for the Thai electricity supply industry  
Currently there is no independent regulatory body in Thailand. 
Together with the latest the ESI restructuring plan studied and proposed by the 
Boston Consulting Group, as discussed in Chapter 3, the design of the regulatory 
body and framework was also studied and proposed. A new ESI model, called the 
enhanced single buyer (ESB) model, and the establishment of a regulatory body, 
named the Energy Commission of Thailand, were approved by the Cabinet in 2003. 
As explained in Chapter 3 that due to political reasons, this latest ESI restructuring 
plan was put on hold and as a result there is no regulatory body set up at the moment.  
This section will summarise and discuss the design of the regulatory body and 
institution proposed by the Boston Consulting Group in more detail. 
The Boston Consulting Group studied several structures of regulatory institutions 
including line ministries, ministerial agencies, independent agencies and self 
regulated agencies. The Boston Consulting Group concluded that the new regulator 
for the Thai ESI should be an agency at ministerial level reporting directly to 
government and perform a role separated from that of policy maker, as shown in 
Figure 7.1.  
The regulator will be an autonomous institution operating with a separate budget and 
under management with substantial degree of independence, however it is ultimately 
accountable to the Minister. 
 
Figure 7.1 Structure of the regulatory body proposed by the Boston Consulting 
Group 
 
Government
Regulator
Utilities/Power Market
Policymaker 
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According to the Boston Consulting Group proposal, a regulatory institution at 
ministerial level is relatively easy to implement government policies and to 
coordinate with other government agencies.  
This structure of regulatory institution can insulate decision makers from external 
influences and provide greater comfort to smaller players, however the disadvantages 
of this structure are that it may lack of transparency and not be able to attract the 
right expertise. Conflicts of interest between the policymakers and the regulator may 
also occur. 
According to the proposal, the regulatory body will be established and governed by 
law with clear objectives as an autonomous agency under the Ministry of Energy 
(MOE). A Board of Commission will be appointed and terminated by the Cabinet, 
upon advice by the MOE, as shown in Figure 7.2.  
 
Figure 7.2 Governance structure proposed by the Boston Consulting Group 
 
Cabinet
NEPC
Ministry of Energy 
Policymaker Regulator 
 
The scope of the regulator’s roles and responsibility covers only the electricity 
sector. Roles of policymaker and regulator are separated, and the regulator is 
mandated with determining the economic operations of industry and pricing. The 
scope of the regulator covers monitoring of system security and reliability, the 
promotion of efficient operations and protection of consumer interests.  
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The regulator is not mandated with noneconomic regulation, such as rural 
electrification, environmental regulation, competition, privatisation, mergers and 
acquisition, and commercial relationships between parties such as power purchase 
agreements. 
The Boston Consulting Group proposed that funding for the regulator should come 
from license fees paid by market players for core regulatory operations, whereas 
noncore and uneconomic activities will be funded through government. 
In the proposal, the MOE will appoint the selection committee who will nominate the 
regulator’s Board of Commission. Final appointment will be made by the Cabinet.  
The Board of Commission comprises of seven members: one member as 
nonexecutive chairman, five members as nonexecutive board members and one 
member as chief executive officer. Only the chief executive officer is a full-time 
employee. 
The selection criteria of members of The Board of Commission clearly state that they 
must be experts in legal, technical, accounting or financial area. 
Essentially the Chief Executive Officer has responsibility to make decisions on 
operational issues whereas the Chairman and Board of Commission will make 
decisions on strategic issues. The MOE and government retain final decision 
authority on policy issues. 
Checks and balances will be introduced with an appeals process. Decisions that 
cannot be appealed are decisions at a policy level, such as tariff design, the 
infrastructure development plan, load forecast, FBt B review and base tariff setting and 
review. 
Even though this proposal explains the establishment of a regulatory body, it does 
not mention how to build up institutional environments. Also, the proposal does not 
clarify how the regulator can acquire and employ information from players for 
regulatory purposes, as insufficient economic data causes difficulty and misguidance 
in regulation. 
Kessides (2004) clarifies the institutional requirements that enable infrastructural 
regulation to operate effectively as: coherence among regulator and ministries, 
independence from political influence, accountability, transparency, predictability 
and capacity.  
The structure of the regulatory body proposed by the Boston Consulting Group 
enhances the independence of the regulator by funding with licence fees so there is 
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no political interference through the budget. Yet the appointment of the Board of 
Commission by the MOE and the Cabinet does not allow full independence from 
political influence. This lack of regulatory independence is one of the clearest 
institutional shortcomings which commonly occur in developing countries (Kessides 
2004:89). 
Transparency in regulatory rules and agreements should be enhanced by publicly 
reporting records, and the predictability of regulatory agencies can be enhanced by 
setting durable rules and procedures that will apply in future until new information is 
obtained. This creates market players’ confidence in regulation, yet the establishment 
of transparency and the predictability of regulatory agency do not clearly appear in 
the proposal. 
Nor does the proposal mention how to set up regulatory capacity, a traditional 
weakness of Thai regulators, through involving financial, economic and technical 
expertise and sound political and legal institutions.  
Inadequate regulatory capacity is another major hindrance to effective regulation in 
Thailand. The critical limitation of regulatory capacity in Thailand is a lack of human 
resources and expertise in regulation. Most of the experts in the ESI work in the 
MOE, Energy Policy and Planning Office and SOEs. For the initial stage, the transfer 
of personnel to a new regulatory body is recommended. For the long term, education 
and training is required.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, developing countries, including Thailand, are 
characterised by high cost of funds, the low transaction cost of collusion, poor 
regulatory capacity, high cost of communications and imperfect decision making.  
The separated and specialised regulator, proposed by the Boston Consulting Group, 
is justified.  
In addition, the unique economic and technological characteristics of the ESI require 
a specialised regulator with deep, industry-specific expertise. 
Centralisation of regulation by setting up a regulator at a high level of government, 
such as the ministerial level proposed by the Boston Consulting Group, is suitable for 
Thailand. The justification of this is the inadequate regulatory capacity to 
decentralise regulation in any particular region. Centralisation minimises the fixed 
costs of regulation such as offices, and most transmission grids operates nationally. 
 187
7.3 Activities under regulation 
As explained in Chapter 3, the ESI restructuring and privatisation plan in Thailand 
are put on hold at the moment and under the current Thai regulatory regime all 
activities involving generation, transmission, distribution and supply are under 
regulation.  
Following discussions that a competitive market can be created around electricity 
generation activity, this chapter aims to focus on natural monopoly activities. 
As discussed in Chapter 5 that natural monopoly requires regulation to maximise 
social welfare, natural monopoly activities in the ESI also have to be regulated. 
There are two natural monopoly activities: transmission and distribution that have to 
be regulated under either public or private ownership and with or without the 
establishment of a regulatory body. 
In Thailand, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) operates a section 
of transmission activities transmitting electricity to two distribution companies: 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) and Provincial Electricity Authority 
(PEA), whereas MEA and PEA have their own transmission lines to send electricity 
out to customers in their service areas. MEA and PEA operate most of the 
distribution activities for their final customers nationwide.  
Separate controls are recommended to regulate transmission and distribution 
activities independently, however in each activity a single price control should be 
imposed on every organisation. 
In Section 7.4, regulation of natural monopolies in the Thai ESI will be discussed. 
7.4 Regulatory regime for electricity supply industry in Thailand 
In this section, discussion of an appropriate regulatory regime for electricity 
transmission and distribution in Thailand will be attempted, following regulatory 
regimes adopted in developed countries and taking into account specific 
characteristics of developing countries as discussed in Chapter 6. Further analysis of 
the current regulatory regime in Thailand, as initiated in Chapter 3, will be 
undertaken. 
7.4.1 Regulatory regime for electricity transmission and distribution  
The regulatory regime that Thailand should adopt depends on the specific 
characteristics of Thailand.  
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As discussed in Chapter 6 the characteristics of the Thai economy, consisting of the 
high cost of funds, low transaction cost of collusion, high cost of communications 
and imperfect decision making, supports the adoption of low-powered incentive 
regulation.  
However when considering the stage of development concerning regulation, 
Thailand is in the first stage.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, in this stage the critical problem in effectively adopting 
low-powered incentive regulation is poor accounting and auditing systems and 
unstable macroeconomic conditions since the 1997 financial crisis. Also, the new 
regulatory body is inexperienced in the early stage.  
Hence to achieve the objective of improvement in efficiency, high-powered incentive 
regulation is recommended for Thailand.  
Price cap and revenue cap are the most popular variations of high-powered incentive 
regulation that have been employed in most developed countries. Choices of the type 
of incentive regulation that should be adopted in Thailand will then be discussed. 
Regulatory regimes must be considered based on the characteristics of the regulated 
industry as well. Regulation employed for transmission and distribution activities is 
different and reflects the differing approach to regulate capital investment in these 
activities.  
The capital expenditure plans of transmission companies are subject to consideration 
on a project-by-project basis. Once these plans are approved, it is unlikely to change 
regardless of an increase or decline in demand over the period, therefore transmission 
business costs can essentially be considered fixed with respect to volume.  
The cost of distribution companies varies with demand because a big proportion of 
the total costs of distribution companies is noncapital or operating costs, which are 
more volume-related than capital costs. The capital costs of distribution companies 
are also likely to be variable with respect to volume because investments are on a 
smaller scale than for transmission, and therefore less regulatory scrutiny than 
individual projects.  
Assessment of projects is based on the need to invest in reinforcing existing systems 
and to meet new volumes and new customers. There is also greater uncertainty over 
the change in demand at the distribution level than at the transmission level, 
therefore the capital costs of distribution activity can be considered to be affected by 
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changes in demand or volumes supplied over the price control period whereas capital 
costs in transmission activity are largely invariant with demand. 
Price cap regulation provides strong incentives to firms to increase sales volumes in 
order to increase profit. This concept conflicts with the demand side management 
program which aims at reducing the consumption of electricity and preserving the 
environment in Thailand. Firms’ gains or losses are also subject to differences 
between forecast volumes at the time of price control being set and the actual 
volumes. In either case, firms can make excess profits or losses which will call for 
the reopening of the price control.  
As shown in Table 7.1 and 7.2, in Thailand peak demand and energy demand 
forecasts for each year were conducted and adjusted several times by various 
methods and under different assumptions.  
The most recent forecast tends to predict peak demand and energy demand more 
accurately. For example, peak demand and energy demand forecast error (actual 
minus forecast values) of 2003 from a forecast conducted in June 1993 were -3,319 
MW and -24,422 GWh respectively, which accounted for -18.31 and -20.92 per cent 
of actual values respectively. The forecast error for 2003 from a forecast conducted 
in August 2002 was 278 MW and 1,824 GWh, which accounted for 3 and 1.56 per 
cent of actual values respectively.  
Future demand in Thailand is highly uncertain due to, for example, the financial 
crisis 1997. In Table 7.1 and 7.2, evidence shows that forecasts of peak demand and 
energy demand in 1997–2003, conducted in October 1996 before the financial crisis, 
were far higher than actual values because it was beyond the authorities’ capability to 
foresee the incident and its effects on demand. 
Even though reforecasting of peak demand and energy demand are needed to capture 
current economic factors, various forecasts mislead firms to draw investment plans 
based on expansion of electricity transmission and distribution requirement because 
investment in capital intensive transmission and distribution activities requires long 
term planning.  
Revenue cap regulation can reduce the severity of these concerns. Because revenue 
remains unchanged, firms will be indifferent to differences between forecast and 
actual volumes, however consumers may bear volume risk and face fluctuating 
prices. This type of regulation is likely to be politically unpopular. 
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Table 7.1 Peak demand forecast (MW) 
 Fiscal year Actual Forecast 
  
June 
1993 
December 
1994 
October 
1995 
April 
1996 
October 
1996 
June 
1997 
September 
1997 
September  
1998 
February 
2001 
August 
2002 
     (High) (Base) (Low) (Very Low) (RER) (MER) (LER) (Base) (Base) 
1993 9,730 9,978 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1994 10,709 10,975 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1995 12,268 11,993 11,993 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1996 13,311 13,103 13,103 13,637 13,789 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1997 14,506 14,193 14,193 14,892 15,310 14,904 14,506 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1998 14,180 15,315 15,315 16,075 16,849 16,445 15,535 14,975 .. .. .. .. .. 
1999 13,712 16,446 16,446 17,268 18,448 18,010 17,014 15,989 14,972 14,499 14,287 .. .. 
2000 14,918 17,685 17,685 18,527 20,148 19,658 18,570 17,481 16,037 15,254 14,762 .. .. 
2001 16,126 19,029 19,029 19,899 21,990 21,423 20,238 19,049 17,286 16,214 15,398 16,184 .. 
2002 16,681 20,237 20,237 21,139 23,745 23,131 21,851 20,566 18,678 17,308 16,150 17,388 16,700 
2003 18,121 21,440 21,440 22,368 25,506 24,848 23,473 22,093 20,042 18,399 16,892 18,587 17,843 
.. not available 
Note: RER is rapid economic growth rate, MER is moderate economic growth rate and LER is low economic growth rate. 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office 
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Table 7.2 Energy demand forecast (GWh) 
 Fiscal 
year Actual Forecast 
  
June 
1993 
December 
1994 
October 
1995 
April 
1996 
October 
1996 
June 
1997 
September 
1997 
September  
1998 
February 
2001 
August 
2002 
     (High) (Base) (Low) (Very Low) (RER) (MER) (LER) (High) (Base) 
1993 62,180 62,797 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1994 69,651 69,407 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1995 78,880 76,388 78,023 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1996 85,924 83,896 85,571 89,375 90,378 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1997 92,725 91,178 92,879 97,849 100,602 97,716 93,795 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1998 92,134 99,334 100,383 105,938 111,035 108,234 102,246 97,077 .. .. .. .. .. 
1999 90,414 106,891 108,160 114,029 121,817 118,797 112,225 104,067 96,904 93,178 91,834 .. .. 
2000 96,781 115,136 116,795 122,289 132,988 129,601 122,431 113,704 103,709 97,858 94,570 .. .. 
2001 103,165 124,158 126,025 131,698 145,537 141,598 133,764 124,233 111,475 103,685 98,108 103,496 .. 
2002 108,399 132,330 134,041 140,032 157,292 153,141 144,668 134,360 120,148 110,436 102,429 110,945 108,036 
2003 116,716 141,138 142,849 149,076 169,985 165,460 156,305 145,168 129,080 117,341 106,947 118,540 114,754 
.. not available 
Note: RER is rapid economic growth rate, MER is moderate economic growth rate and LER is low economic growth rate. 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office 
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None of the high-powered incentive regulation models is perfect fit in the case of 
Thailand.  
Revenue cap regulation is recommended for both transmission and distribution in 
Thailand as it is widely employed by various regulators. Price cap regulation has the 
disadvantage of leading to inefficient consumption of electricity. As for fluctuating 
demand, the regulator can provide incentives to regulated firms by continually 
reviewing the revenue cap during the regulatory period. 
7.4.2 Analysis of current regulatory regime on transmission and distribution   
When considering the characteristics and stage of regulation development in 
Thailand, revenue cap regulation fits and serves well. As explained in Chapter 3, cost 
of service regulation together with regulation with CPI-X on base electricity tariff 
has been employed to regulate transmission and distribution activities in Thailand 
since 2000.  
Since the adoption of current regulation there has been no attempt to evaluate 
operating or technical efficiency. The most important justification for this is that data 
is not publicly available and even regulator does not have adequate data to conduct 
an efficiency evaluation. The only recent work to evaluate efficiency improvement 
was conducted by the Boston Consulting Group (2003). The Boston Consulting 
Group used employee productivity improvement as a proxy for operating efficiency 
improvement. The result shows that from 1999 to 2002 employee productivity of 
EGAT, MEA and PEA increased by 9.4, 10.9 and 10.3 per cent, respectively. This 
results from an increase in electricity sales and decrease in number of employees.  
Given that there is an improvement in operating efficiency in natural monopoly 
activities, the next question arises whether this efficiency improvement has been 
passed on to consumers, which is the ultimate objective of regulation. The Boston 
Consulting Group did not provide any evaluation on this issue, and because of data 
unavailability, econometric assessment cannot be carried out. 
An analysis of any transfer of benefits resulting from improvement in the operating 
efficiency to consumers can be achieved by evaluating the retail electricity tariff. 
Improvements in operating efficiency can bring benefits to consumers by a decrease 
in the retail electricity tariff.  
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In Thailand, retail electricity tariff consists of base tariff and an additional tariff from 
the automatic adjustment mechanism (FBt B). Revenue requirement subject to regulation 
with CPI-X is one of the variables used to determine base tariff structure.  
Since the new tariff structure was approved by the Cabinet in 2000, the base tariff 
structure has not changed, therefore consumers do not directly gain any benefit from 
efficiency improvements through the base tariff. The following evidence shows that 
retail electricity tariff changes are only due to changes in FBt B value. 
Energy Policy and Planning Office (2004) reports FBt B for every four months since 
February 2001 after the new tariff structure approved in 2000, as shown in Table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3 Additional tariffs from automatic adjustment mechanism (FBtB) 
(Satang/kWh) 
Adjustment period Generation Transmission Distribution (FBtPBDP) 
Grand 
Total 
 (F BtPBGP) (F BtPBTP) MEA PEA Total (F BtB) 
February-May 2001 24.75 0.59 -0.23 -0.67 -0.9 24.44 
June-September 2001 28.79 -0.18 -0.58 -0.92 -1.48 27.13 
October 2001-January 2002 25.88 0.15 -0.28 -2.98 -3.26 22.77 
February-May 2002 28.11 -1.02 0.61 -5.75 -5.14 21.95 
June-September 2002 25.64 -1.12 2.58 -5.15 -2.57 21.95 
October 2002-January 2003 27.43 -1.76 2.48 -6.2 -3.72 21.95 
February-May 2003 33.17 -2.29 2.55 -7.31 -4.76 26.12 
June-September 2003 32.04 -1.96 3.02 -6.98 -3.96 26.12 
October 2003-January 2004 30.95 -1.92 4.22 -7.13 -2.91 26.12 
February-May 2004 45.89 -2.57 4.01 -9.05 -5.04 38.28 
June-September 2004 45.35 -2.55 4.05 -8.57 -4.52 38.28 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office  
 
Since 2001, FBt B has fluctuated from one adjustment period to another, and overall it 
has increased by 56.63 per cent from 2001 to 2004.  
Energy Policy and Planning Office (2004) reports the justification for changes in FBt B 
in each adjustment period.  
To sum up, the most frequently mentioned reasons for changes in FBt B, are changes in 
fuel prices, power purchase prices from the non-EGAT generators, foreign exchange 
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rates and the inflation rate. Operating cost reductions resulting from improvements in 
efficiency never appear as a component of FBt B in any period. 
The failure to transfer benefits from efficiency improvement to consumers also 
happened in Latin American countries which were the first groups of developing 
countries to adopt incentive regulation (Bitran and Serra 1998).  
One explanation why the benefits in efficiency improvement cannot successfully be 
transferred is that there is no well established regulatory channel to transfer the 
benefits of efficiency improvement to consumers in the form of a tariff reduction. 
With limited regulatory capacity and limited and asymmetric information, the 
regulator cannot deliver on its mandate and SOEs appropriated the gains.  
One interesting point is that X factors to encourage efficiency improvement 
employed so far are relatively high when compared with those employed by 
regulators in developed countries. For example, the Office of the Tasmania Energy 
Regulator and the Queensland Competition Authority employed 1 and 1–2 per cent 
of X factor, respectively, for their distribution companies during their regulatory 
period. High X factors can provide greater, sometimes unrealistic, incentives to firms 
to improve efficiency. An assessment on the operating efficiency of enterprises 
where X factors are realized should be undertaken.   
Although the regulatory regime and form are set out correctly, to achieve the goals of 
regulation, then regulatory capacity, instruments and transfer mechanisms have to be 
enhanced. 
7.5 Financial issues in economic regulation in Thailand 
As discussed in Chapter 6 with the determination of revenue requirement in 
developed countries, this section aims to discuss issues in the determination in 
Thailand. The discussion will focus on electricity distribution activities only because 
in Thailand electricity distribution companies are separate identities and their data is 
available.  
Transmission activity is included in EGAT, hence data on transmission is not 
separated from the generation business, which is the main business of EGAT, and is 
not publicly available. 
In this section, financial issues relating to capital base, rate of return, depreciation, 
noncapital cost and price index-X adjustment mechanism will be discussed 
respectively. With each financial variable, estimation methods widely used by 
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regulators in developed countries will be addressed and attempted together with 
discussion on the possibility and obstacles of adopting these methods in the Thai 
case. Then revenue cap will be estimated. 
7.5.1 Capital base 
Capital base is the main variable to estimate allowed returns on and of capital. The 
choice of capital base valuation depends on the overall philosophy of the regulatory 
regime. If the objective of the regulatory regime is to compensate investors for the 
capital they have invested into a business, assets should be valued based on historic 
cost.  
SOEs in the ESI in Thailand employ a historic cost approach to value assets, 
depreciated by the straight line method. Capital base of MEA and PEA, reported in 
their annual reports in 2003, are 76.58 and 158.14 billion baht respectively. Even 
though historic cost valuation is relatively inexpensive to measure, simple to 
administer and can avoid the subjectivity associated with determining current asset 
values, historic cost values have no relationship with market values or replacement 
costs and rely on asset age. This means that historic cost valuations could lead to 
shocks in cost change when the assets are replaced. In addition, employing historic 
cost values as a capital base in revenue requirements does not encourage efficiency 
improvement because firms ensure that their costs are recovered.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, to promote efficiency, which is the main objective of 
regulation in Thailand, MEA and PEA should adopt the depreciated optimised 
replacement cost (DORC) approach as the valuation approach of the assets. The 
central idea of DORC is to optimise the asset value in a way that the most efficient 
facilities necessary to produce a specified level of services is identified. Hence values 
are set based on the most efficient configuration of assets that could be used to 
deliver service by eliminating any redundant assets. To estimate DORC value, study 
of the entire network is required, assets are valued at depreciated replacement cost 
and redundant assets are eliminated. 
For general asset valuation, DORC is widely employed by regulators in developed 
countries, such as The Essential Services Commission of South Australia 
(ESCOSA); Office of the Tasmania Energy Regulator (OTTER); Queensland 
Competition Authority (QCA); and Essential Services Commission (ESC) (before 
2002 called Office of Regulator-General (ORG)). It should be noted that this method 
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requires costly examination and assessment procedures, and subjective judgement is 
required in determining optimal network configuration and the degree of excess 
capacity considered to be efficient. The asymmetry of information between the 
regulator and the network owner aggravates this valuation process. 
7.5.2 Rate of return 
To estimate the rate of return, according to weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC), there are two components: the cost of debt and the cost of equity. It is 
recommended that Thailand should follow the international practice, employing 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), to estimate the cost of equity. Even though 
CAPM suffers from a number of theoretical disadvantages, it is still considered to be 
both more objective than and at least as robust as alternatives.  
The determination of rate of return is related to financial issues, particularly the 
capital market. Thailand is classified by the World Bank as a developing country and 
its capital market is also classified by the International Finance Corporation, a 
subsidiary of the World Bank, as an emerging marketTP1 PT.  
Füss (2002) conducted a discriminant analysis and confirmed that the capital market 
of Thailand is the emerging market, hence the technical issues in this section will be 
discussed by taking the characteristics of the emerging market into account.TP2 PT 
To estimate the cost of equity, the traditional local or domestic CAPM have been 
widely employed, particularly in developed markets. The local CAPM TP3 PT is expressed 
as  
i f id md fR R R Rβ ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ ,        (7.1)  
where 
RBi B is the expected return on asset i; 
RBf B is the risk free rate;  
                                                 
TP
1
PT An emerging market describes the equity markets which are located in countries classified as 
developing countries with a low or middle income economy. 
TP
2
PT It should be noted that the field of finance in emerging markets is growing. Bruner et al. (2002) and 
Bekaert and Harvey (2002; 2003) summarise the various and important financial issues in emerging 
markets. 
TP
3
PT The local CAPM is based on the assumption of a completely segmented market, hence assets will be 
priced off the local market return. The local expected return is determined by a product of the local 
beta times the local market risk premium using one country’s data (Bekaert and Harvey 2002:431). In 
this market, the local investors are not allowed to own foreign assets, whereas the foreign investors are 
not allowed to own local securities. The risk that investors face in domestic CAPM is the variance of a 
diversified portfolio within the particular country. 
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RBmd B is the expected return on the domestic market portfolio;  
( )
2
,i md
id
md
COV R Rβ σ=  is risk of asset i against the domestic market portfolio returns; 
and  
md fR R⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  is the risk premium on the domestic market portfolio. 
Equation 7.1 can be rewritten as a weighted average of the risk free rate with weight 
(1-βBid B) and the expected return on the market portfolio with weight βBid B  
( )1i id f id mdR R Rβ β= − +  .       (7.2) 
The equity beta estimated by historical data can be conducted through the application 
of the CAPM as following 
( )i f id md fR R R Rβ= + −  
( )1i f id id mdR R Rβ β= − +  
i i id mdR Rα β= +  ,         (7.3) 
where 
( )1i f idRα β= − ; and  
β BidB is domestic beta. 
Stulz (1999) argued that using a domestic market index is only appropriate for an 
asset traded in a closed, national financial market. Stulz (1995) proposed that the 
above CAPM can be adapted to an international context for assets in the global 
market portfolio given that the purchasing power parity condition holds. 
The Equation 7.1 can be adjusted to a global CAPM TP4 PT as following 
i f ig mg fR R R Rβ ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ ,        (7.4) 
where 
RBi B is the expected return on asset i in a specific pricing currency; 
RBf B is the risk free rate denominated in the pricing currency; 
RBmg B is the expected return in the pricing currency on the unhedged global market 
portfolio;  
                                                 
TP
4
PT The global CAPM is based on the assumption of perfect capital markets, which means the markets 
are perfectly integrated to the world capital markets. In the integrated capital market, the global 
CAPM is defined as the expected return that is determined by the beta with respect to the world 
market portfolio multiplied by the world risk premium (Bekaert and Harvey 2002:431). It means that 
the assets within a particular country are rewarded in terms of their contribution to a well-diversified 
world portfolio. 
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( )
2
,i mg
ig
mg
COV R Rβ σ=  is risk of asset i against the unhedged global market portfolio 
returns with returns computed in the pricing currency; and 
mg fR R⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  is the risk premium on the unhedged global market portfolio. 
From the Equation 7.2, the global equity beta estimated by historical data can be 
conducted through the application of the CAPM as following 
i i ig mgR Rα β= +  ,         (7.5) 
where 
( )1i f igRα β= − ; and  
β BigB is global beta. 
For Thailand, as an emerging market, it is difficult to determine which CAPM, 
domestic or global, is the best estimator of cost of equity. The domestic CAPM with 
the assumption of a completely segmented market is not totally appropriate due to 
the capital market and financial liberalisation.  
The structure of the capital market in emerging markets is moving toward the 
integration end rather than the segmentation end. Realistically the domestic CAPM 
requires data in the local market which is not available, particularly in the sector of 
electricity distribution in Thailand.  
The cost of equity measurement in emerging markets is a bet on market integration 
(Bruner et al. 2002:317). Gerard et al. (2003) found little or no evidence of market 
segmentation in Southeast Asia over the period of 1985–98, however they found that 
emerging markets in Southeast Asia are not yet fully integrated as well.  
Bekaert and Harvey (2002; 2003) provided evidence that gradually the emerging 
markets are integrated into the world market through market liberalisation TP5 PT. In their 
review, there are a number of measurement methods of the degree of market 
integration, ranging from investigating the event such as noting the regulatory reform 
date, employing finance data such as equity return and economic data such as capital 
flow, and adopting an integrated approach which encompasses all the variables 
(events, financial, and economic data).  
                                                 
TP
5
PT It should be noted that market liberalisations are not necessarily defining events for market 
integration (Bekaert and Harvey 2002:431).  
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Bekaert and Harvey (1995) employed equity return data and found that the emerging 
markets exhibit time-varying integration. For Thailand, the model estimates show a 
dramatic increase in the ex ante probability of integration, beginning in 1986 which 
coincides with the year of trading commencing on the Alien board. Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000) recorded the important various events, such as the opening and 
liberalisation of equity markets in emerging countries.  
For Thailand, the official liberalisation date was September 1987; the first country 
fundTP6 PT introduction date is July 1985; the first American Depositary ReceiptTP7 PT 
introduction was on January 1991; and the break point in the jump in net US capital 
flows was in July 1988. 
Bekaert et al. (2002) uses the idea that market integration is an all-encompassing 
event that should change the return-generating process. They search for a ‘break 
date’ of market segmentation and integration and compare this with the official date 
of capital market reform. The results show that the break dates are mostly within two 
years of alternative measures of liberalisation events, and highlights the fact that 
market liberalisation does not necessarily lead to immediate market integration.  
Compared to the dates in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), the result of the univariate 
analysis examining breaks in the ratio of US holdings to market capitalisation shows 
that the break point for Thailand is on July 1988, whereas the multivariate results 
show that most break points were in 1993. 
To sum up, the recent literature agrees that the capital market in Thailand has been 
liberalised and integrated into the world market for more than a decade. Therefore 
the world CAPM should be the approach to adopt. However the assumption of a 
perfect capital market is not perfectly valid either, therefore an estimation of both 
domestic and global CAPM for the regulation of electricity distribution will be 
attempted. 
7.5.2.1 Betas 
The estimation of both domestic and global CAPMs starts with the estimation of 
beta. The empirical counterpart of CAPM is known as the market model, which 
                                                 
TP
6
PT A country fund is an investment company that invests in a portfolio of assets in a foreign country 
which is an emerging market and issues a fixed number of shares domestically, such as in the US. 
TP
7
PT American Depositary Receipts are rights to foreign shares that trade in dollars on the US exchange 
or over-the-counter. 
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represents a statistical relationship of CAPM (Brailsford et al. 1997:4). The standard 
specification of the market model of domestic CAPM is expressed as 
it i id mdt itR Rα β ε= + +  ,        (7.6) 
where  
RBitB is the realised return on asset i for period t;  
RBmdt B is the realised return on the domestic market portfolio for period t;  
t is the measurement interval and t = 1, 2,…, T;  
T is the number of measurement intervals;  
α Bi B is the intercept term for asset i;  
β BidB is the sensitivity measure of return on asset i to domestic market returns assumed 
to be constant through time;  and 
ε BitB is the residual term for asset i in period t.  
The standard specification of the market model of global CAPM is expressed as 
it i ig mgt itR Rα β ν= + +  ,        (7.7) 
where  
RBmgt B is the realised return on the global market portfolio for period t;  
β BigB is the sensitivity measure of return on asset i to global market returns assumed to 
be constant through time;  and 
ν BitB is the residual term for asset i in period t.  
For beta estimation, the data employed is the main issue.  
In Thailand, there is no electricity distribution company listed in the stock exchange 
market. The firms listed are the electricity generation companies which are either IPP 
or SPP. The estimations of both domestic and global betas of the Thai electricity 
generation sector, as firms in the same industry, are conducted instead. Again as 
there are no listed Thai electricity distribution companies, comparable overseas 
electricity companies from developed countries should be considered. The US 
electricity sector is chosen because of manageable and comparable data.  
To obtain beta estimates, returnsTP8 PT are required and have to be constructed.TP9 PT Due to 
simplicity and data limitation, discrete returns are calculated as follows 
1
1
it it
it
it
P PR
P
−
−
−=  ,        (7.8) 
                                                 
TP
8
PT Returns include both dividends and retained earnings. 
TP
9
PT Brailsford et al. (1997) provided a good discussion on the measure of returns in practice.  
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where  
RBitB is realised return on asset i for period t; and 
PBitB is price of asset i at time t. 
The return on domestic market portfolio, RBmdt B, and the return on global market 
portfolio, RBmgt B, are calculated by Equation 7.8.  
Instead of measuring returns of assets or of companies, due to data unavailability the 
estimate of returns in the electricity industry and the market is conducted. PBitB is the 
proxied by the total market return index of industry and the market. Both Thai and 
the US data of the total return index in US dollar of the electricity industry and of the 
market are obtained from DataStream. The global total market return index in US 
dollar is also obtained from the same source. The detail of raw data is shown in Table 
7.4. 
 
Table 7.4 Description of total return index 
DataStream  code Name Currency Variable  
ELECTTH Thailand – DS Electricity US Dollar Total return index  
ELECTUS US - DS Electricity US Dollar Total return index  
TOTMKTH Thailand – DS Market US Dollar Total return index 
TOTMKUS US – DS Market US Dollar Total return index 
TOTMKWD World – DS Market US Dollar Total return index 
 
 
The returns of the Thai and the US electricity sector, domestic market and global 
market are calculated by Equation 7.8 by employing quarterly, monthly and daily 
raw data. Data for Thailand starts in 1995, which is the year that the first electricity 
company was listed on the stock exchange market in Thailand. Data for the US and 
the world starts in 1989. The summary statistics of returns are shown in Table 7.5. It 
is obvious that average of returns from the Thai data are lower than those from the 
US and world data, whereas variation of returns are higher. That can result from a 
smaller number of observations. 
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Table 7.5 Summary statistics of variables 
Data Variable N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Quarterly       
Thailand 
Q2 1995–Q2 2004 R BitB 37 0.02 0.17 -0.46 0.39 
 R BmdtB 37 0.004 0.22 -0.47 0.56 
The US 
Q3 1989– Q2 2004 R BitB 60 0.02 0.07 -0.27 0.17 
 R BmdtB 60 0.03 0.07 -0.15 0.2 
World  
Q3 1989– Q2 2004 R BmgtB 60 0.02 0.07 -0.13 0.17 
Monthly       
Thailand 
02 1995–04 2004 R BitB 111 0.01 0.12 -0.35 0.39 
 R BmdtB 111 0.002 0.13 -0.35 0.48 
The US 
05 1989–04 2004 R BitB 180 0.01 0.05 -0.19 0.14 
 R BmdtB 180 0.01 0.04 -0.1 0.1 
World 
05 1989–04 2004 R BmgtB 180 0.01 0.04 -0.11 0.13 
Daily       
Thailand 
17/01/1995–29/04/2004 R BitB 2,423 0 0.03 -0.13 0.21 
 R BmdtB 2,423 0 0.02 -0.15 0.18 
The US 
26/05/1989–29/04/2004 R BitB 3,895 0 0.01 -0.08 0.08 
 R BmdtB 3,895 0 0.01 -0.07 0.06 
World 
26/05/1989–29/04/2004 R BmgtB 3,895 0 0.01 -0.05 0.05 
Note: N stands for number of observations; and RBitB, R BmdtB and R BmgtB the realised return on assets 
in the  electricity sector, domestic market portfolio and global market portfolio, respectively. 
 
Equation 7.6 and 7.7 on Thai and the US electricity sector will be estimated by 
ordinary least squares. In this section, the computer software, Eviews 4.1, is 
employed to conduct all of the regressions. The estimations of domestic and global 
 203
betas from Thai data will be conducted and discussed and then those estimations of 
the US data will be attempted. 
The analysis comprises of quarterly, monthly and daily data for 5 years (1999–2004), 
10 years (1995–2004) and 15 years (1989–2004).  
For the Thai electricity sector, the data on listed electricity companies started in 
1995, therefore the period of data is reduced to 10 years. To capture the effect of the 
financial crisis in 1997, the estimation of pre crisis (1995–97) and post crisis (1997 
onwards) time intervals are conducted. 
In regressing a time series variable on another time series variables, the problem of 
spurious regression may arise. Hence a test of stationarity or unit root test, is needed 
before running regressions. 
The unit root test adopted in this section is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to 
control for higher-order correlation. The augmented Dickey-Fuller specification is 
1
1
p
t t i t i i
i
y y yµ γ δ η− −
=
∆ = + + ∆ +∑ ,      (7.9) 
where yBt B is returns and ty∆  is lagged difference terms of y Bt B. 
This augmented Dickey-Fuller specification is then employed to test the null 
hypothesis of γ =0, that is a unit root exists in yBt B. If null hypothesis is rejected, yBt B is 
stationary or integrated of order 0, I(0). If not, dPth P-differenced series is tested until it 
is stationary, then the original series, y Bt B, is integrated of order d.  
The results of stationarity tests of each data series of both Thai and the US in various 
period of time are reported in Table 7.6 and 7.7. 
As shown in Table 7.6, quarterly returns of electricity sector in Thailand are not 
stationary in any periods of study. Most of them are integrated of order 1, I(1), 
except quarter returns in pre crisis period, that is integrated of order 2, I(2). Monthly 
and daily returns of electricity sector in Thailand are stationary. All of returns of Thai 
market are stationary except quarterly and monthly returns during pre crisis period. 
The reasons that the returns of Thai electricity and market are not stationary are that 
the number of observations in pre crisis period is small, and it is likely that before 
financial crisis stock returns in market of Thailand were not well behaved. Daily 
returns are all integrated of order 0.  
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Table 7.6 Test of stationarityPa P: Thai data 
Thailand R BitB R BmdtB R BmgtB 
Quaterly    
Q2 1999–Q2 2004 I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Q2 1995–Q2 2004 I(1) I(0) I(0) 
Pre Crisis  
(Q2 1995–Q2 1997) I(2) I(1) I(0) 
Post Crisis  
(Q3 1997–Q2 2004) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Monthly    
04 1999–04 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
02 1995–04 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Pre Crisis  
(02 1995–06 1997) I(0) I(1) I(0) 
Post Crisis  
(07 1997–04 2004) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Daily    
26/04/1999– 29/04/2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
17/01/1995–29/04/2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Pre Crisis 
(17/01/1995–30/06/1997) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Post Crisis 
(1/07/1997–29/04/2004) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
P
a
PThe critical values for this test is the MacKinnon critical values at 1% significance level. 
Note: I(0), I(1) and I(2) stands for integration of order 0, 1 and 2. 
 
Table 7.7 shows that all of daily, monthly and quarterly data of the US returns of 
electricity sector and market in various time periods are stationary except quarterly 
returns during 1999–2004 which is integrated of order 1. It is obvious that the US 
data are better behaved than those of Thailand. 
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Regression of nonstationary data can result in spurious regression. The results from 
this regression are dubious. If both series are integrated of the same order, called 
cointegrated, regression is meaningful or not spurious. 
 
Table 7.7 Test of stationarityPa P: the United States data 
The United States R BitB R BmdtB R BmgtB 
Quarterly    
Q2 1999–Q2 2004 I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Q2 1995–Q2 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Q3 1989–Q2 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Monthly    
04 1999–04 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
02 1995–04 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
05 1989–04 2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Daily    
26/04/1999–29/04/2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
17/01/1995–29/04/2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
26/05/1989–29/04/2004 I(0) I(0) I(0) 
P
a
PThe critical values for this test is the MacKinnon critical values at 1% significance level. 
Note: I(0) and I(1) stands for integration of order 0 and 1. 
 
The results of both the domestic and global beta of Thailand are shown in Table 7.8. 
The domestic CAPM of the Thai electricity generation sector is estimated using the 
data from various periods. The domestic betas obtained are all statistically significant 
and range from 0.5 to 1, depending on the estimation period. The global beta is also 
attempted.  
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Table 7.8 Domestic and global beta: Electricity generation sector in Thailand 
Thailand N Domestic beta 
 
Global beta 
  Coefficient R P2P DW  Coefficient R P2P DW 
Quaterly     
 
   
Q2 1999–Q2 2004 21 0.5** 
(0.13) 
0.43 0.89*  0.87 
(0.44) 
0.17 0.68* 
Q2 1995–Q2 2004PaP 37 0.55** 
(0.09) 
0.51 1.78  0.39 
(0.39) 
0.03 1.67 
Pre Crisis  
(Q2 1995–Q2 1997) 
9 0.85** 
(0.22) 
0.69 3.19*  0.73 
(0.89) 
0.09 1.68 
Post Crisis  
(Q3 1997–Q2 2004) 
28 0.54** 
(0.1) 
0.52 1.79  0.34 
(0.46) 
0.02 1.69 
Monthly 
        
04 1999–04 2004 61 0.56** 
(0.1) 
0.37 2.31  0.6* 
(0.28) 
0.07 2.24 
02 1995–04 2004PaP 111 0.64** 
(0.058) 
0.53 2.19  0.8** 
(0.25) 
0.09 1.93 
Pre Crisis  
(02 1995–06 1997) 
29 1.08** 
(0.23) 
0.45 2.67*  -0.82 
(0.67) 
0.05 1.8 
Post Crisis  
(07 1997–04 2004) 
82 0.63** 
(0.06) 
0.57 2.14  0.99** 
(0.27) 
0.14 1.85 
Daily 
        
26/04/1999– 
29/04/2004 
1,309 0.65** 
(0.03) 
0.33 2.05  0.21** 
(0.06) 
0.01 2.06 
17/01/1995–
29/04/2004PaP 
2,423 0.84** 
(0.02) 
0.51 2.08  0.39** 
(0.07) 
0.01 1.98 
Pre Crisis 
(17/01/1995–
30/06/1997) 
640 1.07** 
(0.05) 
0.46 2.04  0.54** 
(0.21) 
0.01 1.93 
Post Crisis 
(1/07/1997–
29/04/2004) 
1,783 0.8** 
(0.02) 
0.53 2.1  0.37** 
(0.07) 
0.01 2 
The numbers in parentheses are standard error. 
* and ** indicates the statistically significant estimates at 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
P
a
P represents the available data of Thailand. 
Note: DW stands for Durbin-Watson statistic and N stands for number of observations 
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The results show that the betas from quarterly data are not statistically significant at 
all, unlike the betas from the daily and monthly data. The values of betas range from 
0.2 to 0.8.  
Local CAPM regressions on the quarterly data are all spurious because returns of 
electricity market and market in Thailand are not cointegrated at all. Results from 
regressions for global beta show that the quarterly returns of Thai electricity sector 
and global market during period of pre crisis and of 1995–2004 are not cointegrated. 
Evidence from Durbin Watson statistics show that few of the estimated betas suffer 
autocorrelation problem, particularly those estimated during the pre crisis period and 
suffering spurious regression.  
To alleviate the autocorrelation problem, the autoregressive model, in which the 
lagged value of the dependent variable is added as one of the explanatory variables, 
is commonly recommended.  
Hence Equation 7.6 and 7.7 are remodelled as following 
1it i id mdt ir it itR R Rα β β ε−= + + +   and      (7.10) 
1it i ig mgt ir it itR R Rα β β ν−= + + +        (7.11) 
where 
RBit-1 B is the realised return on asset i for period t-1; and 
β Bir Bis the sensitivity measure of return on asset i at time t to the return on asset at time 
t-1  which is assumed to be constant through time. 
Compared to the results in Table 7.8, results the from autoregressive model in Table 
7.9 improve a lot as shown by the increase in RP2 P in domestic CAPM models. 
However there is no significant improvement in global CAPM models.  
A test for serial correlation is thus needed. Because of the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable as the explanatory variable, Durbin-Watson statistics are not 
appropriate as a test for serial correlation.  
The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test statisticTP10 PT is adopted to test 
autocorrelation in an autoregressive model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange Multiplier test is that there is no serial correlation up to lag order p, where 
p is a pre-specified integer.  
 
                                                 
TP
10
PT Greene (1997) provides the procedure of the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test of 
autocorrelation step by step.  
 208
Table 7.9 Implied domestic and global beta: Electricity generation sector in 
Thailand 
Thailand N Domestic beta  Global beta 
  β BidB β Bir B 
Implied 
beta R P
2
P
  β BigB β Bir B 
Implied 
beta R P
2
P
 
Quaterly           
Q2 1999–Q2 2004 21 0.47** 
(0.11) 
0.43** 
(0.14) 
0.82 0.62  0.76 
(0.4) 
0.45* 
(0.18) 
1.38 0.38 
Q3 1995–Q2 2004PaP 36 0.54** 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.54 0.51  0.26 
(0.41) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.30 0.03 
Pre Crisis  
(Q3 1995–Q2 1997) 
8 1.06* 
(0.29) 
-0.46 
(0.28) 
0.73 0.75  -0.10 
(1.17) 
0.23 
(0.47) 
-0.13 0.05 
Post Crisis  
(Q3 1997–Q2 2004) 
28 0.54** 
(0.1) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.54 0.53  0.29 
(0.47) 
0.12 
(0.2) 
0.33 0.03 
Monthly 
          
04 1999–04 2004 61 0.55** 
(0.1) 
-0.07 
(0.1) 
0.51 0.37  0.56 
(0.3) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
0.52 0.08 
03 1995–04 2004 PaP 110 0.65** 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.61 0.53  0.8** 
(0.25) 
0.03 
(0.1) 
0.83 0.1 
Pre Crisis  
(03 1995–06 1997) 
28 1.09** 
(0.26) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
0.97 0.42  -0.8 
(0.68) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.80 0.05 
Post Crisis  
(07 1997–04 2004) 
82 0.63** 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.59 0.58  1.01** 
(0.27) 
0.06 
(0.1) 
1.08 0.15 
Daily 
          
26/04/1999– 
29/04/2004 
1,309 0.65** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.63 0.33  0.21** 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.21 0.01 
18/01/1995–
29/04/2004PaP 
2,422 0.84** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.80 0.51  0.38** 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.39 0.01 
Pre Crisis 
(18/01/1995–
30/06/1997) 
639 1.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
1.04 0.49  0.49* 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.51 0.01 
Post Crisis 
(1/07/1997–
29/04/2004) 
1,783 0.81** 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
0.76 0.53  0.37** 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.38 0.02 
The numbers in parentheses are standard error. 
* and ** indicates the statistically significant estimates at 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
P
a
P represents the available data of Thailand. 
Note: N stands for number of observations. Implied beta is 
1
id
ir
β
β− . 
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The Lagrange Multiplier statistic has asymptotic chi-square distribution, with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of lag, p, χ P2PB(p)B. One practical problem of the 
Lagrange Multiplier test statistic is to specify the right value of p a priori. The value 
of p is roughly specified based on observations of autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelations of residuals from correlograms.  
Null hypothesis is rejected when the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier statistic 
is greater than the critical value, χ P2 PB0.95(p)B. It means that residuals are serially 
correlated and that estimated betas are not efficient. 
Results of tests for autocorrelation of all regressions from Table 7.9 are shown in 
Table 7.10. Evidence shows that in most of the domestic and global CAPM 
autoregressive models, null hypothesis, that there is no autocorrelation, is not 
rejected.  
This problem may result from poor data from the Thai stock market and the 
misspecification of models. Returns in the electricity sector in Thailand are not 
explained well by the simple CAPM because Thai market returns are not normally 
distributed (Bekaert and Harvey 2002:37). Therefore efficient estimates cannot be 
obtained from simple ordinary least square estimation. Moreover, Thai returns in the 
electricity sector can be affected by other variables which are not included in the 
CAPM.  
To obtain better estimates, new model specification and estimation techniques are 
required. However the search for the best model is not the aim of this section. 
As data from the Thai stock market is poorly constructed, estimation of betas 
employing data from developed countries should be conducted. Among electricity 
sectors in equity markets in developed countries, the US electricity sector has the 
largest size and the longest history. Its data is long, publicly available, well recorded 
and well behaved.  
In Table 7.11 results from regression of both domestic and global CAPM in the US 
shows that all of the domestic and global betas are statistically significant and range 
from 0.3 to 0.6. None of the regressions suffer from autocorrelation. None of them 
are spurious.  
With a well developed equity market, regressions from the US data provide more 
reliable results, so in this study the global beta of the US will be employed. 
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Table 7.10 Autocorrelation test: Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test 
Thailand Domestic beta  Global beta 
 
Breusch-
Godfrey 
Lagrange 
Multiplie
r statistic 
χP2 PB0.95(,p)B p Decision  
Breusch-
Godfrey 
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
statistic  
χP2PB0.95(,p)B p Decision 
Quaterly          
Q2 1999–Q2 2004 1.8 3.84 1 Do not Reject HBo B 
 5.9 5.99 2 Do not Reject HBo B 
Q3 1995–Q2 2004Pa P 3 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
 3.04 5.99 2 Do not Reject HBo B 
Pre Crisis  
(Q3 1995–Q2 1997) 6.1 9.5 4 
Do not 
Reject HBo B 
 2.72 5.99 2 Do not Reject HBo B 
Post Crisis  
(Q3 1997–Q2 2004) 3.2 7.8 3 
Do not 
Reject HBo B 
 2.8 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
Monthly          
04 1999–04 2004 5.2 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
 7.3 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
03 1995–04 2004Pa P 2.5 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
 2.7 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
Pre Crisis  
(03 1995–06 1997) 7 5.99 2 Reject HBo B  4.7 5.99 2 
Do not 
Reject HBo B 
Post Crisis  
(07 1997–04 2004) 2 7.8 3 
Do not 
Reject HBo B 
 1.32 7.8 3 Do not Reject HBo B 
Daily          
26/04/1999– 
29/04/2004 0.2 5.99 2 
Do not 
Reject HBo B 
 15.3 5.99 2 Reject HBo B 
18/01/1995–
29/04/2004Pa P 4 5.99 2 
Do not 
Reject HBo B 
 10.4 5.99 2 Reject HBo B 
Pre Crisis 
(18/01/1995–
30/06/1997) 
7 5.99 2 Reject HBo B  9.5 5.99 2 Reject HBo B 
Post Crisis 
(1/07/1997–
29/04/2004) 
0.63 5.99 2 Do not Reject HBo B 
 30.6 5.99 2 Reject HBo B 
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Table 7.11 Domestic and global beta: Electricity sector in the United States  
The United States N Domestic beta 
 
Global beta 
  Coefficient R P2P DW 
 
Coefficient R P2P DW 
Quarterly     
 
   
Q2 1999–Q2 2004 21 0.75* 
(0.29) 
0.26 2.21  0.57* 
(0.28) 
0.19 2.03 
Q2 1995–Q2 2004 37 0.41* 
(0.16) 
0.15 2.13  0.33 
(0.18) 
0.09 2.03 
Q3 1989–Q2 2004 60 0.4** 
(0.12) 
0.16 2.03  0.31* 
(0.13) 
0.09 1.86 
Monthly 
        
04 1999–04 2004 61 0.35* 
(0.15) 
0.08 2.23  0.39* 
(0.17) 
0.08 2.2 
02 1995–04 2004 111 0.33** 
(0.1) 
0.08 2.17  0.3** 
(0.11) 
0.06 2.15 
05 1989–04 2004 180 0.38** 
(0.08) 
0.12 2.09  0.31** 
(0.08) 
0.08 2.06 
Daily 
        
26/04/1999–
29/04/2004 
1,309 0.4** 
(0.03) 
0.15 1.89  0.48** 
(0.04) 
0.11 1.94 
17/01/1995–
29/04/2004 
2,423 0.38** 
(0.02) 
0.16 1.82  0.41** 
(0.03) 
0.09 1.88 
26/05/1989–
29/04/2004 
3,895 0.42** 
(0.01) 
0.2 1.77  0.38** 
(0.02) 
0.1 1.86 
The numbers in parentheses are standard error. 
* and ** indicates the statistically significant estimates at 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
Note: DW stands for Durbin-Watson statistic and N stands for number of observations 
 
 
The choices of sampling interval for the data and the length of the estimation period 
lead to the different values of global beta. The short interval data, such as daily 
intervals, are systematically biased in such a way that highly traded securities are 
overstated whereas those of infrequently traded securities are understated. However 
the long intervals, such as annual data, lower the number of observations for the 
estimation and reduce the accuracy of beta values. Brailsford et al. (1997) 
empirically showed that the beta estimates using monthly data for 4 to 5 years 
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provide a reasonable trade off between the number of observations and the stability 
of beta estimates. The global beta of the US, estimated from monthly data for 5 
years, is 0.39. According to the Bloomberg adjustment approach, the adjusted equity 
beta is 0.6.TP11 PT 
The next step is to ungear the adjusted equity beta to produce an asset beta using 
Equation 6.21 from Chapter 6. To estimate the asset beta, the debt beta, using 
Equation 6.22 will be estimated. The choice of market risk premium employed in this 
study is 6 per cent. The risk free rate of the US is represented by the ten-year US 
Treasury bond rate in April 2004 of 4.5 per cent. The cost of debt for the US 
electricity utilities is 5.5 per cent estimated from adding a one-per-cent basis spread 
of electric utilities in the US from Damodaran (2004) on the bond rate. The 
calculated debt beta is 0.17. This study will employ debt beta values of zero and 0.17 
and the capital structure for asset beta estimation will be assumed at 30 and 60 per 
cent. 
 
Table 7.12 Asset beta estimation  
Capital Structure Asset Beta 
 Debt beta = 0 Debt beta = 0.17 
0.3 0.41 0.46 
0.6 0.23 0.33 
 
 
The levered equity beta, estimated by Equation 6.23 is 0.6. 
Another secondary source of the levered betas of comparable electricity companies 
are from a study by Damodaran from New York University. Damodaran publishes an 
industry summary of betas for the electricity sector in the US, Europe, Japan, and 
emerging markets. The figures from January 2004 are reported in Table 7.13.  
Note that employing the beta from overseas electricity companies has to be 
undertaken with care, as significant differences between these companies and those 
operating in Thailand exist. There are differences in stock markets, macroeconomic 
                                                 
TP
11
PT Evidently the implied domestic and global betas estimated from five-year monthly data of Thailand 
are 0.51 and 0.52 respectively. These numbers are very close to this adjusted equity beta. The possible 
reason is that the implied beta represents long-run estimate of beta. 
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conditions, regulatory regimes, industry structure and levels of competition and non-
distribution activities within the companies. 
 
Table 7.13 Beta and unlevered beta in the electricity supply industry 
Country/Region Industry name Beta  Unlevered beta  
United States Electric utility (Central) 0.8 0.42 
 Electric utility (East) 0.73 0.43 
 Electric utility (West) 0.79 0.42 
Europe Electric-Distribution 0.62 0.49 
 Electric-Generation 0.48 0.41 
 Electric-Integrated 0.78 0.54 
 Electric-Transmission 0.62 0.39 
Japan Electric-Integrated 0.42 0.42 
Emerging market Electric-Distribution 0.73 0.47 
 Electric-Generation 0.91 0.65 
 Electric-Integrated 0.83 0.39 
 Electric-Transmission 0.92 0.38 
Note: The betas are computed using five years of monthly returns for each stock and then 
averaged (simple). The unlevered betas are estimated using the average market debt/equity 
ratios by industrial sector.  
Source: Damodaran, A., Stern School of Business, New York University 
( HTUhttp://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ UTH) 
 
The estimated value of the levered equity beta of the US electricity sector is 0.6. This 
levered beta incorporates business risk and financial (or capital structure) risk, 
however in the developing countries such as Thailand the regulated firms are also 
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subject to  higher regulatory riskTP12 PT due to the specific characteristics of developing 
countries.  
Also, regulation in the US is generally accomplished with the rate of return model 
and is different from the regulation in Thailand. Therefore, the risk in the electricity 
distribution business in Thailand should be higher than in the US. This study 
assumes a 0.2 difference related to the regulatory risk, hence the levered equity beta 
of 0.8 is adopted. 
7.5.2.2 Market risk premium 
Research on market risk premium is vast and varies by estimation approach. There 
are several practical methods to estimate market risk premium, such as the use of 
historical data, surveys, the supply-side approach and extrapolation for foreign 
markets. There is no consensus on what the best methods are and what the 
appropriate value of market risk premium should be. The historic based measure is 
the most widely used estimate of market risk premium. 
The studies on the US market risk premium are well developed, and are discussed 
based on the estimation approach selected. 
1. Historic based approach 
There are a number of recent studies on historical based market risk premium in the 
US, however for Thailand there are very few of studies on market risk premium. The 
summary of recent studies is shown in Table 7.14. 
 
                                                 
TP
12
PT Regulatory risk occurs from regulatory discretion and sunk investment (Church and Ware 
2000:768). The regulator can itself introduce risk through unpredictable or unjustifiable regulatory 
intervention so raising the firms’ cost of capital and leading to inefficient investment.  
Ex ante, the regulator sets the regulatory regimes and instruments, which allows the regulated firms to 
compensate for their investment. This means revenues obtained are estimated to be sufficient to allow 
for a return on and a return of investment. However, ex post, it can happen that a regulator has failed 
to carry out a commitment and changed the regulatory instruments which after all do not allow the 
firms to cover the capital costs. The regulator expropriates the firm’s capital investment.  
The firms with sunk investment which does not have alternative uses can protect themselves by 
underinvestment, which means that firms will have higher costs and binding capacity constraints, 
which results in the loss of efficiency. Alternatively, the firms can be compensated for regulatory risk 
through a higher rate of return. 
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Table 7.14 Market risk premium: historic based approach  
Source Country Period Description Market risk premium (per cent) 
Dimson et al. 
(2003) 
the US 
(annual) 
1900–
2002 
Relative to 
treasury bills 
Geometric 
mean 
5.3 
    Arithmetic 
mean 
7.2 
   Relative to 
treasury 
bonds 
Geometric 
mean 
4.4 
    Arithmetic 
mean 
6.4 
Mehra and 
Prescott (2003) 
the US 
(annual) 
1889–
2000 
Author’s data 
set 
Arithmetic 
mean 
6.9 
Salomons and 
Grootveld (2003) 
the US 
(monthly) 
1976–
2001 
Relative to 
money 
market 
Arithmetic 
mean 
0.3 
 Thailand 
(monthly) 
1985–
2001 
Relative to 
money 
market 
Arithmetic 
mean 
1.28 
 
2. Supply side approaches 
The supply side approach of estimating a forward-looking market risk premium is to 
calculate the implied risk premium using the discounted cash flow model. The basic 
idea is to estimate the expected future cost of capital in the market and then to 
subtract the prevailing yield on treasury securities. The expected cost of capital can 
be estimated by the dividend growth model or residual income model. Most of the 
research available on supply side approaches has been undertaken in the US. 
The market risk premiums obtained from supply side approaches are generally lower 
than the historical based market risk premium. Many researchers have been 
concerned about employing the market risk premium from the historic based 
approach because they are too high and might overstate the true market risk 
premium. TP13 PT  
 
                                                 
TP
13
PT Gebhardt et al. (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001) and Jagannathan et al. (2000) provide a discussion 
on reasons of high market risk premium obtained from historic based approach. 
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Table 7.15 Market risk premium: supply side approach 
Source Country Methodology Period Market risk premium (per cent) 
Fama and French 
(2002) 
the US 
(annual) 
Dividend growth 
model 
1951–2000 3.83 
  Earnings growth 
model 
1951–2000 4.78 
Jagannathan et al. 
(2000) 
the US 
(annual) 
Dividend growth 
model 
1926–99 4.3 
  GNP growth model 1926–99 5.7 
Claus and 
Thomas (2001) 
the US 
(annual) 
Abnormal earning 
model 
1985–98 3.39 
Gebhardt et al. 
(2001) 
the US 
(annual) 
Residual income 
model 
1979–95 2.7 
Easton et al. 
(2002) 
the US 
(annual) 
Residual income 
model 
1981–98 5.3 (I/B/E/S sample) 
2.7 (Energy)          
3.5 (Utility) 
 
3. Surveys 
The final approach directly measures risk premium obtained from surveys with 
financial academics, experts and chief financial officers in the US. These surveys are 
conducted at a specific point in time, and the results vary by the sample group and 
time of survey. 
 
Table 7.16 Market risk premium: surveys 
Source Country Sample group Responses Time of survey Market risk premium (per cent) 
Graham and 
Harvey 
(2001) 
the US Chief 
financial 
officers 
1,100 Second quarter 
2000–Third 
quarter 2001 
3.6–4.7 (10-year 
forecast) 
Welch (2000) the US Academic 
financial 
economists 
226 October 1997–
late 1998 
7.1 (Mean of 10-year 
forecast)             
7.2 (Mean of 30-year 
forecast) 
Welch (2001) the US Finance and 
economic 
professors 
510 August 2001 5–5.5 (Mean of 30-
year forecast) 
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From the reviews of various estimation methods of market risk premium, there is no 
consensus on what the best method is. The value of market risk premium of the US 
ranges from 3 to 7 per cent, and there is also no consensus on what the appropriate 
value of market risk premium should be.  
Estimation of market risk premium by employing Thai data is likely to be inaccurate. 
This is due to the unavailability of a long series of a risk free rate, which is usually 
proxied by long term government bond rate. In Thailand, direct financing through 
government bonds is small and Thai bond market is not yet developed.  
To select the appropriate market risk premium for regulatory purpose for Thailand, 
the values of market risk premium employed by the various Australian and the UK 
regulators should be explored. As shown in Table 7.17, apart from Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (OFGEM) all of regulators employ a 6 per cent of market risk 
premium which is estimated from the most conservative historical based approach. 
OFGEM considered that a forward-looking market risk premium is more appropriate 
than a historical market risk premium. OFGEM argued that 5 to 6 per cent of market 
risk premium is too high, particularly when a reduction in expected market risk 
premium is due to such factors as a more stable business environment and better 
opportunities for investors to diversify. Hence market risk premiums adopted by 
OFGEM are lower than the other regulators. 
It should be noted that a 6 per cent of market risk premium is consistent with values 
obtained from empirical studies conducted in the US, as discussed above.  
As for Thai economic conditions, the arguments set out by OFGEM are not 
applicable. Therefore in this study market risk premium set at 6 per cent will be 
employed. 
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Table 7.17 Market risk premium employed by various regulators in electricity 
distribution (per cent) 
Regulator/Author Market risk premium 
QCA (2001) 6 
ORG (2000) 6 
IPART (2004)  5–6 
OTTER (2003) 6 
ESCOSA (2004) 6 
OFGEM (2004) 2.5 (low), 4.5 (high) 
Note: QCA is Queensland Competition Authority, ORG is Office of the Regulator-General, 
Victoria (since 2002 called Essential Services Commission (ESC)), IPART is Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales, OTTER is Office of the Tasmania 
Energy Regulator, ESCOSA is the Essential Services Commission of South Australia, 
OFGEM is Office of Gas and Electricity Market. 
 
7.5.2.3 Country risk premium 
To value equity for Thailand, which is an emerging market, an additional risk 
premium for country risk included in the CAPM should be considered.  
Country risk represents the uncertainty that investors face over future prospects in a 
given economy. Country risk is composed of two primary components: a country’s 
ability to pay its obligations relating to financial and economic risk and a country’s 
willingness to pay its obligation relating to political risk.  
Whether this additional country risk premium is included in CAPM depends on 
whether the market is viewed as open or segmented. If the markets are segmented, in 
which marginal investors cannot or will not invest outside their domestic market, risk 
premiums can be different in each market.  
Marginal investors cannot diversify their portfolio outside their domestic market, and 
the likelihood that country risk is diversified declines substantially. Hence the 
additional country risk premium should be included in CAPM. 
Even if the marginal investor is globally diversified, the condition that all or much of 
country risk should be country specific has to be met so that the additional country 
risk premium is not needed.  
That country risk is country specific can be proven by low correlation across 
markets. If the correlation of returns across countries is significantly positive, 
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country risk has a market risk component which is not diversifiable and has to be 
included in risk premium.  
Bekaert and Harvey (2002) estimated the correlation of the International Finance 
Corporation composite with the Morgan Stanley Capital International world return in 
two periods: before and after 1990 for 20 emerging markets, including Thailand and 
found that the correlation across countries has increased. The results also show that 
correlation among emerging markets has increased as well. When the correlations 
increase, the country risk is less diversifiable, thus the country risk premium should 
be included in CAPM. 
The next step is to measure country risk premium and include it into CAPM.TP14 PT  
The simplest and most widely used method is a country bond default spread which is 
the difference between the yields on bonds issued by the country and the default free 
bond yield in the same currency (Damodaran 2003:65). This default spread is 
typically added into both the cost of equity and debt.  
Given that country risk premiums have been estimated, Damodaran (1999) 
summarised three alternative views to include country risk premium into the 
expected cost of equity as follows. 
 
Table 7.18 Views for inclusion of country risk premium into cost of equity 
Views of country risk Expected rate of return 
1. All companies in a country are equally 
exposed to country risk. [ ]i f i m fR R R R CRβ= + − +  
2. Company’s exposure to country risk is 
proportional to its exposure to all other 
market risk, beta. 
[ ]{ }i f i m fR R R R CRβ= + − +  
3. Each company has an exposure to 
country risk that is different from its 
exposure to all other market risk. 
[ ]i f i m fR R R R CRβ λ= + − +  
Note: CR is country risk premium and 
Market share in local market
Market share in global market
λ = . 
 
                                                 
TP
14
PT The literature on estimation of country risk premiums is vast. Erb et al. (1997), Harvey (2001) and 
Damodaran (2003) have reviewed other methods to measure country risk, such as use of beta from 
global CAPM as country risk, the country spread model, the Ibbotson model and the Erb-Harvey-
Viskanta model using country credit rating. This study aims to employ the method that is simple and 
transparent for the regulated firms, and thus complicated methods will not be suitable. 
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Estache et al. (2003b) proposed the model of cost of equity in developing countries 
by adding CR into the standard CAPM in the same way as the first view proposed by 
Damodaran (1999). They also suggested that country risk premium (CR) should also 
be included in the cost of debt: debt fR R CR= + .  
Assuming that large public utilities have good credit rating, the cost of debt can be 
proxied by the return on public bonds in the country. 
For the regulatory purpose, Green and Pardina (1999) proposed the modified CAPM 
in which the country risk premium is added into the cost of debt and equity, resulting 
in debt fR R CR= +  and i f i m fR R R R CRβ ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦ , respectively, for the developing 
countries.  
If the regulated company is not quoted on a stock market, CAPM cannot be used and 
the regulator should determine the rate of return for similar companies.  
Useful information for the calculation of the cost of debt and equity can be obtained 
from other companies in the same part of the industry, in the home country, in other 
countries with similar economies and from regulated companies in other industries. 
For example, the gas regulator (ENARGAS) of Argentina calculated the cost of debt 
by employing the US risk free rate and adding the country risk premium. The use of 
the US Treasury bond risk free rate is justifiable as long as the country is interested 
in attracting foreign capital into the sector. To estimate the cost of equity, 
ENARGAS employed the beta and market risk premium of the US gas distribution 
companies. The country risk was estimated from the difference between the yield of 
a domestic bond in US dollar and the risk free rate with the same average life. The 
cost of capital based on data from the developed market will set the benchmark for 
efficient firms. 
For the purpose of regulating electricity distribution in Thailand, the local CAPM of 
the US as the comparable electricity sector with Thailand is calculated and adjusted 
by the country risk premium following the first view that all companies in a country are 
equally exposed to country risk. 
( ) ( )electricityiT fUS US mUS fUS fT fUSR R R R R Rβ= + − + −     (7.12) 
where  
 221
electricity
USβ  is the levered equity beta of the US electricity sector obtained from the 
global CAPM, electricity electricityUS i US mgR Rα β= + , and  
( )fT fUSR R− is country risk premium; where fTR is the risk free rate of Thailand and 
fUSR is the risk free rate of the US. 
RBfT B is proxied by Thai baht denominated ten year Thai government bond yield in 
June 2004, at 5.13 per cent whereas RBfUS B is represented by the ten year US Treasury 
bond rate in April 2004, at 4.5 per cent.  
The country risk premium is thus 0.63 per cent.  
The Thai bond rate is surprisingly low. Most Thai government bonds are issued in 
the Thai domestic market in Thai baht, and it should be noted again that the domestic 
bond market in Thailand is immature and not well developed. Most capital 
mobilisation has been done through bank intermediation and direct financing through 
both government and corporate bonds is relatively small. Thailand’s strong fiscal 
balances between 1988 and 1996 provided no incentive for the government to issue 
regular and large amounts of government bonds (Chabchitrchaidol and Permpoon 
2002:190).  
Since the 1997 financial crisis, Thailand’s domestic bond market has grown because 
of an increase in the supply of government bonds in order to borrow to meet the cost 
of financial restructuring and to finance public debt. Since then a regular supply of 
government bonds has been created.  
The other estimation method of country risk premium is to use country default bond 
spreads that come with country risk rating adjusted by the volatility of the equity 
market in a country relative to the volatility of the bond market used to estimate the 
spread. The country risk premium can be estimated as following 
Equity
Country bond
Country risk premium = Country default spread*
σ
σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  (7.13) 
where Equityσ  is the annualised standard deviation in the country equity index and 
cdCountrybonσ   is the annualised standard deviation in the country bond. This country 
risk premium will increase if the country rating drops or if the relative volatility of 
the equity market increases.  
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Damodaran, from New York University, estimated the country risk premium of 
many developed and developing countries, including of Thailand using the country 
rating from Moody’s and estimating the country default spread for that rating. The 
emerging market average of 1.5 was then used as the relative equity market volatility 
for that market (standard deviation in country equity market/standard deviation in 
country bond) which means that equity markets are about 1.5 times more volatile 
than bond markets.  
In January 2004, Moody’s rating of Thailand is Baa1 which leads to a 150 basis 
points of country default spread.  
Therefore the country risk premium of Thailand is 2.25 per cent. Damodaran (2003) 
argued that this method provides a more accurate measure of country risk premium 
than the country bond default spread method for the immediate future.  
7.5.2.4 Cost of equity, cost of debt and weighted average cost of capital 
The market risk premium of the US market is 6 per cent. With 0.63 per cent of 
country risk premium, the costs of equity of the Thai electricity sector, RBiT B, are 8.73 
and 9.93 per cent based on the levered equity beta of 0.6 and 0.8 respectively, 
whereas with 2.25 per cent of country risk premium, the costs of equity, estimated by 
Equation 7.12 are 10.35 and 11.55, respectively. Obviously the low country risk 
premium leads to the low equity beta. 
 
Table 7.19  Estimation of cost of equity 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Levered equity beta 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 
R BfUSB (per cent) 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Market risk premium (per cent) 6 6 6 6 
Country risk premium (per 
cent) 0.63 2.25 0.63 2.25 
Cost of equity (per cent) 8.73 10.35 9.93 11.55 
 
 
Since the country risk premium calculated from the country bond default spread is 
too low as a result of the low Thai denominated government bond rate, this study 
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will use the country risk premium, 2.25 per cent, from the country default spreads 
derived from the country risk rating. 
The cost of debt, 7.38 per cent, is calculated from debt fR R CR= + , where RBf B is the 
nominal risk free rate of Thailand, 5.13 per cent, and CR is the country risk premium, 
2.25 per cent. The nominal risk free rate of Thailand is proxied by a ten-year 
government bond yield on June 2004 obtained from Bank of Thailand.  
The nominal WACC is estimated by Equation 6.14. With the levered equity betas of 
0.6 and 0.8, the costs of capital obtained are 9.46 and 10.3 per cent respectively. The 
summary of parameters and WACC estimates by various regulators in Australia and 
the UK, and by developing countries, Pakistan and Argentina, is shown in Table 
7.20. Compared to WACC regulated by the Australian and UK regulators in the 
electricity distribution business, WACC of Thailand is higher, mainly owing to the 
inclusion of country risk premium in both cost of debt and cost of equity. When 
compared with the same industry in the developing country, Pakistan, the resulted 
WACC of Thailand is lower, due to the lower cost of debt and lower capital 
structure.  
Pakistani regulators relied on more debt financing than equity which is in contrast to 
the capital structure for Thailand. 
7.5.3 Depreciation 
Following international practice, the choice of depreciation method for Thailand 
should be the straight line depreciation method. With the high investment levels 
forecast by MEA and PEA, the straight line depreciation method leads to very low 
capital costs at the end of an asset’s life. It helps to smooth prices throughout the 
regulatory period. 
7.5.4 Noncapital cost 
The determination of non-capital or operating costs is straightforward and follows 
the usual international practice. Therefore there is no issue, specifically about 
Thailand, to be discussed. The price index-X adjustment mechanism on non-capital 
costs is more central to the discussion in the case of Thailand. 
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Table 7.20 Summary of parameters and weighted average cost of capital estimates for regulation in developed and developing countries 
including Thailand 
Industry  Electricity distribution  Gas distribution 
 Electricity 
distribution 
Regulator/Author 
 QCA 
(2001) 
ORG 
(2000) 
IPART 
(2004) 
OTTER 
(2003) 
ESCOSA 
(2004) 
OFGEM  
(2004) 
Alexander 
et al. 
(2003) 
 Green and 
Pardina 
(1999) 
 
Author 
Country  Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia UK Pakistan  Argentina  Thailand 
       Low High       
Nominal risk free rate 
(per cent) 
 5.36 3.5PeP 5.8 5.05 5.81 2.25 3 8  6.39  5.13 5.13 
Market risk premium (per 
cent) 
 6 6 5–6 6 6 2.5 4.5 3  6.08  6 6 
Asset beta  0.45 0.4 0.35–0.45 .. .. .. .. ..  ..  0.41–0.46 .. 
Equity beta  0.71 1 0.78–1.11 0.95 1 0.6 1 0.66  0.78  0.6 0.8 
Debt beta  0.28 0 0–0.06 .. .. .. .. ..  ..  0–0.17 .. 
Franking credit  
(per cent) 
 50 50 50 50 50 .. .. ..  ..  .. .. 
Capital structure 
(Debt/value) (per cent) 
 60 60 60 60 60 50 60 55  30  30 30 
Tax rate (per cent)  30 32/30 30 30 30 30 30 ..  30  30 30 
Debt margin  1.65 1.5 0.9–1.1 1.25 1.625 1 0 ..  ..  .. .. 
Nominal cost of debt (per 
cent) 
 7.01 5PaP 6.7–6.9 6.3 7.4 3.25 4.8 12.4  13.02  7.38 7.38 
Expected inflation  
(per cent) 
 2.08 2.6 2.3 2.09 2.37 .. .. ..  ..  1.8 1.8 
Nominal post-tax cost of 
equity (per cent) 
 9.62 9.5PbP 9.7–12.5 10.75 11.8 3.75 7.5 12  17.75  10.35 11.55 
Nominal post-tax WACC 
(per cent) 
 8.05 6.8PcP 6–7 6.19 7.5PdP 3 5 12.2  15.17  9.46 10.3 
Country risk premium 
(per cent) 
 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2  6.17  2.25 2.25 
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.. not available 
P
a
P real cost of debt 
P
b
P real post-tax cost of equity 
P
c
P real post-tax WACC 
P
d
P real pre-tax WACC 
P
e
P real risk free rate 
Note: QCA is Queensland Competition Authority, ORG is Office of the Regulator-General, Victoria (since 2002 called Essential Services Commission (ESC)), 
IPART is Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales, OTTER is Office of the Tasmania Energy Regulator, ESCOSA is the Essential 
Services Commission of South Australia, OFGEM is Office of Gas and Electricity Market. 
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7.5.5 Price index-X adjustment mechanism 
In Thailand regulated firms are expected to be able to raise most or all of their 
funding from Thai baht denominated sources, and most of their expenditures are also 
likely to be Thai baht denominated. Therefore it is not necessary to include 
indexation of exchange rates into price index.  
The general measure of changes in costs in Thailand, the Consumer Price Index, is 
appropriately employed. Even though it does not reflect true input costs, it is more 
convenient and less costly than constructing an industry specific index which is not 
readily available in Thailand. Moreover the use of an industry specific index also has 
the drawback that it may encourage less effort in negotiating prices with union and 
input suppliers if the firm knows it can pass those prices on to consumers. 
For the X factor, it can be directly constructed by econometric methods or 
mathematical programming, based on the data available from two distributors in 
Thailand: MEA and PEA.  
An inherent difficulty in measuring the X factor is that regulated firms have private 
information about their operation which enables them to extract information rents.  
In addition, issues of efficiency and productivity of firms under public ownership are 
politically sensitive in Thailand. It is likely that Thai distributors prefer to supply 
data in such a way that estimated X factors are favourable to them. 
Yardstick competition can be a regulatory option which can weaken the firms’ 
information monopolies. By comparing enterprises with comparable firms providing 
similar services, it is possible to determine the lowest cost potential of every firm. 
Potential drawbacks are regulatory gaming between the regulator and regulated 
firms, and the unavailability of comparable firms. Because electricity distributors 
operate in geographically separate areas, the latter problem can be controlled by 
using exogenous variables for performance measurement.  
Another problem is that in Thailand only data from two distributors can be used for 
efficiency comparisons. To obtain a more robust X factor, a larger database is 
required, hence international benchmarking is recommended.  
Data on comparable firms from other countries can increase the number of data, 
however the problems of comparability and data collection still exist. To solve 
problems of firm comparability, again exogenous variables, including country’s 
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variables, such as the level of economic development, must be considered (Estache et 
al. 2004).  
For Thailand, international benchmarking against comparable firms from such 
countries as Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore can be a good option. 
International coordination of electricity regulation in Southeast Asia can also be 
promoted. 
The other options for Thailand are to directly employ the X factor from the other 
regulators in developed countries and set it as a goal for Thai distribution companies 
to achieve. 
7.5.6 Revenue cap 
As discussed in Section 7.4, revenue cap regulation is recommended for electricity 
distribution in Thailand.  
According to the building block regulation approach, the major components for 
revenue requirement are the allowed return on capital, the allowed return of capital 
and the efficient noncapital costs. The standard formula is 
Revenue requirement=(WACC*Capital base) +(Depreciation rate* Capital base)  
+Efficient OPEX .      (7.14) 
The allowed return on capital, estimated by WACC*Capital base, is the allowed 
return to the regulated firm to achieve a fair and reasonable rate of return. 
The allowed return of capital or depreciation, estimated by Depreciation rate* 
Capital base, is associated with recouping the capital that the regulated firm invested 
in its business assets over the useful lives of those assets.  
The efficient noncapital cost (Efficient OPEX) is estimated from operating expense 
adjusted through price index-X mechanism. It provides the regulated firm incentive 
for efficiency improvement 
This section aims to estimate revenue requirement of two electricity distribution 
companies in Thailand: MEA and PEA. The data for estimating Equation 7.14 are 
taken from discussion in previous sections and from annual reports of MEA and PEA 
in 2003. 
The values of WACC estimated in Section 7.5.2 are 10.35 and 11.55 per cent. 
Although Capital base should be estimated by DORC approach, as discussed in 
Section 7.5.1, due to data unavailability, capital base of MEA and PEA, proxied by 
values of electric assets reported in their annual reports in 2003, which are 76.58 and 
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158.14 billion baht, are employed. Because service area of PEA is larger than that of 
MEA, values of electric assets of PEA are greater than those of MEA. 
Depreciation rate is assumed to be 3 per cent for both companies. 
Due to data unavailability, Efficient OPEX, is proxied by operating expenditures of 
MEA and PEA reported in their annual report in 2003.  
In annual report operating expenses of MEA and PEA include expenses on purchase 
of electricity energy. But Efficient OPEX is the operating expenditures that exclude 
the expenses on purchase of electricity energy. The reason is that in unbundled firms, 
distribution and retailing businesses are operated by separate firms. Electricity 
distribution companies operate only on electricity distribution business. The 
consumers purchase and pay for the electricity through the retailers.  
Although electricity distribution and retailing businesses in MEA and PEA are not 
unbundled, to regulate distribution companies in Thailand, exclusion of expenditures 
on purchase of electricity supply is needed because purchasing electricity supply is 
not main operation of distribution companies. Incentive for efficiency improvement 
through efficient operating expenses should be imposed on only electricity 
distributing operation. 
The operating expenditures for estimation of revenue requirement of MEA and PEA 
are 7.36 and 14.23 billion baht respectively. 
Results from estimation of Equation 7.14 are shown in Table 7.21. With 9.46 per 
cent of WACC, revenue caps of MEA and PEA are 16.9 and 33.93 billion baht 
respectively whereas with 10.3 per cent of WACC, they are 17.55 and 35.26 billion 
baht respectively. 
With both WACCs, revenue caps, obtained from estimation, of MEA and PEA 
exceed actual revenue in 2003, as shown in Table 7.21. Note that actual revenues 
obtained from annual reports of MEA and PEA in 2003 exclude expenditures from 
purchase of electricity supply so that the operating revenue represents revenue from 
operating distribution business. 
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Table 7.21 Comparison of revenue cap and actual revenue of distribution 
companies in Thailand (billion baht) 
 Revenue cap   
 WACC = 9.46 per  cent WACC = 10.3 per cent  
Actual revenue 
in 2003 
MEA 16.9 17.55  16.5 
PEA 33.93 35.26  26.62 
 
The results show that revenue caps based on existing operating costs and book values 
of capital are slightly greater than the existing revenue. The differences between 
revenue caps and actual revenue can be explained by margin of error associated with 
estimates of WACC and other financial parameters obtained from a number of 
assumptions. The results indicate that both enterprises are not receiving significant 
monopoly profits. For regulatory purposes in the next regulatory period if prices are 
not to increase, regulators will either have to reduce the allowable capital base or 
require reductions in operating costs in order to provide MEA and PEA with more 
incentive for efficiency improvement.   
7.6 Summary 
This chapter addresses several regulatory issues in the ESI in Thailand.  
Firstly, according to the Boston Consulting Group’s study, the new regulatory body 
should be ministerial agency. It provided a good explanation of the setup of the 
regulatory body but little on creating the regulatory capacity to strengthen the 
conduct and performance of the regulatory body. However with the characteristics of 
Thailand a specialised, separated and centralised regulator as suggested by the 
Boston Consulting Group is justified. 
The activities in the ESI subject to economic regulation should include transmission 
and distribution because they are characterised by natural monopoly.  
With characteristics of Thai economy and level of development concerning 
regulation, the high power incentive regulatory regime should be adopted in both 
electricity transmission and distribution activities to achieve the objective of 
economic efficiency improvement. A higher power incentive regulatory regime will 
also increase risk and hence the cost of capital. The particular regulatory form for 
both activities should be revenue cap regulation. Price cap regulation is not 
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appropriate because it provides incentives for firms to increase sale volumes which 
conflicts with demand side management program in Thailand and also provides more 
risk to firms and less incentive to invest owing to high demand forecast error in 
Thailand. Revenue cap regulation can reduce the severity of these problems. 
Although currently Thailand adopts a cost of service form of control on retail tariffs 
together with regulation with CPI-X on the base tariff, there is some evidence that 
operating efficiency in the three SOEs in Thailand has improved. There is, however, 
no evident channel that facilitates the transfer of benefits from improvement in 
operating efficiency to final consumers in the form of tariff reductions. 
Due to a lack of data, poor accounting and auditing systems and a weakly 
functioning capital and equity market, issues in regulatory finance in electricity 
distribution in Thailand have some variation from those in developed countries. 
Currently MEA and PEA employ historic cost approach to value assets. To promote 
efficiency, MEA and PEA should adopt the DORC approach as with this approach, 
they can optimise the asset values in such a way that the most efficient facilities 
necessary to produce a specified level of service is identified. However it should be 
noted that this approach requires costly examination and assessment procedures to 
obtain DORC. 
Rate of return is considered to be the most complicated of the regulatory variables. It 
is a regulatory variable that is seriously affected by a poorly functioning equity 
market and the problem of imperfection and lack of information in Thailand.  
Some elements of CAPM are directly taken from comparable firms or from 
regulators in developed countries because data in Thailand is nonstationary and 
insufficient to achieve efficient estimators. 
To estimate the rate of return, WACC is employed. Following international practice, 
CAPM is employed to estimate cost of equity.  
A few of the important issues in estimating CAPM are summarised here. 
Thailand’s equity market is considered as an emerging market which cannot be 
characterised as either a perfectly segmented or a perfectly integrated market, hence 
both domestic and global CAPMs are attempted for electricity distribution.  
Results of betas from Thai domestic and global CAPMs are unsatisfactory, therefore 
the US models are attempted instead. The levered equity beta of the US electricity 
sector adjusted with regulatory risk in Thailand leads to the levered equity beta of 0.8 
for the Thai electricity distribution business. 
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The next element in determining the cost of equity is market risk premium. Most of 
the empirical research on estimating market risk premium by historic based, supply 
side and surveys approaches are on the US market. Values of market risk premium 
by the US range from 3 to 7 per cent. Together with the common practice of other 
regulators, 6 per cent of market risk premium is employed. 
As an emerging market, an additional risk premium on country risk is included in the 
CAPM for Thailand, with a country risk premium of 2.25 per cent being employed. 
Because WACC for Thailand is estimated by the inclusion of country risk premium, 
the estimated WACC, 9.46 and 10.3 per cent, of Thailand is higher than those of 
developed countries. 
Estimation of depreciation and noncapital cost strictly follows methods adopted by 
developed countries. 
In the price index-X mechanism, the price index is taken straight from the Consumer 
Price Index of Thailand.  
Determination of X factor is an important issue in this mechanism. Because of the 
limited number of distribution companies in Thailand, straightforward estimation 
either by index number, mathematical programming or an econometric method can 
suffer the problem of insufficient data. To obtain a more robust X factor, 
international benchmarking against comparable firms from comparable countries, or 
employing the X factor from the other regulators in developed countries, is 
recommended.  
The revenue caps for MEA and PEA based on building block approach are 
estimated. Evidence shows that under the proposed revenue cap regulation MEA and 
PEA’ actual revenues are slightly less than their revenue caps, therefore both 
enterprises are not receiving any significant monopoly profits from their operation. 
For regulatory purposes regulators will either have to reduce the allowable capital 
base or require reductions in operating costs in order to provide MEA and PEA with 
more incentive for efficiency improvement.   
 Chapter 8 
  
  
 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE OF THAI  
 AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Part I, the full privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
electricity supply industry (ESI) in Thailand: Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT), Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) and Provincial 
Electricity Authority (PEA), was proposed.  
One of justifications for privatisation is the poor performance and lack of efficiency 
of these SOEs. This justification is widely examined by both theoretical and 
empirical studies. As discussed in Chapter 4, theoretical approaches that is: property 
right, principal-agent, public choice and organisational theories, essentially explain 
that SOEs cannot achieve operating efficiency and that private ownership is superior 
to public ownership. Hence privatisation, particularly through transfer of ownership, 
enhances efficiency gains.  
This hypothesis has been extensively tested by many works in both developed and 
developing countries and in various industries, as already discussed in Chapter 4. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to measure the technical efficiency of the 
electricity generation sector1 in Thailand using a comparative application of 
nonparametric and parametric approaches and employing both power plant and 
supplier-level data sets.  
For comparison between techniques, this chapter uses three consistency conditions: 
consistency in efficiency level, ranking and the identification of the best and worst 
performers as criteria.  
This chapter also examines the technical inefficiency model by using power plant 
specific variables to capture the effect of different characteristics of power plants on 
inefficiency levels.  
                                                 
1 Because it is difficult to derive internationally comparable measures of operating efficiency for 
distribution and transmission enterprises, this chapter focuses on the electricity enterprise, EGAT. 
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The chapter starts with an evaluation of Thai power plants’ technical efficiency and 
industry structure during the 1990s, then a comparison of the performance of Thai 
power plants in the 1990s and Australian power plants in the 1980s is conducted.  
For inter-country comparison this chapter employs the data of 1994 to compare the 
technical efficiency of EGAT with 34 electricity suppliers from both Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. 
The scope of this comparison is confined to 1994 in which the EGAT was entirely 
state-owned and partial privatisation began. 
This chapter is divided into 10 sections, In Section 8.2, the related literature is 
discussed, then the concept of technical efficiency is presented and briefly described 
in Section 8.3.  
In Section 8.4 and 8.5, the nonparametric and parametric approaches of technical 
efficiency measurement are explained and the technical inefficiency models 
employed are specified. In Section 8.6, the data and variables of Thai power plants, 
Australian power plants and electricity suppliers are explained in detail, respectively.  
From Section 8.7 to 8.9, the empirical results of technical efficiency estimation from 
both nonparametric and parametric approach and the consistency conditions for the 
case of Thai power plants, the comparison of Thai and Australian power plants and 
the comparison of international electricity suppliers are reported. In Section 8.10, the 
conclusions will be drawn. 
8.2 Review of literature 
Applied studies on the performance, particularly in term of efficiency using the 
frontier analysis, of the electricity generation sector have been increasing since the 
1980s. Hiebert (2002) provides a good brief summary, therefore to avoid repetition 
only the recent literature is summarised in Table 8.1. The efficiency concept: 
technical, cost efficiency or both, and techniques: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or both are employed. Its variations rely on 
the nature and availability of data.  
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Table 8.1 Summary of literature on efficiency measurement of the electricity generation sector 
Author(s) Efficiency Concept Data 
Period of 
study Techniques Output(s)
a Input(s)b Environmental Variable(s) 
  
Bagdadioglu (1996) Technical 
efficiency 
 
28 Turkish power 
plants 
1991  
      
       
  
       
   
       
   
       
  
        
       
    
      
DEA Net hydro-electric
generation 
 
 Labour, capital .. 
Coelli (2002) Total Factor 
Productivity 
 
13 Australian power 
plants 
1981/2-
1990/1 
SFA-P 
DEA 
Electricity sent out Labour, Capacity, Fuel Dummy variables for State 
Domah (2002) Technical 
efficiency 
16 Islands and 121 
US investor-Owned 
utilities 
1994–2000 SFA-P
DEA 
Electricity 
generated  
Labour, Installed capacity, 
Fuel 
Per capita consumption, Number of 
customers, Capacity factor, Island 
dummy, Connection dummy 
 
Goto and Tsutsui 
(1998) 
Cost efficiency 9 Japanese and 14 US 
investor-owned 
utilities 
1984–93 DEA Electricity sold to
residential and 
non-residential 
customer 
 
 Capacity, Fuel, Labour, 
Quantity of power 
purchase 
.. 
Hiebert (2002) Cost efficiency 432 coal generating 
plants and 201 natural 
gas plants from the 
US 
1988–97 SFA-C Operating and
maintenance 
expenses 
Net generation, Price of 
fuel and labour, 
Nameplate capacity, 
Vintage of the plant, Age 
of plant, Number of units, 
Dummy for coal plant. 
 
Capacity utilisation, Number of plants 
in the same technology category, 
Dummy variable for investor owned 
utilities, Dummy variable for 
cooperative, Location dummy variable 
Hawdon (1998) Technical 
efficiency 
82 developing 
countries 
1988 DEA Gross electricity
generated 
 Installed capacity, Number 
of employees in 
generation, Number of 
employees in distribution, 
Fuel 
.. 
Khanna et al. (1999) Technical 
efficiency 
66 Power plants in 
India 
1987/8–
1990/1 
SFA-C 
Semi-parametric 
analysis 
Cost of electricity 
generated 
Price of labour and fuel, 
Net electricity generated, 
Dummy for coal plant 
 
Dummy variables for ownership, Age 
of plant, Non-utilised capacity factor 
Kleit and Terrell 
(2001) 
Cost efficiency 78 US steam plants 1996 SFA-Bayesian Total production
cost 
Annual output, Peak 
output, Wage, Price of 
fuel, Price of capital 
 
.. 
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Author(s) Efficiency Concept Data 
Period of 
study Techniques Output(s)
a Input(s)b Environmental Variable(s) 
Knittel (2002) Technical 
efficiency 
 
US investor-owned 
utilities 
1981–96   
     
      
   
        
   
       
  
       
SFA-P Electricity
transmitted 
 
Labour, Coal, Gas, Oil, 
Capacity 
Dummy variables for various 
regulatory programs 
 
Meibodi (1998) Technical 
efficiency 
26 Electricity utilities 
in developing 
countries 
15 Iranian power 
plants 
1987–88 
 
 
1994–95 
1990–95 
SFA-P 
DEA 
 
SFA-P 
DEA 
Electricity 
generated 
 
Electricity 
generated 
 
Capital, Labour, Fuel 
 
 
Capital, Labour, Energy 
Capacity, Share of public ownership 
 
 
Share of steam electricity generation, 
Share of R&D employees 
 
Olatubi and Dismukes 
(2000) 
Cost efficiency 313 US investor-
owned utilities 
1996 DEA Net electricity
generated 
Labour, Capital, Fuel, Fuel 
prices, Labour price, 
Capital price 
Capacity factor, Heat rate,  Annual 
regulatory expenditures, Market share, 
Off-system sales, Operating efficiency, 
Dummy variables for region, Dummy 
variable for alternative fuel, Dummy 
variable for holding company, Dummy 
variable for ownership, Dummy 
variable for operating FGD scrubber at 
site. 
Plane (1999) Technical 
efficiency 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Electricity Company 
1959–95 SFA-P Gross electricity
generated 
Capacity, Labour Ratio of customers to length of 
distribution network, Binary variable 
for privatisation, time trend 
 
Whiteman (1999) Technical 
efficiency 
39 Electricity 
suppliers from 
various countries 
 
1994–95 SFA-P
DEA 
Electricity 
generated 
Hydro capacity, thermal 
capacity, Labour 
.. 
Yunos and Hawdon 
(1997) 
Technical 
efficiency 
 
 
27 firms from various 
countries 
NEB, EGAT, CEGB 
1987 
 
1975–90 
DEA 
 
DEA 
 
 
 
Gross electricity 
generated 
Gross electricity 
generated 
 
Capacity, Labour, Total 
system loss, Capacity 
factor 
Capacity, Labour, 
Electricity loss, Thermal 
efficiency 
 
.. 
 
 
.. 
        
a In cost function, the output is cost. 
b In cost function, the input includes of output, input prices and quantities and other variables. 
.. not available 
Note: SFA, DEA, P and C stand for Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Data Envelopment Analysis, production function and cost function respectively. 
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Most of works study at power plant level, an only few of them attempt to achieve the 
inter-country comparison. Since this study focuses on the case of Thailand, only the 
previous studies related to the case of Thailand are discussed. 
There are a limited number of recent studies on the performance of SOEs in Thailand 
particularly in the ESI.  
The only comprehensive study of the performance of the electricity state-owned 
firm, EGAT, relating to privatisation issue, by using the plant-level data is a study by 
Ruangrong (1992). 
Ruangrong (1992) employed a generalized cost function to investigate the economic 
efficiency of generating activities of EGAT. The data set used covered 14 thermal 
and gas-turbine power plants of EGAT during the period 1973–89.  Ruangrong found 
that EGAT performs as a cost minimiser and produces output at an efficient level.  
The results also showed that a natural monopoly no longer persists in this industry, 
hence the promotion of competition in the electricity generating sector could not be 
blamed in terms of sacrificing economies of scale.  
It should be noted that this study used the cost function to measure efficiency so it 
implicitly uses cost minimising behaviour as the definition of efficiency (Färe et al. 
1985:90).  
This assumption may not be valid when analysing a public enterprise (Coelli 
2002:169). Also, it may not be valid to use with regulated monopolies when the form 
of regulation does not encourage cost minimisation.  
London Economics (1997), hired by the National Energy Policy Office, conducted 
the research on measuring the productivity of the Thai electricity companies. The 
simple ratio analysis was conducted, followed with data envelopment analysis to 
measure efficiency level and productivity growth of 11 power plants of EGAT, two 
independent power producers: Rayong Electricity Generating Co. Ltd., Electricity 
Generating Public Co. Ltd., and Khanom Electricity Generating Co. Ltd., and one 
small power producer: COCO, during the period 1991–96.  
In this study, output is electricity generated whereas the inputs are capacity and 
operating expenditures to represent labour and non labour inputs. It does not include 
fuel, which is the most important input in electricity generation, into the model.  
The result shows that only Mae Moh thermal power plant of EGAT is on the frontier, 
with the other power plants facing the low or negative productivity growth. 
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In addition to studies using the plant-level data, there are several cross country 
studies regarding the relative technical efficiency of firms in the ESI, in which data 
from Thailand was also included. These are studies by Yunos and Hawdon (1997), 
Meibodi (1998) and Hawdon (1998). These studies assess the relative technical 
efficiency of firms by either the method of SFA, DEA, or both. 
Yunos and Hawdon (1997) evaluated the performance of the electricity sector in 
Malaysia by using cross-section data in 1987 to compare the technical efficiency of 
the National Electricity Board of Malaysia with the 26 other electricity producers in 
various developing countries. They also compared the technical efficiencies of the 
National Electricity Board in Malaysia with EGAT in Thailand and the Central 
Electricity Generating Board in the UK by using time series data from 1975 to 1990.  
They employed the output augmentation approach of data envelopment analysis to 
calculate the technical efficiencies of both cases. 
In the first approach, with the assumption of constant return to scale, they found that 
Malaysia, with an efficiency of 70 per cent, ranked eighteenth, somewhat behind 
Thailand with an efficiency of 76 per cent. This efficiency was estimated with the 
assumption of variable return to scale. The results show that the efficiency of 
producers in Malaysia went up to 88 per cent and in Thailand rose to 94 per cent.  
The results from the first approach indicate that Malaysia is relatively inefficient in 
electricity production when compared with other countries. To cross check whether 
inefficiency was a long-term process or merely a peculiarity of a particular period, 
the second approach was conducted to compare the efficiency of National Electricity 
Board relative to EGAT and the Central Electricity Generating Board through time. 
The results show that EGAT has been more efficient than National Electricity Board, 
and that the Central Electricity Generating Board was the most efficient of the three 
producers. The reasons for the relatively poor performance of National Electricity 
Board concern its high excess capacity and low thermal efficiency as compared with 
EGAT. 
One important conclusion from this study is that changes in ownership do not 
necessarily lead to improvements in efficiency. The results of first approach using 
both public and private firms from various countries shows that public firms 
performed at least as well as private firms. 
Meibodi (1998) investigated the technical efficiency of the Iranian electricity 
industry by comparing it with 26 other developing countries. He used panel data, 
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collected on thermal power plants, covering the period of 1987 and 1988 to ensure 
that the sample constitutes a homogenous technology. Both data envelopment 
analysis and stochastic frontier analysis were employed to estimate the technical 
inefficiency. Meibodi found variations in efficiency in the electricity industry in 
developing countries. The evidence of increasing return to scale is obvious in most of 
developing countries. Results from both methods show that Thailand was one of the 
most efficient power suppliers in the sample group.  
Hawdon (1998) employed data envelopment analysis to estimate the technical 
efficiency of the electric power sector of 82 developing countries in 1988 under both 
constant and variable returns to scale. Efficiency scores in Thailand were found to be 
relatively high at around 81 per cent with the overall inefficiency being relatively 
high in Sub Saharan Africa countries.  
8.3 Technical efficiency 
This section provides a brief discussion of modern efficiency measurement.2 The 
economic or overall efficiency of the firm has two components: technical efficiency, 
which refers to the ability of a firm to minimise inputs proportionally to produce a 
given set of output3; and allocative or price efficiency, which refers to the ability to 
combine inputs and outputs in optimal proportions, given the prices of inputs and 
outputs and the production technology. With one output, in this study electricity, the 
allocative efficiency can be achieved through the least-cost input mix, sometimes 
called input mix allocative efficiency. Since the input prices are not available, only 
the technical efficiency of a firm is employed to assess the performance of units in 
the power plants of EGAT, the electricity generating SOE.4
To measure the technical efficiency, a production frontier must be constructed. With 
the given data of inputs and outputs, a frontier is fitted and the technical efficiency is 
                                                 
2 The technical details are provided by Lovell (1993) and Coelli et al. (1998). 
3 This is the concept of input-oriented technical efficiency. Alternatively, the output-oriented technical 
efficiency refers to the ability of a firm to maximise output from a given set of inputs. In this chapter 
the concept of input-oriented measure is selected because as the SOE, each plant in EGAT is required 
to generate and dispatch electricity following the merit order in order to satisfy a certain level of 
demand and therefore the quantities of input are the major decision variables. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that the output and input technical efficiency measures will result in the same set of efficient 
firms but the measures of technical efficiency of inefficient firms may be different (Coelli et al. 
1998:159). Both measures provide the same values only under the constant return to scale assumption. 
4 It should be noted that the measurement of allocative efficiency of SOEs is not fruitful for the 
management of SOE; because the allocative inefficiency mostly comes from the factor market 
distortions which are not under their control. Strong labour union limited access to capital market and 
subsidised input prices such as fuel are major sources of allocative inefficiency in the SOEs.  
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measured as the distance between each data point and the estimated production 
frontier. There are two major, and the most widely used, approaches to construct the 
production frontier: the parametric and nonparametric approach.5
The nonparametric approach uses mathematical programming to construct the 
production frontier and measure efficiency relative to the constructed frontier.6 The 
advantage of this approach is that a specific functional form is not required, hence 
this approach is less prone to model specification error. However, this approach is 
nonstochastic, therefore it cannot distinguish the noise from the effects of technical 
inefficiency. 
The parametric approach uses econometric methodology to estimate the production 
function and measure technical efficiency scores from the residual term.7 It can 
distinguish the effects of noise from the effects of the technical inefficiency, however 
the estimated technical inefficiency is influenced by the structure of the error term 
and the validity of the assumption about its distribution. In addition, since this 
approach is parametric, it confounds the effect of misspecification of the functional 
form of production technology and inefficiency. 
Essentially, the two approaches use different techniques to construct the production 
frontier. Lovell (1993) concluded that neither approach strictly dominates the other. 
Employing both methods with the same set of data to estimate the production frontier 
under the same assumption of return to scale should produce similar results (Coelli et 
al. 2003:20). Both methods will be employed in this study. 
8.4 Data Envelopment Analysis  
The method of production frontier construction by mathematical programming is 
called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).8  DEA uses mathematical programming 
                                                 
5 This broad classification follows Lovell (1993), Coelli et al. (1998) and Kalirajan and Shand (1999). 
It should be noted that another method to measure technical efficiency is the Bayesian approach. Since 
this approach is out of the scope of this study, the review of literature on this approach will not be 
attempted here. Kalirajan and Shand (1999) provide a good review of it in comparison to the 
parametric and nonparametric approach. 
6 Seiford and Thrall (1990) and Ali and Seiford (1993) review the literature on the mathematical 
programming approach to measure efficiency extensively. 
7 Greene (1993) and Kalirajan and Shand (1999) surveys the econometric approach and provides a 
good summary of econometric techniques applying to both cross-section and panel data. 
8 The details of the method at the introductory level are presented by Coelli et al. (1998), Cooper et al. 
(1999) and Thanassoulis (2001). More technical and comprehensive reviews of this methodology are 
given by Ali and Seiford (1993) and Charnes et al. (1994). 
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to build a non-parametric piece-wise frontier over the data. Technical efficiencies are 
estimated relative to this frontier.  
To conduct a DEA analysis, assumptions regarding returns to scale have to be 
considered carefully. Charnes et al. (1978) proposed an input-oriented measure of 
technical efficiency with an assumption of constant return to scale (CRS).9 To 
estimate the technical efficiency of a firm , the following linear programming 
problem
i
10 is conducted. 
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where  
yi represents the output of firm i;  
xi is a vector of firm i ‘s inputs with elements xij (j = 1, 2,…, M); 
Y is a (1×N) vector of the outputs of all firms with elements yi (i = 1, 2,…, N); 
X is a (M×N) matrix of the inputs of all firms with element xij; 
λ is a (N×1) vector of weight λi to be determined; and 
θ is a scalar value denoting the technical efficiency score. 
The linear programming problem must be solved N times, once for each firm i. If θ 
takes a value of 1, indicating a point on the frontier which means a technically 
efficient firm or a best-practice firm, this means that a particular firm has zero 
technical inefficiency. If θ is less than unity, a firm is operating off the production 
frontier which means that the particular firm is technically inefficient and can 
potentially reduce inputs by a factor of (1-θ) while holding output constant by 
adopting the behaviours of best-practice firms. 
The CRS assumption is restricted to the case where firms are operating at an optimal 
scale. This assumption is not appropriate to the firms operating in an imperfectly 
                                                 
9 In some DEA books, this model is referred as the CCR model in which CCR stands for Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes. 
10 Originally the mathematical programming problems to estimate the production frontier are 
introduced in the multiplier form. Employing the duality in linear programming, the problems in 
envelopment form can be derived. The technical derivation, particularly regarding the efficiency 
analysis, is shown in Ali and Seiford (1993). One benefit of solving the problems in the envelopment 
form is that it requires fewer constraints than in the multiplier form (Coelli et al. 1998:141). Also, to 
be consistent with the DEA software, which will be mentioned later on, the linear programming 
problem will be stated in the envelopment form. 
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competitive market or SOEs, which is a common characteristic in power generation 
activity. There are some firms that do not operate at the optimal scale or are smaller 
than the other firms due to factors out of their control which are usually determined 
by historical factors or government policies.  
The model with an assumption of variable return to scale (VRS) should be 
considered in order to eliminate the scale effect from the technical efficiency 
measurement. Banker et al. (1984) extended the model by Charnes et al. (1978) by 
imposing the assumption of VRS into a model.11  
To modify the CRS linear programming problem into VRS specification, they add 
the convexity constraint: 1N 1λ′ =  to Equation 8.1 as follows 
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where 
N1 is an N×1 vector of ones. 
This model envelopes the data points more tightly than the CRS model, therefore the 
obtained technical efficiency scores are greater than or equal to those in the CRS 
model.  
The convexity constraint also ensures that an inefficient firm is only benchmarked 
against firms of a similar size whereas in a CRS specification, a firm may be 
benchmarked against firms which are substantially larger or smaller than it. 
Technical efficiency scores obtained from the CRS model are called global technical 
efficiency, since the implied comparison is with firms operating at the optimal scale 
whereas those obtained from the VRS model are called local pure technical 
efficiency.  
If a firm is fully efficient in both CRS and VRS specifications, it is operating in the 
most productive scale.  
If a firm has a full score in VRS model but a low score in CRS model, it is operating 
locally efficiently but not globally efficiently due to the scale of the firm. The 
                                                 
11 In some DEA books, this model is referred as BCC model in which BCC stands for Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper. 
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difference between the CRS and VRS technical efficiency scores indicates that the 
firm has scale inefficiency. 
Scale efficiency (SE) is defined by 
CRS
VRS
SE θθ=          (8.3) 
where  
θCRS is the CRS technical efficiency score of a particular firm; and 
θVRS is the VRS technical efficiency score of a particular firm. 
In the most productive scale, the SE is 1, which means that a fully technical efficient 
firm in the VRS model has CRS characteristics. Otherwise, SE is not greater than 1 
since technical efficiency scores from the VRS model are always greater than those 
from the CRS model. 
From Equation 8.3, the global technical efficiency from the CRS model can be 
decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency as 
CRS VRS SEθ θ= × .        (8.4) 
This decomposition separates the sources of inefficiency into the inefficient 
operation and scale inefficiency. 
To indicate whether a firm is operating in the area of increasing or decreasing return 
to scale, the DEA problem with the assumption of non-increasing return to scale 
(NIRS) has to be estimated. This is done by relaxing the convexity condition in the 
VRS model to 1N 1λ′ ≤ .  The following NIRS linear programming problem is 
estimated. 
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The scale inefficiency due to increasing or decreasing return to scale for a particular 
firm can be determined by checking whether the NIRS technical score is equal to the 
VRS technical score. If they are not equal, increasing return to scale exists for the 
firm. If they are equal, decreasing return to scale exists. 
The computer software package, DEAP Version 2.1, is employed to measure the 
technical efficiency under both constant and variable return to scale (Coelli 1996a). 
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In DEAP Version 2.1, the technical efficiency scores can be estimated by three DEA 
models, which vary by the treatment of slacks, namely one-stage, two-stage and 
multi-stage DEA.  
One-stage DEA is the model explained above. To estimate the technical efficiency, 
the treatment of slacks is not necessary because the slacks are considered as the 
allocative efficiency. Coelli et al. (1998) argues convincingly that solving DEA 
linear programming above can achieve satisfactory measurement of technical 
efficiency.12
In this study the panel data are employed. To deal with the role of time, the 
intertemporal model which merges the data for all the years into one set and 
calculates efficiency scores for the whole data set is chosen.13  
This model is based on the assumption that no technological change occurs during 
the period of study. This assumption is consistent with the fact that the Thai power 
plants generate electricity by using the same generation techniques throughout the 
period of study.  
It is not surprising because the electricity power plants have a long life and the 
establishment of new power plants, new units or a change in generation techniques is 
costly and time consuming, therefore the evidence of technical change in this 
industry is somewhat limited. 
The above production frontier analysis and technical efficient measurement rest on 
the major assumption that all the units share the same production technology and 
encounter the same environmental variables. For electricity generating activity, the 
environmental or firm specific factors which are beyond control of units such as 
ownership, regulatory environment, different characteristics and age of production 
units may have influence on technical inefficiency scores.  
To estimate the effects of environmental factors on technical inefficiency, the 
technical inefficiency estimated from the first-stage DEA is used as the dependent 
                                                 
12 The two-stage and multi-stage DEA models were estimated. The results of technical efficiency 
scores of these two models are the same as those of the one-stage model. The only difference among 
them is the values of slacks. 
13 Tulkens and Eeckaut (1995) provided the definition and derivation of three methods of non-
parametric frontier to deal with the role of time: contemporaneous, sequential and intertemporal 
model. The choice of model depends on the characteristics of sample and application of model (Linna 
1998:417–8). 
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variable in a second stage regression in which the independent variables are the 
environmental variables.14  
Since inefficiency scores computed from the DEA model are bounded between 0 and 
1, ordinary least square regression would produce biased and inconsistent estimators 
in the second stage regression. Therefore, to avoid this problem, the tobit model of 
inefficiency scores using maximum likelihood estimation is adopted. The 
specification of the tobit model for each case will be discussed. 
8.5 Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
The traditional econometric production model to estimate the production frontier, 
often called the ‘deterministic production frontier’, is defined as 
( ) (, ituit ity f x eβ −= )
)
                                                
        (8.6) 
i = 1, 2, …, N, and t = 1,2, ……,T, where  
yit is the output of the firm i at time t;   
xit denotes a (1×K) vector of inputs;  
f(.) is a suitable functional form (such as Cobb Douglas or translog functional form);  
β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and 
uit is an error term in which all deviations from the frontier are assumed to be the 
result of technical inefficiency. It neglects the possible effects of measurement errors 
and other noise such as the effects of weather, strikes and luck.  
To take into account these effects, random error is included into the deterministic 
production frontier to create ‘stochastic production frontier’ which is defined as 
( ) (, it itv uit ity f x eβ −= ,        (8.7) 
 
14 The method employed here is called the two-stage approach. By this approach the effects of 
environmental variables can be statistically tested. According to Fried et al. (1999), there are three 
broad classifications of methods to accommodate the environment variables in DEA analysis: the 
frontier separation approach, the all-in-one approach and the two-stage approach. The frontier 
separation approach disaggregates the data set into a sub group according to a categorical variable 
which is the environmental variable, such as ownership structure. The frontiers are estimated for each 
sub group and for the pooled data set. The effect of environmental variables is estimated by 
comparing sub-group and pooled technical efficiency scores. This method is limited to the case of one 
categorical variable. The all-in-one approach is to include the environmental variables directly into the 
linear programming formulation as either input(s) or output(s). This approach is not limited to one 
environmental variable. However the choice of putting it as either input or output has to be made 
carefully. As input it implies that the environmental variable is favourable whereas as output it implies 
that it is an unfavourable operating environment. The operating environment has been judged before 
including in the model. This method is not appropriate if a test on how the operating environments 
affect the efficiency will be conducted.  
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where vit is random error15, accounting for measurement error and other random 
noise, which is assumed to be identically, independently distributed, to have 
N(0,σv2)-distribution, to be independent of the uit; and uit is the technical inefficiency 
effect16. 
The technical efficiencies of each firm in each year can be predicted using the 
conditional expectation of , given the value of ( )itue − it it itv uε = − .  Since uit is a non-
negative random variable, these technical efficiency predictions are between 0 and 1. 
A value of 1 indicates full technical efficiency.   
The technical efficiency measures are obtained as  
( /ituit itTE E e )ε−= ,        (8.8) 
where it it itv uε = − .  
As explained about the significance of firm-specific variables in the technical 
inefficiency model, this study adopts the Battese and Coelli (1995) model to 
construct the single stage estimation of technical inefficiency scores and models of 
its determinants.17 It assumes that technical inefficiency effects, uit, are independently 
but not identically distributed non-negative random variables. From Equation 8.7, for 
the i-th firm in the t-th period, the distribution of uit, is obtained by truncation at zero 
of 2( , )it uN m σ ; where  
it itm z δ= ,          (8.9) 
                                                 
15 It is called stochastic production frontier because the output values are bounded above by the 
stochastic variable, ( )( , ) tvitf x eβ . The random error can be negative or positive and hence the stochastic 
frontier outputs vary about the deterministic part of the frontier model ( , )itf x β . 
16 The statistical properties of uit vary by the type of data such as cross section or panel data and 
assumptions imposed. Greene (1993) and Kalirajan and Shand (1999) review the literature on this 
issue extensively. 
17 Coelli et al. (1999) explains that there are two views to accommodate the firm-specific 
environmental variables in the model. The first approach assumes that the environmental variables 
influence the production frontier and should be included directly into the production function as the 
independent variables. This approach is somehow comparable to the all-in-one approach for DEA. 
The resulting technical efficiency terms are net of influences of environmental variables.  
The second approach assumes that the environmental factors have influence only on the degree of 
technical inefficiency and these factors should be modelled in the technical inefficiency regression. 
Most of the early works use the two-stage estimation approach, in which the technical inefficiency 
scores are estimated in the first stage and are regressed upon environmental factors in the second 
stage. It is argued that there is a problem of inconsistency in this approach. Since the error term, 
representing the inefficiency score, is assumed to be identically distributed in the first stage, 
regressing it in the second stage suggests that it is not identically distributed. Therefore, a single stage 
approach is proposed. The specification of a model in which both inefficiency scores and it regression 
are estimated in a single model such as the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. 
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where zit is a px1 vector of variables affecting the technical efficiency of a firm and d 
is an 1xp vector of parameters to be estimated. 
FRONTIER Version 4.1 is employed (Coelli 1996b). This program is designed 
specifically to estimate Battese and Coelli (1995) by simultaneous maximum 
likelihood estimation of the stochastic frontier and the model of technical 
inefficiency effects. This program utilises the parameterization by replacing 2vσ and 
2
uσ with 2 2v 2uσ σ σ= +  and 2 2 2/( )u v uγ σ σ σ= + . After obtaining the estimates, this 
software package also provides the estimated technical efficiency levels of each plant 
in each year. Following Battese and Coelli (1988), these levels are calculated by 
using 
21 ( / ) exp( / 2)
1 ( / )
A it A
it it A
it A
TE σ γε σ γε σγε σ
−Φ −= −Φ +      (8.10) 
where is the distribution function of the standard normal random variable, (.)Φ
2 2/ sγ σ σ= , 2 2 2s vσ σ σ= +  and 1/ 22(1 )A sσ γ γ σ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ . 
Before estimating the technical inefficiency, the various hypotheses will be tested to 
find the most appropriate functional form of the production structure. A likelihood 
ratio test is employed to simultaneously test the significance of groups of 
coefficients. The likelihood ratio test is based on the statistic: 
λ = -2[L(H0)-L(HA)],        (8.11) 
where L(HA) and L(H0) are the maximised values of the log-likelihood function under 
HA and H0, respectively. This λ statistic has asymptotic chi-square distribution, with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed under the null 
hypothesis. H0 is rejected when λ > χ2c where χ2c is a critical value from the χ2(j) 
distribution where j is number of restrictions. 
8.6 Data and variables 
The data for analyses consists of data of Thai and Australian power plants and data 
of electricity suppliers in developed and developing countries, including EGAT.  
Before explaining each set of data and variables used for the estimation, it is worth 
mentioning that data limitation exists. Coelli et al. (2003) stated clearly that limited 
access to the data of public enterprises is the conventional problem for developing 
countries, therefore the good proxies of variables for frontier models are always 
rarely obtained. Even in the developed countries in which data is easier to access and 
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more organised, they also face a data constraint due to the nature of public 
enterprises.18 Therefore, with data limitation, it should be noted that the results 
obtained are suboptimal. 
8.6.1 Thai power plants 
The EGAT’s electricity generation consists of two major types of power plants: 
thermal and hydro power plants. EGAT’s thermal power plants generate electricity 
by converting the heat from fuel combustion into mechanical energy and then 
electricity via the several types of generation system: conventional thermal or steam 
turbine, gas turbine, combined cycle and diesel engine system. 19  
The conventional thermal and combined cycle thermal power plants generally serve 
as base load plants,20 whereas gas turbine, diesel thermal and hydro power plants 
supply electricity for the peak load and reserve capacity. 
In this study, the data covers all of the thermal power plants excluding the diesel 
power plants. The reason for this is that the diesel power plants are of small size and 
capacity, being not more than 5 MW which is very small when compared with the 
other types of power plants. Given that diesel oil is the most expensive fuel so EGAT 
seldom operates them and often retains them as the last resort.  
The data is provided by EGAT. For reasons of confidentiality, data is provided in 
units of power plants rather than the data of each power plant. It should be noted that 
there are a number of power plants which consists of different types of electricity 
generation techniques. The data in each unit level allows comparison of the 
performance of different production techniques. The number of units in each type of 
power plants is presented in Table 8.2. The conventional thermal power plants are 
separated into two subtypes based on the major fuel used: lignite, fuel oil and natural 
gas. 
 
                                                 
18 Lovell (2002) summarised the data problem of assessing the public enterprise performance into 
three respects: definition of service provided, price of service and service quality. 
19 Each type of generation system has its own merit. The details of electricity generation systems are 
shown in Appendix 6. 
20 Base load plant is the electricity generating plant operating to meet requirement for energy on a 
round-the-clock basis. 
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Table 8.2 Types of thermal power plants in Thailand 
Number of units 
Types of thermal power plants Unbalanced 
panel data 
Balanced 
panel data 
Conventional thermal – lignite 3 3 
Conventional thermal – fuel oil and natural gas 7 5 
Combined cycle 7 3 
Gas turbine 7 1 
Total 24 12 
 
The data set consists of annual measures of output and three inputs: labour, capital 
and fuel in the period 1992 to 2001. In the obtained sample data set, some 
observations are not available in certain years because some units had started 
operations in later years, or closed down due to the high cost of operation, lower 
electricity demand and service life expiration.  
Owing to these data omissions, the final unbalanced panel data set includes 170 
observations. To reduce the data set to the balanced panel data, the units with 
incomplete annual data and the missing data of some of the units in 2001 are 
eliminated.  
Most of units eliminated are those of gas turbine power plants, which is not 
surprising because almost all of the gas turbine power plants serve the peak demand.  
Eventually the final balanced panel data set consists of 12 units and covers period of 
1992 to 2000. For the reason of simplicity and congruency with the Australian data, 
which will be explained later on, from now on the units will be regarded as power 
plants.  
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Table 8.3 Summary statistics of variables: Thai and Australian power plants 
Data Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Output (GWh) 3,481.95 3,162.41 0.29 12,146.77 Thai 
unbalanced 
panel data Capacity (MW) 657.18 534.05 14 2,031 
 Labour (person) 368.89 390.44 1.58 2,150.43 
 Lignite (million tonnes) 1.21 2.81 - 12.06 
 Fuel oil (million litres) 231.06 503.43 - 2,172.94 
 Diesel oil (million litres) 21.16 57.39 - 337.68 
 Natural gas (million cubic feet) 
15,643.93 20,333.14 - 93,961.91 
 Fuel (terajoule) 34,880.43 31,228.35 5.45 129,725.95
Output (GWh) 4,146.53 3,076.33 40.03 12,146.77 Thai 
balanced 
panel data Capacity (MW) 700.05 493.53 25 1,800 
 Labour (person) 462.07 394.71 59.3 1,907.27 
 Lignite (million tonnes) 1.16 2.74 - 12.06 
 Fuel oil (million litres) 348.46 597.91 - 2,172.94 
 Diesel oil (million litres) 14.57 47.39 - 273.85 
 Natural gas (million cubic feet) 
14,309.43 16,070.67 - 53,182.18 
 Fuel (terajoule) 41,379.35 30,694.55 518.87 129,725.95
 Age (month) 165.33 84.67 11 360 
Output (GWh) 5,502.63 3,744.89 65.09 15,406 Australian 
unbalanced 
panel data Capacity (MW) 1,270.53 720.61 120 2,640 
 Labour (persons) 639.76 329.38 40.64 1,786.78 
 Fuel (terajoules) 62,924.94 39,518.52 1,281.74 156,366.8 
Output (GWh) 4,293.06 3,543.52 0.29 15,406 
Capacity (MW) 903.38 684.38 14 2,640 
Thai and 
Australian 
unbalanced 
panel data Labour (person) 477.62 389.93 1.58 2,150.43 
 Fuel (terajoule) 46,137.73 37,357.69 5.45 156,366.8 
- zero 
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Table 8.3 shows the summary statistics of each variable in both the unbalanced and 
balanced panel data. A description of each variable in the whole unbalanced panel 
data set is briefly explained as follows.21
The output is the electricity generated by each plant with the average output in this 
sample being 3,481.95 GWh. The largest plant, which is the lignite-type 
conventional thermal power plant, can generate 12,146.77 GWh whereas the smallest 
gas turbine plant can produce only 0.29 GWh to serve the peak demand. The capital 
measure22 used is the capacity23 of each plant in megawatt (MW).24 The average 
capacity of plants in the sample is 657.18 MW, with largest combined cycle plant 
having a total of 2,031 MW of generating capacity and the smallest gas turbine plant 
having 14 MW.  
The most troublesome variable is the employment number. According to EGAT 
officials, the data of employment in some plants is not recorded at all and for some 
only in some years, therefore the fragmented employment data cannot fit in the data 
set of the other variables. To avoid the problem of missing data, indexing the 
employment number from the labour expenditures can be the only option, however 
the labour expenditures are not recorded separately. They are recorded as the portion 
of operating, maintenance, administrative and general expenses because in the 
electricity generation most labour is employed to do these tasks. Therefore the 
summation of these expenditures can be a proxy of labour expenditures.  
The period of study covers the period of financial crisis in which EGAT suffered 
from the loss of foreign exchange. The administrative and general expenses25 are 
very high, particularly in 1999 as it includes of the expenditures from the 
headquarters in which loss from foreign exchange is a major component. Moreover 
                                                 
21 Since the balanced panel data is a subset of the unbalanced one, its description will not be provided. 
22 Coelli (2002) pointed out that as a proxy of capital, a measure of the overall capital investment 
adjusted for depreciation and embodied technical change is more preferable. Due to the data 
limitation, this measure cannot be constructed. 
23 The capacity of each unit is the maximum flow of power that it can produce. For example, a unit 
with a capacity of 1 megawatt can produce electricity not more than 8,760 (1x8,760 hours in a year) 
MWh a year.  
24 In this study, capacity is not depreciated. To the author’s knowledge, depreciating the nameplate 
capacity cannot be done. This is proven by various frontier studies on electricity generating activities 
using the non-depreciating capacity as proxy of capital. Age of power plants will be included as the 
environmental variable in the technical inefficiency model. Inclusion of the age will represent 
depreciation of power plants. Technical efficiency scores obtained will net out the effect of 
depreciation of capital.   
25 The administrative and general expenses are the expenditures incurred by the headquarters 
including of  operating, maintenance, depreciation, loss of foreign exchange and interest on long-term 
debt. 
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the labour component in this expenditure is not related to electricity generation but is 
related to administrative jobs in the headquarters. Therefore these expenses do not 
reflect the true cost of electricity operation.  
To avoid overestimation of labour expenditures, only the summation of operating 
and maintenance expenditures will be employed for the calculation of labour input. 
These aggregates will be deflated by the wage bill26 and then adjusted by the 
conversion factors27 to obtain the estimated labour input.28  
The last variable is fuel. Each type of power plant has a particular combination of 
fuel used due to the different electricity generation systems.  
The conventional thermal power plants use either lignite or fuel oil and natural gas as 
their main fuel, whereas the combined cycle power plants employ natural gas.  
The gas turbine power plants use diesel oil.  
Apart from their main fuel, some of power plants use other additional fuel such as 
diesel oil to start up or to test the operation of plant. Therefore, it is difficult to 
choose a single measure of fuel input.  
To avoid difficulties in comparing different physical plants using different fuels, it is 
ideal to convert volumetric measures of fuels into “joule” measurements of the actual 
heat energy content.29 The converted number can then be aggregated into a fuel 
                                                 
26 Since EGAT did not provide the data on wages, the wages of employed persons from the Report of 
Labor Force Survey, National Statistical Office from 1992–2001 are used instead. During 1992–98, 
the monthly wages of employed persons were collected in the first and third round of the survey. The 
first round enumeration is held in February, coinciding with the non-agricultural season, whereas the 
third round is held in August, during the agricultural season. Commencing in the year 1999, the 
monthly wages of employed persons have been surveyed for four rounds a year. The second round is 
normally held in May, in which a new labour force comes from students who have just finished their 
schooling. The fourth round has been conducted in November. The average monthly wage is the 
round-average of wages of an employed person.  The wage bill is calculated by multiplying the 
average monthly wage of an employed person by 12 months. 
27 EGAT provided the true employment numbers of two units in the conventional thermal and 
combined cycle power plants throughout the period of study. These numbers are employed to 
calculate two average conversion factors, one of which is to convert the wage deflated labour 
expenditure into the proxy of number of employment of units in the conventional thermal power 
plants and another is for units in combined cycle and gas turbine power plants. Using the same 
conversion factor for the combined cycle and gas turbine power plants is based on the fact that their 
production techniques are similar. 
28 Due to data limitation, an estimation of employment numbers is required, however the best way is 
to directly obtain the data of labour. Further study should be conducted by updating and obtaining the 
true employment number, however with better exposure to the data, the quality adjusted labours are 
more satisfactory. 
29 The fuels will be converted into British thermal unit (BTU) by using the Department of Energy 
Development and Promotion conversion factor: 1 kilogram of lignite = 9,920 BTU, 1 litre of fuel oil = 
37,700 BTU, 1 litre of diesel oil = 34,520 BTU and 1 cubic feet of natural gas = 980 BTU. Then a unit 
of BTU will be converted in to joule by a factor of 1,055.056. 
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figure for each plant. The average fuel used is 34,880.43 terajoules30. The largest 
plant uses 129,725.95 terajoules whereas the smallest plant uses 5.45 terajoules. 
For measurement of technical efficiency in Thai power plants, the balanced panel 
data is employed. To capture the variation in technical inefficiency across Thai 
power plants, two firm-specific variables, the age of the power plant and power plant 
dummy variable, are included in the technical inefficiency model. 31  
The age of plant could affect its technical inefficiency a number of ways.  
On the one hand the older plants reflect the older production technology and 
equipment which may increase plant inefficiency as the power plant ages.  
On the other hand the better adaptation of production conditions in the older plants 
may lead to higher efficiency levels. In the balanced panel data, the age of plants 
varies between 11 and 360 months with an average of 165 months. The power plant 
dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for the j-th power plant and 0 otherwise, is 
included to capture each plant specific characteristics.  
8.6.2 Australian power plants 
Australian data is generously supplied by Coelli (2002).32 It consists of annual 
measures of output and three inputs: labour, capital and fuel, for 13 Australian coal-
fired electric power generation plants in the period of 1981/82 to 1990/91. Three 
power plants are from Western Australia, and four and six are from Victoria and 
New South Wales, respectively. All were publicly owned throughout the data period. 
In the obtained sample data set, some observations were not available in certain years 
because some power plants did not start operating until after 1981/82. Furthermore, 
in some power plants, output and labour figures were missing from the data 
provided.  
Owing to these omissions, the final unbalanced panel data set includes 114 
observations.  
                                                 
30 A terajoule is equal to a joule multiplied by 1012. 
31 There are more environmental variables determining technical inefficiency. Joskow and 
Schmalensee (1987), Khanna et al. (1999) and Knittel (2002) provide a detailed explanation and 
justification of various determinants of technical inefficiency. Due to the data limitation, all of the 
possible determinants in the model are not covered. 
32 The details of the source and definition of the data and variables can be explored in Coelli (2002). 
The same content will not be repeated here. 
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For comparison of performance of Thai and Australian power plants, the unbalanced 
data set of both unbalanced panels of 24 Thai and 13 Australian plants are combined. 
There are 284 observations in the final data set.  
During the period of study, both Thai and Australian power plants were state-owned 
and all of them were thermal power plants. 
There are several remarks that should be made about the data and the variables 
employed in both data sets.  
Firstly, output in Australian data is the electricity sent out whereas in Thai data the 
electricity generated is used.  
Secondly, both data sets use capacity and number of employees as the capital and 
labour measure, respectively.  
Lastly, the main fuels used in the Thai and Australian power plants are different. The 
main fuels used in the Thai power plants vary by the type of thermal power plants, 
such as lignite, natural gas and oil, whereas in the sample the Australian power plants 
are all coal-fired. Both Thai and Australian also used other fuel types as the 
supplementary fuel. To avoid the differences in fuel measurement, all of the fuels are 
converted into terajoule equivalents. 
Due to the data limitation the only firm specific variable included in the technical 
inefficiency model is limited to the power plant dummy variable intended to capture 
the different characteristics of each plant from Thailand and Australia. 
8.6.3 Electricity suppliers 
Evaluation of the performance of EGAT at firm level requires the data of 
international electricity suppliers for comparison. The data of 34 electricity suppliers 
from both OECD and non-OECD countries, not including data of EGAT, were 
supplied by Whiteman (1999).33  
The data cover the period 1994 to 1995. Data from EGAT was obtained from the 
annual report of EGAT as of September 1994. This is the appropriate time to study 
the pre-partial privatisation performance of EGAT because the first partial 
privatisation of EGAT was conducted in December 1994. 
                                                 
33 The original data set consists of 39 electricity firms. Four of them do not have hydro power plants. 
The author decided to eliminate those observations to concentrate on the firms with both hydro and 
thermal power plants. 
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Variables for analysis consists of annual measures of output, electricity generated 
(GWh) and three inputs: hydro capacity (MW), thermal capacity (MW) and the 
number of full-time employees, for 35 electricity suppliers.  
The first variable is output. The amount of electricity generated is used as the output. 
Capital input is separated into two types: hydro capacity and thermal capacity, 
according to the electricity generating technology. This classification can cover the 
whole operation of suppliers in the sample. The last input variable is the number of 
employees.  
 
Table 8.4 Summary statistics of variables: Electricity suppliers 
Data Variable Mean Standard  deviation Minimum Maximum EGAT 
Output (GWh) 100,757.04 104,666.19 8,498 427,688 68,806.2 
Hydro capacity (MW) 5,659.87 6,671.99 2 2,9011.82 2,531.06 
OECD and 
non-OECD 
Countries 
Thermal capacity (MW) 18,294.92 21,349.03 9.08 90,458.66 10,425.09 
 Employees (person) 36,279.77 58,226.44 465 274,525 34,710 
Output (GWh) 101,051.1 112,606.18 8,498 427,688 68,806.2 OECD 
Countries 
Hydro capacity (MW) 6,140.76 7,141.52 2 29,011.82 2,531.06 
 Thermal capacity (MW) 18,396.91 23,056.74 9.08 90,458.66 10,425.09 
 Employees (person) 39,467.07 63,432.34 465 274,525 34,710 
Output (GWh) 99,335.71 59,011.06 23,407 167,241 68,806.2 Non-
OECD 
Countries Hydro capacity (MW) 3,335.56 3,045.2 450 9,176.17 2,531.06 
 Thermal capacity (MW) 17,801.96 11,041.97 7,090 33,959.32 10,425.09 
 Employees (person) 20,874.5 13,339.9 3,919 34,710 34,710 
 
 
As shown in Table 8.4, EGAT electricity production is on average smaller relative to 
the other suppliers in terms of output and capital input employed, particularly when 
compared with the whole data set and OECD countries.  
EGAT produces 68,806.2 GWh, which is below the average of electricity generated. 
EGAT also employs both types of electricity generating technology. The capacity of 
hydro power plants accounts for 19.54 per cent of the total capacity, whereas the 
capacity of the thermal power plants is 80.46 per cent. In terms of employees, when 
compared with the whole data set and OECD countries, EGAT employs less than the 
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average, but among the non-OECD countries34 EGAT is the largest organisation in 
term of employees. 
8.7 Empirical results: Thai power plants 
In this section, the efficiency measurements of the Thai power plants are conducted 
by the methods of DEA and SFA and the use of the balanced panel data of Thai 
power plants. The mean value of technical efficiency scores estimated by DEA and 
SFA are reported in Table 8.5 and the details of estimation of each model will be 
discussed as follows. 
 
Table 8.5 Technical efficiency scoresa and descriptive statistics: Thai power 
plants 
Types Plant Ageb DEA CRS 
DEA 
VRS SFAA SFANA Y/K Y/L Y/F 
1  272 0.76 0.82 0.91 1 5.34 2.74 0.1 Conventional 
thermal - 
lignite 2  200 0.81 0.81 0.69 0.98 5.98 4.81 0.1 
 3 140 0.82 0.91 0.47 0.99 6.08 7.51 0.1 
4  236 0.73 0.75 0.84 0.94 5.44 2.88 0.09 
5 360 0.79 0.83 0.5 0.96 5.77 7.6 0.1 
Conventional 
thermal – 
fuel oil and 
natural gas 6 209 0.85 0.88 0.65 0.99 6.13 15.05 0.11 
 7 107 0.82 0.9 0.63 0.93 5.95 19.56 0.1 
 8 334 0.81 0.99 0.99 1 6.1 0.92 0.08 
9 242 0.81 0.84 0.72 0.91 5.65 19.21 0.1 Combined 
cycle 10 127 0.91 0.95 0.96 1 6.29 26.15 0.12 
 11 121 0.79 0.86 0.85 1 5.46 17.55 0.11 
Gas turbine 12  212 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.99 7.22 13.52 0.07 
 Mean  0.82 0.88 0.77 0.97 5.95 11.46 0.1 
 Median  0.81 0.87 0.78 0.99 5.97 10.56 0.1 
 Minimum  0.73 0.75 0.47 0.91 5.34 0.92 0.07 
 Maximum  0.93 0.99 0.99 1 7.22 26.15 0.12 
 Standard deviation  0.06 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.50 8.15 0.01 
a  The mean technical efficiency scores over the period of study. 
b  The reported age is in months and is the age at the end of period of study. 
                                                 
34 The non-OECD countries consist of Argentina, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China 
and Thailand. The Republic of Korea joined the OECD in 1996. The period of study is 1994–95 
during which the Republic of Korea was the non-OECD country. 
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8.7.1 Data Envelopment Analysis  
The plant-level global (DEA CRS) and pure (DEA VRS) technical efficiency scores 
of Thai power plants are calculated. The mean values of both technical efficiency 
scores of each plant over the period of study are shown in Table 8.5.  
To examine the effects of plant-specific variables and age on the technical 
inefficiency, the tobit model is specified as below: 
( ) 110
1
1 s j j a i ii
j
p AGEθ ψ ψ ψ
=
− = + + +∑ ω ,     (8.12) 
where θs is the technical efficiency score of s, representing CRS (global) and VRS 
(pure) efficiency; pj is a plant dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for the j-th 
plant and 0 otherwise; AGE is the age of each plant in months; and ψs are unknown 
parameters to be estimated.  ωi ~N(0,σω2). 
The estimates of tobit regressions on the global and pure technical inefficiency 
scores are shown in Table 8.6. Age is statistically significantly different from zero at 
1 per cent significance level and has an expected positive effect on the technical 
inefficiency, therefore it can be concluded that technical efficiency deteriorates as the 
plant ages which is consistent with conclusion drawn by Khanna et al. (1999) in case 
of thermal power plants in India. The results of plant dummy variables of both 
regressions indicate that the plants with different characteristics have different levels 
of technical inefficiencies. These results are useful for ranking the most and least 
efficient plants which will be discussed. 
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Table 8.6 Tobit regression of technical inefficiency scores: Thai power plants 
Variables Constant return to scale  Variable return to scale 
 Estimate Marginal effect  Estimate Marginal effect 
Constant -0.16* (0.07)  
 -0.16** 
(0.06)  
p1
0.09 
(0.06) 0.09 
 0.09 
(0.05) 0.08 
p2
0.14** 
(0.05) 0.13 
 0.18** 
(0.05) 0.16 
p3
0.21** 
(0.06) 0.2 
 0.14** 
(0.05) 0.13 
p4
0.17** 
(0.06) 0.16 
 0.21** 
(0.05) 0.18 
p5
-0.06 
(0.08) -0.06 
 -0.02 
(0.06) -0.02 
p6
0.08 
(0.06) 0.07 
 0.09* 
(0.05) 0.08 
p7
0.26** 
(0.07) 0.24 
 0.2** 
(0.06) 0.17 
p8
-0.04 
(0.07) -0.04 
 -0.26** 
(0.07) -0.23 
p9
0.07 
(0.06) 0.07 
 0.11* 
(0.05) 0.09 
p10
0.12* 
(0.06) 0.12 
 0.11* 
(0.05) 0.09 
p11
0.27** 
(0.06) 0.25 
 0.22** 
(0.05) 0.2 
AGE 0.001** (0.0003) 0.001 
 0.001** 
(0.0003) 0.001 
Log-Likelihood Value 73.9  
 
72.05  
R2 0.28  
 
0.47  
σ 0.12  
 
0.09  
The numbers in parentheses are standard error. 
* and ** indicates the statistically significant estimates at 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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8.7.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
To find the most appropriate production structure, the translog production function 
with the technical change represented by time trend and squared time trend is 
selected as the unrestricted model. The hypotheses regarding the form of technical 
change and Cobb Douglas production function are then tested against it by the 
likelihood ratio test. 
Table 8.7 reports the results from the testing production structure hypotheses.  
The Cobb Douglas functional form is rejected in any form of technical change, 
therefore the translog production function is selected. Two tranlog functions with 
technical change in the form of only time trend and both time trend and squared time 
trend are rejected, hence the most favourable model is translog production function 
with no technical change.  
This result is consistent with the fact that the electricity generating techniques of 
plants do not change over the period of study, and it confirms that the intertemporal 
model for DEA is appropriate.  
Equation 8.7 is thus specified by the translog production function as follows: 
 ln(Qit) = β0 + βKln(Kit) + βLln(Lit) + βFln(Fit) + βKK[ln(Kit)]2 + βLL[ln(Lit)]2  
  + βFF[ln(Fit)]2 + 2[βKLln(Kit)ln(Lit) + βKFln(Kit)ln(Fit)  
  + βLFln(Lit)ln(Fit)]  + vit - uit,     (8.13) 
             i = 1,2,...,N, and  t = 1,2,...,T,   
where Qit is electricity output (GWh) by the i-th plant in the t-th year; Kit, Lit and Fit 
represent capital (MW), labour (persons) and fuel inputs (terajoules), respectively. 
The model is written in natural logarithmic form, denoted by ln. To investigate the 
influence of firm-specific variables on the technical inefficiency, this study follows 
Battese and Coelli (1995) as already explained above. To be comparable with the 
DEA, Equation 8.9 will be specified by the same variables as those in the tobit model 
below: 
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Table 8.7 Results from testing production structure hypotheses: Thai power 
plants 
Model Description 
(Restrictions) 
Log-
Likelihood 
Function 
λ 
 
χ20.95,(j)
 
j Decision 
Translog ( No Technical Change) 
(βt=βtt=0) 140.25 -2.7 5.99 2 
Do not 
reject Ho
Translog (Technical Change with t and t2) 138.91     
Translog (Technical Change with t) 
(βtt=0) 134.67 8.46 3.84 1 Reject Ho
Cobb Douglas (No Technical Change) 
(βKK=βLL =βFF=βKL=βKF=βLF=βt=βtt=0) 119.79 38.24 15.51 8 Reject Ho
Cobb Douglas (Technical Change with t and t2)
(βKK=βLL =βFF=βKL=βKF=βLF=0) 117.69 42.44 12.59 6 Reject Ho
Cobb Douglas (Technical Change with t) 
(βKK=βLL =βFF=βKL=βKF=βLF=βtt=0) 118.49 40.84 14.07 7 Reject Ho
 
 
11
0
1
it j j a it it
j
m p AGEδ δ δ
=
= + + +∑ ξ        (8.14) 
where 2~ (0, )it N ξξ σ . 
Equation 8.13 and 8.14 (SFAA) are simultaneously estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method. The estimates are shown in Table 8.8.  
To ensure that the inefficiency effects are stochastic, the null hypothesis that the 
inefficiency effects are not present; H0 : g =δ0 =…=δ11=δa=0; and the inefficiency 
effects are not stochastic; H0 : g =0 and the coefficients of the variables in the 
technical inefficiency model are zero;  H0 :δ0 =…=δ11=δa=0 and H0 :δ1 =…=δ11=δa=0 
are tested.  
In Table 8.9 the results show that all of null hypotheses are rejected and indicate that 
the technical inefficiency effect is stochastic and related to plant dummy variables 
and the age of power plants. However, the estimate of g is not significantly different 
from 1 at 5 per cent level of significance which indicates that the stochastic frontier 
model is not significantly different from the deterministic frontier. All the deviation 
from the frontier results from the technical inefficiency. 
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The results of the inefficiency model show that age is statistically significant from 
zero, at 1 per cent significance level, and has a positive effect on technical 
inefficiency as expected. Also, the results of the plant dummy variables show that the 
plant characteristics have a particular effect on the technical inefficiency in both 
negative and positive ways. 
From the estimates in Table 8.8, the output elasticities with respect to capital, labour 
and fuel and return to scale elasticity are calculated around mean and reported in 
Table 8.10.  
All of them have the expected positive signs. The output elasticities of capital, labour 
and fuel are 0.55, 0.12 and 0.75 respectively.  
This means that if capital, labour and fuel increase proportionally by 1 per cent, 
output will increase proportionally by 0.55, 0.12 and 0.75 per cent, respectively. The 
production elasticities are dominated by the fuel elasticity because in electricity 
generation the fuel is the most important input.  
The labour elasticity is smallest, which matches with the fact that labour is the least 
important input in electricity generation.  
The return to scale elasticity at the sample mean, 1.42, indicates that Thai thermal 
power plants operate at an increasing return to scale. The estimated value of 1.42 is 
relatively large compared with those reported in the previous studies in the US such 
as studies by Christensen and Greene (1976) and Kopp and Smith (1980). Given that 
these studies are based on data of steam generating electric plants whereas this study 
employs thermal power plant, it can be explained that the different electricity 
generating techniques result in variation in return to scale elasticity. The unexhausted 
scale economies are increasing as the thermal power plants are becoming 
progressively larger. 
The mean technical efficiency scores of each plant are reported in Table 8.5. 
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Table 8.8 Maximum-likelihood estimates of translog stochastic frontier 
model: Thai power plants  
Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t-Statistics 
β0 -6.89 1.03 -6.66 
βK -1.44 0.42 -3.43 
βL 0.97 0.31 2.92 
βF 2.14 0.27 7.94 
βKK 0.06 0.03 1.86 
βLL 0.01 0.03 0.18 
βFF -0.04 0.03 -1.25 
βKL 0.07 0.03 2.18 
βKF 0.02 0.03 0.9 
βLF -0.08 0.03 -2.5 
δ0 -0.51 0.12 -4.2 
δ1 0.07 0.08 0.84 
δ2 0.54 0.11 4.86 
δ3 1.05 2.02 5.2 
δ4 0.25 0.08 3.22 
δ5 0.52 0.14 3.76 
δ6 0.6 0.12 4.8 
δ7 0.84 0.15 5.59 
δ8 -0.44 1.19 -3.74 
δ9 0.41 0.1 4.28 
δ10 0.18 0.12 1.54 
δ11 0.49 0.12 3.95 
δa 0.002 0.001 4.82 
σ2 0.01 0.001 5.4 
γ 0.92 0.18 4.96 
Log-likelihood 140.25   
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Table 8.9 Results from testing the technical inefficiency model: Thai power 
plants  
Null hypothesis 
Log-
Likelihood 
Function 
λ 
 
χ20.95,(j)
 
j Decision 
H0 : g =δ0 =…=δ11=δa=0 97.83 84.84 24.38a 15 Reject Ho
H0 : g =0b 130.07 20.36 5.14 2 Reject Ho
H0 :δ0 =…=δ11=δa=0 100.02 80.46 22.36 13 Reject Ho
H0 :δ1 =…=δ11=δa=0 97.83 84.84 21.03 12 Reject Ho
a If the test involving g=0, then λ has a mixed Chi-square distribution. The critical values for 
this test are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). 
b Coelli (1995) argued that testing g  by the two-sided likelihood ratio is invalid because λ 
has the incorrect size. Although he recommended that the one-sided likelihood ratio test is in 
preference to the t-test, he suggested that the test of g  by t-statistics is sufficient. The t-
statistics of g indicates that g  is statistically different from zero at 1 per cent confidence 
level. 
 
 
 
Table 8.10 Estimates derived from the translog stochastic frontier model: Thai 
power plants  
Description Estimate 
Capital Elasticity of Output 0.55 
Labour Elasticity of Output 0.12 
Fuel Elasticity of Output 0.75 
Return to Scale Elasticity 1.42 
 
8.7.3 Consistency of results from Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis 
The technical efficiency scores from DEA with both CRS (DEA CRS) and VRS 
(DEA VRS) assumptions and SFAA are reported in Table 8.5.  
The most striking result is that the mean technical efficiency score from SFAA, 0.76, 
is somewhat lower than those from DEA CRS and DEA VRS, 0.82 and 0.87, 
respectively.  
This result is contrary to the fact that technical efficiency estimates from DEA should 
be lower than those from SFA because DEA does not separate the technical 
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inefficiency effect from the error term, and the efficiency levels of each plant are 
hugely different between DEA and SFA. Possible reasons of higher DEA scores and 
differences of efficiency mean and level can be the inclusion of age in estimation of 
technical efficiency scores by SFAA, as the older plants are less efficient and can 
result in the lower technical efficiency scores.  
Therefore Equation 8.14, remodelled by eliminating age as the plant-specific 
variables (SFANA), is estimated and presented in Table 8.11.35   
Results of tests on the inefficiency model are shown in Table 8.12.36  
The value of g , 0.03, is statistically different from zero at 5 per cent confidence 
level, therefore the production function with no technical efficiency effect is not an 
adequate representation of the data. Also the value of g  is statistically different from 
one at 1 per cent level of significance so the model is different from the deterministic 
model.  
When comparing results from SFANA and SFAA, it is obvious that the value of g 
obtained from SFANA is much smaller than the one in SFAA and almost close to 
zero. When considering the statistical significance of each individual coefficient of 
power-plant dummy variables in technical inefficiency effect, the SFAA model has 
more favourable results. 
The technical efficiency scores after eliminating the age variable increase 
dramatically.  
The mean score of SFANA, 0.97, is the largest and higher than those of DEA. It 
results from low value of g.  
It is clear that dropping age of plant does impact the scores, therefore the choice of 
modelling approach does affect the results.  
This study does not aim to choose the best model but to observe the effect of age on 
technical efficiency scores, therefore both SFAA and SFANA model will be 
discussed together with DEA model later on. 
                                                 
35 The production structure strictly follows Equation 8.13 for reason of consistency, therefore the 
detail of tests of production structure is not needed and not provided here. However it should be 
mentioned that the author attempted all of the tests and found no serious problem regarding this 
model. 
36 By using λ statistics (-16.94), the null hypothesis of H0 : g=0 is not rejected. Coelli (1995) used the 
Monte Carlo experimentation to investigate the properties of the maximum likelihood estimator of g 
and found that when g* is small, maximum likelihood estimator is biased. Therefore the λ statistics 
have incorrect size and its test is invalid. Coelli suggested that t test of g  is sufficient. 
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To be comparable with SFANA, the tobit regressions of both CRS and VRS 
technical inefficiency scores in Equation 8.12, excluding age as explanatory variable 
are also estimated and reported in Table 8.13.  
Table 8.11 Maximum-likelihood estimates of translog stochastic frontier model 
without age variable: Thai power plants 
Coefficient Estimate Standard error t-Statistics 
β0 -6.6 0.99 -6.68 
βK -0.3 0.87 -0.35 
βL 0.51 0.87 0.58 
βF 1.77 0.68 2.6 
βKK 0.02 0.15 0.1 
βLL -0.02 0.19 -0.13 
βFF -0.07 0.08 -0.84 
βKL -0.03 0.09 -0.29 
βKF 0.04 0.1 0.33 
βLF 0.004 0.09 0.04 
δ0 -0.004 0.35 -0.01 
δ1 -0.1 0.77 -0.13 
δ2 0.03 0.37 0.07 
δ3 0.001 0.85 0.001 
δ4 0.07 0.44 0.15 
δ5 0.05 0.39 0.12 
δ6 -0.01 0.97 -0.01 
δ7 0.08 0.71 0.11 
δ8 -0.03 0.85 -0.04 
δ9 0.1 0.75 0.14 
δ10 -0.15 0.47 -0.32 
δ11 -0.11 0.33 -0.34 
σ2 0.01 0.004 1.94 
γ 0.03 0.01 2.11 
Log-likelihood 111.82   
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Table 8.12 Results from testing the technical inefficiency model without age: 
Thai power plants 
Null hypothesis Log-Likelihood Function λ 
 
χ20.95,(j)
 
j Decision 
H0 : g =δ0 =…=δ11=0 97.83 27.98 23.07a 14 Reject Ho
H0 :δ0 =…=δ11=0 100.02 23.6 21.03 12 Reject Ho
H0 :δ1 =…=δ11=0 97.83 27.98 19.68 11 Reject Ho
a If the test involving g=0, then λ has mixed Chi-square distribution. The critical values for 
this test are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986).  
 
The mean technical efficiency scores from DEA CRS and VRS, 0.82 and 0.87 
respectively, are high. Undoubtedly the global technical efficiency which does not 
take the scale effect into account results in the lower score. Eliminating the scale 
effect pushes the plants to the frontier as scale effect does matter in the power plant 
efficiency.  
Due to some inconsistency in scores from different approaches, the question of 
comparing and identifying the most and least efficient power plants arises.  
Bauer et al. (1998) proposed a set of consistency conditions for the different 
efficiency models for the regulatory purposes. Owing to the different purpose, this 
study adopts a subset of consistency conditions that efficiency scores obtained from 
the different models should be consistent and in order, in their efficiency levels, 
rankings and identification of the best and worst power plants. 
The first condition, consistency in efficiency levels is not met, as already explained. 
It can conclude that the levels of efficiency scores for both DEA and SFA methods 
vary across power plants and at mean values, however it is possible that the ranking 
of power plants from different methods are similar.  
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Table 8.13 Tobit regression without age variable of technical inefficiency 
scores: Thai power plants 
Variables Constant return to scale  Variable return to scale 
 Estimate Marginal effect  Estimate Marginal effect 
Constant 0.07 (0.04)  
 0.02 
(0.04)  
p1
0.18* 
(0.06) 0.16 
 0.16** 
(0.05) 0.14 
p2
0.13* 
(0.06) 0.12 
 0.17** 
(0.05) 0.15 
p3
0.11 
(0.06) 0.1 
 0.06 
(0.05) 0.05 
p4
0.2** 
(0.06) 0.19 
 0.24** 
(0.05) 0.2 
p5
0.15** 
(0.06) 0.14 
 0.15** 
(0.05) 0.13 
p6
0.08 
(0.06) 0.07 
 0.1 
(0.05) 0.08 
p7
0.11 
(0.06) 0.1 
 0.08 
(0.05) 0.07 
p8
0.13* 
(0.06) 0.12 
 -0.13* 
(0.06) -0.11 
p9
0.12* 
(0.06) 0.11 
 0.14** 
(0.05) 0.12 
p10
0.01 
(0.06) 0.01 
 0.02 
(0.05) 0.01 
p11
0.14* 
(0.06) 0.13 
 0.12* 
(0.05) 0.11 
Log-Likelihood Value 66.83  
 
65.64  
R2 0.17  
 
0.36  
σ 0.12  
 
0.1  
The numbers in parentheses are standard error. 
* and ** indicates the statistically significant estimates at 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8.14 Correlation coefficients between efficiency scores obtained from 
different models: Thai power plants  
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFAA SFANA 
DEA CRS 1 0.74** 0.25** 0.14 
DEA VRS  1 0.35** 0.28** 
SFAA   1 0.35** 
SFANA    1 
** 1 % level of significance (two sided) 
 
Table 8.15 Spearman rank-order correlations between efficiency scores 
obtained from different models: Thai power plants 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFAA SFANA 
DEA CRS 1 0.78** 0.43** 0.25** 
DEA VRS  1 0.45** 0.33** 
SFAA   1 0.51** 
SFANA    1 
** 1 % level of significance (two sided) 
 
Table 8.16 Consistency in identifying the best and worst plants across models: 
Thai power plants 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFAA SFANA 
DEA CRS  0.67 0.67 0.33 
DEA VRS 0.67  1 0.67 
SFAA 0.33 1  0.67 
SFANA 0.33 0.33 0.33  
Note: The upper triangle represents the best plants. Each number is the proportion of plants 
that were identified by one model as the most efficient three plants were also identified as 
the most efficient three plants by the other model. The lower triangle shows the worst plants. 
Each number is the proportion of plants that were identified by one model as the least 
efficient three plants were also identified as the least efficient three plants by other model. 
 
In Table 8.15 Spearman rank-order correlations between scores from different 
techniques are positive but most of them are very low. Only the correlation between 
nonparametric models (DEA CRS and DEA VRS), 0.78, is statistically different 
from zero at the 5 per cent level of confidence. The result suggests that DEA and 
SFA give an inconsistent ranking in comparison with each other. Again this 
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condition is not met.Although the different models do not rank the power plants in a 
similar way, they may be consistent in identifying the most and least efficient power 
plants. In Table 8.16, the upper triangle shows the proportion of power plants that 
both simultaneously classified in the upper quartile (three power plants) by the two 
techniques, whereas the lower triangle shows the same for the lower quartile (three 
power plants).  
For consistency in identifying the best power plants, there is a good consistency 
among and across both DEA and SFA techniques but no consistency between DEA 
CRS and SFANA.  
Consistency in identifying the worst power plants is relatively low among and across 
techniques. 
Even though the consistency conditions of efficiency level and ranking of both DEA 
and SFAA are not met, consistency in identifying the best and worst plants is met. 
The ranking obtained from the tobit regression with the age of both CRS and VRS 
technical inefficiency scores (TA CRS and TA VRS) when compared with ranking 
from SFAA are particularly consistent, as shown in Table 8.17.37 When comparing 
ranking obtained from the tobit regression without the age of both CRS and VRS (T 
CRS and T VRS) and SFANA, the result is not highly consistent.  
The age of power plants does affect negatively to the technical efficiency scores. 
Dropping it from the regression yields the improvement of scores, however ignoring 
it affects the consistency of identifying the best and worst power plants negatively. 
Therefore, ranking obtained from regression with age has net out the effect of age on 
technical efficiency scores and results in consistency in identifying the most and least 
efficient power plants across the models. 
It can be concluded that a gas turbine power plant (number 12), a conventional 
thermal power plant using fuel oil and natural gas (number 8) and the combined 
cycle power plant (number 10), are considered the top three of the most efficient 
power plants. Conventional thermal power plants using lignite (number 1) and using 
fuel oil and natural gas (number 4) are the worst performers. 
 
                                                 
37 It is noted that in this chapter in case that power plants’ mean technical efficiency scores are equal, 
those power plants are ranked among themselves by power plant numbers. 
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Table 8.17 Comparison of ranking of plants across models: Thai power plants  
Age  No age 
Rank DEA CRS DEA VRS
TA CRS TA VRS SFAA  T CRS T VRS SFANA
1 12 8 5 8 8  12 8 11 
2 10 12 8 5 12  10 12 10 
3 6 10 12 12 10  6 10 8 
4 3 3 6 1 1  3 3 1 
5 7 7 9 6 11  7 7 12 
6 2 6 1 9 4  9 6 6 
7 8 11 10 10 9  2 11 3 
8 9 9 2 3 2  8 9 2 
9 5 5 4 2 6  11 5 5 
10 11 1 3 7 7  5 1 4 
11 1 2 7 4 5  1 2 7 
12 4 4 11 11 3  4 4 9 
Note: The numbers in the table represent the plant number. 
 
Efficiency of power plants can be assessed using the measures of productivity. The 
partial factor productivities, which are the ratio of output to input: capital, labour and 
fuel, represented by Y/K, Y/L and Y/F respectively, are commonly used. As shown 
in Table 8.5, for the best performer, plant number 12 has the highest partial 
productivity of capital, 7.22 whereas plant number 10 has the highest partial 
productivity of labour and fuel, 26.15 and 0.12, respectively.  
As for the worst performers, plants number 1 and 4 have the lowest partial 
productivity of capital.  
Therefore it can be concluded that the results from frontier analysis are consistent 
with the simple partial productivity measures. It should be noted that the partial 
productivities of fuel of power plants do not vary much, from 0.07 to 0.12, because 
the amounts of fuel used to generate a certain level of electricity are required to be 
fixed whereas the wide range of partial productivities of labour results from the 
different electricity generation techniques.  
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8.8 Empirical results: Comparison of Thai and Australian power plants 
To compare technical efficiency between Thai and Australian power plants, the Thai 
and Australian unbalanced panel data are combined and estimated by DEA and SFA. 
The mean value of technical efficiency scores are reported in Table 8.18. 
8.8.1 Data Envelopment Analysis  
Again the plant-level CRS (DEA CRS) and VRS (DEA VRS) technical efficiency 
scores of the power plants of both countries are obtained and reported in Table 
8.18.38 The tobit model of effects of plant-specific variables on the technical 
inefficiency is specified by 36 plant dummy variables: 
( ) 360
1
1 s j j ii
j
pθ ψ ψ
=
− = + +∑ ω
                                                
.       (8.15) 
The results of tobit regressions on CRS and VRS technical inefficiency scores are 
shown in Table 8.19. Evidence shows that the power plants with different 
characteristics result in a different level of technical inefficiencies. 
 
 
38 The plant numbers in Table 8.18 and 8.25 represent the different plants from those in Table 8.5 and 
8.17. The numbers are randomly arranged for the data confidentiality required by EGAT. 
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Table 8.18 Technical efficiency scores and descriptive statistics:  Thai and 
Australian power plants 
Plant DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA Y/K Y/L Y/F 
1 0.75 0.75 0.99 5.34 2.74 0.1 
2 0.82 0.83 0.96 6.11 4.85 0.1 
3 0.82 0.87 0.99 6.13 7.2 0.1 
4 0.72 0.73 0.86 5.44 2.88 0.09 
5 0.76 0.79 0.98 5.53 7.47 0.1 
6 0.82 0.84 0.98 5.9 14.47 0.1 
7 0.79 0.82 0.96 5.72 18.53 0.1 
8 0.8 0.94 0.99 6.1 0.92 0.08 
9 0.76 0.76 0.87 3.6 3.31 0.09 
10 0.85 0.97 0.99 6.63 0.93 0.09 
11 0.81 0.83 0.99 5.39 18.87 0.11 
12 0.76 0.77 0.91 5.17 18.49 0.1 
13 0.9 0.9 0.99 6.16 26.11 0.12 
14 0.79 0.8 0.99 5.46 17.55 0.11 
15 0.74 0.79 0.95 3.61 16.57 0.1 
16 1 1 0.95 4.07 65.36 0.09 
17 0.85 0.86 0.94 4.87 29.91 0.1 
18 0.92 0.92 0.83 7.17 13.65 0.07 
19 0.24 0.48 0.8 0.25 0.88 0.06 
20 0.4 0.42 0.82 1.01 7.51 0.08 
21 0.48 0.49 0.84 1.42 8.9 0.08 
22 0.24 0.44 0.7 0.82 1.95 0.06 
23 0.23 1 0.98 0.42 2.51 0.05 
24 0.24 1 0.93 0.4 0.99 0.06 
25 0.72 0.76 0.89 5.62 16.63 0.1 
26 0.62 0.65 0.82 4.6 4.96 0.08 
27 0.75 0.78 0.83 5.75 8.54 0.08 
28 0.61 0.62 0.52 4.79 1.92 0.05 
29 0.73 0.85 0.95 4.79 21.46 0.1 
30 0.68 0.76 0.97 4.06 16.45 0.09 
31 0.58 0.6 0.91 3.63 11.56 0.09 
32 0.48 0.48 0.8 3.09 6.52 0.08 
33 0.72 0.74 0.95 5.11 9.09 0.1 
34 0.55 0.55 0.86 3.65 6.59 0.09 
35 0.31 0.35 0.62 1.54 1.22 0.07 
36 0.63 0.64 0.81 4.52 6.34 0.08 
37 0.46 0.46 0.87 2.78 5.52 0.08 
Mean 0.66 0.74 0.89 4.23 11.06 0.09 
Median 0.73 0.77 0.93 4.79 7.47 0.09 
Minimum 0.23 0.35 0.52 0.25 0.88 0.05 
Maximum 1 1 0.99 7.17 65.36 0.12 
Standard 
deviation 0.21 0.18 0.11 1.94 11.94 0.02 
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Table 8.19 Tobit regression of technical inefficiency scores: Thai and 
Australian power plants  
Variables Constant return to scale  Variable return to scale 
 Estimate Marginal effect  Estimate Marginal effect 
Constant 0.54** (0.04)  
 0.54** 
(0.04)  
p1
-0.29** 
(0.05) -0.29 
 -0.29** 
(0.06) -0.29 
p2
-0.36** 
(0.05) -0.36 
 -0.37** 
(0.05) -0.36 
p3 -0.36** 
(0.05) -0.36 
 -0.41** 
(0.05) -0.41 
p4 -0.26** 
(0.05) -0.26 
 -0.27** 
(0.06) -0.27 
p5 -0.3** 
(0.05) -0.3 
 -0.33** 
(0.05) -0.32 
p6 -0.36** 
(0.05) -0.36 
 -0.38** 
(0.05) -0.38 
p7 -0.33** 
(0.05) -0.33 
 -0.36** 
(0.05) -0.36 
p8 -0.34** 
(0.05) -0.34 
 -0.51** 
(0.06) -0.5 
p9 -0.3** 
(0.06) -0.3 
 -0.3** 
(0.07) -0.3 
p10 -0.39** 
(0.07) -0.39 
 -0.51** 
(0.07) -0.5 
p11 -0.35** 
(0.05) -0.35 
 -0.37** 
(0.06) -0.37 
p12 -0.3** 
(0.05) -0.3 
 -0.31** 
(0.05) -0.3 
p13
-0.46** 
(0.05) -0.45 
 -0.46** 
(0.55) -0.45 
p14
-0.33** 
(0.05) -0.33 
 -0.33** 
(0.06) -0.33 
p15 -0.28** 
(0.06) -0.28 
 -0.32 
(0.06) -0.32 
p16 -0.63** 
(0.09) -0.62 
 -0.98 
(1.65) -0.96 
p17 -0.4** 
(0.07) -0.4 
 -0.42** 
(0.07) -0.41 
    
    
 272
Variables Constant return to scale  Variable return to scale 
 Estimate Marginal effect  Estimate Marginal effect 
p18 -0.46** 
(0.05) -0.46 
 -0.47** 
(0.05) -0.46 
p19 0.22** 
(0.06) 0.22 
 -0.02 
(0.07) -0.02 
p20 0.06 
(0.06) 0.06 
 0.04 
(0.07) 0.04 
p21 -0.02 
(0.07) -0.02 
 -0.02 
(0.07) -0.02 
p22 0.22** 
(0.07) 0.22 
 0.03 
(0.07) 0.03 
p23 0.23 
(0.12) 0.23 
 -0.98 
(2.86) -0.96 
p24 0.22** 
(0.07) 0.22 
 -0.98 
(1.43) -0.96 
p25 -0.26** 
(0.06) -0.26 
 -0.32** 
(0.06) -0.31 
p26 -0.16** 
(0.05) -0.16 
 -0.19** 
(0.06) -0.19 
p27 -0.29** 
(0.05) -0.29 
 -0.32** 
(0.06) -0.32 
p28 -0.15** 
(0.05) -0.15 
 -0.16** 
(0.06) -0.15 
p29 -0.27** 
(0.06) -0.27 
 -0.4** 
(0.06) -0.4 
p30 -0.22** 
(0.05) -0.22 
 -0.3** 
(0.06) -0.3 
p31 -0.12* 
(0.05) -0.12 
 -0.14* 
(0.06) -0.13 
p32 -0.02 
(0.05) -0.02 
 -0.02 
(0.06) -0.02 
p33 -0.26** 
(0.05) -0.26 
 -0.28** 
(0.06) -0.28 
p34 -0.09 
(0.05) -0.09 
 -0.09 
(0.06) -0.09 
p35 0.15** 
(0.05) 0.15 
 0.12* 
(0.06) 0.11 
p36 -0.17** 
(0.05) -0.17 
 -0.18** 
(0.05) -0.17 
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Variables Constant return to scale  Variable return to scale 
 Estimate Marginal effect  Estimate Marginal effect 
Log-Likelihood Value 196.29  
 
171.92  
R2 0.71  
 
0.67  
σ 0.12   0.12  
The numbers in parentheses are standard error. 
* and ** indicates the statistically significant estimates at 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
 
8.8.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
The model by Battese and Coelli (1995) is adopted for this analysis. The production 
structure strictly follows Equation 8.13, whereas the technical inefficiency model is 
specified by only dummy variables in the same way as tobit regression in DEA 
analysis:  
36
0
1
it j j it
j
m pδ δ
=
= + +∑ ξ .       (8.16) 
Equation 8.13 and 8.16 (SFA) are simultaneously estimated by maximum likelihood 
method. The results are reported in Table 8.20. The value of g is 0.59 is statistically 
different from zero at 1 per cent confidence level. The results of tests on inefficiency 
model shown in Table 8.21 reject all hypotheses, therefore there is no sign of an 
invalid technical inefficiency model and nonstochastic frontier. Plant dummy 
variables show that the plant characteristics have a particular effect on the technical 
inefficiency scores.  
As shown in Table 8.22, the obtained output elasticities of capital, labour and fuel are 
0.002, -0.036 and 1.02 respectively. The production elasticities are dominated by the 
fuel elasticity because in electricity generation the fuel is the most important input. 
This result conforms with the previous study by Kopp and Smith (1980), which 
concludes that fuel and capital appear to be the most important inputs to the 
electricity production. 
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Table 8.20 Maximum-likelihood estimates of translog stochastic frontier 
model: Thai and Australian power plants  
Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t-Statistics 
β0 -3.36 0.58 -5.85 
βK 0.31 0.53 0.57 
βL 0.23 0.14 1.69 
βF 0.9 0.08 11.01 
βKK -0.09 0.07 -1.26 
βLL -0.05 0.03 -1.72 
βFF -0.06 0.03 -1.96 
βKL -0.04 0.06 -0.64 
βKF 0.06 0.04 1.73 
βLF 0.04 0.05 0.83 
δ0 0.07 0.21 0.32 
δ1 -0.58 0.82 -0.7 
δ2 -0.12 0.14 -0.84 
δ3 -0.36 0.83 -0.44 
δ4 0.07 0.3 0.24 
δ5 -0.21 0.94 -0.22 
δ6 -0.26 0.28 -0.94 
δ7 -0.1 0.93 -0.11 
δ8 -0.49 0.46 -1.1 
δ9 0.05 0.85 0.06 
δ10 -0.63 1.44 -0.44 
δ11 -0.63 0.51 -1.23 
δ12 -0.01 0.36 -0.02 
δ13 -0.66 0.35 -1.89 
δ14 -0.46 0.92 -0.5 
δ15 -0.18 1.98 -0.09 
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Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t-Statistics 
δ16 -0.05 0.62 -0.08 
δ17 -0.05 0.69 -0.08 
δ18 0.15 0.5 0.31 
δ19 0.14 0.9 0.16 
δ20 0.1 0.7 0.14 
δ21 0.08 0.77 0.11 
δ22 0.28 0.88 0.31 
δ23 -0.12 0.93 -0.13 
δ24 -0.01 0.37 -0.03 
δ25 0.03 0.89 0.03 
δ26 0.16 0.33 0.5 
δ27 0.13 0.57 0.24 
δ28 0.55 0.24 2.36 
δ29 -0.12 0.74 -0.16 
δ30 -0.25 1.34 -0.19 
δ31 -0.02 0.65 -0.03 
δ32 0.16 0.15 1.04 
δ33 -0.09 0.6 -0.15 
δ34 0.05 0.59 0.09 
δ35 0.42 0.34 1.25 
δ36 0.16 0.33 0.49 
σ2 0.01 0.01 1.45 
γ 0.59 0.21 2.82 
Log-likelihood 244.78   
 
The negative labour elasticity of output suggests that electricity generation operated 
in stage three of the production function where the more labour is added, the less 
marginal product the electricity generators gain. In this stage, there is considerable 
congestion in the use of labour. In both the Australian electricity industry in the 
1980s and Thai electricity industry in the 1990s, all generating plants were 
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government owned and the labour unions were quite powerful. The evidence is 
consistent with the idea that the industry was characterised by a surplus of labour at 
the beginning of the sample period, and that some or all of this surplus labour was 
shed over time. 
The return to scale elasticity, 0.986, indicates that during the period of study both 
Thai and Australian power plants operated at a decreasing return to scale. 
The technical efficiency scores are shown in Table 8.18. 
 
Table 8.21 Results from testing the technical inefficiency model: Thai and 
Australian power plants  
Null hypothesis 
Log-
Likelihood 
Function 
λ 
 
χ20.95,(j)
 
j Decision 
H0 : g =δ0 =…=δ36=0 121.7 246.16 54a 39 Reject Ho
H0 :δ0 =…=δ36=0 122.6 244.36 55.76 40 Reject Ho
H0 :δ1 =…=δ36=0 132.49 184.58 55.76 40 Reject Ho
a If the test involving g=0, then λ has mixed Chi-square distribution. The critical values for 
this test are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986).  
 
Table 8.22 Estimates derived from the translog stochastic frontier model: Thai 
and Australian power plants  
Description Estimate 
Capital Elasticity of Output 0.002 
Labour Elasticity of Output -0.036 
Fuel Elasticity of Output 1.021 
Return to Scale Elasticity 0.986 
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8.8.3 Consistency of results from Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis 
Table 8.18 presents the average scores of technical efficiency over the period of 
study obtained from DEA CRS, DEA VRS and SFA of 24 Thai power plants 
(number 1–24) and 13 Australian power plants (number 25–37), respectively.  
The first impression is of hugely different scores of each plant obtained from 
different approaches. Owing to the scale effect it is not surprising the scores from 
DEA CRS are lower than those from DEA VRS and SFA. Yet under the same 
variable return to scale assumption, DEA VRS and SFA scores are also not 
consistent. Therefore, the consistency conditions in ranking and identification of the 
most and least efficient power plants are considered again. 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the same approach (DEA) and the 
different approaches (DEA and SFA) in Table 8.24 are positive, quite high and 
statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level of significance, therefore the 
results of various techniques are consistent in terms of ranking.  
 
Table 8.23 Correlation coefficients between efficiency scores obtained from 
different models: Thai and Australian power plants 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
DEA CRS 1 0.85** 0.52** 
DEA VRS  1 0.58** 
SFA   1 
** 1 % level of significance (two sided) 
 
Table 8.24 Spearman rank-order correlations between efficiency scores 
obtained from different models: Thai and Australian power plants 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
DEA CRS 1 0.87** 0.55** 
DEA VRS  1 0.61** 
SFA   1 
** 1 % level of significance (two sided) 
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Table 8.25 Consistency in identifying the best and worst plants across models: 
Thai and Australian power plants 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
DEA CRS  0.7 0.6 
DEA VRS 0.8  0.5 
SFA 0.5 0.6  
Note: The upper triangle represents the best plants. Each number is the proportion of plants 
that were identified by one model as the most efficient ten plants that were also identified in 
the most efficient ten plants by the other model. The lower triangle shows the worst plants. 
Each number is the proportion of plants that were identified by one model as in the least 
efficient ten plants that were also identified as among the least efficient ten plants by other 
model. 
 
Table 8.25 shows the consistency in identifying the best and worst plants by different 
techniques.  
The DEA and SFA methods tended to identify the same plants as the best and worst 
power plants. The proportions are pretty high when the nonparametric methods 
(DEA CRS and DEA VRS) are compared. Table 8.26 shows the ranking of power 
plants in different models in detail. The ranking from tobit regressions of both CRS 
and VRS models (T CRS and T VRS) are almost exactly the same as those of DEA 
CRS and DEA VRS, respectively. It results from the tobit regression modelled by the 
plant dummy variables that do not take the other effects on the inefficiency into 
account.  
The ranking shows that among the most efficient ten power plants there is only one 
Australian power plant (number 29) from DEA VRS model, whereas there are six 
Australian plants from DEA VRS and SFA models and four Australian plants from 
DEA CRS reported as the plants among the least efficient ten power plants.  
Clearly the Thai power plants during 1990s are more technically efficient than 
Australian plants during 1980s. This result is confirmed by the average scores of the 
power plants from each country as shown in Table 8.27. Thai power plants yield the 
much higher technical efficiency scores on average than the Australian ones across 
three methods. The partial factor productivities are again employed to check the 
consistency of the results. It is clear that on average the partial productivities of 
capital, labour and fuel of Thai power plants are higher than those of Australian 
plants.  
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Table 8.26 Comparison of ranking of plants across models: Thai and 
Australian power plants  
Rank DEA CRS DEA VRS T CRS T VRS SFA 
1 16 16 16 16 1  
2 18 23 13 23 3  
3 13 24 18 24 8  
4 10 10 17 8  10 
5 17 8 10 10 11 
6 2 18 2 18 13 
7 3 13 3 13 14 
8 6 3 6 17 5  
9 11 17 11 3 6 
10 8 29 8 29 23 
11 7 6 7 6 30 
12 14 2 14 2  2 
13 5 11 5 11 7 
14 9 7 9 7 15 
15 12 14 12 5  16 
16 1 5 1  14 29 
17 27 15 27 15 33 
18 15 27 15 25 17 
19 29 12 29 27 24 
20 4 9 4 12 12 
21 25 25 25 9 31 
22 33 30 33 30 25 
23 30 1 30 1 9  
24 36 33 36 33 37 
25 26 4 26 4  4 
26 28 26 28 26 34 
27 31 36 31 36 21 
28 34 28 34 28 18 
29 21 31 21 31 27 
30 32 34 32 34 20 
31 37 21 37 19 26 
32 20 19 20 21 36 
33 35 32 35 32 19 
34 19 37 19 37 32 
35 22 22 22 22 22 
36 24 20 24 20 35 
37 23 35 23 35 28 
Note: The numbers in the table represent the plant number. 
 280
Table 8.27 Descriptive statistics of technical efficiency scores: Thai and 
Australian power plants 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA Y/K Y/L Y/F 
Thai power plants       
Mean 0.69 0.79 0.92 4.28 12.19 0.09 
Median 0.78 0.83 0.96 5.37 7.49 0.1 
Minimum 0.23 0.42 0.7 0.25 0.88 0.05 
Maximum 1 1 0.99 7.17 65.36 0.12 
Standard deviation 0.24 0.17 0.08 2.26 14.16 0.02 
Number of power plants 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Australian power plants       
Mean 0.6 0.63 0.83 4.15 8.98 0.08 
Median 0.62 0.64 0.86 4.52 6.59 0.08 
Minimum 0.31 0.35 0.52 1.54 1.22 0.05 
Maximum 0.75 0.85 0.97 5.75 21.46 0.1 
Standard deviation 0.13 0.15 0.13 1.20 6.01 0.01 
Number of power plants 13 13 13 13 13 13 
 
It should be noted that in this study the output of Thai and Australian data is 
differently defined. Whereas the electricity generated is used for Thai output, the 
electricity sent out is the output variable for Australia, and the generation technology 
of Australian plants during the 1980s was definitely not as sophisticated as that of 
Thai plants during the 1990s. In particular the main fuels used by power plants from 
each country are different with the coal-based plants having lower designed energy 
efficiency.  
8.9 Empirical results: International comparison of electricity suppliers 
8.9.1 Data Envelopment Analysis  
This section calculates firm-level global and pure technical efficiency scores and the 
scale efficiency measures of 35 electricity suppliers from various countries. 
Table 8.28 presents the results of the DEA approach.  
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Table 8.28 Technical efficiency scores from Data Envelopment Analysis: 
Electricity Suppliers 
Electricity Suppliers DEA CRS DEA VRS Scale Efficiency Scale Type 
VEO (Austria) 0.62 0.64 0.97 IRS 
Electrabel (Belgium) 0.81 0.84 0.97 IRS 
Danske Elvaerkers Forening 
(Denmark) 0.83 1 0.83 DRS 
Suomen Sahkolaitosyhdistys 
(Finland) 0.81 0.85 0.96 IRS 
EdF (France) 0.82 1 0.82 DRS 
VDEW (Germany) 0.78 1 0.78 DRS 
PPC (Greece) 0.80 0.84 0.95 IRS 
ESB (Ireland) 0.75 0.93 0.81 IRS 
ENEL (Italy) 0.62 0.64 0.98 DRS 
Oslo Energi (Norway) 1 1 1 - 
EDP (Portugal) 0.65 0.7 0.94 IRS 
UNESA (Spain) 0.64 0.64 1 - 
SSPB (Sweden) 0.97 1 0.97 DRS 
United Kingdom 0.78 1 0.78 DRS 
BC Hydro 0.86 0.87 0.99 IRS 
Hydro-Quebec 1 1 1 - 
Ontario Hydro 0.93 0.94 0.99 DRS 
TransAlta 1 1 1 - 
Carolina P&L 1 1 1 - 
Duke Power 0.81 0.82 0.98 IRS 
Los Angeles dept. W&P 0.60 0.67 0.89 IRS 
Chubu Electric 0.74 0.74 1 - 
Kansai Electric 0.68 0.68 0.99 DRS 
Tokyo Electric 0.85 1 0.85 DRS 
Edenor (Argentina) 0.91 1 0.91 DRS 
ESKOM (South Africa) 0.87 1 0.87 DRS 
Korea Electric Power 
Corporation 1 1 1 - 
Taiwan Power Compay 1 1 1 - 
New South Wales 0.75 0.77 0.97 IRS 
Victoria 0.87 0.93 0.94 IRS 
Queensland 0.84 0.93 0.9 IRS 
Western Australia 1 1 1 - 
Tasmania 0.72 0.93 0.78 IRS 
China Light and Power 0.59 0.66 0.9 IRS 
EGAT (Thailand) 0.99 1 0.99 IRS 
Mean 0.83 0.89 0.93  
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The average global technical efficiency scores of electricity suppliers are found to be 
relatively high at 0.83. The relatively high average scale efficiency score, which is 
0.93, suggests that scale inefficiency is a less serious problem than pure technical 
inefficiency, which is 0.11, in the suppliers under investigation.  
Seven suppliers, namely Oslo Energi from Norway, Hydro Quebec from Canada, 
TransAlta from Canada, Carolina P&L from the US, Korea Electric Power 
Corporation, Taiwan Power Company and Western Australia, are fully technically 
efficient under the CRS assumption.  
When considering only pure technical efficiency by estimating the VRS linear 
programming, the results show that the pure technical efficiency scores of the sample 
group vary widely from 0.64 to 1. Sixteen suppliers obtain the full score of pure 
technical efficiency. Seven of them are the same suppliers achieving the full score of 
global technical efficiency who also achieve the full scores of scale efficiency. 
The other nine suppliers are Danske Elvaerkers Forening from Denmark, EdF from 
France, VDEW from Germany, SSPB from Sweden, suppliers from the UK, Tokyo 
Electric from Japan, Edenor from Argentina, ESKOM from South Africa and EGAT 
from Thailand. These suppliers have a full score in the VRS model but a relatively 
lower score from the CRS model.  
It indicates that they have fully technical efficiency in operation but not in scale 
efficiency. As shown in Table 8.28, the scale efficiency score of these suppliers are 
lower than 1 whereas those of the former group are exactly 1.  
The scale inefficiency of most of suppliers in this group comes from operation in the 
decreasing return to scale region, with the exception of EGAT. It should be noted 
that most of the fully technically efficient suppliers are from OECD countries 
although suppliers from non-OECD countries: Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, 
Argentina and Thailand also achieved the full scores. 
When considering the whole group of electricity suppliers, 15 of the 35 electricity 
suppliers are scale inefficient as they operate in the increasing return to scale region, 
whereas 11 suppliers are scale inefficient due to operating in the decreasing return to 
scale region.  
The former group operates at a scale less than the long run optimum. Therefore, to 
improve performance, scale expansion is required, but the latter group should reduce 
their operation.  
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8.9.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Since cross section data is employed in this analysis, the stochastic production 
frontier is defined as  
( ) (, i iv ui iy f x eβ −= )
)i
        (8.17) 
i = 1, 2, …, N, where 
yi is the output of the firm i;   
xi denotes a (1×K) vector of inputs;  
f(.) is a suitable functional form (such as Cobb Douglas or Translog functional form);  
β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; 
ui is an inefficiency term and assumed to be non-negative, and independently and 
identically distributed as the half normal distribution39, N(0, σ2); and 
vi is random error and is assumed to be independently and identically distributed as 
the normal distribution N(0, σv2). 
The technical efficiency measures are obtained as  
( /iuiTE E e ε−= ,        (8.18) 
where i iv uiε = − .  
Following Battese and Coelli (1988), the predictor of technical efficiency is obtained 
by using 
21 ( / ) exp( / 2)
1 ( / )
A i A
i
i A
TE i A
σ γε σ γε σγε σ
−Φ −= −Φ + ,     (8.19) 
where is the distribution function of the standard normal random variable, (.)Φ
2 2/ sγ σ σ= , 2 2 2s vσ σ σ= +  and 1/ 22(1 )A sσ γ γ σ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ . 
FRONTIER Version 4.1 was employed to estimate the stochastic frontier by 
maximum likelihood estimation and provide the estimated technical efficiency scores 
of each firm. 
The translogarithmic production function is adopted for this analysis: 
                                                 
39 Since half-normal distribution has a mode at zero, it is prone to result in the relatively high technical 
efficiency. To overcome this problem, truncated-normal distribution, which is a generalisation of the 
half-normal distribution is proposed (Coelli et al. 1998:199–200). The author attempted to estimate 
the production frontier with the truncated-normal distribution and test the null hypothesis that the half 
normal model is adequate against it. The result shows that the truncated-normal model is rejected. 
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ln(Qi) = β0 + βHln(Hi) +βTln(Ti)+ βLln(Li) + βHH[ln(Hi)]2 + βTT[ln(Ti)]2  
+ βLL[ln(Li)]2 + 2[βHTln(Hi)ln(Ti) + βHLln(Hi)ln(Li) + βTLln(Ti)ln(Li)]   
+ vi - ui,         (8.20) 
where Qi is electricity output (GWh) by the i-th firm; Hi, Ti and Li represent hydro 
capacity (MW), thermal capacity (MW) and number of full-time employees 
(persons), respectively. 
As reported in Table 8.29, g is 1 which indicates that the residual variation results 
from the inefficiency effect. The one-sided generalised likelihood ratio test of g =0 
yields a statistic of 11.92 which is greater than the 5 per cent critical value of 2.71.40 
The estimates of technical efficiency scores of each firm are shown in Table 8.30. 
 
Table 8.29 Maximum-likelihood estimates of translog stochastic frontier 
model: Electricity suppliers  
Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t-Statistics 
β0 -0.4 1.56 -0.26 
βH 0.89 0.61 1.45 
βT 1.13 0.43 2.63 
βL -0.33 0.74 -0.44 
βHH 0.04 0.01 3.64 
βTT 0.04 0.04 0.98 
βLL -0.08 0.03 -2.49 
βHT -0.13 0.03 -5.26 
βHL 0.06 0.02 2.63 
βTL 0.05 0.04 1.45 
σ2 0.08 0.02 3.8 
γ 1 0.001 904.07 
Log-Likelihood 18.33   
 
                                                 
40 Since the likelihood ratio statistic has asymptotic distribution which is a mixture of chi-square 
distributions, the critical value is taken from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986). As previously argued 
that t test of g is sufficient, the t statistics of g is also tested. The result obtained complies with the 
likelihood ratio test that the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 8.30 Technical efficiency scores and descriptive statistics: Electricity 
suppliers 
Electricity Supplier DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
VEO (Austria) 0.62 0.64 0.85 
Electrabel (Belgium) 0.81 0.84 0.8 
Danske Elvaerkers Forening (Denmark) 0.83 1 0.48 
Suomen Sahkolaitosyhdistys (Finland) 0.81 0.85 0.77 
EdF (France) 0.82 1 0.92 
VDEW (Germany) 0.78 1 0.87 
PPC (Greece) 0.8 0.84 0.78 
ESB (Ireland) 0.75 0.93 0.92 
ENEL (Italy) 0.62 0.64 0.6 
Oslo Energi (Norway) 1 1 0.93 
EDP (Portugal) 0.65 0.7 0.58 
UNESA (Spain) 0.64 0.64 0.63 
SSPB (Sweden) 0.97 1 0.95 
United Kingdom 0.78 1 0.8 
BC Hydro 0.86 0.87 0.81 
Hydro-Quebec 1 1 0.93 
Ontario Hydro 0.93 0.94 0.92 
TransAlta 1 1 0.94 
Carolina P&L 1 1 0.85 
Duke Power 0.81 0.82 0.79 
Los Angeles dept. W&P 0.60 0.67 0.56 
Chubu Electric 0.74 0.74 0.73 
Kansai Electric 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Tokyo Electric 0.85 1 0.89 
Edenor (Argentina) 0.91 1 0.81 
ESKOM (South Africa) 0.87 1 0.84 
Korea Electric Power Corporation 1 1 1 
Taiwan Power Company 1 1 0.97 
New South Wales 0.75 0.77 0.71 
Victoria 0.87 0.93 0.83 
Queensland 0.84 0.93 0.88 
Western Australia 1 1 0.97 
Tasmania 0.72 0.93 0.84 
China Light and Power 0.59 0.66 0.59 
EGAT (Thailand) 0.99 1 1 
Mean – OECD countries 0.83 0.87 0.8 
Mean – Non OECD countries 0.89 0.94 0.87 
Mean 0.83 0.89 0.82 
Median 0.82 0.93 0.84 
Minimum 0.59 0.64 0.48 
Maximum 1 1 1 
Standard deviation 0.13 0.14 0.14 
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8.9.3 Consistency of results from Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis 
As discussed in Section 8.9.1, the results from the nonparametric approach (DEA 
CRS and DEA VRS) are very similar. When considering the frontier under the 
variable return to scale assumption, the efficiency levels of each firm from DEA 
VRS and SFA are quite different. The scores from SFA are lower than DEA VRS for 
most of the suppliers and on average. DEA often give higher mean technical 
efficiency score relative to SFA because of the high degree of flexibility in the DEA 
frontier. 
It is inconsistent with the proposition that scores from SFA should be higher than 
those from DEA because it separates the technical inefficiency effect from the error 
term. Since the estimated g, 1, suggests that the error variation is mainly due to the 
inefficiency effect, undoubtedly the technical efficiency scores obtained from SFA 
are small, however their average scores of technical efficiency are very close.  
Again the consistency conditions in ranking and identification are tested. The 
statistically significant, high and positive Spearman rank correlations reported in 
Table 8.32 and high proportions of electricity suppliers that were identified as the 
best and worst suppliers by few pairs of techniques as shown in Table 8.33 satisfy 
both consistency conditions, respectively. 
 
Table 8.31 Correlation coefficients between efficiency scores obtained from 
different models: Electricity suppliers 
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
DEA CRS 1 0.85** 0.76** 
DEA VRS  1 0.76** 
SFA   1 
** 1 % level of significance (two sided) 
Table 8.32 Spearman rank-order correlations between efficiency scores 
obtained from different models: Electricity suppliers  
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
DEA CRS 1 0.8** 0.8** 
DEA VRS  1 0.76** 
SFA   1 
** 1 % level of significance (two sided) 
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 Table 8.33 Consistency in identifying the best and worst plants across models: 
Electricity suppliers  
 DEA CRS DEA VRS SFA 
DEA CRS  1 0.89 
DEA VRS 0.89  0.89 
SFA 0.78 0.89  
Note: The upper triangle represents the best suppliers. Each number is the proportion of 
suppliers that were identified by one model as among the most efficient nine suppliers that 
were also identified in the most efficient nine suppliers by the other model. The lower 
triangle shows the worst suppliers. Each number is the proportion of suppliers that were 
identified by one model as among the least efficient nine suppliers that were also identified 
as the least efficient nine suppliers by other model. 
 
The conclusion made in Section 8.9.1 is valid for evaluation of performance of 
electricity suppliers, however there are some remarks.  
Among the top nine suppliers ranked by the SFA method, ESB from Ireland is 
ranked the ninth firm but by DEA VRS, it is the twentieth firm.  
Among the least efficient nine suppliers ranked by SFA, Danske Elvaerkers Forening 
from Denmark is the least efficient firm but by DEA VRS, it is a fully efficient firm.  
Large changes in ranks are possible between DEA and SFA when the data point is at 
the fringe of the sample data because the DEA frontier will bend to accommodate the 
observation. 
Since this study focuses on the performance of EGAT, this finding is not serious 
because it does not change the conclusion regarding the EGAT performance. 
Moreover the efficiency score of EGAT by SFA, 1, is not different from DEA VRS 
at all.  
Also the results from both techniques indicate that on average EGAT is more 
efficient than the suppliers from both OECD and non-OECD countries.  
This result is consistent with the previous studies by Yunos and Hawdon (1997) and 
Meibodi (1998). It contrasts with the general argument for privatisation of EGAT 
that under public ownership EGAT performed poorly.41  
                                                 
41 The implications from results of frontier analysis should be carefully drawn. Quiggin (2002b) 
pointed out clearly the limitations of both DEA and SFA and the danger of over-reliance on the results 
for the policy implementation. 
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8.10 Concluding remarks 
The main argument for the privatisation of EGAT is the improvement in operating 
efficiency. This claim is based on the assumption that under public ownership, the 
enterprise performs poorly. 
This study has examined the technical efficiency of EGAT in both plant and firm 
level by both DEA and SFA. The three data sets: Thai power plants, Thai and 
Australian power plants and electricity suppliers in various countries were employed. 
The implications that can be drawn from the results of each data set are different. 
Firstly, the empirical results from evaluating the Thai power plants are beneficial to 
the internal management, enabling the EGAT executives to improve the performance 
of the less efficient power plants. EGAT can also use these measures as the criteria 
for the future IPP and SPP bids. 
Secondly, comparison of Thai power plants in the 1990s with Australian power 
plants in 1980s shows that Thai power plants have better managerial ability. Under 
the public ownership, the power plants from developing country, in this case, 
Thailand can perform better than those from a developed country, like Australia. The 
level of country development is not an indicator of plant-level performance. 
Lastly, the inter-country comparison of electricity utilities confirms that at the firm 
level EGAT is one of the best performers. The proposition that EGAT should be 
privatised due to the poor performance either in terms of financial performance42 or 
efficiency is not justified. The expected efficiency improvement after privatisation is 
negligible. It is still not conclusive, however, whether EGAT should be privatised 
because the other justifications for privatisation, such as fiscal burden and less 
competition, have not yet been resolved. 
 
                                                 
42 As discussed in Section 3.2.1, EGAT with monopoly power has good financial performance. 
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 Chapter 9 
  
 FISCAL ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATISATION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4 there are several main objectives of privatisation including 
efficiency improvement, promotion of competition and fiscal benefits to government 
in the form of debt reduction.  
Whether the privatisation of an state owned enterprise (SOE) is desirable or not 
depends on the objectives that the government aims to achieve. Therefore, 
approaches to assess the desirability of privatisation vary according to the objectives 
of privatisation.  
The main objective of this chapter is to evaluate the fiscal benefits and costs of 
privatisation.  
Before discussing an analysis of fiscal benefits of privatisation, the term privatisation 
as defined in this chapter needs to be understood.  
According to the Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform (Master Plan) 
(Royal Thai Government 1998) privatisation is defined to include all measures which 
increase private sector participation. It includes both transactional methods of 
privatisation (such as divestiture of SOEs or assets, concession arrangements) and 
nontransactional methods (such as management contracts, leasing, outsourcing); 
deregulation which increases competition; the creation of needed regulatory bodies; 
and the introduction of new competitors (Office of State Enterprise and Government 
Securities 2000:6). 
Following King’s (1992) view on privatisation as discussed in Chapter 4, this 
definition of privatisation is too broad. It includes irrelevant, industry-wide concepts 
such as deregulation; the creation of regulatory bodies and the introduction of new 
competitors.  
These concepts are needed for the promotion of private sector participation but they 
are distinct concepts from privatisation. An example of this is how deregulation or 
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the introduction of new competitors without privatisation can consequently promote 
private sector participation. 
Privatisation should be narrowed down to involve changes in ownership, governance 
and the organisation of an enterprise with the aim of improvement in cost efficiency. 
Privatisation, therefore, involves both transactional and nontransactional methods. 
Although there are various transactional and nontransactional methods of 
privatisation, to evaluate the fiscal benefits of privatisation, a one-off asset sale, a 
widely adopted type of transactional methods of privatisation, is assumed for 
simplicity, in this chapter. Also, full privatisation will be assumed for assessment.  
The assessment will be separated into the generation activity (Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT)) and the regulated distribution activity (Metropolitan 
Electricity Authority (MEA) and Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA)). Due to the 
different characteristics of these activities, different assessment approaches will be 
adopted. The data employed in this chapter is from the annual reports of the three 
SOEs. 
In Section 9.2, a framework for fiscal assessment of privatisation will be presented 
and issues in asset valuation, particularly in the public sector, will be discussed. A 
bottom-up valuation approach is derived as the preferred option. In Sections 9.3 and 
9.4, fiscal assessments of the privatisation of EGAT, and MEA and PEA will be 
conducted and reported, while Section 9.5 concludes the chapter. 
9.2 Framework for fiscal assessment of privatisation 
As discussed in Chapter 4 privatisation is fiscally beneficial for the public sector only 
when asset sales have an effect on public sector net worth.  
To assess the fiscal impact of privatisation of a publicly-owned enterprise, a 
valuation of the enterprise under continued public ownership is required. If this value 
is smaller (larger) than the sale price realised through privatisation, then privatisation 
increases (decreases) public sector net worth. Hence privatisation is (is not) justified. 
There is a large body of literature on the valuation of firms in private ownership. 
Damodaran (1994) provides a useful guide.  
To value public enterprises there are some issues that should be addressed as follows. 
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9.2.1 Economic analysis and fiscal analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 4 the question of whether government should privatise or 
not can be answered by the cost and benefit analysis considering various economic 
agents: consumers, workers, asset buyers and government. Under certain conditions, 
privatisation will be neutral in its effects on consumers, workers and buyers of the 
asset and can be confined to the fiscal effects on government. 
Privatisation will be neutral for consumers if the firm operates in a competitive 
market, or if regulation is competitively neutral, that is, if it appropriately resembles 
competitive market conditions. The main requirement for competitive neutrality is 
that price or revenue caps should be based on efficient costs of production, 
disregarding any cost advantages or disadvantages arising from particular structures 
of ownership. 
Privatisation is logically distinct from industry restructuring, although the two 
policies are frequently adopted as part of a package of reform in infrastructure 
industries such as the electricity supply industry (ESI).  Fiscal analysis of 
privatisation can therefore be undertaken based on the assumption that whatever 
changes in market structure are undertaken, the result will be the same, whether or 
not privatisation takes place. 
Privatisation will be neutral for asset buyers if the asset is sold in an efficient and 
competitive capital market and if there is no buyer with specific cost advantages 
gaining an above-normal rate of profit from ownership of the enterprise. Under these 
circumstances, the value of any increase in operating efficiency is capitalised into the 
sale price of the asset. The reduction in value that arises if private investors face a 
higher cost of capital than the public sector is also capitalised into the sale price. 
Privatisation will be neutral for workers if wages are initially set at a competitive 
level and there is full employment. Under these conditions, workers displaced as a 
result of efficiency improvements in a privatised firm will be re-employed elsewhere 
in the economy at the competitive market wage. However, these conditions are not 
realistic, because public enterprises frequently pay above-market wages, and labour 
markets rarely function well enough to achieve the full employment assumption. 
An alternative way to achieve neutrality is to observe that the process of 
corporatisation under public ownership usually results in reductions in employment 
comparable to those happened under privatisation. If projections of earnings under 
continued public ownership incorporate a continuation of reductions in employment, 
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transfers from workers will be netted out of any comparison of privatisation and 
continued public ownership. 
To sum up, under reasonable conditions most of the economic effects of 
privatisation, as distinct from industry restructuring and corporatisation, will be 
captured by the sale price realised for the asset. Under these conditions, a complete 
analysis of net economic costs and benefits of privatisation can be achieved by an 
analysis of fiscal costs and benefits of privatisation. 
9.2.2 Issues in asset valuation 
To conduct a fiscal cost and benefit analysis, asset valuation methods and choices of 
cash flow will be discussed. 
The most common asset valuation approach is based on discounted cash flows. 
Choices for cash flows usually include earnings, dividends and measures of free cash 
flow. Given a projection of future cash flows, a risk-adjusted discount rate, r, can be 
applied to estimate a present value. In the simplest case, the relevant cash flows grow 
indefinitely at constant rate, g. With the initial value of cash flow, c, the discounted 
cash flows is 
( )
c
g r− . 
In the more general case that firms go through a life cycle, either a more complex 
estimation (such as an S-shaped projection of current cash flows) or separate 
projection of costs and revenues separately to obtain relevant cash flows is 
recommended. 
Another issue is the choice of cash flow for valuation. If value of equity is chosen, 
concern is the difficulty to implement because payments to equity take the form of 
dividends which firm’s dividend policy changes over time. 
The value of the firm is equal to equity plus debt, therefore it is frequently more 
satisfactory to estimate the value of the entire firm by the present value of earnings 
and subtract the value of debt to obtain the value of equity as a residual.  
A difficulty with this approach occurs if debt levels vary over time. To illustrate how 
to handle this problem, it is useful to consider conditions under which multiple-based 
estimates will yield the same outcome whether they are based on dividends or on 
earnings. Assume that the firm operates with constant returns to scale and maintains 
a stable dividend policy and debt-equity ratio, and that the rate of interest on debt is 
constant. Then earnings, debt and interest payments will grow at the same rate of 
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dividends. In this case the present value of dividends is equal to the present value of 
earnings less the present value of interest payments. 
9.2.3 Issues in public sector 
Although asset valuation issues are discussed, specific issues in valuation of public 
enterprises have to be addressed to take into account the special characteristics of 
public enterprises. 
The first issue is the choice of discount rate. As discussed in Chapter 4, the private 
sector discount rate derived from the captal asset pricing model is not appropriate for 
valuation of public enterprises because it relies on strong assumptions about the 
efficiency of private capital markets. 
Moreover the private sector discount rate incorporates a large market risk premium 
which is not relevant to public sector because it reflects the weakness in spreading 
risk by private firms rather than the social cost of risk. Hence the private sector 
discount rate is higher than the social cost of capital. Grant and Quiggin (2003) 
examine this issue and conclude that the appropriate rate of discount for public 
enterprises is close to the real bond rate. 
Another issue is that many public enterprises are monopolies which are regulated to 
restrict monopoly power and are required to pursue some mixture of social objectives 
at the expense of profit maximisation.  
An issue which can be disregarded in valuation of public enterprises is the treatment 
of tax payments. Because public enterprises are owned by the same government that 
collects taxes, the rate at which earnings are taxed is irrelevant. Finally, both taxes 
and post-tax earnings are received by the same entity. 
9.2.4 Evaluation approach  
This chapter employs a bottom-up valuation approach introduced by Quiggin 
(1998b) to evaluate the fiscal assessment of privatisation.  
Under various assumptions the simulations of streams of forgone earnings (fiscal 
costs) and streams of interest saving arising when sale proceeds are used to repay 
debt (fiscal benefits) are conducted. It is assumed that any interest payments in 
excess of dividends forgone are used to repay additional debt.  
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Two streams are compared. This results in a stream of net costs or benefits from 
privatisation that may be converted to a present value to derive an evaluation of 
fiscal impact of privatisation.  
In the case analysed by Quiggin (1998b), the sale price was already predetermined. 
The analysis was aimed at determining whether privatisation would yield positive or 
negative net fiscal benefits given the proposed sale price. In the present case, the sale 
price is not predetermined.  
Several approaches are adopted to overcome this problem. First, an analysis similar 
to that of Quiggin is undertaken using a projected sale price derived as a multiple of 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) for 2003. Second, an estimation of break-
even price, at which privatisation is neutral in fiscal terms, is conducted. Third, for 
monopoly distribution enterprises, sale prices may be analysed in relation to the asset 
value determined for regulatory purposes. 
9.3 Fiscal assessment of privatisation of Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand 
An enterprise-level fiscal assessment of EGAT will be conducted in this section. 
EGAT is responsible for electricity generation and transmission in Thailand. 
Separate financial and accounting data on EGAT’s activities, generation and 
transmission, is not publicly available. According to the last ESI restructuring plan, 
Thailand will adopt the enhanced single buyer (ESB) model in which EGAT will not 
be either horizontally or vertically separated. After privatisation, EGAT still plays 
the same role in the electricity generation and transmission business.  
Full privatisation taking place in 2003 will be assumed for this analysis. The 
financial and accounting data of EGAT from annual report in the year leading up to 
privatisation, assuming 2003, will be employed for estimation of sale price and value 
of firms under continued public ownership.  
The section adopts the framework for fiscal assessment of the privatisation of EGAT 
developed in Section 9.2.  
Simulations of the sale price which will be converted into the stream of interest 
saving as fiscal benefits of privatisation and compared with the simulated stream of 
forgone earnings under continued ownership as fiscal costs of privatisation are 
conducted under various assumptions. Also, the break-even sale price at which 
privatisation is neutral in fiscal terms will be estimated. 
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9.3.1 Assumptions 
To make a comparison between retention and sale of EGAT, the assumptions on 
annual variables are that the inflation rate is 1.8 per cent (obtained from Bank of 
Thailand), depreciation rate is 3 per cent, and the dividend ratio is 30 per cent. 
Nominal interest rate or discount rate, proxied by the government bond rate, is 5.1 
per cent. As discussed in Chapter 4, the discount rate for analysis of public enterprise 
should be the risk free rate or government bond rate not the private sector discount 
rate private sector.  
Thus the real interest rate is 3.3 per cent, while the growth rate of operating expenses 
and liabilities is assumed to be 5 per cent. These are the assumptions employed in all 
projections of the retention and sale of EGAT.  
Three projections of retention of EGAT varying by the growth rate of operating 
revenues will then be presented.  
In the first projection, it is assumed that the operating revenues grow at 5 per cent. 
This scenario is designed to cope with the normal situation where after privatisation 
there is no dramatic increase in the operating revenue since the new regulatory 
policies may constrain price and market share of EGAT.  
In the second projection, it is assumed that the operating revenues grow at 6 per cent 
whereas the operating expenses grow at 5 per cent. It is designed to represent the 
high-growth situation. The rapid revenue growth will come about because after 
privatisation EGAT plays a dominant role in generation activity and is a natural 
monopolist in transmission activity, a situation exacerbated when the regulator 
choose to adopt a light-handed policy. Under this assumption, EGAT’s operating 
revenues grow at a faster rate than operating expenses.  
In the last projection, it is assumed that the operating revenue grows at 3.5 per cent 
while the operating expense grows at 5 per cent. This scenario represents the 
situation when the regulator may make an unfavorable decision to EGAT such as 
opening up the competitive market for new entry and allowing low-cost access to 
transmission systems, which results in a decrease in market share of EGAT and 
eventually result in a slow growth of revenue for EGAT. 
Two possible sale prices are considered, representing multiples of 12 and 15 applied 
to the 2003 EBIT. In addition, a break-even price is derived. 
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Table 9.1 Projection of EGAT revenue and earning 2004–13: normal growth 
rate of operating revenue (billion baht) 
Yeara Revenueb Expensec EBITd Intereste Pretax profit Dividend 
Retained 
earnings 
2004 241.92 194.8 35.87 6.55 29.33 8.8 20.53 
2005 254.02 204.54 37.67 6.25 31.42 9.43 21.99 
2006 266.72 214.76 39.55 5.91 33.64 10.09 23.55 
2007 280.05 225.5 41.53 5.54 35.99 10.8 25.19 
2008 294.06 236.78 43.61 5.12 38.48 11.55 26.94 
2009 308.76 248.61 45.79 4.66 41.13 12.34 28.79 
2010 324.2 261.05 48.07 4.15 43.93 13.18 30.75 
2011 340.41 274.1 50.48 3.58 46.9 14.07 32.83 
2012 357.43 287.8 53 2.96 50.04 15.01 35.03 
2013 375.3 302.19 55.65 2.28 53.37 16.01 37.36 
a Year ended September 30 
b Operating revenue 
c Operating expense excluding depreciation, interest and abnormal 
d Earning before interest and tax 
e Interest on long term debt 
Table 9.2 Projection of EGAT revenue and earning 2004–13: high growth 
rate of operating revenue (billion baht) 
Yeara Revenueb Expensec EBITd Intereste Pretax profit Dividend 
Retained 
earnings 
2004 244.22 194.80 38.18 6.55 31.63 9.49 22.14 
2005 258.88 204.54 42.42 6.36 36.06 10.82 25.24 
2006 274.41 214.76 47.01 6.07 40.94 12.28 28.66 
2007 290.87 225.50 51.98 5.67 46.31 13.89 32.41 
2008 308.33 236.78 57.35 5.14 52.21 15.66 36.54 
2009 326.83 248.61 63.16 4.48 58.68 17.60 41.08 
2010 346.44 261.05 69.43 3.65 65.78 19.73 46.05 
2011 367.22 274.1 76.21 2.65 73.56 22.07 51.49 
2012 389.26 287.80 83.52 1.46 82.06 24.62 57.44 
2013 412.61 302.19 91.41 0.05 91.36 27.41 63.95 
a Year ended September 30 
b Operating revenue 
c Operating expense excluding depreciation, interest and abnormal 
d Earning before interest and tax 
e Interest on long term debt 
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Table 9.3 Projection of EGAT revenue and earning 2004–13: low growth rate 
of operating revenue (billion baht) 
Yeara Revenueb Expensec EBITd Intereste Pretax profit Dividend 
Retained 
earnings 
2004 238.46 194.8 32.42 6.55 25.87 7.76 18.11 
2005 246.81 204.54 30.63 6.09 24.54 7.36 17.18 
2006 255.45 214.76 28.63 5.68 22.95 6.88 16.06 
2007 264.39 225.5 26.42 5.35 21.06 6.32 14.74 
2008 273.64 236.78 23.96 5.1 18.85 5.66 13.2 
2009 283.22 248.61 21.24 4.95 16.3 4.89 11.41 
2010 293.13 261.05 18.26 4.9 13.36 4.01 9.35 
2011 303.39 274.1 14.98 4.96 10.02 3.01 7.01 
2012 314.01 287.8 11.4 5.17 6.23 1.87 4.36 
2013 325 302.19 7.48 5.52 1.96 0.59 1.37 
a Year ended September 30 
b Operating revenue 
c Operating expense excluding depreciation, interest and abnormal 
d Earning before interest and tax 
e Interest on long term debt 
 
9.3.2 Projections and results 
The results of three scenarios in ten years (2004–13) are shown as shown in Table 
9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 respectively. 
Table 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 show the projected operating revenues at 5, 6 and 3.5 per cent 
of growth rate under normal, high and low growth rate scenarios respectively 
whereas the projected expenses grow at the same rate, 5 per cent. The pretax profits 
are split into dividends and retained earnings. To consider the fiscal costs of 
privatisation of EGAT, the flow of forgone pretax profits, including dividends and 
retained earnings will be assessed. The higher the forgone pretax profits are, the 
higher fiscal costs of privatisation of EGAT are. 
Under the normal growth rate scenario the forgone pretax profits are increasing as 
time goes by, however, the forgone profits are still much lower than profits under the 
high-growth rate situation. In 2013, the result of the first scenario in Table 9.4 shows 
that the pretax profit is 53.37 billion baht which is lower than the pretax profit of 
91.36 billion baht under the second projection in Table 9.5. 
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Table 9.4 EGAT sale and retention options with a normal growth rate 
projection  2004–13 (billion baht) 
Yeara Profit Forgone 
EBIT Multiple = 12 
Sale price = 237.62 billion baht  
EBIT Multiple = 15 
Sale price = 329.12 billion baht 
  Interest saving 
Net gain 
or loss  
Interest 
saving 
Net gain 
or loss 
2004 29.33 12.12 -17.21  16.79 -12.54 
2005 31.42 12.74 -18.68  17.64 -13.78 
2006 33.64 13.39 -20.25  18.54 -15.1 
2007 35.99 14.07 -21.92  19.49 -16.5 
2008 38.48 14.79 -23.7  20.48 -18 
2009 41.13 15.54 -25.59  21.52 -19.6 
2010 43.93 16.33 -27.6  22.62 -21.31 
2011 46.9 17.17 -29.73  23.78 -23.12 
2012 50.04 18.04 -32  24.99 -25.05 
2013 53.37 18.96 -34.41  26.26 -27.11 
Present 
value 302.29 115.31 -186.99  159.71 -142.59 
Break-even 
sale price 622.96      
a Year ended September 30 
 
Under the low growth rate projection, where it is assumed that the regulator may 
make unfavorable decision to EGAT, the market share of EGAT decreases and the 
operating revenues are growing at a lower rate than operating expenses.  
The results show that the forgone pretax profit is decreasing continuously. In 2013, 
EGAT will receive pretax profit of 1.96 billion baht as shown in Table 9.6. 
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Table 9.5 EGAT sale and retention options with a high growth rate projection  
2004–13 (billion baht) 
Yeara Profit Forgone 
EBIT Multiple = 12 
Sale price = 237.62 billion baht  
EBIT Multiple = 15 
Sale price = 329.12 billion baht 
  Interest saving 
Net gain 
or loss  
Interest 
saving 
Net gain 
or loss 
2004 31.63 12.12 -19.51  16.79 -14.85 
2005 36.06 12.74 -23.32  17.64 -18.42 
2006 40.94 13.39 -27.55  18.54 -22.4 
2007 46.31 14.07 -32.24  19.49 -26.82 
2008 52.21 14.79 -37.42  20.48 -31.73 
2009 58.68 15.54 -43.14  21.52 -37.16 
2010 65.78 16.33 -49.45  22.62 -43.16 
2011 73.56 17.17 -56.39  23.78 -49.78 
2012 82.06 18.04 -64.02  24.99 -57.07 
2013 91.36 18.96 -72.4  26.26 -65.09 
Present 
value 424.05 115.31 -308.74  159.71 -264.34 
Break-even 
price 873.87      
a Year ended September 30 
 
If the government sells or privatises EGAT, the fiscal benefits are represented by the 
flow of interest saving achieved through the repayment of debt from the sale of 
EGAT. The sale price is calculated by multiplying EBIT in 2003 by the ‘EBIT 
multiple’ and subtract by the long-term debt in the same year. Two choices are 
assumed for EBIT multiples of 12 and 15, which lead to the sale prices of 237.62 
billion baht and 329.12 billion baht respectively. Assuming that the nominal interest 
rate is 5.1 percent and all privatisation proceeds are used to repay debt, the use of 
sale proceeds repay debt will yield interest saving on public debt. Furthermore 
interest savings in excess of the dividend assumed in the public ownership option are 
assumed to be used to achieve further reductions in debt, so that savings grow over 
time. This assumption ensures neutrality with respect to the treatment of retained 
earnings under the privatisation and public ownership options.  Under each scenarios 
the flows of interest saving are shown inTable 9.4 to 9.6.  
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Table 9.6 EGAT sale and retention options with a low growth rate projection 
2004–13 (billion baht) 
Yeara Profit Forgone 
EBIT Multiple = 12 
Sale price = 237.62 billion baht  
EBIT Multiple = 15 
Sale price = 329.12 billion baht 
  Interest saving 
Net gain 
or loss  
Interest 
saving 
Net gain 
or loss 
2004 25.87 12.12 -13.75  16.79 -9.09 
2005 24.54 12.74 -11.81  17.64 -6.9 
2006 22.95 13.39 -9.56  18.54 -4.41 
2007 21.06 14.07 -6.99  19.49 -1.57 
2008 18.85 14.79 -4.07  20.48 1.63 
2009 16.3 15.54 -0.76  21.52 5.23 
2010 13.36 16.33 2.97  22.62 9.26 
2011 10.02 17.17 7.15  23.78 13.76 
2012 6.23 18.04 11.81  24.99 18.76 
2013 1.96 18.96 17  26.26 24.31 
Present 
value 131.99 115.31 -16.69  159.71 27.71 
Break-even 
price 272.01      
a Year ended September 30 
 
In Table 9.4, the flow of pretax profits forgone or the fiscal costs of privatisation are 
taken from Table 9.1. The flows of interest saving based on both sale prices represent 
the fiscal benefits of privatisation. It is obvious that with the higher sale price, the 
interest savings are higher than those with the low sale price.  
To assess whether the privatisation of EGAT is favourable or not, the net gain or loss 
by subtracting the fiscal benefits, measured by interest savings, by the costs, 
measured by profit forgone, is estimated.  With both sale prices of 237.62 and 329.12 
billion baht, there is a consistent net loss from the privatisation of EGAT since the 
forgone earning is increasing at a higher rate than the interest saving from both sale 
prices throughout the period of study.  
Considering the first approach of sale price and the present value of flows of profit 
forgone in comparison, the present value of flows of profit forgone is discounted by 
nominal interest rate which is 302.29 billion baht. That is still lower than sale prices.  
With both comparisons, in the normal situation it can be concluded that it is not 
worthwhile to privatise EGAT since the government will receive a net loss from 
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selling assets. To break-even net from privatisation (present value of net gain or loss 
is zero), the  asset  must realise 622.96 billion baht. 
In the high-growth situation, Table 9.5 shows that there are the higher net losses 
from the privatisation when compared to the first scenario because the flow of pretax 
profits forgone is growing at an increasing rate. Under this circumstance, the 
government should not sell EGAT, no matter which sale price is, since the fiscal 
costs obviously exceed fiscal benefits by a large amount. The break-even sale price 
has increased to 873.87 billion baht. 
In the low growth rate scenario where the pretax profits forgone are decreasing over 
time due to an unfavourable competitive environment for EGAT, the net losses from 
privatisation are decreasing over time for both sale prices and change to be 
increasing net gain. If the government can sell EGAT at the higher sale price, it 
would receive a net fiscal gain earlier and higher than the lower sale price.  
The choice of EBIT multiple matters in this case. In this case, it is worthwhile for the 
government to privatise EGAT if EGAT will be sold at 15 times EBIT, 329.12 
billion baht, which value is greater than the break-even sale price of 272.01 billion 
baht. 
From the above comparisons of sale and retention options of EGAT, under the 
normal and high-growth scenarios which enhance EGAT’s dominant role in 
electricity market the government should not privatise EGAT since the fiscal costs 
obviously exceed the fiscal benefits. But under the low-growth scenario in which 
industry restructuring and open market access and competition which is unfavourable 
to EGAT’s dominant role, it is more beneficial to privatise EGAT at the high sale 
price.  
It can be concluded that  the merit of privatising EGAT depends on level of the  sale 
price and on how the wholesale electricity market is restructured, along with whether 
EGAT can retain its market share after ESI restructuring and deregulation.  
9.4 Fiscal assessment of privatisation of Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
and Provincial Electricity Authority 
With the nature of electricity distribution as a natural monopoly activity, MEA and 
PEA are the sole electricity distributors in their own areas. 
For the reason of simplicity and data availability, the fiscal effect of privatisation will 
be evaluated at enterprise level: MEA and PEA. Again the full privatisation of both 
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enterprises is assumed to be in 2003, and the data from the annual report of MEA and 
PEA in 2003 are employed for analyses. 
According to the ESB model, MEA and PEA will not be either horizontally or 
vertically disintegrated. After privatisation, they will play the same role in electricity 
distribution business. An assumption of full privatisation of MEA and PEA is made. 
The revenue cap regulation on electricity distribution as, proposed in Chapter 7, will 
be adopted for this analysis whether enterprises are under public or private 
ownership. As a regulated monopoly, the fiscal analysis of privatisation of MEA and 
PEA will be somewhat different from EGAT.  
9.4.1 Evaluation approach: regulated monopoly 
According to revenue cap regulation, aggregate annual revenue requirement for each 
of the distribution companies is the sum of the individual building block components, 
which consist of 
return on capital = WACC*DORC, where WACC is the real weighted average cost of 
capital and DORC is the depreciated optimised replacement cost which represents 
value of distribution asset 
return of capital or depreciation and  
adjusted operating expenses, ( )1 tt oOPEX OPEX CPI X= + − , where is the 
initial operating expenses, CPI is consumer price index and X is the X factor. 
oOPEX
In the case where the monopoly is subject to public ownership and achieves annual 
cost reductions at the rate of X and that depreciation is measured correctly, the public 
will receive an annual net return equal to  
( )WACC r DORC−         (9.1) 
where r is the actual real rate of interest on government debt. 
Suppose that DORC is growing at rate DORCg  annually, an annual net return at time t 
is 
( ) (1 to DORCWACC r DORC g− + ) .      (9.2) 
This is an amount of return forgone if the public monopoly is privatised. 
Considering privatisation through asset sales, the asset will be sold at a price 
(1 ) oP DORCπ= +         (9.3) 
where π is a premium paid by buyers.  
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If proceeds are used for repaying debt, the fiscal benefit from privatisation is the 
interest saving represented by 
or DORCπ .         (9.4) 
Apart from the interest saving, assuming that the privatised firm is given a different 
X factor, X*, consumers can benefit more on cost reduction 
( * )toOPEX X X− .        (9.5) 
Suppose that OPEX is growing at rate of annually, the benefit to consumer at 
time t is 
OPEXg
(1 ) ( * )to OPEXOPEX g X X+ t− .      (9.6) 
The interest saving and benefit to consumer in form of increased efficiency after 
privatisation is the fiscal benefit of privatisation. 
9.4.2 Assumptions 
To make a comparison between the retention and sale of MEA and PEA, the various 
assumptions have to be made. The data of MEA and PEA in 2003 is employed as the 
base year. Due to data limitation, data from annual report is taken. It should be noted 
that to calculate the real value of DORC, the detail of data of the asset values is 
needed. 
The nominal WACC, 10.3 per cent, is taken from the estimation in Chapter 7. The 
nominal interest rate is the ten-year government bond rate of 5.13 per cent. The 
inflation rate is 1.8 per cent. The premium from privatisation, π, is assumed to be 40 
per cent, following Australian experience. Assuming that a privatised firm performs 
better than monopoly under public ownership, X*-X is assumed to be 2 per cent. The 
growth rate of OPEX is assumed to be 5 per cent. All of these variables are assumed 
to be constant throughout the period of study.  
The analysis is undertaken for the ten-year period 2004–13 . The present values of 
annual net return, interest saving and benefits to consumers in term of cost reduction 
are calculated and reported to assess fiscally the privatisation of MEA and PEA. The 
privatisation is justified if the net fiscal benefit is positive, which means that the 
benefit of retaining SOEs under public ownership is less than sum of benefits from 
interest saving after privatisation and from cost reduction. 
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9.4.3 Projections and results 
To assess whether MEA and PEA should be fully privatised or not, four scenarios of 
a comparison of fiscal benefit under public ownership and privatisation are 
undertaken.  
In base case, DORCg  and  are assumed to be at zero per cent. Three projections,  
which are normal, high and low-growth rate scenarios with 5, 8 and 3 per cent of 
OPEXg
DORCg  are then conducted respectively. These projections are assumed to be based on 
the electricity demand growth rate.  
With a premium of 40 per cent, sale prices of MEA and PEA are 107.21 and 221.4 
billion baht, respectively. As shown in Table 9.7 and 9.8, in all of the scenarios for 
both MEA and PEA the net fiscal cost of privatisation is positive which means that 
benefit from retaining SOEs under public ownership is greater than sum of benefits 
from interest saving after privatisation and from cost reduction owing to increased 
firm efficiency. The net fiscal cost of privatisation is the highest in scenario of high 
growth rate of demand. In high growth rate scenario, net fiscal cost of privatisation 
are 42.18 and 96.25 billion baht respectively. 
The next question is which level of sale price and X*-X should be to obtain at least a 
zero net fiscal cost from privatisation. These variables can be a policy instrument to 
ensure that privatisation throught asset sales achieve the benefit to public. 
Given all other things being equal, zero net fiscal cost can be achieved if sale prices 
have increased to 230.93 and 477.06 billion baht for the sale of MEA and PEA with 
a premium of 202 per cent in normal growth rate scenario, respectively. Selling 
assets at the high price however may not be politically favourable, particularly in 
term of speed of sale. 
The other possibility in gaining zero net fiscal cost is to regulate the privatised firm 
in such a way that the annual cost reduction of the privatised firm is a lot higher than 
that of a firm under public ownership. X*-X  increases to 84 and 86 per cent in  the 
case of MEA and PEA respectively. Privatisation can be of benefit to the public only 
if the privatised firm can operate far more efficiently than an SOE. 
In summary, the results show that privatisation of MEA and PEA is not fiscally 
feasible. The net fiscal benefits of the retention of both enterprises are big positive 
number in all scenario. To ensure the benefits of privatisation to the public, MEA 
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and PEA have to be sold at a high price or the privatised firms have to be regulated 
to achieve a very high cost reduction ability. 
 
Table 9.7 Net fiscal cost and break-even analysis of privatisation of 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority (billion baht) 
Scenario Base case 
Normal 
growth 
rate 
High 
growth 
rate 
Low 
growth 
rate 
Assumption     
    Growth rate of OPEX (per cent) - 5 5 5 
    Growth Rate of DORC (per cent) - 5 8 3 
Public ownership     
    Present value of annual net return 33.21 43.29 50.89 38.9 
Privatisation     
    Sale Price (Premium = 40 per cent) 107.21 107.21 107.21 107.21 
    Annual interest saving 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 
    Present value of interest saving 8.56 8.56 8.56 8.56 
    X*-X (per cent) 2 2 2 2 
    Present value of benefits to customers 
    (in form of cost reduction) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Net fiscal cost of privatisation 24.51 34.58 42.18 30.19 
     
Break-even analysis  
(Zero net fiscal cost)     
1. Sale price 194.89 230.93 258.26 215.31 
    with premium (per cent) 154.51 201.57 237.26 181.18 
    Annual interest saving 3.94 5.14 6.05 4.62 
    Present value of interest saving 33.06 43.13 50.74 38.75 
or     
2. X*-X (per  cent) 81 84 84 82 
    Present value of benefits to customers 24.65 34.73 42.34 30.34 
- zero 
Note: OPEX is operating expenses and DORC is depreciated optimised replacement cost. 
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Table 9.8 Net fiscal cost and break-even analysis of privatisation of Provincial 
Electricity Authority (billion baht) 
Scenario Base case 
Normal 
Growth 
rate 
High 
Growth 
rate 
Low 
Growth 
rate 
Assumption     
    Growth rate of OPEX (per cent) - 5 5 5 
    Growth Rate of DORC (per cent) - 5 8 3 
Public ownership     
    Present value of annual net return 68.58 89.39 105.1 80.34 
Privatisation     
    Sale Price (Premium = 40%) 221.4 221.4 221.4 221.4 
    Annual interest saving 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 
    Present value of interest saving 17.67 17.67 17.67 17.67 
    X*-X (per cent) 2 2 2 2 
    Present value of benefits to customers 
    (in form of cost reduction) 0.28 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Net fiscal cost of privatisation 50.63 71.43 87.14 62.37 
     
Break-even analysis 
(Zero net fiscal cost)     
1. Sale price 402.59 477.06 533.22 444.63 
    with premium (per cent) 154.57 201.67 237.18 181.16 
    Annual interest saving 8.14 10.62 12.49 9.54 
    Present value of interest saving 68.3 89.1 104.81 80.04 
or     
2. X*-X (per  cent) 83 86 89 83 
    Present value of benefits to customers 50.91 80.83 96.55 71.78 
- zero 
Note: OPEX is operating expenses and DORC is depreciated optimised replacement cost. 
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9.5 Summary 
This chapter conducted fiscal analyses of EGAT, MEA and PEA employing a 
bottom-up valuation approach introduced by Quiggin (1998b) taking into account 
characteristics of public enterprises. 
Evidence from comparison of fiscal costs and benefits and the estimated break-even 
price shows that for EGAT, the fiscal benefit exceeds the fiscal costs of privatisation 
only in the case where after privatisation and ESI restructuring, competition and 
deregulation is introduced into the electricity market to hinder the exploitation of the  
dominant power of EGAT. Privatisation after these circumstances will lead to the 
flow of increasing net gains which is beneficial to the economy. In additon, to ensure 
the net benefit of privatisation, the sale price of EGAT has to be determined to be  
sufficiently high.  
For the regulated monopoly distribution business of MEA and PEA, the net fiscal 
costs of public ownership are positive in low, medium and high growth rate 
scenarios. To ensure the feasibility of privatisation, MEA and PEA have to be 
privatised at a very high price with a premium of 200 per cent. The high sale price of 
SOEs may not be politically favourable particularly when the government wants to 
speed up the sale process. The other possibility in justifying privatisation is that the 
regulator has to regulate the privatised firms to achieve very high annual cost 
reduction and to operate highly efficiently. 
Based on analysis of the fiscal assessment, for all of the three profit-making SOEs in 
ESI, it can be concluded that privatisation alone is not beneficial in terms of fiscal 
net gain without appropriate ESI restructuring and deregulation in the electricity 
market and high-powered regulatory reform to enhance large efficiency 
improvements for regulated monopolies. As for regulated monopolies, ownership 
transfer from public to private firms does not matter for efficient operation as long as 
effective regulation is imposed on firms. 
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 Chapter 10 
  
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1 Summary and findings of the thesis 
Electricity supply industry (ESI) in Thailand is characterised by vertically integrated 
monopolies under public ownership. There are two types of activities in the ESI: 
natural monopoly (transmission and distribution) and potentially competitive 
activities (generation and retailing).  
These activities are mainly operated by three state owned enterprises (SOEs): the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the Metropolitan Electricity 
Authority (MEA) and the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA). 
EGAT is the largest electricity generating firm and the sole transmission operator 
and purchaser from private power producers. MEA and PEA are the only firms to 
operate electricity distribution and retailing businesses in their jurisdiction areas. 
ESI restructuring started in Thailand in 1992 with a program to encourage private 
sector participation in the electricity generating business, however progress was slow 
until the 1997 financial crisis. ESI restructuring and privatisation of SOEs in this 
industry were included in the Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform.  
The main objectives of ESI restructuring and privatisation are to improve the 
efficiency of firms, to increase competition, to reduce the investment and fiscal 
burden on government, to promote the efficient use of energy and to provide the best 
possible services to consumers.  
Since 1997 there have been several ESI model restructuring and privatisation plans 
presented and withdrawn, mainly due to opposition from labour unions and concern 
from the authorities, the three SOEs and academics. The most important 
disagreement among these agents centres on the ESI restructuring model and the 
processes of privatisation. 
Considering the extent of debate over privatisation, restructuring and regulation of 
the ESI in Thailand in recent years there was a surprising lack of rigorous economic 
analyses and studies. This thesis aimed to fill that gap. 
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Regulatory reform of the ESI is recommended before ESI restructuring and 
privatisation of SOEs, particularly for activities with natural monopoly 
characteristics.  
Therefore, the first objective of this thesis was to explore an appropriate design for a 
regulatory institution and regime for electricity activities characterised by natural 
monopoly, namely transmission and distribution. This thesis studies regulatory 
experiences and regimes pioneered, developed and adopted in the developed 
countries, and analyses them in light of specific characteristics of developing 
countries such as Thailand. 
Like other developing countries, Thailand is characterized by the high cost of public 
funds, the prevalence of collusion, corruption and regulatory capture, the absence of 
sophisticated cost accounting and auditing systems, poorly functioning capital and 
financial markets and a lack of regulatory capacity, particularly in human resources. 
These characteristics affect the choice and design of regulatory institutions and 
regimes. 
Given these characteristics, specialised and centralised regulatory institutions are 
recommended for Thailand. The advantages of this design of regulatory institution 
are that it can reduce regulatory cost, pool regulatory capacity in form of technical, 
economic and financial expertise into one organisation and reduce the likelihood of 
corruption and regulatory capture. 
Apart from general characteristics of the Thai economy, the level of development 
concerning regulation plays a major role in the design of the regulatory regime. 
When regulatory systems are poorly developed, a high powered incentive regulatory 
regime is recommended for Thailand. A high powered regime provides the regulated 
firm with an incentive to improve efficiency until Thailand can develop a well 
performing regulatory capacity. The particular regulatory form for both activities 
should be revenue cap regulation.  
Price cap regulation is inappropriate as it provides incentives for firms to increase 
sale volumes, which conflicts with the demand side management program in 
Thailand. Price cap regulation also increases risks for regulated firms, as well as a 
greater disincentive to invest owing to demand forecast errors in Thailand.  
Revenue cap regulation can reduce severity of these problems. 
Under revenue cap regulation, the regulated firm’s allowed revenues are capped. The 
firm can maximise profit by minimising costs. To set the revenue cap, revenue 
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requirement, basic financial component, is required. It should be noted that revenue 
requirement is also a basic component of other types of regulation such as price cap 
or ROR regulation. 
This thesis estimated the revenue requirement for MEA and PEA electricity 
distribution companies in Thailand. The aim of this exercise was to demonstrate that 
the adoption of regulatory finance from developed countries with well developed 
capital and equity markets needs some modifications to fit with developing countries, 
which are characterised by poor accounting and auditing systems and weakly 
functioning capital and equity markets. The problem of lack of data and asymmetric 
information faced by the regulator in Thailand is more severe than in developed 
countries. 
To estimate the revenue requirement, capital base, rate of return and efficient 
operating costs are important financial issues, which will be addressed as follows. 
As regards estimating the capital base, MEA and PEA currently employ the historic 
costs approach to value electricity assets. To promote efficiency, regulators should 
adopt the depreciated optimised replacement cost (DORC) approach instead, as with 
this approach they can optimise the asset values in such a way that the most efficient 
facilities necessary to produce a specified level of services is identified. It should be 
noted, however, that this approach requires costly examination and assessment 
procedures to obtain DORC. 
Rate of return is considered to be the most complicated regulatory financial variable. 
It is a regulatory variable that is seriously affected by a poorly functioning equity 
market and the problem of imperfection and lack of information in Thailand. Some 
elements of capital asset pricing model (CAPM), such as market risk premium, are 
taken directly from comparable firms or from regulators in developed countries, as 
data in Thailand is not well behaved and not adequate to achieve efficient estimators. 
To estimate rate of the return, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) model is 
employed. Following international practice, CAPM is used to estimate the cost of 
equity. A few of the important issues on the estimation of CAPM is summarised 
here. 
Thailand’s equity market is considered as an emerging market, which cannot be 
characterised as a market as being either perfectly segmented or perfectly integrated. 
Hence both domestic and global CAPMs are attempted for electricity distribution. 
Results of betas from Thai domestic and global CAPMs are unsatisfactory due to the 
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nonstationary nature of data from Thailand, therefore, the US models are attempted 
instead. The levered equity beta of the US electricity sector, adjusted for regulatory 
risk in Thailand, is employed for CAPM estimation. 
The next element in the cost of equity is market risk premium. Market risk premium 
in Thailand cannot be estimated because of short times series data of risk free rate.  
The standard risk free rate is proxied by the long term government bond rate. In 
Thailand the bond market is not well developed and bond financing is not the major 
type of financing undertaken by government, thus a long time series of the risk free 
rate is not available. Market risk premium for Thailand is set by considering the US 
market risk premium, together with the market risk premium employed for 
regulatory purposes.  
As an emerging market, an additional country risk premium on country risk is 
included in the CAPM for Thailand.  
Because WACC for Thailand is estimated by the inclusion of country risk premium, 
the estimated WACC of Thailand is higher than those of developed countries. 
In the price index-X mechanism, the price index is taken straight from the Consumer 
Price Index in Thailand. The determination of X factor is an important issue in this 
mechanism. Due to the limited number of distribution companies in Thailand, a 
clear-cut estimation either by index number, mathematical programming or 
econometric method can suffer the problem of insufficient data. To obtain a more 
robust X factor, international benchmarking against comparable firms from 
comparable countries in term of economic development, or employing the X factor 
from the other regulators in developed countries as a benchmark, is recommended.  
With these considerations the estimated revenue caps of MEA and PEA are 
attempted.  
The results show that revenue caps based on existing operating costs and book values 
of capital are slightly greater than the existing revenue. The differences between 
revenue caps and actual revenue can be explained by a margin of error associated 
with estimates of WACC and other financial parameters obtained from a number of 
assumptions. 
The results also indicate that both enterprises are not receiving significant monopoly 
profits.  
Regulators can adjust regulatory variables to provide them with an incentive for 
greater efficiency improvements. Thus, if prices are not to increase regulators will 
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either have to reduce the allowable capital base or require reductions in operating 
costs.  
Regulatory analysis demonstrates that although regulatory reform is needed before 
privatisation, adoption of regulatory regime, form and finance from developed 
countries has to be undertaken with care and modified in light of Thai characteristics 
and economy. 
The next objective of this thesis was to examine the empirical basis for the 
justifications for privatisation that have been claimed in recent years. Although there 
are a number of justifications for privatisation, this thesis narrows analyses down into 
two important arguments that privatisation can induce efficiency improvement in 
SOEs, and fiscal benefits. 
Measures of the technical efficiency of the electricity generation sector in Thailand 
are estimated by employing a comparative application of Data Envelopment Analysis 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis approaches, employing both power plant and 
supplier-level data sets.  
The important observations are as follows.  
Under public ownership, comparison of Thai power plants in 1990s and Australian 
power plants in 1980s shows that Thai power plants obtained higher technical 
efficiency scores. The power plants from developing country, in this case, Thailand 
can perform better than those from developed country, Australia. The level of 
country development is not the indicator of plant-level performance.  
Along with this, the inter-country comparison of electricity utilities confirms that at 
firm level EGAT is one of firms on frontier, meaning that the expected efficiency 
improvement after privatisation of EGAT is unlikely to happen.  
This thesis studied further another justification of privatisation, that of fiscal benefit. 
Fiscal analysis was undertaken to evaluate fiscal net benefits of full privatisation in 
form of asset sales of three SOEs in ESI: EGAT, MEA and PEA. This analysis 
employed a bottom-up valuation approach, taking issues in the public sector into 
account, to assess fiscal costs (retention of SOEs) and benefits (sale of SOEs) of 
privatisation. 
Full privatisation of EGAT results in fiscal net benefits only when ESI restructuring 
and deregulation of wholesale electricity market have adverse effect on EGAT’s 
performance. It is consistent with the analysis that EGAT is an enterprise on the 
efficiency frontier. Expected improvements in efficiency after privatisation are 
 313
negligible or almost zero, therefore privatisation without industry restructuring and 
regulatory reform is unlikely to be beneficial.  
Due to their undertaking of identical distribution activities, MEA and PEA are 
analysed under the same framework taking into consideration revenue cap regulation.  
Under revenue cap regulation, full privatisation of the regulated distribution 
monopolies of MEA and PEA is not fiscally feasible. The net economic benefits of 
the retention of both SOEs are positive. Privatisation of MEA and PEA is justified 
only when they are privatised at very high sale price with a premium of 200 per cent.  
Note that this high sale price of SOEs may not be politically palatable, particularly 
when the government wants to speed up sale process.  
The other way to justify privatisation of MEA and PEA is through the regulation 
imposed on the privatised firms in such a way that after privatisation they achieve 
very high annual cost reductions and operate much more efficiently than under 
public ownership. 
10.1.1 Limitation of the study 
The lack of availability of data limits regulatory, efficiency and fiscal analyses in this 
study. Note that this limitation has been mentioned throughout the thesis, particularly 
where estimations are conducted. 
Without the true value of DORC, the proxy of the asset values of the distribution 
business obtained from annual reports may overvalue the efficient costs, which 
results in a high revenue cap. Also, the estimated rate of return of Thailand is 
obtained from many comparable data from comparable distribution companies. It can 
over/undervalue of rate of return, which ultimately affects the level of revenue 
requirement.  
To conduct an efficiency analysis, quantities of inputs are needed. Due to data 
unavailability, few of the variables are constructed, hence the proxy of variables 
from limited data does not represent the best proxy of those variables. For example, 
the employment data is the most troublesome variable because there is no record of 
employment numbers in each power plant in EGAT. Therefore the index number of 
employment is created and used for technical efficiency estimations. Undoubtedly 
results from the estimations with the true employment number are more reliable. 
At the time that this study is conducted, there was no ESI restructuring and 
regulatory reform, therefore fiscal analysis relies on various assumptions.  
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10.2 Policy implication 
This section attempts to draw policy implications from the findings of this thesis.  
It should be noted this section did not aim to provide a clear answer as to whether 
SOEs in ESI should be privatised, but aimed to discuss the conditions where benefits 
from the privatisation of SOEs in the ESI are enhanced.  
Privatisation, restructuring and regulation of the ESI are interrelated concepts. To 
maximise benefits from privatisation, ESI reform requires proper sequencing. ESI 
structural choices have to be made before privatisation, otherwise a poorly designed 
ESI structure can create private monopolies and it is difficult and costly to implement 
changes after privatisation.  
For this reason the ESI has to be restructured to introduce competition, and 
regulation has to be in place to ensure fair competition and to regulate natural 
monopoly activities before privatisation can take place. 
Laffont (2003) states that there is no universally appropriate model for restructuring 
network utilitites.  
ESI restructuring, therefore, has to be undertaken while taking into account the 
features of the industry and the country’s economic, institutional, social and political 
characteristics (Kessides 2004:43). For example, electricity markets are relatively 
small in many developing countries, therefore opportunities to introduce competition 
into such systems is limited (2004:45).  
The next major challenge for Thailand is the development of effective regulation.  
Effective regulation requires a regulatory body free from politics, competent and 
professional regulatory experts and predictable, accountable and transparent 
regulatory procedures.  
Building up regulatory capacity and designing effective and practical regulatory 
regimes are also needed to achieve effective regulation.  
After an appropriate ESI structure and effective regulation are well established, the 
methods of privatisation have to be evaluated based on industry characteristics, level 
of capital market development and the objective of privatisation. This ensures that 
ownership of public utilities is diversified to public and strategic investors, not to 
small interest groups.  
Due to political factors, opposition to privatisation in Thailand is strong, and the 
analysis in this thesis suggests that the benefits of privatisation may be low or 
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negative. Alternative policies that can achieve the objectives of privatisation without 
transfer of ownership should be considered. 
10.3 Further research 
While this thesis tried to cover main issues of privatisation, restructuring and 
regulation of ESI in Thailand, there are other interesting issues that should be further 
studied. 
The progress of privatisation in the ESI is strongly affected by political factors, so 
the political economy of privatisation in ESI in Thailand should be further explored. 
Given that the merit of ESI restructuring and effective regulation are well grounded, 
the choice of transactional or non-transactional privatisation methods that best fits 
with SOEs in the ESI, taking into account industry features, level of capital market 
development and the objectives of privatisation, should also be studied.  
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APPENDIX 1:  
PERFORMANCE OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TP1PT  
IN THAILAND 
 
                                                          
TP
1
PT State owned enterprises (SOEs) in this list do not include SOE subsidiaries, enterprises in the 
liquidation process, or financial institutions temporarily under the supervision of the Bank of 
Thailand. Data is calculated and provided by the Comptroller General's Department, Ministry of 
Finance. 
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Table A1.1 Profit (loss) of 59 state owned enterprises (million baht) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Per cent of total 
profit 
in 2001 
 Energy sector 24,463.24 44,506.51 -41,537.4 40,168.31 35,108.21 50.34 
1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand  12,827.81 18,488.71 -25,055.43 20,175.37 11,591.47 16.62 
2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority  4,143.93 2,727.25 -935.87 2,159.76 5,185.57 7.44 
3 Provincial Electricity Authority  9,066.27 11,522.72 -7,382.32 6,700.36 4,235.9 6.07 
4 Petroleum Authority of Thailand 2,209.74 11,741.35 -6,380.64 12,697.62 15,660.07 22.45 
5 Bangchak Petroleum Plc -3,784.51 26.48 -1,783.14 -1,564.8 -1,564.8 -2.24 
  Transportation sector -23,002.95 5,209.08 -8,501.01 2,181.51 8,042.42 11.53 
1 State Railway of Thailand  -2,408.68 -3,064.75 -7,190.14 -5,087.81 -5,326.36 -7.64 
2 Port Authority of Thailand  2,278.19 1,579.51 -78.6 980.15 1,430.02 2.05 
3 Airports Authority of Thailand  4,315.55 5,094.53 5,272.35 6,867.02 7,013.83 10.06 
4 Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand  439.77 -70.05 -4,161.54 -650.92 -208.87 -0.3 
5 Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority  83.65 70.62 -5,908.41 -1,876.67 -134.35 -0.19 
6 Express Transportation Organisation of Thailand  -167 -236.59 -72.91 -47.65 10.12 0.01 
7 Bangkok Mass Transit Authority  -2,471.52 -2,731.82 -2,441.68 -2,889.17 -3,158.51 -4.53 
8 Thai Airways International Public Company Ltd.  -25,202.59 3,933.54 5,859.04 4,820.25 8,355.2 11.98 
9 Transport Company Ltd.  130.91 357.34 308.20 226.89 134.4 0.19 
10 Aeronautical Radio of Thailand - - - - - - 
11 Thai Maritime Navigation Company Ltd. 80.41 114.91 52.03 17.63 21.21 0.03 
12 Bangkok Dock Co. Ltd. (Royal Thai Navy) 4.00 2.21 9.09 2.51 4.84 0.01 
13 Civil Aviation Training Center -76.97 -68.92 -64.79 -34.07 10.77 0.02 
14 New Bangkok International Airport Co.,Ltd. -8.67 228.55 -83.65 -146.65 -109.88 -0.16 
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  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Per cent of total 
profit 
in 2001 
  Telecommunication sector 34,115.72 21,576.9 6,117.82 10,140.43 13,744.98 19.71 
1 Communications Authority of Thailand  9,236.4 7,369.23 3,707.81 5,688.42 7,177.74 10.29 
2 Telephone Organisation of Thailand 23,783.94 13,629.15 1,937.40 3,999.77 5,975.30 8.57 
3 Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand 1,095.38 578.52 472.61 452.24 591.94 0.85 
  Water sector 1,668.38 897.24 -1,304.31 2,090.20 2,144.82 3.08 
1 Metropolitan Waterworks Authority  1,582.96 1,198.11 -615.81 2,588.00 2,573.20 3.69 
2 Provincial Waterworks Authority 80.48 -287.41 -677.99 -494.07 -421 -0.6 
3 Waste Water Management Organisation 4.94 -13.46 -10.51 -3.73 -7.38 -0.01 
  Financial sector 10,925.11 -50,569.98 -101,304.51 -19,894.48 4,746.84 6.81 
1 Bank for Agriculture And Agricultural Cooperatives  1,448.69 1,376.55 202.81 280.48 427.73 0.61 
2 Government Savings Bank  6,243 4,408 4,004 8,165 8,524 12.22 
3 Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd 210.27 -61,584.85 -91,936.70 -28,939.17 -5,684.62 -8.15 
4 Government Housing Bank 2,722.75 5,174.52 -12,737.62 374.71 967.33 1.39 
5 Export-Import Bank of Thailand 300.4 55.8 -837 224.5 512.40 0.73 
  Industrial sector 6,174.16 5,737.76 4,590.00 5,787.89 6,116.37 8.77 
1 Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand  534.03 540.03 -1,024.52 288.45 255.44 0.37 
2 Liquor Distillery Organisation, Excise Department  56.06 98.66 95.22 107.27 121.14 0.17 
3 Glass Organisation  19.17 -32.97 -26.26 - - - 
4 Tanning Organisation  0.13 -72.98 -16.41 -10.79 8.11 0.01 
5 Battery Organisation  -31.39 -24.55 -11.58 13.72 11.7 0.02 
6 Thailand Tobacco Monopoly  5,527.18 5,162.34 5,516.71 5,336.26 5,653.74 8.11 
7 Playing Card Factory  41.61 50.71 45.1 38.85 39.41 0.06 
8 Police Printing Press  27.37 16.52 11.74 14.13 26.83 0.04 
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  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Per cent of total 
profit 
in 2001 
  Agricultural sector 494.82 -1,037.16 -886.98 -447.97 -123.27 -0.18 
1 Fish Marketing Organisation  16.69 40.44 12.5 18.2 13.62 0.02 
2 Rubber Estate Organisation  -58.07 -39.58 -22.1 -22.11 33.78 0.05 
3 Marketing Organisation for Farmers  100.49 151.90 -3.92 -126.22 36.08 0.05 
4 Forestry Industry Organisation  -141.12 -225.88 -14.82 -10.18 19.47 0.03 
5 Thai Plywood Company Ltd.  -129.53 -101.02 20.18 -51.22 -139.96 -0.20 
6 Office of the Rubber Replanting Aid Fund 960.07 -492.3 -669.57 - - - 
7 Dairy Farming Promotion Organisation of Thailand  -241.03 -355.41 -174.56 -219.72 -55.3 -0.08 
8 Botanical Garden Organisation -12.68 -15.31 -34.69 -36.72 -30.96 -0.04 
  Commercial and services sector 771.92 581.11 903.62 735.19 374.23 0.54 
1 Public Warehouse Organisation  -36.07 -5.43 -73.68 7.56 11.06 0.02 
2 Marketing Organisation 12.76 7.27 9.68 11.34 8.21 0.01 
3 Government Lottery Office  744.46 936.33 837.64 628.00 262.89 0.38 
4 Tourism Authority of Thailand  23.99 -361.53 125.37 84.07 87.85 0.13 
5 Syndicate of Thai Hotels and Tourist Enterprises 26.78 4.47 4.61 4.22 4.22 0.01 
  Social and technology sector 701.18 735.92 423.52 -49.83 -414.23 -0.59 
1 Zoological Park Organisation -6.25 -14.04 -11.96 -29.56 -13.12 -0.02 
2 Sports Authority of Thailand  11.94 62.24 -166.16 -58.94 -83.97 -0.12 
3 National Housing Authority  153.06 40.55 -115.75 -635.96 -868.08 -1.24 
4 Institution for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology 62.22 153.39 - - - - 
5 Government Phamaceutical Organisation  428 385.68 580.77 534.36 422.14 0.61 
6 Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research  -19.32 12.18 16.90 11.79 23.74 0.03 
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  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Per cent of total 
profit 
in 2001 
7 Office of Public Pawnshop 69.89 97.69 113.18 125.84 95.92 0.14 
8 National Science Museum  1.64 -1.77 6.54 2.64 9.14 0.01 
 59 State owned enterprises 56,311.58 27,637.38 -141,499.25 40,711.25 69,740.37 100 
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Table A1.2 Return on asset and on equity of 59 state owned enterprises (per cent) 
  Return on asset  Return on equity 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Energy sector            
1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 4.06 5.16 -6.33 4.64 2.84  12.70 15.53 -21.45 16.49 8.81 
2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority 6.09 3.54 -1.14 2.45 5.5  18.85 11.50 -3.73 8.17 17.35 
3 Provincial Electricity Authority 6.29 7.54 -4.87 4.26 2.55  11.45 13.81 -14.07 12.52 7.2 
4 Petroleum Authority of Thailand 1.56 8.03 -4.02 6.64 6.46  7.01 25.16 -44.27 58.52 23.31 
5 Bangchak Petroleum Plc -12.16 0.1 -6.16 -5.40 -5.46  -36.15 0.26 -22.98 -26.78 -32.3 
 Transportation sector            
1 State Railway of Thailand -5.38 -6.17 -13.21 -8.47 -7.49  -15.08 -15.79 -44.62 -30.57 -23.58 
2 Port Authority of Thailand 12.74 7.97 -0.37 4.12 6.54  18.23 12.89 -0.65 6.88 8.7 
3 Airports Authority of Thailand 18.22 18.27 15.38 18.04 17.43  26.41 24.6 20.19 23.13 21.7 
4 Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand 0.34 -0.05 -2.69 -0.40 -0.15  1.83 -0.26 -13.02 -1.84 -1.15 
5 Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority 0.58 0.25 -10.62 -2.58 -0.14  1.51 1.78 -217.14 -192.69 -10.48 
6 Express Transportation Organisation of Thailand -26.19 -48.64 -17.98 -14.59 3.17  24.81 26.19 7.47 4.66 -1 
7 Bangkok Mass Transit Authority -25.61 -27.5 -24.94 -55.17 -65.6  26.17 32.04 23.03 22.22 19.43 
8 Thai Airways International Public Company Ltd. -18.32 2.61 4.02 2.88 4.42  -895.77 84.65 121.31 50.49 28.76 
9 Transport Company Ltd. 4.41 11.74 9.9 7.27 4.39  6.19 15.20 12.85 9.4 5.7 
10 Aeronautical Radio of Thailand - - - - -  - - - - - 
11 Thai Maritime Navigation Company Ltd. 18.68 31.97 16.55 5.75 6.36  33.94 40.39 18.22 6.36 7.30 
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  Return on asset  Return on equity 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
12 Bangkok Dock Co. Ltd. (Royal Thai Navy) 2.05 1.15 4.37 1.25 2.45  2.27 1.26 4.95 1.39 2.68 
13 Civil Aviation Training Center -13.95 -12.74 -11.34 -6.27 1.91  -15.08 -13.81 -12.42 -6.68 2.01 
14 New Bangkok International Airport Co.,Ltd. -0.10 1.92 -0.60 -0.92 -0.6  -0.1 2.23 -0.67 -1.08 -0.75 
 Telecommunication sector            
1 Communications Authority of Thailand 14.37 11.33 5.02 6.75 8.21  16.11 12.42 5.97 7.83 9.63 
2 Telephone Organisation of Thailand 9.51 5.37 0.77 1.54 2.27  13.68 7.88 1.15 2.22 3.23 
3 Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand 20.13 10.85 8.44 7.88 10.04  20.96 11.31 8.86 8.19 10.34 
 Water sector            
1 Metropolitan Waterworks Authority 3.90 2.70 -1.33 5.32 5.17  11.07 7.41 -3.88 14.33 13.22 
2 Provincial Waterworks Authority 0.29 -0.94 -2.04 -1.33 -1.05  0.53 -1.67 -3.75 -2.40 -1.86 
3 Waste Water Management Organisation 11.55 -45.86 -53.84 -21.60 -123.83  11.89 -47.85 -59.41 -22.66 -142.47 
 Financial sector            
1 Bank for Agriculture And Agricultural Cooperatives 0.70 0.58 0.08 0.1 0.15  11.91 20.57 1.15 1.36 2.03 
2 Government Savings Bank 2.22 1.18 0.93 1.71 1.59  24.21 14.91 10.51 19.78 22.79 
3 Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd 0.03 -5.78 -9.26 -2.92 -0.58  0.46 -73.78 -90.92 -44.14 -9.15 
4 Government Housing Bank 0.93 1.44 -3.94 0.11 0.32  63.56 28.48 -95.9 2.67 6.66 
5 Export-Import Bank of Thailand 0.50 0.1 -1.58 0.39 0.94  7.26 0.69 -11.55 3.00 5.64 
 Industrial sector            
1 Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 4.72 4.62 -8.55 2.33 2.05  12.88 11.77 -28.07 7.35 6.07 
2 Liquor Distillery Organisation, Excise Department 5.77 10.23 11.11 13.09 13.85  8.30 14.22 11.66 13.63 14.77 
3 Glass Organisation 2.84 -4.69 -4.16 - -  4.80 -9.56 -13.57 - - 
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  Return on asset  Return on equity 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
4 Tanning Organisation 0.04 -21.79 -5.25 -3.60 2.18  0.10 -128.24 -36.35 -31.41 20.46 
5 Battery Organisation -15.32 -11.79 -6.52 8.87 7.50  -62.82 -96.58 -32.97 116.17 49.77 
6 Thailand Tobacco Monopoly 34.79 26.42 32.22 30.11 33.14  37.17 29.35 35.24 34.07 37.59 
7 Playing Card Factory 35.64 38.45 33.18 23.08 24.75  36.04 39.84 36.56 30.80 31.17 
8 Police Printing Press 14.99 8.67 5.74 5.51 11.56  16.08 9.37 6.43 7.34 13.21 
 Agricultural sector            
1 Fish Marketing Organisation 2.04 4.66 1.35 1.64 1.80  2.60 5.87 1.74 2.53 1.92 
2 Rubber Estate Organisation -10.77 -6.95 -4.16 -3.98 6.27  -28.40 -17.37 -10.09 -8.72 12.69 
3 Marketing Organisation for Farmers 2.42 2.84 -0.08 -2.55 0.76  275.84 24.81 -0.64 -25.34 6.50 
4 Forestry Industry Organisation -4.86 -7.91 -0.53 -0.37 0.69  -7.34 -13.32 -0.89 -0.62 1.10 
5 Thai Plywood Company Ltd. -4.94 -3.51 0.00 -1.66 -5.31  -16.67 -14.94 0.00 -11.35 -33.50 
6 Office of the Rubber Replanting Aid Fund 16.40 -9.04 -14.74 0.00 0.00  17.47 -9.77 -15.95 0.00 0.00 
7 Dairy Farming Promotion Organisation of Thailand -25.69 -29.91 -15.56 -19.96 -4.80  -119.81 -76.33 -36.95 -92.23 -34.16 
8 Botanical Garden Organisation -3.47 -2.63 -6.12 -6.68 -5.82  -3.63 -2.80 -6.13 -6.75 -5.85 
 Commercial and services sector            
1 Public Warehouse Organisation -4.71 -0.66 -7.15 0.66 1.07  -6.02 -0.78 -12.21 1.13 1.58 
2 Marketing Organisation 5.78 2.92 3.83 5.27 4.34  12.47 5.41 6.90 7.91 5.65 
3 Government Lottery Office 7.19 8.77 7.38 10.97 4.76  38.28 37.15 28.87 18.31 7.68 
4 Tourism Authority of Thailand 1.12 -20.97 5.82 3.66 4.76  1.97 -44.6 13.76 8.6 7.59 
5 Syndicate of Thai Hotels and Tourist Enterprises 12.15 2.03 2.12 1.95 1.95  12.28 2.06 2.14 1.97 1.98 
 Social and technology sector            
1 Zoological Park Organisation -0.86 -1.65 -1.14 -2.44 -1.03  -0.88 -1.68 -1.15 -2.44 -1.03 
2 Sports Authority of Thailand 0.58 1.91 -5.80 -2.10 -3.36  0.62 1.97 -6.08 -2.3 -3.36 
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  Return on asset  Return on equity 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
3 National Housing Authority 0.37 0.09 -0.23 -1.28 -1.64  3.19 0.89 -1.86 -16.77 -24.24 
4 Institution for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology 26.36 37.4 - - -  32.72 44.7 - - - 
5 Government Phamaceutical Organisation 12.21 9.67 12.97 11.17 8.92  13.72 11.64 15.20 12.87 9.77 
6 Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research -1.78 1.12 1.54 1.10 2.05  -2.21 1.38 1.88 1.34 2.39 
7 Office of Public Pawnshop 5.57 6.2 7.28 7.07 5.32  12.09 15.1 15.7 15.62 11.25 
8 National Science Museum 0.22 -0.22 0.46 0.19 0.67  0.31 -0.22 0.48 0.19 0.67 
 59 state owned enterprises 1.75 0.72 -3.61 0.98 1.64  7.73 3.27 -17.37 4.87 7.63 
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Table A1.3 Debt equity ratio of 59 state owned enterprises (time) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Energy sector      
1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 2.13 2.01 2.39 2.55 2.11 
2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority 2.09 2.25 2.26 2.33 2.15 
3 Provincial Electricity Authority 0.82 0.83 1.89 1.94 1.83 
4 Petroleum Authority of Thailand 3.48 2.13 10.02 7.82 2.61 
5 Bangchak Petroleum Plc 1.97 1.74 2.73 3.96 4.91 
 Transportation sector      
1 State Railway of Thailand 1.80 1.56 2.38 2.61 2.15 
2 Port Authority of Thailand 0.43 0.62 0.75 0.67 0.33 
3 Airports Authority of Thailand 0.45 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.25 
4 Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand 4.38 4.23 3.85 3.55 6.88 
5 Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority 1.59 6.24 19.44 73.78 74.31 
6 Express Transportation Organisation of Thailand -1.95 -1.54 -1.42 -1.32 -1.32 
7 Bangkok Mass Transit Authority -2.02 -2.17 -1.92 -1.40 -1.3 
8 Thai Airways International Public Company Ltd. 47.89 31.46 29.15 16.56 5.51 
9 Transport Company Ltd. 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.29 0.3 
10 Aeronautical Radio of Thailand 2.35 2.39 2.34 2.48 3.35 
11 Thai Maritime Navigation Company Ltd. 0.82 0.26 0.1 0.11 0.15 
12 Bangkok Dock Co. Ltd. (Royal Thai Navy) 0.11 0.1 0.13 0.12 0.1 
13 Civil Aviation Training Center 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 
14 New Bangkok International Airport Co. Ltd. 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.25 
 Telecommunication sector      
1 Communications Authority of Thailand 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.17 
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  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
2 Telephone Organisation of Thailand 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.42 
3 Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 
 Water sector      
1 Metropolitan Waterworks Authority 1.84 1.74 1.91 1.69 1.56 
2 Provincial Waterworks Authority 0.80 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.76 
3 Waste Water Management Organisation 0.03 0.04 0.1 0.05 0.15 
 Financial sector      
1 Bank for Agriculture And Agricultural Cooperatives 16.01 34.18 13.98 12.46 12.72 
2 Government Savings Bank 9.89 11.61 10.24 10.57 13.33 
3 Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd 16.28 11.76 8.82 14.10 14.67 
4 Government Housing Bank 67.52 18.75 23.35 22.47 19.91 
5 Export-Import Bank of Thailand 13.6 5.56 6.32 6.77 5.01 
 Industrial sector      
1 Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 1.73 1.54 2.28 2.16 1.96 
2 Liquor Distillery Organisation, Excise Department 0.44 0.39 0.05 0.04 0.07 
3 Glass Organisation 0.69 1.04 2.26 - - 
4 Tanning Organisation 1.83 4.89 5.92 7.73 8.39 
5 Battery Organisation 3.1 7.19 4.06 12.09 5.63 
6 Thailand Tobacco Monopoly 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.13 
7 Playing Card Factory 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.33 0.26 
8 Police Printing Press 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.33 0.14 
 Agricultural sector      
1 Fish Marketing Organisation 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.54 0.06 
2 Rubber Estate Organisation 1.64 1.50 1.42 1.19 1.02 
3 Marketing Organisation for Farmers 112.8 7.73 7 8.93 7.51 
       
 
 
349
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
4 Forestry Industry Organisation 0.51 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.6 
5 Thai Plywood Company Ltd. 2.37 3.26 0 5.85 5.3 
6 Office of the Rubber Replanting Aid Fund 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.04 
7 Dairy Farming Promotion Organisation of Thailand 3.66 1.55 1.37 3.62 6.12 
8 Botanical Garden Organisation 0.04 0.06 0 0.01 0.01 
 Commercial and services sector      
1 Public Warehouse Organisation 0.28 0.2 0.71 0.71 0.48 
2 Marketing Organisation 1.16 0.86 0.80 0.50 0.3 
3 Government Lottery Office 4.32 3.23 2.91 0.67 0.61 
4 Tourism Authority of Thailand 0.75 1.13 1.37 1.35 0.6 
5 Syndicate of Thai Hotels and Tourist Enterprises 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 Social and technology sector      
1 Zoological Park Organisation 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 
2 Sports Authority of Thailand 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.1 0 
3 National Housing Authority 7.64 8.76 7 12.12 13.81 
4 Institution for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology 0.24 0.2 - - - 
5 Government Phamaceutical Organisation 0.12 0.2 0.17 0.15 0.1 
6 Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.16 
7 Office of Public Pawnshop 1.17 1.44 1.16 1.21 1.12 
8 National Science Museum 0.4 0.03 0.04 - - 
 59 State owned enterprises 3.43 3.52 3.81 3.96 3.66 
 
APPENDIX 2: 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY REFORM AND  
POWER POOL IN THAILAND 
 
Reform of Thailand’s electricity supply industry (ESI) and power pool was approved 
by Cabinet on 25 July 2000, is summarized as following.1
A2.1 Restructuring and privatisation of the electricity supply industry 
Implementation of proposed ESI reform can be divided into three stages as follows. 
A2.1.1 Stage I: Short-term electricity supply industry structure (2000–01) 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand’s (EGAT) different internal 
departments will be commercialised to form autonomous business units operating as 
profit centres, while the Ratchaburi power plant will be privatised. At this stage, 
EGAT will retain its dominant position in bulk purchases and the supply of power, 
with Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) and Provincial Electricity Authority 
(PEA) retaining their franchise customer bases. There is no direct access for 
customers to generation companies, except through purchase from small power 
producers (SPPs). MEA will corporatise its core and peripheral service businesses as 
business units.  
Draft legislation on the establishment of an independent regulatory body and related 
rules and regulations, including market rules for the power pool will be developed. 
Regulatory control would be exercised to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of all 
generators. 
                                                 
1 The detail of the plan is in Electricity Supply Industry Reform and Thailand Power Pool, by National 
Energy Policy Office (2000). Privatisation and liberalisation plans are provided by National Energy 
Policy Office (1999). 
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Figure A2.1 Stage I: Proposed future electricity supply industry structure in 
Thailand 
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A2.1.2 Stage II: Medium-term electricity supply industry structure (2001–02) 
EGAT will retain its state enterprise status and remain in its position as a central 
supplier of power in the form of a holding company. EGAT’s thermal generation 
business units will be corporatised into its subsidiaries, in the form of  PowerGen 1 
and PowerGen 2.2 Transmission and the system operation business units will also be 
separated.  
EGAT will still be the single buyer and act as the central agency for long-term 
planning and operation of the power system.  
EGAT will prepare the three systems required to function as the System Operator 
(SO), Market Operator (MO) and Settlement Administrator (SA) with these functions 
eventually being transferred to an entity independent of EGAT.  
Non-core service businesses of MEA will be corporatised as wholly owned 
subsidiaries with the MEA’s shareholding being gradually reduced. PEA will be 
reorganised into four network business units and 12 Regulated Electricity Delivery 
Companies (REDCOs). PEA’s non-core service businesses will be reorganised as 
business units within PEA. 
                                                 
2 See details of PowerGen 1 and PowerGen 2 in Section A2.3.1. 
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An independent regulatory body for the ESI will be established, along with a 
regulatory framework for determining charges for transmission and distribution line 
utilization and  an incentive regulatory regime. 
 
Figure A2.2 Stage II: Proposed future electricity supply industry structure in 
Thailand 
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A2.1.3 Stage III: Long-term electricity supply industry structure (from year 2003 
onwards) 
In the long run, a competitive wholesale power pool will be established with power 
trading taking place within this pool. Retail competition would be introduced initially 
for certain customers and gradually expanded to cover a broader group of consumers.  
Generation companies (GENCOs) would bid into the power pool as well as have 
individual bilateral contracts with major customers. Sale of EGAT’s shares in 
PowerGen 1 and PowerGen 2 will begin to increase the general public’s 
shareholding. The regulator will monitor transmission and distribution system 
activities to ensure access for third party operators to the national power system at 
reasonable costs. 
To implement the government’s energy policy, such as fuel diversity and 
maintenance of adequate competition among GENCOs, regulation of the power 
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generation sector may be required. This may necessitate a fuel preference in fuel 
licensing or a fuel allocation for pool purchase. 
An Independent System Operator (ISO) functions as an independent referee over the 
competitive generation process, responsible for the security of the power system. It is 
important that the ISO own no generation asset so that potential and perceived 
conflicts of interest are avoided. The ISO will be responsible for economic merit 
order dispatch and the development of the national power system plan. 
The REDCOs, the future form of the MEA and PEA, will be responsible for power 
distribution within their respective customer franchise areas. The independent 
regulator will regulate the criteria for distribution services and charges for delivery 
related services.  
For retail customers, competitive Retail Companies (RetailCos) will be an alternative 
for consumers. RetailCos may offer value-added services to customers together with 
their electricity delivery. 
At this stage, EGAT remains a state enterprise, responsible for the Grid Company 
and hydro power plants, with shares in some power generation companies and other 
related businesses. Competitive neutrality between state owned and private sector 
GENCOs will foster real competition in both bulk and retail supply of power. 
Private sector participation is to be promoted in both the power generation and 
retailing areas.  
In the first stage a power pool will be established as an independent entity, separate 
from EGAT. It will comprise of the SO, MO and SA. Intially EGAT may carry out 
all or part of the functions of the power pool but ultimately the SO, MO and SA will 
be transferred out of EGAT and the SO will become the ISO. 
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Figure A2.3 Stage III: Proposed future electricity supply industry structure in 
Thailand 
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A2.2 Future electricity supply industry and power pool 
A2.2.1 Electricity supply industry structure 
In a competitive market, a number of generators will participate in power trade 
bidding in the power pool. Each generator will commence actual operation when a 
dispatch instruction, according to the generation cost merit order, is received. The 
electricity, represented by MWh in the Figure A2.4, will be delivered via a high-
voltage transmission grid of grid company (GridCo). Then the voltage of the 
electricity will be transformed and transferred to a low-voltage distribution system of 
distribution companies (DisCos), which in turn will ultimately be delivered to the 
consumers. Consumers will pay retailers for electricity who themselves usually buy 
electricity from generators through a combination of contract and spot trading. 
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Figure A2.4 Functions in an electricity supply industry in a competitive 
market 
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According to the above functions, the entities that perform these functions are shown 
in Figure A2.5.  
GENCOs are competitive private generation entities.  
GridCo and Discos are responsible for high voltage transmission grid systems and 
low voltage distribution systems respectively. Both will belong to government and 
working under regulation.  
RetailCos are unregulated private entities and are competitive providers of electricity 
and various delivery-related services for general consumers. SupplyCos are regulated 
entities who supply electricity and provide related services to consumers who do not 
want or are not free to buy electricity from competitive RetailCos. The choice of 
SupplyCos and RetailCos allows power consumers under all categories to have 
access to these services. Traders will negotiate and trade contracts that were signed 
between EGAT and IPPs. 
An ISO will monitor and control the power system operation, the MO will administer 
the power pool, and the SA will manage the billing and settlements among market 
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participants. The ISO, MO and SA will have to work closely with and be 
independent from other entities participating in the power pool. 
 
Figure A2.5 Functional entities in an electricity supply industry 
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Given the basic functions and various functional entities above, the recommended 
future ESI structure is shown in Figure A2.6. 
The functions of DisCos and SupplyCos are combined in REDCOs which will be 
regulated by the regulator. A REDCO will provide electricity to consumers at spot 
price plus delivery-related costs, which will be regulated by the regulator. 
Competitive RetailCos can also offer consumers the value-added services such as 
electricity tariff risk management (hedging) and energy conservation services. 
In the power pool the ISO, MO and SA functions are combined.  
The ISO will be responsible for the economic merit order dispatch to generators, 
with close coordination with the MO and operational control of the GridCo.  
The SA, responsible for the billing and settlements among market participants, may 
eventually be part of the power pool or be split off as a separate entity.  
The GridCo owns, operates and carries out maintenance work on the grid facilities 
under a contract made with the ISO, and must not have any affiliation with any 
competitive entities.  
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The GENCOs and RetailCos will operate in the competitive environment. Traders 
are entities that buy or sell energy without owning generation facilities. They act as 
mediators between power producers, consumers and retailers, or as administrators of 
the existing PPAs signed between EGAT and IPPs. In the power pool those PPAs 
will be treated as individual power plants. 
 
Figure A2.6 Recommended future ESI structure 
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A2.2.2 Power pool 
As recommended by the consultancy team, the appropriate power pool design for 
Thailand is a “Voluntary Net Pool” with mandatory rules and regulations governing 
the pool operations. Market rules are fixed and cover the submission of price bids, 
the provision of information on generation plans, responses to dispatch orders of the 
ISO and payments for service charges. These market rules still allow market 
participants to determine their own generation plans and commercial transactions as 
well as carrying out trading both inside and outside the power pool. 
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The two important functions of the power pool are to be the centre of the power trade 
between generators and retailers and to be the driving mechanism of the power 
systems management. In the power pool, the market operation will be in the form of 
both forward market and real time operation, which will in turn be on either an 
hourly or half-hourly basis. Power business operators can carry out their trades either 
in the power pool or outside the pool by bilateral contracts. 
A2.3 State owned enterprise reform 
To achieve the long-term goal of a competitive ESI structure and commencement of 
the power pool by the year 2003, internal restructuring of the three state owned 
power utilities is required.  The transition process for each SOE is as follows. 
A2.3.1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand reform 
According to the ESI reform plan, EGAT will start reorganising its existing activities 
into business units in 2000.  
Engineering, construction and maintenance activities are to be distributed to the 
various business units.  
The generation business, in the form of the thermal power plants, will be separated 
and corporatised into two companies called PowerGen.  
PowerGen 1 consists of North Bangkok, Bang Pakong, Surat Thani, Nam Phong, 
Wang Noi and Sai Noi power plants. The total generating capacity of PowerGen 1 is 
5,999 MW.  
PowerGen 2 consists of South Bangkok, Mae Moh, Nong Chok, Krabi and Lan 
Krabue power plants with a total generating capacity of 4,600 MW. Mae Moh mine 
will be grouped with PowerGen 2.  
Ratchaburi power plant is to be privatised and its EGAT’s shareholding will be less 
than 50 per cent.  
The hydropower plants, in which the total capacity is 3,384 MW, will also be 
separated as business unit. The grid system and system operator will be separated to 
be business units in order to prepare for third party access to the grid system. 
Discussions and management of the existing PPAs will also commence. 
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Figure A2.7 Structure of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand in 
2000–01 
EGAT (State Enterprise) 
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In 2002, the Independent Regulatory Body is planned to be established. PowerGen 1 
and PowerGen 2 is planned to be corporatised as EGAT’s wholly owned 
subsidiaries. EGAT will reorganise various activities into business units such as 
DebtCo, GridCo and the Hydropower and Energy Management Agency, which is a 
combination of the current Demand Side Management Office and Research and 
Development Office, to prepare for power pool commencement. SO, MO and SA is 
planned to be established as business units while at this stage EGAT retains state 
enterprise status. 
In 2003, the power pool will operate. The GridCo, hydro business and Energy 
Management Agency will remain as business units in EGAT. EGAT will dilute its 
shareholding in PowerGen 1 and PowerGen 2 as well as the Ratchaburi power plant 
and EGCO. EGAT will act as the SO, MO and SA, with these functions ultimately 
being separated from GridCo of EGAT. The PPA traders will be set up as wholly 
owned subsidiaries of EGAT to independently trade in the power pool. 
Beyond 2003 the corporatisation of the hydro business and GridCo into subsidiaries 
with 100 per cent of EGAT’s shareholding will be considered. At this stage EGAT 
will further reduce its shareholding in its GENCOs until EGAT can completely 
divest itself from these entities. 
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Figure A2.8 Structure of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand in 2002 
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Figure A2.9 Structure of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand in 2003 
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Figure A2.10 Structure of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand post 
2003 
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A2.3.2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority reform 
In 2000 and 2001 the MEA will remain a single entity, but there will be accounting 
separation between the distribution and supply businesses. Non-core service 
businesses (NSBs) will be divided into four business units which are the electrical 
system service department; the product design and manufacturing office; the 
information technology department and the power system maintenance department. 
 
Figure A2.11 Restructuring of Metropolitan Electricity Authority in 2000–01 
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In 2002 and 2003, the electrical system service department and the product design 
and manufacturing office will be corporatised and eventually privatized. The MEA 
will hold part of shares in the power system maintenance and the information 
technology department.  
 
Figure A2.12 Restructuring of Metropolitan Electricity Authority in 2002–03 
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In 2003, the distribution and supply activities of REDCOs will be operationally 
separated.3 However, if the results of evaluation of operating efficiency of MEA 
reach the performance targets, MEA will not be split. The all of four business units 
will be corporatised and the structure of MEA will be reviewed. 
 
                                                 
3 The consultancy team recommended that the distribution and supply business of MEA should be 
disaggregated, at the minimum, into three REDCOs.  
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Figure A2.13 Structure of Metropolitan Electricity Authority post 2003 
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A2.3.3 Provincial Electricity Authority reform 
From 2000–02, internal organisation of the PEA will be undertaken. The distribution 
business of 22 kV and above will be reorganised into four business units whereas the 
low voltage wire business (below 22 kV) and supply business will be reorganised 
into 12 REDCOs with NSBs reorganised into business units. 
 
Figure A2.14 Structure of Provincial Electricity Authority in 2000–02 
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After 2003, all REDCOs and NSBs will be corporatised and eventually privatized. If 
the overall performance improvement cannot reach the targets, corporatisation of all 
network business units will be considered. 
 
Figure A2.15 Structure of Provincial Electricity Authority after 2003 
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APPENDIX 3: 
NEW ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ARRANGEMENT 
 
In 2002 Energy Policy and Planning Office proposed the new electricity supply 
industry model under New Electricity Supply Arrangement (NESA) which is based 
on the New Electricity Trading Agreements of the UK.1 The details below are 
summarised from the seminar held on 23 December 2002.  
A3.1 Restructuring and privatisation of electricity supply industry 
Under NESA, the generators will make contracts with retailing companies and 
industrial users. The generators are free to arrange their own operation and self 
dispatch. These contracts can be traded in the power exchange. The transmission and 
distribution systems will be opened equally and without discrimination to all of the 
generators to pass electricity on to their customers. The retailing companies can also 
compete freely.  
The residual imbalances of power which may arise because of a failure or 
unwillingness of parties to self-balance and fulfil the contracts will be managed by a 
balancing mechanism, which is controlled by System Operator (SO) to ensure the 
system stability. Under the balancing mechanism, the SO will accept offers to 
increase or decrease generation or demand to solve these imbalances.  
While the submission of these offers and bids will be voluntary, the parties who 
create imbalance and cannot fulfil the contracts will be penalised by the SO.  
To counter this power exchange will be set up to hedge the risk. 
EGAT’s thermal generation business units will also be separated and corporatised 
into three companies, namely PG1, PG2 and PG3.  
The hydro business may be a part of the grid company, however if the generation 
activity can be totally separated from the grid system activity the transmission 
company can be set up by combining the SO and the grid company. If this proves 
unachievable the SO should be set up separately as the independent system operator 
(ISO), with EGAT then diluting its shareholding in PG1, PG2 and PG3 from 2004 
                                                 
1 This appendix is summarised from Energy Policy and Planning Office (2002). 
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onward while retaining the hydro business and grid system as a state owned 
enterprise (SOE). 
In MEA and PEA, there will be accounting separation between distribution and 
supply and retailing business.  
MEA will be restructured internally by separating various activities into business 
units.  
 
Figure A3.1 The electricity supply industry under the New Electricity Supply 
Arrangement 
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PEA will be reorganised by disaggregating distribution and retailing business into 
four regional business units.  
MEA and PEA public share offering will start approximately mid and third quarter 
2004 respectively. 
An independent regulator is proposed to be established to be in charge of both the 
electricity and natural gas industry.  
The new ESI under NESA is shown in Figure A3.1. 
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A3.2 State owned enterprise reform 
A3.2.1 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand reform 
To ensure fair competition, the grid system will be separated from the generation 
business and eventually corporatised and privatized.  
The thermal generation business will be separated into three groups, namely PG1, 
PG2 and PG3. Each group will be allowed to increase generating capacity and 
repower old power plants, with corporatisation and privatisation the ultimate aim. 
EGAT will reduce its shareholding in EGCO and RATCH in 2003. 
In the initial stage, where the generating activity and grid system will not be 
separated, the ISO will be temporalily separated and managed by the independent 
committee. When they are separated, ISO and grid system can combine as one 
transmission company. 
A3.2.2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority reform 
With accounting and financial separation among distribution business, supply 
business and NSBs. MEA will be corporatised and listed in the Stock Exchange 
Market of Thailand in the second quarter of 2004. Planned internal reorganisations in 
NSBs are also likely to lead to staff reductions. Finally MEA will be dissolved  
 
Figure A3.2 Metropolitan Electricity Authority structure in 2003–04 
 
 
MEA Public Company Limited (State Enterprise) 
Governor
NSBs 
Supply
(SupplyCo)
Distribution 
(DisCo) 
 
 367
A3.2.3 Provincial Electricity Authority reform 
The distribution and supply businesses will be reorganised into four business units, 
reflecting the four regions which are the North, Centre, Northeast and South of 
Thailand. NSBs will also be reorganised into business units.  
PEA’s public share offering will commence toward the end of 2004. 
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APPENDIX 4: 
MULTIPLE BUYERS/MULTIPLE SELLERS MODEL- 
PARTIAL LIBERALISATION 
 
In 2002 EGAT proposed the new ESI, called Multiple Buyers/Multiple Sellers 
Model – Partial Liberalisation, which is based on the Grid Access Model or the Third 
Party Access Model.  
A4.1 Restructuring and privatisation of electricity supply industry 
The electricity market will be partially opened up to allow the large industrial users 
to purchase power directly from the generators. The market will be partially 
liberalised in 2004 to allow the generators, including EGAT and private generators, 
to compete only in the large industrial user segment. The proportion of the liberalised 
market will not exceed 30 per cent of the total electricity demand.  
The trading system between the generators and the large industrial users are in the 
form of bilateral contracts with the power imbalance from the bilateral contracts 
being traded in the power exchange. In the distribution sector, MEA and PEA can 
compete to supply electricity to the large industrial user market via bilateral 
contracts. 
The rest of the market, accounting for at least 70 per cent, including residential, 
business and small industrial consumers, will be served directly from EGAT, MEA 
and PEA in the current single buyer structure. The tariff structure will not 
significantly change from the current one. 
EGAT’s generation business will not be separated. EGAT will manage the grid 
system and be the system operator. The current IPPs and SPPs will sell electricity 
directly to EGAT, however EGAT will allow the private producers which have no 
PPA or related agreements to use the grid and distribution system by paying the 
wheeling charge to EGAT, MEA and PEA.  
The regulator will be set up under state control, which may be the Ministry of 
Energy, and will regulate the wheeling charge for the other participants in the 
market. 
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Figure A4.1 Multiple buyers/Multiple sellers model – Partial liberalisation 
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A4.2 State owned enterprise reform 
EGAT will stay intact and its generation and noncore business will not be separated. 
EGAT will operate the grid system and function as the system operator, however 
there will be accounting unbundling among the various business units in EGAT.  
Finally, EGAT will be privatised with no less than 70 per cent of shares being held 
by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Figure A4.2 Structure of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
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APPENDIX 5: 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY MODELS  
PROPOSED BY THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP 
 
The Boston Consulting Group, hired by the Ministry of Energy in 2003, proposed the 
following five ESI models.1
A5.1 Full competition model 
Figure A5.1 Full competition model 
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The key characteristics of the full competition model are: 
• full ownership unbundling of EGAT’s transmission and generation businesses; 
• EGAT will retain the hydro generation business, and the remaining generating 
assets will be broken into Gencos; 
                                                 
1 The details of the five models are taken from ‘Strategies for the Development of Thailand’s Energy 
Sector and the Power Sector Efficiency Improvement Program’ published by Boston Consulting 
Group (2003) 
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• a competitive wholesale power pool is to be created. Gencos can bid in the pool, 
and purchases can also be made through bilateral contracts; 
• an independent system operator is set up and responsible for economic merit 
order dispatch, as well as system security and financial settlements for bulk 
power purchases; 
• EGAT will retain transmission business activities with regulated tariffs, third 
party access to the grid is allowed, transmission operator is responsible for 
network operations and maintenance, and transmission is regulated via the grid 
code and transmission license; 
• MEA and PEA will operate their networks with regulated tariffs and are regulated 
via the grid code and distribution license with third party access to network 
allowed; 
• retail opening is allowed,  with regulated price access to network; 
• end users are free to choose the retailers, and end user tariffs may be capped by 
the regulator; and 
• a regulator is in place to enforce the grid code and generation, transmission, 
distribution obligations, with the regulator coordinating and accountable for long 
term system adequacy planning. 
A5.2 Competitive bilateral contract model 
The key characteristics of the competitive bilateral contract model are: 
• legal unbundling of EGAT’s transmission and generation businesses; 
• EGAT retaining generation business, third party access to grid allowing new 
plants to be set up, and contracts for volume and price negotiated with retailers or 
large end users; 
• EGAT to retain transmission business with regulated tariffs, third party access to 
grid allowed with, transmission operator is responsible for network operations 
and maintenance, and transmission is regulated via the grid code and transmission 
license; 
• system operator is ring fenced within EGAT, with responsibility for dispatch 
planning based on negotiated contracts, dispatch, real time balancing and network 
operation planning, as well as determining the balancing pool prices; 
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• MEA and PEA will operate their networks with regulated tariffs and are regulated 
via the grid code and distribution license, with third party access to network 
allowed; 
• Retail opening is allowed, with regulated price access to network; 
• end users are free to choose the retailers, and end user tariffs will be capped by 
the regulator; and 
• a regulator is in place to enforce the grid code and generation, transmission, 
distribution obligations, with the regulator coordinating and accountable for long 
term system adequacy planning. 
 
Figure A5.2 Competitive bilateral contract model 
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A5.3 Partial competition model 
Figure A5.3 Partial competition model 
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The key characteristics of the partial competition model are: 
• account unbundling of EGAT’s transmission and generation businesses; 
• EGAT retaining generation business, along with competitive bidding being 
adopted for future generation plant-up, and the lowest price being awarded the 
power purchase agreement by the regulator; 
• EGAT retaining transmission business with regulated tariffs, with limited third 
party access to grid is allowed for large customers, which account for 30 per cent 
of demand, and transmission is regulated via the grid code and transmission 
license; 
• system operator is ring fenced within EGAT, and retains responsibility for 
dispatch planning, dispatch, real time balancing and network operation planning; 
• MEA and PEA will operate their networks with regulated tariffs and are regulated 
via the grid code and distribution license;  
• end users tariffs will continue to be regulated for 70 per cent of demand, and 
large customers allowed to directly select suppliers and negotiate price; and 
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• a regulator is in place to enforce the grid code and generation, transmission, 
distribution obligations, with the regulator coordinating and accountable for long 
term system adequacy planning. 
 
A5.4 Enhanced single buyer model 
Figure A5.4 Enhanced single buyer model 
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The key characteristics of the enhanced single buyer model are: 
• account unbundling of EGAT’s transmission and generation businesses; 
• EGAT retaining generation business, and new capacity being allocated through a 
process determined by the regulator; 
• EGAT retaining transmission business with regulated tariffs, with transmission 
regulated via the grid code and transmission licenses; 
• system operator is ring fenced within EGAT, with responsibility for dispatch 
planning, dispatch, real time balancing and network operation planning; 
• single buyer will be transparent within transmission business and will be 
responsible for contracting capacity and accountable for long term system 
planning; 
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• MEA and PEA will operate their networks with regulated tariffs and are regulated 
via the grid code and distribution license; 
• end users tariffs will continue to be regulated by the regulator; and 
• regulator is set up to enforce the grid code and generation, transmission and 
distribution licenses as well as awarding new power purchase agreements and 
coordinating for long term system adequacy planning. 
A5.5 Super national champion model 
Figure A5.5 Super national champion model 
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The key characteristics of the super national champion model are: 
• integration of EGAT, MEA and PEA into a holding company, with legal an 
account unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution; 
• competitive bidding for future generation plant-ups will be adopted, and the 
lowest bids will be awarded power purchase agreements; 
• EGAT transmission is responsible for transmission with regulated tariffs, qirh 
transmission regulated via the grid code and transmission license. Transmission 
operator retains obligation for dispatch planning, dispatch, real time balancing 
and network operations planning with third party access prohibited; 
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• single buyer will be transparent within transmission business and will be 
responsible for contracting capacity and accountable for long term system 
planning; 
• MEA and PEA will operate their networks with regulated tariffs and are regulated 
via the grid code and distribution license, with third party access is prohibited; 
• end user tariffs will continue to be regulated, and large customer contestability 
reviewed in the future; and 
• regulator is set up to enforce the grid code and generation, transmission and 
distribution licenses as well as awarding new power purchase agreements and 
coordinating for long term system adequacy planning. 
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APPENDIX 6: 
THERMAL POWER PLANTS OF                                         
ELECTRICITY GENERATING AUTHORITY OF THAILAND 
 
In essence, thermal power plants convert the heat from fuel combustion into 
mechanical energy and then electricity. Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) has several types of thermal power plants as follows.1
A6.1 Conventional thermal power plant 
In a conventional thermal or steam turbine system, fuel is burned in the boiler 
furnace to heat water into hot steam. This superheated, high pressure steam is then 
piped through to rotate the steam turbine at fixed revolution speed, thus spinning the 
generator which is connected directly with the turbine shaft. Electricity is thus 
generated and readied for further transmission. After driving the turbine, the exhaust 
steam from the low pressure turbine is passed into the condenser where it is cooled 
for reuse in the boiler.  
Conventional thermal power plants are widely employed because their service life is 
long, up to 25 years and they can burn various kinds of fuel, such as natural gas, oil 
and lignite. These types of power plants usually operate as the base load plant 
because it is time-consuming for them to start up. 
A6.2 Gas turbine power plant 
A gas turbine operates in the same manner as the jet motor of an aeroplane. Ambient 
air is channelled into the compressor and subsequently heated in the combustion 
chamber. Fuel is then sprayed to be mixed in with the compressed air. The gas 
mixture then ignites, causing the hot combustion gas to increase sharply in volume 
which then exerts pressure against turbine blades. This drives both the compressor 
and the generator and producing an electricity supply. 
The gas turbine power plant can burn either diesel oil or natural gas. Compared with 
a conventional thermal plant, the gas turbine takes less time from start up to attain 
full capacity. Due to its higher cost of fuel however, gas turbines are operated for a 
shorter period of time to provide peaking or reserve capacity. Installation of gas 
 378
turbines can be completed within a short time and can be easily moved elsewhere. 
They can also be developed further for a combined cycle operation at a later date.. 
Their service life is around 15 years. 
A6.3 Combined cycle power plant 
A combined cycle power plant incorporates the technologies of gas turbine and 
steam turbine systems. The high temperature exhaust gas from gas turbine generators 
is not wasted through immediate release into the atmosphere but will be transferred 
to the heat recovery steam generators. This heats the water in the boilers into steam. 
This superheated steam will pass into the steam turbine generator to drive the steam 
turbine and produce electricity.  
The combined cycle power plant can reduce fuel costs by using waste heat from the 
gas turbines to produce more electricity without using additional fuel. Generally the 
combined cycle power plants serve as medium to base load plants, with a service life 
of approximately 20 years. 
A6.4 Diesel power plant 
In a diesel engine system, ambient air is drawn into cylinders and compressed by 
pistons. Fuel is sprayed in to mix with the heated air, causing ignition in the gas 
mixture. The hot combustion gas then increases sharply in volume and pressure, 
pushing the pistons downward immediately. The crank shafts of the pistons then 
move and rotate the connected generators to produce electricity.  
In practice diesel power plants are of small size, not more than 5 MW in capacity. 
They can be easily moved for rapid installation elsewhere and the operation can be 
quickly started up, making them suitable for peak load and reserve capacity. Their 
service life is around 20 years.  
As shown in Table A6.1, the gas turbine and diesel power plants are less costly in 
terms of initial investment but their production costs are approximately double those 
of conventional thermal and combined cycle power plants.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
1 The content of this section is summarised from Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (2003). 
 379
Table A6.1 Types of power plants of Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand 
Types of power plants Size (MW) Fuel Initial investment (baht/kW) 
Production Cost 
(baht/kWh) 
 
Conventional thermal 
power plant 
150-300 
400 and 
more 
Lignite 
Natural Gas 
Fuel Oil 
25,200-29,200 
9,300-15,900 
9,300-15,900 
1.117 
1.128 
1.247 
Gas turbine power plant 15-25 Diesel Oil 5,300-10,600 3.305 
Combined cycle power 
plant 360 Natural Gas 8,430-13,250 1.107 
Diesel power plant 2.5 Diesel Oil 5,300-6.630 4.717 
Note: Production cost and initial investment does not include the administrative expenditures 
and transmission costs. 
Source: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
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